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Preparation of the Final Corrective Action Plan for the
NPOSR-CUW Tiger Team Assess.ent
James Randolph
Assistant secretary for Fossil Energy
Attached is the Final Report for the NPOSR-CUW Tiger Tea.
Assessment and the EH-l summary to . . on .ajor probl . . areas.
Please prepare a final corrective action plan addressing the
findings, concerns, and root caUses in the report. The plan
shall be forwarded to me after receiving the concurrence of the
Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health by no
later than twelve weeks from sumbission of the draft action
plan to EH-l, whereUpon I will authorize you to implement the
response actions.
The final corrective action plan will include a strategy for
meeting with the regulators to review and address areas of
noncompliance. The final corrective action plan shall also
include the planned or current corrective action proposed or
underway, the schedule for impl.mentation and completion of
each corrective action, and resource budgetary requirements.
You should highlight those corrective actions that are not
currently accounted for in the Five-Year Plan. If you are
unable to determine an appropriate response action for a
particular finding or coricern, clear1y indicate the reasons •
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This report documents the Tiger Team Assessment of the Naval Petroleum and Oil
Shale Reserves in Colorado , Utah , and Wyoming (NPOSR-CUW). NPOSR-CUW consists
of Naval Petroleum Reserve Number 3 (NPR-3) located near Casper, Wyomi ng;
Nava 1 Oil Shale Reserve Number 1 (NOSR-l) and Naval Oil Shale Reserve Number 3
(NOSR-3) located near Rifle, Colorado ; and Naval Oil Shale Reserve Number 2
(NOSR-2) located near Vernal, Utah, which was not examined as part of this
assessment .
The U.S . Oepartment of Energy's (~OE's) Office of Fossil Energy (FE) i s the
program organization responsible for NPOSR-CUW, and the responsible Field
Office is the DOE/NPOSR-CUW Office. John Brown Engineers & Constructors Inc . ,
(JBEC) is the operating contractor at NPOSR-CUW. The Tiger Team Assessment
was conducted from June 15 to July 20, 1992, under the auspices of DOE's
Offi ce of Special Projects (OSP) under the Assistant Secretary for
En';ironment, Safety and Health (EH-l).
The assessment was comprehensive, encompassing environment, safety, and health
(ES&H) and quality assurance (QA) disciplines; site remediation; facili t ies
management ; and waste management operations . Compliance with applicable
Federal , state, and local regulations; applicable DOE Orders; best management
practices ; and internal NPOSR-CUW requirements was assessed . In add ition, an
evaluation of the adequacy and effectiveness of FE, DOE/NPOSR-CUW, and JBEC
management of the ES&H/GA programs was conducted.

This page intentionally left blank .

The content of this report has been reviewed for factual accuracy by DOE
Headquarters program secretarial officers including ones from FE, the Office
of Environment, Safety and Health, and the Office of General Counsel;
DOE/NPOSR-CUW ; and JBEC management and personnel . The report has also been
reviewed by Federal, state, and local regulators.
The NPOSR-CUW Ti ger Team Assessment is part of a larger, comprehensive DOE
Tiger Team Independent Asses sment Program planned for DOE facilities. The
assessment program is part of a 10-point initiative announced by the Secretary
of Energy , Admiral James O. Watkins, USN (Ret.) , on June 27, 1989, to conduct
independent compl iance oversight and management assessments of ES&H/QA
programs and waste management operations at DOE facil ities. The objective of
the initiative is t o provide the Secretary with information on the compliance
status of DOE facll iti es with regard to ES&H requirements, root causes for
noncomp liance, adequacy of DOE and contractor ES&H management programs,
response actions to address the identified problem areas, and DOE -wide ES&H
compliance trends and roo causes .
July 1992
Washington, DC
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1'iS

Support functions do not provide sufficient assistance to the
operations and maintenance organizations;

EXECUTiVE SUMMARY
This report presents the results of the u.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Tiger
Tea.. Assessment of the Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves in Colorado,
Utah, and Wyoming (NPOSR-CUW). The Tiger Team Assessments are intended to
provide the Department with information on the comp1 iance status of the
facil ities with regard to ES&H requirements, adequacy of the contractor and
DOE lIIanagement of ES&H programs, the root causes of any problems, and actions
needed to address identified problem areas.
The NPOSR-CUW consists of three major sites . The Naval Petroleum Res~rve
Number 3 (NPR-3) is located about 35 miles north of Casper, Wyoming. The
NPR-3 is a Federally-owned oil field consisting of 9,481 acres currently
operated for the production and sale of oil and associated gas liquids. The
second site consists of the 40,760-acre Naval Oil Shale Reserve Number I
(NOSR-I) and the contiguous 14,130-acre Naval Oil Shale Reserve Number 3
(NOSR-3), which are located five miles northwest of Rifle, Colorado.
Experimental oil shale mining and retorting was conducted on NOSR-I and NOSR-3
from the 1920s through the early 1980s. There are natural gas resources on
the NOSR-I and NOSR-3, and gas is produced from 17 wells to protect against
the loss of the gas resource from drainage by adjacent privately-owned wells.
Tbe third site is the Naval Oil Shale Reserve Number 2 (NOSR-2), a 90,000
acre-site located in Utah about 50 miles southwest of Vernal, Utah. There is
curr·e nt1y no activity at NOSR-2.
Management of the sites is under the direction of the DOE Assistant Secretary
for Fossil Energy (FE-I). local oversight and direction is provided by a DOE
office located in Casper, Wyoming. John Brown Engineers and Constructors Inc.
(JBEC) operates the facil ities under contract to the DOE. The main office of
the operating contractor is also located in Casper, Wyoming. The operating
contract with JBEC will expire on September 30, 1992, and a new contractor,
Fluor Daniel Services, Inc., has been selected to replace the eXisting
contractor .
The Tiger Team, which was comprised of about 35 professionals from DOE,
contractors, and consultants, conduc t ed the assessment from June IS , 1992
through July 20, 1992 . Teams visited NPR-3, NOSR-I, and NOSR-3 and reviewed
the programs and practices of both DOE and the operating contractor.

Waste management practices and environmental AIOnitoring do not
comply with all DOE and regulatory requirements; and
Certain facilities and equipment are not operated in a safe and
reliable .anner .
Root Cause
The consolidation of the concerns, findings, and causal factors results in a
single integrated root cause:
"The continuing emphasis on program lIIission orientation has inhibited
DOE and the operating contractor from estab1 i shing a fully effective
environment, safety, and health program and from achieVing DOE's overall
goal of ES&H excellence."
This root cause is allowed to exist largely due to the organizational belief
by FE and NPOSR that their operations are "unique" within DOE, and a
perception that DOE direction and ES&H initiatives form "legalistic"
requirements that often do not apply to operations at NPOSR-CUW. In addition,
the NPOSR-CUW operation is perceived as profit and production-based with their
ES&H program relating more closely to that which would be found in the
commercial sector rather than to the DOE emphasis of a commitment to
excellence characterized by the vigorous pursuit of fUllnality and discipline,
and sufficient funding, staffing, and training.
EnVironment
There were 62 findings identified in the environmental area, none of which
presents either an immediate risk to pub1 ic health or to the environment, or
which warrants an immediate cessation of operations. Taken together, however,
they represent a seriously deficient environmental protection pr~gram at the
NPOSR-CUW. Fifty-nine of these findings reflect noncompliance WIth
requirements of Federal, state, or local laws and regulations; DOE Orders or
directives; or the operating contractor directives and procedures. This is a
significantly higher percentage than normally found at DOE facilities. The
key findings are as follows:

Swan of Results
The primary results of the assessment of the NPOSR-CUW enVironmental, safety,
and health programs can be summarized as follows:
The DOE does not provide adequate direction and oversight of the
operating contractor's programs;
There is a lack of formal ES&H pngram plans, and, therefore,
consistent and complete implementation of programs is lacking;

NPOSR-CUW lacks a formal ized environmental management program with
poliCies, plans, procedures, and training sufficient to ensure
compliance with all environmental laws, regulations, and DOE
Orders;
Envi ronmenta 1 qual i ty assurance programs have not been implemented
by NPOSR-CUW;
Many of the environmental monitoring and protection programs at
NPOSR-CUW have fundamental deficiencies; and

There is insufficient ES&H expertise and training at both the
operat ing contractor and DOE;

ES-I
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NPOSR-CUII has not developed a waste management program that
defines roles and responsibil ities, procedures, and training and
qual ifi cat ions .

Safety Iud Health
There is a heightened awareness of safety throughout the NPOSR-CUII site, and
IlUch illlprovl!IIent in the safety and health program is evident over the last 6
to 12 IIOnths. However, the operating contractor has s~jll not fully
connunicated its expectations for safety improvement and has not provided
sufficient leadership, resources, and training to assist the employees in
achieving an excellent safety program. The operating contractor and DOE
lIanagement have not developed the necessary tools, such as safety and health
(S&H) plans, goals, performance standards, and a quality assurance program.
DOE Orders and requirements have not been effectively transmitted to the
operating contractor. DOE has not provided sufficient oversight of the
operating contractor's safety and health programs and associated activities .
These deficiencies have resulted in the failure to develop an S&H program
appropriate for the site's risks .
There were 110 concerns identified in the safety and health program. There
were no concerns which identified hazards that required il1l1lediate shutdown of
any facilities or operations. There were, however, 11 concerns that represent
a significant risk to people or property or substantial noncompl iance with DOE
Orders and which will require il1ll1ediate attention.
The four key concerns developed are the following:
The DOE Site Office has not provided the guidance, support, and
oversight to the operating contractor necessary for the
implementation of effective safety and health related programs;

production and profitability. There are a number of deficiencies in the
management approach of both the DOE and the operating contractor. These are
reflected in the following key findings:
DOE (FE/NPOSR/NPOSR-CUII) and the operating contractor have not
developed an effective, self-initiated, strategic or operational
planning process to ensure that proposed courses of action to
implement a comprehensive ES&H program can realistically be
accompl ished -and integrated with operating objectives;
DOE (FE/NPOSR/NPOSR-CUII) and the operating contractor have not
implemented an effective environment, safety, and health training
program; and
DOE (FE/NPOSR/NPOSR-CUII) and the operating contractor ES&H
oversight activities have been inadequate to ensure the
development and effective implementation of good ES&H programs.
Self-Assessment Program

FE has made Significant progress in their self-assessment program. This
includes development of a self-assessment approach that flows through the
entire line organization, from FE-l to the operating contractor. Although FE
has taken an aggressive approach to their self-assessment program, program
elements have not been developed and instituted in a timely fashion. Field
organizations and the operating contractor have not received timely guidance
and direction for the development and conduct of self-assessment activities .
Self-asses:ments that have been done by the site do not yet provide a
sufficient level of detail. While progress has been made, much remains to be
done to ensure that an institutionalized, comprehensive self-assessment
program is fully implemented throughout the FE organization.

The operating contractor's management has not organized and
coordinated its operational and technical support functions for
the development and implementation of safety and health plans,
programs, and requi rements;
The operating contractor has not properly identified, evaluated,
controlled and corrected lIany safety and health hazards in the
work place; and
The operating contractor does not ensure that operations,
maintenance, and technical staff have the necessary safety,
health, and qualification training required by DOE Orders.
IkniQ!!lll!nt
The primary lIission of the NPOSR-CUII has been to produce oil froll the NPR-3 in
accordance with legislation enacted in 1916, which directed production at the
U Xi llUIl efficient rate. Economic production is still the prillary driving
force i n operation of the site today. The DOE and its operating contractor
r ecogn i ze the importance of enhanced safety and environllental progralls and are
ukl ng iI s i ncere effort to ll11prove their ES&H progralls. However, ES&H
progrilils ilre still not perceived as a no IIIOre than equal in status with
ES -3
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INTRO!!!!CTION

On June 27, 1989, Secretary of Energy. Admiral James D. Watkins, USN
(Retired), announced a 10-point initiative to strengthen environment. safety.
and health (ES&H) programs and waste management operations in . the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE). One of the initiatives involved conducting
i ndependent Tiger Team Assessments at DOE operating facil ities. The DOE
Office of Special Projects (OSP) in the DOE Office of Environment. Safety and
Health (EH) has the responsibil ity to conduct Tiger Team Assessments for the
Secretary of Energy . This report presents the assessment of the buildings,
hci1 ities, and activities at the Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves in
Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming (NPOSR-CUW) . NPOSR-CUW consists of Naval
Petroleum Reserve Number 3 (NPR-3) near Casper. Wyoming; Naval Oil Shale
Reserve Number 1 (NOSR-I) and Naval Oil Shale Reserve Number 3 (NOSR-3) near
Rifle, Colorado; and Naval Oil Shale Reserve Number 2 (NOSR-2) near' Vernal,
Utah. NPR-3, NOSR-I, and NOSR-3 were examined as part of the assessment . As
there has never been any significant activity at NOSR-2 , it was not examined
as part of the assessment . NPOSR-CUW is the thirty -fifth DOE site to be
reviewed by a Tiger Team.

1.0

INTRODUCTION

NPOSR-CUW are large oil .. gas, and oil shale reserves which have been used as
an instrument of strategic i nsurance, national security policy, and sources of
revenue. DOE's Office of Fossil Energy (FE) is the program organization
responsible for NPOSR-CUW, and the responsible Field Office is the
DOE/NPOSR-CUW office. John Brown Engineers l Constructors Inc. (JBEC) is the
operat i ng Contractors for NPOSR-CUW .
1.1

PURPOSE

The purpose of the NPOSR-CUW Tiger Team Assessment is to provide the Secretary
of Energy with concise information on the following :
current ESlH compliance status at the site and the vulnerabilities
associated wi th that compliance status,
root causes for noncompliance,
adequacy of DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC ES&H management programs , and
adequacy of response actions needed to address identified problem
areas .
Th i s i nformation wi ll ass i st DOE i n determining patterns and trends in ES&H
comp1 iance and probable root causes , and will prov i de guidance for management
to take needed corrective actions.

,) j

1.2

SCOPE

The scope of the NPOSR-CUW Tiger Team Assessment is comprehensive and includes
an evaluation of applicable site management systems. facilities. and
operations in the context of ESlH. The ESlH areas reviewed included. but were
not 1 imitec:l to the following:
compliance with ~pplicable Federal. state. and local regulations.
requirements. permits. agreements. and enforcement actions;
comp 1 i ance wi th OOE ES&H Orders;
compliance "!lith the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) rpg~l at ions and standards;
adequac.y of DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC ES&H management programs.
inc144ing policy and procedures. internal oversight. planning and
budgetin~. organization. resources. training. and qual ity
assurance;
conformance with applicable "best" or "accepted industry
pr_ctices";
identification of root causes;
identification of noteworthy practices; and
adequacy of th~ $elf-,ssessment process to identify. track. and
resolve significant ESlH issues.
1. 3

APPfI(lAI:H

The Tiger Team AsseSSl!leflt at I!POSR-CUW was conducted in accordance with the
Tlger Teall Gui@Dce Mtn~il (Fe~ru~ry 1~90). the "Performance Objectives and
Criteria for Technlca · ~fqty Appr_inls at OOE Facilities and Sites" (June
1990). and genenll,y accepteil techniques. A team of specialists from various
DOE offices and support ~Qntr_ctors cgnducted the assessment. The Tiger Team
was ..anaged by a senior QO~ officiil. ,nd three experienced Subteam leaders.
one for each of th, three di$ciplines of Environment. Safety and Health. and
Management. TUII IIItJllber~. with their Jreas of responsibil ity and work-related
experience. are id~ntifie~ in ApPQndix A.
The Tlger Team Assessment reviewed all major production and support facilities
and operations at "PR-~. NQSR-l. and NOSR-3 . Major Production facilities and
operations examined i"cl~(je. but were not limited to. the low Temperature
Separation (llS) Gas Plant. Steam Generat or Units. and drilling operations.
The pr incipal support facilities include product transfer and transport
systeills. road systems. fresh water and wastewater treatment and disposal
systeills. sewage systems. and fire wat,r syst,lIs.
The Environmental Sllbte~ Perfonll8d i~s asseUNnt consistent with the
Environmental Aydit Manyv (January 1990). This document was used as a tool
in preparing for the aH'HJI!I!nt an~ ~i$ SURPllllll!IIted with current regulations.
regulatory guidance docull!llnts. and references applicable to identifying best

management practices. The objective was to assess the site's current
environmental compl iance status with regard to Federal state and local
reg~lations ; DOE Orders; agreements; and applicable pe~its . 'The
environmental assessment examined site performance against best or accepted
industry practices. and evaluated the adequacy of OOE and contractor
env i ronmenta1 program management and resources .
The Safety and Health Subteam. which conducted a separate Technical Safety
Appraisal (TSA) under the leadership of an experienced Subteam leader
reviewed all major facil ities at NPR-3. NOSR-l and NOSR-3 using TSA •
protocols. as delineated in OOE 5482.1B. "Envi;onment Safety and Health
Appraisal Program". and the "Performance Objectives a~d Crite;ia for Technical
Sa~ety Appraisals at DOE Facil ity and Sites" (June 1990). Performance
obJecti~es used for the appraisal making up the safety and health assessment
~reder1ved from.OOE Orders. Secretary of Energy Notices (SENs). other policy
stat~ments. and lndustry standards.
The objectives of the Management Subteam were to determine the effectiveness
of FE. OOE/NPOSR-CUW. and JBEC ES&H program management and to identify
underlying probable root causes for observed weaknesses or deficiencies
The
Management Subteam conducted its assessment in accordance with the draft
"Management Performance Objectives and Criteria for Tlger Team Management
Ass~ssments" (August 15. 1991). The Management Subteam coordinated with the
Envlronment and Safety and Health Subteams to share information and ideas on
management issues identified during the course of the Tiger Team Assessment
as well as to identify management issues that were common to the findings of
a11 of the subteams .
A Self-Assessment Task Group under the leadership of a member of the
Managem~nt Subteam evaluated FE. OOE/NPOSR-CUW. and JBEC self-assessment
a~tivitles. compared results of self-assessments with the Tlger Team's
flndings. and reviewed the cognizant FE. DOE/NPOSR-CUW. and JBEC
self-assessment programs. The Task Group conducted its evaluation in
accordance with SEN-60-91 and ihe Secretary's memorandum and attachments
subject: "Guidance on EnVironment. Safety and Health (ES&H) Self-Assessment"
(July 31. 1990).
As part of the Tiger Team Assessment at NPR-3. a review of the working level
employee (i.e .• hourly employees actually performing the operations.
maintenance. well servicing. etc . ) perceptions of that facility's health and
saf~ty program was conducted. This review was deemed necessary because these
work i ng 1eve 1 employees are not represented by a un i on or an employee
organization . The review. entitled "Working level Employee Perceptions of
NPR-3 Health and Safety Program." can be found in Appendix I.
A systematic approach was implemented to analyze probable root causes This
approach began with the analysis and evaluation of detailed background
information and assessment data by the individual subteams to develop their
findings and concerns . These individual findings were integrated by the
subteallls through identification of probable causal factors. The last step in
the process was a collective determination of a set of probable root causes
based on the identified causal factors. for the findings and concerns
•
identified.
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The Tiger Team Assessment process includes four distinct phases:
.
pre-assessment and planning, onsite activities, reporting, and correctIVe
action planning .
1.3.1

Preassesslent Planning

Planning for the assessment included the issuance of an introduction and
information request memorandum, a preassessment ~ite visit, an initial review
of the requested documentation provided to the Tlger Team by DOE/NPOSR-CUW,
and development of an assessment agenda.
The preassessment site visit was conducted by the Tiger Teillll leader; the
Environment, Safety and Health, and Management Subteillll leaders; and
representatives fro,!, EH, OSP, and FE o~ April 28 through 3~, 1992. The senior
1I,IDagers involved wlth NPOSR-CUW activlties provided overV l ews of site
operations and ES&H programs . The Tiger Teillll Leader and Subteillll Leade~s
discussed the Tiger Team Assessment progrillll and necessary support requlrements
for the onsite assessment. Federal and state regulators attended the
pre-assessment act ivi ty.
1.3.2

Onsite Actiyities

Onsite activities for the assessment took place from Jun~ 15 through
July 20, 1992. These activities included field observatlon~; document
reviews. observation of routine operations, emergency exerClses, and t~e
physical condition of the site and facil ities; reviews of previous aud·,ts and
assessments ; and interviews with FE, DOE/NPOSR-CUW , and JBEC personnel, as
well as personnel from Federal, state, and local regulatory agencies.
Using these sources of information, the Tiger Team developed issues that are
reported as either findings (Environmental Assessment, Management Assessment,
and Self-Assessment), or concerns (Safety and Health Assessment). Section
1.3.3 discusses this development process in more detail.
The Tiger Teillll process was conducted in an open mar,ner for FE, DOE/NPOSR-CUW,
and JBEC staff and management, and regulators in order to enha~ce
communication with these groups and to ensure the accuracy of lnforaaation and
is sues . During the process, all three subteams conducted daily debriefing
sessions . In addition, the Tiger Teillll Leader held frequent llleetings with
senior DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC managers to provide a sUIIIDary overview of the
Ti ger Team'S progress and to discuss lIajor issues identif~ed by the subtealls .
Pr i or to the closeout briefing, each subteillll provided coples of draft findings
and concerns to FE, DOE/NPOSR-CUW, and JBEC per sonne 1 and conducted factual
accuracy rev I ews .
1.3.3

Reporting

The balance of this Tiger Teillll Assessment report contains five sections.
Section 2.0 is an overall SUlllllary of the key Tiger Team Assessment findings,
concerns noteworthy practices, and probable root causes identified by all
three subteams. Sections 3.0 through 5.0 contain the Environmental, Safety
and Health, and Management Subteam findings and concerns, respectively.
Section 6 . 0 addresses an evaluation of the FE, NPOSR-CUW, and JBEC
self- assessment programs and reports .
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For the Environmental Subteam, identified issues are categorized as either
comp1 iance findings (CFs) , best management practice findings (BMPFs), or
noteworthy practices. Comp1 iance findings are conditions that, in the
judgment of the subteam, may not satisfy app1 icab1e ES&H regulations, DOE
Orders (including internal DOE memoranda where referenced and draft DOE
Orders), internal ES&H site operating standards, enforcement actions,
agreements with regulatory agencies, or peraait conditions. Best management
practice findings are derived from regulatory agency gUidance, draft DOE
Orders, accepted industry practices, and professional judgment. Noteworthy
prac t ices are actions or practices which are viewed as exceptional or
conmendab1e in meeting ES&H objectives. Other facilities are encouraged to
adopt these practices when they apply to their operations .
A statement of an ap!>l icab1e performance objective prefaces each finding.
Performance objectives for compliance findings are derived from promulgated
regulations and final DOE Orders, consent orders, agreements, and permit
conditio~ls.
Performance objectives for best management practice findings are
derived from regulatory agency gUidance, accepted industry practices, and
professional judgment. Findings for the Environmental Subteam are not
necessarily arranged in order of relative significance .
The Safety and Health Subteam employed a reporting format consistent with the
TSA process. Each identified issue was developed into a concern, which is
supported by findings, and has the characteristics of being explicit (stating
the problem), measurable (auditab1e), and justifiable. A concern addresses a
sitijation that, in the judgment of the subteam, meets one or more of the
following criteria:
reflect. less than full compliance with a DOE safety and health
requirement or mandatory safety standard;
threatens to compromise safe operations; and
if properly addressed, would substantially enhance the excellence
of that particular situation even though that part of the
operation was judged to have a currently acceptable margin of
safety.
Because of this l ast category addressing the excellence of the operation, more
concerns are reported than would result from a strictly compliance -oriented
assessment. Each concern is categorized by its seriousness, potential hazard
consideration, and compliance consideration. Findings and concerns are
prefaced by a statement of the performance objective in each discip1 ine area .
The Management Subteam evaluated the effectiveness of management processes
relative to ES&H programs to identify findings and further insights into
probable root causes for ES&H findinqs and concerns developed by the other
subteams . The Management Subte a~ 's findings were derived from analyses of key
management areas that impact on ES&H activities , and considered DOE policy and
Orders, generally accepted management principles, and industry standards.
Each finding is supported by a sunmary and discussion which identifies further
detail as to the background, factual basis, and, where appropriate, the
management implications of t he finding .
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The Self-Assessment Task Group evaluated the effectiveness of the cognizant
self-assessment activities and programs to identify problems, weaknesses, and
vulnerabilities. The Task Group's findings resulted from evaluations based on
the 11 elements, performance objectives and criteria in the Secretary's
July 1990 llemorandum, as well as a comparison of FE, DOE/NPOSR-CUW, and JBEC
self-assessment findings to those of the Tiger Team. Each finding is
supported by a discussion which provides detail and, where appropriate , any
aanagement implications of the finding.
The Tiger Team Assessment reflects conditions at a fixed point in time .
Improvements ill the ES&H areas that were planned, but were not completed at
the time of this assessment, are identified in the report to provide a
complete and accurate picture of the condition of NPOSR-CUW from the onset of
the assessment.
This Tiger Team report was transmitted to DOE Headquarters program secretarial
officers, including ones from FE, the Office of Energy Research (ER), EH, and
the Office of General Counsel; Federal, state, and local regulators ; and
DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC management and personnel for technical and factual
accuracy review .
1.3 . 4

Correct i ve Act i on P1 ann i ng

The Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy will be responsible for the
preparation of a draft action plan that addresses the findings and concerns
and probable root causes identified by the Tiger Team Assessment.
DOE/NPOSR-CUW, JBEC and Fluor Daniels Service, Inc. staff will participate in
the action plan development. The Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety
and Health (EH-1) will review and comment on the draft plan. Following
revisions to the draft action plan, the Secretary, through concurrence of
EH-1, will approve the final action plan and will direct the Assistant
Secretary for Fossil Energy to implement.
1.4

SITE DESCRIPTION

NPOSR-CUW consists of NPR-3, located near Casper, Wyoming; NOSR-1 and NOSR-3,
located near Rifle , Colorado; and NOSR-2, located near Vernal, Utah .
NPR-3 covers 9, 481 acres and is approximately 7 miles long by 3 miles wide.
Ten oil zones have produced oil and gas at NPR-3 of which eight oil zones are
still producing. The most significant production has occurred in the Second
Wall Creek and Shannon formations. The Second Wall Creek is nearly depleted .
The Shannon Steam Drive Project will be the primary source of production in
the future .
NPR- 3 has a site population of approximately 140 NPOSR-CUW personnel . About
50 JBEC and 14 DOE personnel are based in Casper, and the remainder of the
JBEC personnel are located at the site. The number of subcontractor personnel
vari es from 0 to 40 as they are needed. The nearest communities are Midwest
and Edgerton, which are located about 5 .i1es north of the oil field , and
Casper which is 35 mi l es southwest .

present in the Teapot Creek and Little Teapot Creek drainages. These deposits
may be up to 40 feet thick. These alluvial deposits also contain shallow
groundwater that !s intimately connected with the surface water system.
Sulfate and chlOride salts are abundant in the shale residues derived from
shale, alluvial deposits , and surface water. These ;alts cause surface waters
to be na~urally high in total dissolved solids and are unfit for human
consumpt10n.
The regional c1 imate is generally semiarid to arid. Temperature extremes
range from 100°F in July and August to -40°F in December and January.
No endangered species of plants or animals have been identified on NPR-3 .
Wyoming Game and Fish Department has reported sighting Bald Eagles .

The

NOSR:1 and NOSR-~ are adjacent oil shale reserves of 40,760 and 14,130 acres
in SlZe, respectlVely, located in northwestern Colorado near the towns of
R!f1e and Parachute. NOSR-1 contains an oil shale resource estimated at 3 .8
b1llion barrels of recoverable oil shale and is part of the oil shale rich
Piceance Basin of Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah. NOSR-3 contains very little
oil shale, since most of it lies below the outcrop . NOSR-1 and NOSR-3 contain
natural gas resources in the Wasatch and Mesasverde formations. Only one JBEC
employee is assigned full-time to the NOSR-1 and NOSR-3 sites .
NOSR-1 ~nd NOSR-3 1 ie within the Upper Colorado River drainage basin . They
are dra1ned by the eastern tributaries of Government Creek on the eastern
side, and several streams and washes along their southern boundary all of
which drain into the Colorado River. Surface water at NOSR-1 is of nigh
quality. The groundwater system of NOSR-1 for the first 2 000 feet in depth
contains very high quality water .
'
The climate is semiarid with temperatures ranging from -38°F to 101°F .
Surv~ys have found no 1 isted endangered or candidate threatened or endangered
spec1es at NOSR-1 and NOSR-3, with the exception of the candidate species
Colorado cutthroat trout and the Peregrine falcon.
Figu~e 1-1 depicts the location of NPR-3, NOSR-1, and NOSR-2 within the
W~om1ng, Colorado, Utah region . Figures 1-2 and 1-3 provide a more detailed
d1sp1ay of NPR-3, NOSR- 1, and NOSR-3 respectively.

NOSR - ~ is an oil shale reserve of about 90,000 acres, located in northeastern
Utah 1n Carbon and Uintah Counties, about 50 miles southwest of Vernal Utah
NOSR-2 lies within the Hill Creek Extension of the Uintah-Ouray Indian'
.
Reservation. ~he size of the non-Indian portion of NOSR-2 is about 46,000
acres. No res1dences exist at NOSR-2, and no DOE facilities have been
constructed. The only activities are commercial livestock grazing by the Ute
Indian Tribe and by ranchers who lease grazing rights through the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM). The Desolation Canyon of the Green River cuts across
the northwestern corner of NOSR-2. It is used as a recreation area by private
and commercial rafters.

The land surface at NPR-3 is covered .ain1y by a very thin soil derived frOll
weathered shale conta i ning thin beds of bentonite . Alluvial deposits are
1-6
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NOSR-Z Is situated In rugged dissected table land , characterized by
flat-topped mesas and steep-walled canyons . Elevation ranges from 4, 600 feet
above sea level at the bottom of Desolation Canyon at the west boundary of
NOSR-Z to 1,050 feet above sea level near the south boundary of NOSR-2.
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l.5

OVERVIEW OF NPOSR ACTIVITIES

As the missions of NPR-3, NOSR-l, and NOSR-3 are different , they will be
profiled separately.
NPR-3 was established by Executive Order in 1915, and was created by the U. S.
Department of the Navy as an emergency source of liquid fuels. The reserves
were transferred to the Department of the Interior in 1922, back to the Navy
Department in 1928, and, subsequently, to DOE in 1977. In 1976, the U.S.
Con~ress enacted Public Law 94-258, which allowed production for 6 years at
the Maximum Efficiency Rate {MER} . The President has extended production four
times for 3-year periods; the current authorization has been extended until
1994.
The lIIission of NPR-3 is to produce oil and gas at the MER. This requires that
drilling and production be done economically and that the oil field remain
profitable.
Major production facilities on NPR-3 are the LTS Gas Plant, the four steam
generators for the Shannon Steam Drive Project, the Water Treatment Facility,
Water Disposal Facility, and the tank batteries and test satellites. The
principal support facilities include road systems , freshwater and wastewater
systems, sewage systems, landfill, and electrical power distribution system.
Prior to 1976, 235 wells had been drilled at NPR-3. Since 1976, an additional
877 wells have been drilled, 18 wells in 1991. In addition, Steam Generators
3 and 4 were installed in 1991, and injection into two well patterns was
initiated. The Water Treatment Facility expansion was also completed in 1991
to supply softened water to generators , and Generator 5 was purchased with
delivery and installation scheduled for 1992.
NOSR-l and NOSR-3 were established in 1916 and 1924, respectively, by
Executive Order , as a future source of field supplies for the U. S. Navy.
The lIIission of NOSR-l and NOSR-3 is to prospect and explore for oil shale
reserves wh ile ensuring pr otection of the environment. Prot ec~lo n of the
surface environment is effected through a Memorandum of Understanding with the
Bureau of Land Management. DOE has drilled 17 natural gas wells to protect
NOSR-3 from the loss of gas resources through drainage. The wells are
operated by JBEC.
During 1991, DOE produced 1.7 bill i on cubic feet of natural gas from its ten
100- percent wells a NOSR-3, and 4.0 billion cubic feet of natural gas was
produced from the 17 cOlll11unitized wells in which DOE owns an interest.
JBEC is the management and operation contractor for NPR-3, NOSR-l, and NOSR-3
{as well as NOSR-2}. {JBEC purchased Lawrence-Allison and Associates West,
Inc., the previous contractor, and the contract was novated to JBEC in March
1989.} The term of the current JBEC co~ act j ~ from October 1, 1986 to
September 30 , 1991; however, a 6-month extension with 2 additional 3-month
extensions have been gra~ted. As a result of a recent procurement decision,
Fluor-Daniels Services, Inc. will become the management and operating
contractor effective October 1, 1992.
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2.0

KEY FINDINGS, ROOT CAUSES,
AND NOTEWORTHY PRACTICES

2.0

KEY FINDINGS.

2.1

ENYlROfIIOOAl

ROOT CAUSES. AND NOTEWQRDlY PRACTICES

The Enviromllenta1 Subteam identified 62 f i ndings as part of the Tiger Team
Assessillent. Whil~ none of the findings present an il1l1lediate risk to public
health or the env1ronment or warrant an il1l1lediate cessation of operations
taken together they represent a serious deficiency in the environmental '
protection program at the Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves in Colorado
Utah , and WYOllling (NPOSR-CUW) . Fifty-nine findings reflect situations that'
result frOID not llleeting the requireillents of Federal, state, or local laws and
regulations; U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) Orders; and Naval Petroleum and
Oil Shale ~eserves (FE-60) ?r.onsite contractors' directives or procedures .
Three findlngs reflect cond1t10ns where best management practices are not
elllj)loyed.
No noteworthy practices were identified as part of this assessment . A
noteworthy practice is a f i n~ing which, in the judgment of the assessment
team, will have general application at other DOE faCilities/operations.
However, the lack of noteworthy practices is not an indication of a
defic i ency .
FrOID these 62 findings, the Environmental Subteam identified the following 4
~ey f i ndings . Each key finding is supported by a group of findings presented
1n Section 3.5 and represents an important program concern.
2. 1.1

Key Fi ndi DQS
FOl"llality of Envirol1llental ProgrilllS, PoliCies, Procedures, and
Training. NPOSR-CUW lacks a formalized environmental management
program with poliCies, plans, procedures , and training sufficient
to ensure compliance with all enVironmental laws, regulations, and
DOE Orders. Many of the enVironmental protection docuillents
required by DOE 5400.1 either do not exist, or are not of
sufficient quality or scope . These include the Waste Minimization
Plan, the Pollution Prevention Awareness Plan, the Environmental
Monitor i ng Plan, and the Groundwater Protection Management Plan .
The impleillentation of the plans that have been written is
defi cient in many areas. Most of the environmental protect i on
act i vities are done without formal procedures and training of
personnel. This concern is prevalent across all of the
environmental pr otection disc i plines. Additionally, documentation
related t o 2nvironmenta1 protection and compliance was found to be
chr on i cally defi cient at NPOSR-CUW . The lack of formality of
NPOSR-CUW's env i ronmental activities is partially the result of
the personnel aSS i gned to implement and oversee the environmental
protecti on pr ograms; they are not of sufficient number and do not
have adequate experience and training. The lack of formality in
envi r onmenta1 pr ograms ha"s contri buted to the slow progress since
1990 to r esolve environmental protection i ssues . The 1988 DOE
Envi ronmental Sur vey and assessments conducted by subcontractors
in 1990 and 1991 identifi ed many findings , concerns. and issues
that could have been addressed before the Tiger Team Assessment .
There has been a failure to properly cOl1l1lunicate DOE policies and
r equ i rement s throughout NPOSR-CUW. Within DOE/NPOSR-CUW, not all

DOE Orders have been reviewed for relevance at NPOSR-CUW and for
those reviewed, guidance was less than adequate in SOllie cases .
Quality Assurance and OverSight. Environmental quality assurance
(QA) programs have not been completely impleillented by NPOSR-CUW.
Environmental QA program plans have been prepared and sulMllitted by
DOE/NPOSR-CUW and John Brown Engineers and Constructors Inc.
(JBEC) to the DOE Office of Fossil Energy (FE) for approval.
However, NPOSR-CUW has not allocated resources to illlPlement this
program. Elements of an environillental QA program that have not
been implemented include use of formal procedures, personnel
training, audits/corrective actions, oversight of the contractor
and subcontractors , data validation , and recordkeeping. Within
DOE/NPOSR-CUW, the QA Officer does not have sufficient
independence, is not allotted sufficient time to perfol'll all of
the elements of an envi ronmenta1 quality assurance program, and
has limited quality assurance training. Within JBEC, the QA
function has improved recently due to the hiring of a key
speCialist who will address quality issues on a full-tilll8 basis .
The overall QA function, however, does not adequately address
environmental QA . Audits and assessments have not been
effectively implemented because of a lack of procedures and
training. The lack of environmental QA at NPOSR-CUW is apparently
caused by a lack of DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC management recognition
of this need .
NPOSR-CUW lacks a basic overall understanding of QA oversight as a
fundamental management tool to ensure that all environillental
activities are performed in compliance with environmental laws,
regulations , and DOE Orders. QA oversight is also essential to
ensure that the data obtained from analytical support services are
of known quality and are defensible. DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC have
not instituted a formal program of oversight to ensure that plans
and actions for QA are established, understood, and illiplemented.
Environmental Monitoring and Protection Prograas. Many of the
environmental monitoring and protection programs at NPOSR- CUW have
fundamental deficiencies. Deficiencies have been identified in
the groundwater, air, and surface water programs , and the validity
of monitoring data for all media is in question because of
weaknesses in sampling practices . Groundwater protection
management programs and sitewide hydrogeologic monitoring well
networks have not been established. Inadequate plugging and
abandonment practices for inactive and abandoned IIIOnitoring wells
and cased borehol es present pot ential pathways for groundwater
contamination. A formal air quality management program has not
been developed to determine applicable Federal and state
requirements and to assess compliance status. Air quality
surveillance has not been performed to monitor the effects, if
any, of NPOSR-CUW activities on onsite and offsite environmental
and natural resources. There is no meteorological monitoring
program to provide meteorological information in support of air
management and emergency response activities. A complete source
control and assessment program to quantify emissions , which is
needed for eval lJation of prevention of significant deterioration
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source status, does not exist. A concern at NOSR-3 Is the
possible collapse of the shale pile and Its potential Impact on
waters of the United States .

A discussion of these four causal factors follows :
Policy illp1ementation appeared in 6S percent of the findings .
Federal, state, and local laws and regulations or DOE Orders were
not implemented Dr fully implemented . This causal factor was
evident in all of the environmental disciplines assessed .

Many of the deficiencies at NPOSR-CUW can be attributed to a lack
of qualified personnel, Inadequate allocation of personnel
resources, and a general lack of understanding of environmental
laws, regulations, and DOE Orders. The roles, responsibilities,
and authorities have not been clearly defined In DOE/NPOSR-CUW and
JBEC, so that effective environmental programs can be Implemented.
The self-assessment program has not been Institutionalized and a
corrective action progrillll has not been Implemented.
Vaste llanage8ent. NPOSR-CUW has not developed a waste management
progrillll that defines roles and responsibilities, procedures, and
training and qualifications. The lack of a progrillll has resulted
In considerable deficiencies in the area of waste lDanagement. The
critical waste management issue identified during the Tiger Teillll
Assessment involved inadequate recordkeeping. NPOSR-CUW could not
provide documentation to detel"llline Its RCRA generator status,
which Is necessary to establish applicable hazardous waste
management requirements. Another significant Issue Is waste
characterization. NPOSR-CUW does not have procedures to
characterize both hazardous and nonhazardous wastes, resulting in
several Instances of nOAc0lllp1iance with Federal and state
requirements . NPOSR-CUV's management of waste acculDU1atlon,
treatment, and disposal facilities is deficient as evidenced by a
lack of required notifications to regulatory agencies, design
Inadequacies, and improper operations. These deficiencies can be
attributed to a lack of oversight (by both JBEC and DOE/NPOSR-CUW)
and a lack of procedures to ensure compliance with DOE, EPA, and
state requirements . Interviews with employees responsible for the
day-to-day conduct of waste management operations indicated a
consistent lack of knowledge with respect to regulatory
requirements. These employees have not been provided with
training and fOl"lllal operational guidance that would ensure
compliance with regulatory requirements.

2. 1.2

Causal Factors

The Environmental Subteam attempted to identify apparent causal factors that
contributed to the occurrence of individual findings. Establishing the
predolDinant causal factors assists management in the fOl"lllulatlon of probable
root causes . OOE/NPOSR-CUII and JBEC are expected to develop and implement
corrective actions for Individual causal factors Identified in each finding,
as well as for causal factors known by NPOSR-CUII to have contributed to the
finding.
Thirteen causal factors were identified as contributing to the occurrence of
the Environmental SubtealD findings. In many instances, IIOre than one causal
factor is Identified for each finding. A sWllllary of individual causal fac t ors
identified for each finding is presented in Section 3 . 0 (see Table 3-2). Each
of these causal factors is defined in Appendix G. The four causal factors
that appear IIOst frequently are policy implementation, procedures, training,
and appnlsa1s/audits/reviews .
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Procedures appeared in 47 percent of the findings . NPOSR-CUW has
not developed and implemented procedures to ensure enVironmental
comp1 iance . This causal factor was evident in all environmental
discip1 ines assessed except radiation .
Training appeared in 37 percent of the findings. NPOSR-CUII does
not have an adequate personnel training program to implement DOE
Orders and app1 icab1e Federal, state, and loca1 laws and
regulations. This causal factor was evident in all environmental
disciplines assessed except radiation and waste management.
However, several deficiencies in waste management training are
presented in QA/CF-S .
Appraisals/audits/reviews, a secondary causal factor, appeared In
3S percent of the findings. NPOSR-CUII has failed to Identify
Inaccuracies and program deficiencies because it has not
implemented a formal and comprehensive program of audits,
surveillance, and work product review for environmental
activities . This causal factor was evident In all environmental
di sci pI ines assessed except quaIl ty assurance.
2.2

SAFm AND HEALTH

In the 13 technical areas examined by the Safety and Health SubtealD, all
applicable performance objectives were evaluated . The Safety and Health
Subteam identified a total of llO concerns In the 13 technical areas. The
most significant concerns, based on the level of hazard potent~al and
noncompliance with DOE requirpments, are in the areas of Organ~zatlon and
Administration, Maintenance, Worker Safety and Health, Occupatlonal Safety,
and Fire Protection.
Category II concerns were identified that addressed lack of enforcement of the
provisions of the DOE -JBEC operating contract , lack of DOE/NPOSR-CUII direction
and oversight of JBEC, the presence of equipment and facility safety hazards,
JBEC noncompliance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
standards , JBEC lack of hazard evaluation and control, and JBEC failure to
protect facll ities against excessive property losses for a maximum credible
fire.
2. 2.1

Key Concerns

Key concern s were fo rmulated ba sed on the potential impact on the safety of
activities conducted at NPOSR-CUW, and are as follows :
The DOE/NPOSR- CUW Site Office has not provided the guidance,
support , and oversight to the operating contractor necessary for
the implementation of effective safety and health - related
programs . The lack of sit e office guidance , support, and
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oversight has resulted in serious deficiencies or lack of JBEC
programs in training, emergency preparedness packaging and
transportati?n, occupational safety and healih, fire protection,
medical servIces, and qual ity assurance. The site office has not
enforced the safety and health and quality assurance provisions of
the DOE operating contract with JBEC. The Site Office has not
conducted functional appraisals of JBEC to ensure safety and
health coverage, has not conducted safety and health program
assessments, has not ensured the development of a Safety Analysis
Report, and has not provided surveillance and oversight of the
JBEC internal safety review system.
The operatin~ contract?r's llanagement has not organized and
coordinated ItS operational and technical support functions for
the develolJlll!nt and iarplementation of safety and health plans
prograas, and requireJIents. JBEC has not prepared safety and'
hea~th plans as required by DOE Orders and the operating contract
to Integrat~ the efforts of key groups. The Packaging and
Trans~ortatlon Program has not been organized or properly
coordInated. Responsibility and authority for shipment of
hazardous m~terials has not been established. The JBEC Safety
Review ~0'!"1~ttee does ~ot have a charter specifying
responslbll1ty, a~thonty, and reporting requirements. JBEC
O~eratio~s an~ MaIntenance groups do not effectively interface
wIth E~glne~nng to ~nsure sound safety prinCiples in the
selectl?n, InstallatIon, operation, and maintenance of components
and equIpment. JBEC does not effectively coordinate electrical
and ~chanical engineering support with operations and maintenance
activlti~s. JB~C does not effectively incorporate safety in the
engineenng desIgn and installation of facilities and equipment.
JBE~ does n?t formally require safety and health review of new and
revI sed Poll cy and Procedure documents. The JBEC Safety and
Health Section does not provide all necessary support and
oversight to the line organization.
The operating contractor has not properly identi fled, evaluated,
controlled, and corrected llany safety and health hazards in the
workplace. JBEC Operations personnel do not effectively monitor
the safe ope~ating condition of equipment. Certain facilities and
drill ing equIpment are not operated and maintained in a safe and
reliable manner : The Maintenance organization does not ensure
safe a~d effectIve conduct and control of maintenance activities.
The MaIntenance organization has not maintained the condition of
components and equipment in a manner to prevent hazardous
conditions c~used by non-code installations, improper operation,
and deterionzation . A Safety Analysis Report has not been
developed to define the administrative safety control limits for
operat i ons . JBEC does not require independent safety and health
rev i ews , does not ensure comprehensive review of major items
important to safe operations, does not perform periodic safety
appra i sals, and has not conducted triennial safety appraisals of
i ts safety rev i ew system. JBEC does not comply with numerous OSHA
standar ds , including Walking and Working Surfaces, Machinery and
Mach i ne Guarding , Electrical, Control of Hazardous Energy
(Lockout/Tagout) , Excavations, and Hazard COlll11unication, among

others. JBEC has not ident i fi ed confi ned space entry hazards and
does not properly control confined space entries .
JBEC has not
properly identified and controlled the hydrogen sulfide hazard.
JBEC does not conduct an effective hazard surveillance and
exposure monitoring program. Hazards from handling of chemicals
have not been fully evaluated, and basic safety equipment such as
eyewash stations have not been properly provided. Job safety
analyses have not been conducted for many operations. ~azards of
working alone have not been evaluated, and a correspondIng work
alone policy has not been developed . Electrical safety hazards
have not been evaluated, and personal protective equipment has not
been specified and provided.
The operating contractor does not ensure that operations,
llaintenance, and technical staff have the necessary safety,
health, and qualification training required by DOE Orders. JBEC
has not implemented a formal training program to ensur~ that
operations, maintenance, and technical staff have reqUired safety,
health, and qual ification training. Formal on-the-job training
has not been developed for field operations and maintenance
personnel. JBEC has not ensured that all subcontractors working
onsite satisfy safety and health training requirements. Not all
JBEC employees have received occupational safety and health
training appropriate to job needs. Emergency preparedness
training, hazardous materials emergency response training, and
personal protective equipment training have not been conducted.
There is no training program for personnel i nvolved in hazardous
materials packaging and transportation operations. Competent
person training, as required by OSHA, has not been provided.
Hazard cOlll11unication training has not been provided as required by
the OSHA standard. Confined space training for those authorizing
entry is not sufficient to qualify them for this responsibility.

z.z.z

Causal Factors

The Safety and Health Subteam made an effort to identify the causal factors
that contributed most directly to each concern. These causal factors have
been highlighted for ease of identification and are noted below.
The DOE/NPOSR-CUV Site Office has not provided direction for the
illJllementation of DOE Orders and requireJIents at the Naval
PetroleUli Reserve NUlllber 3 (NPR-3). DOE Orders and requirements
have not been formally transmitted to the contractor in a timely
manner by DOE/NPOSR-CUW due to the lack of a formal directives
system . The site office has not provided sufficient information
to assist JBEC in interpreting and implementing DOE Orders.
Recent directives from the site office to JBEC requested
implementation of Orders that had been in effect for some period
of time. Many of these directives lacked sufficient guidance to
assist JBEC. The delays in receiving clear guidance and direction
have r esulted in significant deficiencies in JBEC safety and
health-related programs wnich include quality assurance , emergency
preparedness, packagi ng and transportation, fi re protect i on, and
medical services.
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The operating contractor aanage.ent has not developed and
c_iuted a strategy for Its safety and health program at NPR3. JBEC aanagellent hiS not developed safety and health progrUl
plans defln!ng respons i bil i ties , progrUl needs ilnd prior i ties , ilnd
hlplellenhtl0n schedules. llanagellent staffing plans have not been
prepilred to support silfety ilnd hulth progrUl plans ilnd to
ilntic l pilte ilnd aanilge llipilcts resulting frOll potenthl fund i ng
chilnges , ilttritlon, ilnd progruaatic di rection . Contrilctor
aanilgellent has not established iI lleans to define ilnd ca.unicate
its expechtions ilnd standards for silfety and health progrUlS
Position ~escri ptions do not provide clear docUllentation of s~fety
responsibllities. Clearly defined safety perfonaance standards
have not been e~tabl ished ilS part of the perfonaance appnisal
process to provlde accountabil ity and cOllllUnicate direction to
e.ployees. Annual safety ilnd health goals have neither been
eshbl i shed by JBEC lIanagellent nor has a process been developed to
ca.unicate such goals and direct i on to all levels of the
organization . JBEC has not properly developed and appl i ed the
necessary aanagellent tools ilnd systetls to bring the NPR-3 safety
ilnd health progrUlS i nto a single coherent strategy. The lack of
such strat~ ~as resulted In nUllerous progrilll deficienc i es in the
ilreas of tr~l nlng ~ emergency . prepar edness , packagi ng and
transportatlon , fue protectlon , lledical services , quality
ilssurance , and certain elellents of occupational safety and health .
2.3

IlMAGEJIEXT

2.3.1

Key Findi ngs

All)

ORGANIZATII*

Histori call~, the pri lAry ~ission of DOE/NPOSR-CUII has been to produce oil
f~OII NPR-3 ln ilccordance wlth Public Law (P . L.) 94-25B enacted in 1976 which
dlrected ~he Secretary of the Navy to produce NPR-3 at the lIaxillllJm efficient
nte. ThlS instruct i on has been further interpreted to llean that the reserves
... st be profitable and gros s revenues ... st exceed gross outlays of
ilpproprh ted fun~s : It i s for those reasons t hat production and profitability
hilve been the drlvlng forces that have strongly influenced nearly all of the
aanilgellent stnteg i es ilnd dec 's ions of the organization , frOll those concerning
plann i ng , budget i ng , and scheduling to illlocation of resources The
llanagellent SubteUl bel i eves product ion ilnd profi tabil ity are still the prillary
c~ntro~li~g forces, s i nce the illternative i s to cease operations and close the
fle1d lf lt were to ~COlle a financial burden to the taxpayers . DOE and the
contractor orgiini Ziitlon il1so recognize the i llportance of the requirement for
iln enhanced env i roRllent , safety, and hulth (ES&H) progrUl to achieve the
Secretary of Energy 's stated object i ves . Although DOE/NPOSR-CUII and their
opent i ng cont r ac t or seem to be lAk i ng iI Si ncere effort to fulfill their
respons i bili t ies ~ nd obl i gati ons, ES&H is st ill not perceived as a lIi ssion
equal in status Wl th product i on and profi tabil i ty .
The inherent risks assoc i ated with the operat i on of a natural gas or oil
field , coupled with iI lIarg inall y effective ES&H program and capabilities have
the potenth1 t o produce an unacceptabl e risk t o the enviroRilent as well'ils to
the safety and health of workers and to the pUblic . This potential is even
greater when the prillilry IIOt i vati on is product i on and profitabi lity The
i nter pretat i on of the leg i slat ive lIa ndate , which is believed to be beyond the
power of DOE Headquarters or t he fi el d organ iz at ion to change, potenthlly
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represents iI significant barrier to the achievement of the level of ES&H
exce 11 ence expected by the Secretary .
The Management SubteUl identified 30 findings (including 6 self- iSsessllent
findings in Section 6.0) that pertain to both DOE's and the openting
contractor's approach to achievement of ES&H objectives . These 30 findings
have been distilled into 3 key findings which have iI signi f icant i llpact on illl
other areas eXUlined by the Management Subteam: planning, tnining, and
oversight. Planning heavily influences illl functions and opentions of the
field organization, as well as DOE Headquarters, and represents the framework
through which production and ES&H objectives are established and prioritized .
Training is particularly illPortant i n the field organization due to the
absence of technical expertise in several areas critical to the illP1ementation
of ES&'H requirellll!nts. Even IIOre importantly, the DOE and contractor
organ i zations are attellpting to des i gn ilnd illPlement a cohesive ES&H progrUl
without a thorough knowledge of DOE Orders and directives. Oversight is the
process of ensuring and verifying that production and ES&H objectives are
being achieved , and is critical to the success of both field operations and
the impl ementation of an effective ES&H program. For these reasons, planning,
training , and oversight are addressed as key findings.
DOE (FE, DOE/NPOSR, DOE/NPOSR-CUII) and the openting contrilctor
have not developed iln effective, self-initiated, strategic or
operational planning process to ensure that proposed courses of
ilction to illplellent iI cOllprehensive ES&H progrUl ciln reillistically
be accOllpl1shed ilnd integrated with openting objectives. A
significant increase in funding allocation is not likely to
provide the lIII!ans to accomplish ES&H objectives within NPOSR-CUII ,
since outlay expenditures are constrained by the legislative
mandate to maintain production and profitability. Therefore,
difficult decisions must be made to divert funding and staffing
resources from operational activities to support the formulation
and imp1ellll!ntation of an ESlH program that will fully comply with
DOE Orders and directives. Planning and budgeting activities , at
the DOE Headquar ters and f i eld levels, have neither reflected
those difficult decisions involving trade-offs between program ilnd
ESlH objectives, nor have they charted a clear course as to how
those ES&H objectives are to be accomplished in the near term.
Strategic plans generated by DOE Headquarters should estab1 i sh
important goals and objectives at the macro level. However , they
are not a subst i tute for self-generated strateg ic and operat i onal
planning at the field level. DOE/NPOSR-CUW has made no vis i ble
effort to develop plans or strategies to exami ne alternatives or
fallback options under the prevail i ng leg i slative mandate for
product i on and profitab i lity . This type of careful planning
should provide the basic framework for well reasoned dec i sion s
regard i ng trade -offs between program and ESlH considerations. It
should also provide a means of priori tiz i ng and scheduling
specifiC actions t o be taken and the resources required to support
those actions . St rategic and operat ional plann i ng also establi sh
the mechani sm to analyze the potential downstream consequences of
those dec i sion s i n order to mi nimi ze unexpected events dur i ng
implementat i on .
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II.JE/NPOSR-CUW and the operating contractor have established some
Ulbitious goals and schedules in response to their internal selfassessment evaluations . However, the proposed actions and
scheduling coanitments do not reflect the real ities of expenditure
constraints imposed by the prime misSion . Moreover, DOE/NPOSR-CUW
and the operating contractor have not considered applying any
extensive intennediate or compensatory actions that could improve
their ES&H posture until longer term or permanent solutions can be
developed and implemented.
DOE (FE/NPOSR1NPOSR-CUV) and the operating contractor have not
I~le.ented an effective ESlH training progra.. An effective ESlH
training prograll should serve as both a mechanism to ensure that
staff perform their functions in a qualified manner and as a
vehicle to cOlllllunicate management values and cOlllllitments
throughout the organization. This Tiger Team Assessment
demonstrated that the DOE/NPOSR-CUW and the operating contractor
ESlH training programs are seriously deficient. While elements of
ES&H training programs can be found, an integrated, for ..,alized
ES&H training prograll based on clearly defined goals and
objectives is not established for DOE/NPOSR-CUW or for the
operating contractor. Neither DOE/NPOSR-CUW nor the operating
contractor has provided adequate training for its personnel in
ES&H fundamentals or comprehensive training in those elements of
the site work activities which require specific knowledge and
application of ES&H requirements .
This assessment also revealed the reliance placed on line
personnel to perform ESlH oversight functions and indicated that
the prospects of adding new personnel to address ESIH
responsibilities are not favorable. Consequently, these
circumstances heighten the i mportance of a fully effective ES&H
training prograll. In addition, FE and DOE/NPOSR have not
established their own training programs and have not provided
guidance, direction, or oversight of ESIH training at NPOSR-CUW.
DOE (FE/NPOSR1NPOSR-CUV) and the operating contractor ES&H
oversight activities have been inadequate to ensure the
developeent and effective I~l_ntatlon of appropriate ESlH
prograllS. FE, DOE/NPOSR, DOE/NPOSR-CUW, and the operating
contractor have failed to allocate the resources and provide the
organizational structure necessary to oversee the ESIH prograll and
activities within their own or subordinate organizations . ESIH
oversight staffing has been inadequate, and many of the personnel
assigned ESIH oversight responsibilities have been insufficiently
trained, or are no~ . qualified by education or experience. DOE
organizational elements have generally not provided timely or
formal guidance and direction to subordinate DOE organizations and
the operating contractor. DOE ESIH oversight responsibilities
have often been collateral duties, subordinate to program
r esponsibilities . This circumstance has resulted in
organi zat l ona 1 and personal confli cts of interest.
Management systems vital to the conduct of oversight (e.g . , formal
policies and procedures , direct ives, corrective action, and
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cu.ltlll!nt tracking systeas) have either not been developed or are
informal and Inadequate. Formal assessment an\! review activities
have been miniMl at all levels, and oversight of several ES&H
functional areas has been nonexistent. The assesslll!nt process
Involves little planning, coordinating, scheduling, docUlll!nting of
results, tracking findings to verify closure, or Identifying and
correct i ng root causes.

2.3.2

Root Causes

The ManagellN!nt Subtea. reviewed concerns and findings, and the individual
causal factor analyses of the Environlll!ntal and Safety and Health Subtea.s, as
well as those of its own to determine the IIOSt probable overall root cause.
Root cause Is defined as that IIOSt basic deficiency that, if corrected, will
prevent recurrence of the proble••
The following root cause was determined to have contributed most directly to
the deficiencies identified by the NPOSR-CUW Tiger Team.
The continuing _hasls on progra. .Isslon orientation has
inhibited DOE (FE/NPOSR1NPOSR-CUII) and the operating contractor
frca establishing a fully effective environlll!nt, safety, and
health progra. and frca achieving DOE's overall goal of ES&H
excellence. The c~rclal oil field style and philosophy of
management and operat ions, that Is centered around
product i on
and profi tabili ty, Is a 1egacy of the more than 70 year history of
NPR-3 . Although the stewardship of NPR-3 is has progressed
through several Federal agencies, the oil field mentality has
prevailed, and today the primary focus of management attention Is
on production and profitability. As a result, the primary frame
of reference or cul ture for NPOSR-CUW personnel with respect to
ES&H needs Is typical of that for commercial oil and gas
operations. Contributing to this culture is the fact that FE: (1)
is involved in prograll activities that are inherently ES&H-related
(e.g., clean coal technology), (2) does not operate high risk
nuclear sites, and (3) considers the risks associated with their
operations to be lower than comparable coaaercial fossil energy
facilities. Statelllents made by DOE management personnel in FE,
NPOSR, and NPOSR-CUW indicate that these conditions and beliefs
have lead FE and NPOSR to consider their operations unique within
DOE, and the belief that DOE directives and ES&H initiatives
constitute "legalistiC" requirelllents that do not really apply to
NPOSR-CUW operations. Consequently, this competitive, profitdriven, "we are unique" culture has instilled within managelllent at
all levels (i.e . , FE through the operating contractor) a
reluctance to fully accept the applicability, value, and need for
a formal, dynamic ES&H progra.. The findings and concerns
identified by this Tiger Teall Assessment demonstrate the
consequences of that reluctance.
Although the Secretary of Energy's stated ESIH Initiatives have
been a matter of record for IIOre than 3 years, the mission
orientation described above, combined with a real possibility of
declining budget and manpower allocations, has resulted in
inadequate allocation of resources needed to develop and maintain
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an effective ES&II prograll. Typically, ES&II has been treated as an
additional burden to be considered In, but not to Interfere with,
production responsibilities. Alternative vehicles to providing
the needed ES&II expert I se and prograll elements have not been
adequately explored or exploited.
The NPOSR-CUW oilfield culture, coupled with FE's attitude of
uniqueness, has resulted In an absence of rigor and fonaallty In
the IlanageaM!nt of ES&II programs, as cited In Alany Tiger Teall
Envlronllental, Safety and Health, and Management Subteall Findings,
Concerns, and causal factors. There I s an overall 1ack of fonaa 1
ES&II policies, plans, and procedures and, generally, Inadequate
docUllentat I on of ES&II-rel ated act hit les. An ES&II prograll
strategy and associated staffing plan and Alany crucial ES&II
llanagellent systells have not been fully developed or Implellented .
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3.0

ENYIRO!I!ENTAL ASSESSMENT

3.1

PURPOSE

The purpose of the EnvlrolUlental portion of the Tiger TeillA Assessillent Is to
provide the Secretary of Energy with Infol'llatlon on current envlrolUlental
cOlljlliance status and associated vulnerabllities of each faclllty, root causes
for noncOllpllance, adequacy of DOE and site contractor environillental
lIanagelllent progrillAs, and adequacy of response actions to address Identified
proble. areas. The results of the assessillent wlll aid In tracking DOE-wide
environillental cOlllpllance trends .
3.2

3.0
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

SCOPE

The scope of the NPOSR-CUW environmental assessillent was cOllPrehensive,
addressing all environmental saedla and appllcable Federal, state, and local
regulations and requirements, DOE Orders, and best managesaent practices. The
environmental disciplines addressed In this assessment Include air; surface
water; groundwater/solls, sediments, and biota; waste manageAlent; toxic and
chemical materials; quallty assurance; radiation; Inactive waste sites; and
the requlreAlents of the National Environmental Pollcy Act (NEPA) .
Field work was conducted at NOSR-l and NOSR-3 in Colorado and NPR-3 in
WYOlling. The disciplines that received the IIOSt intense review were
groundwater, surface water, and inactive waste sites; however, the other
discipllnes were reviewed on a AIOre llmited basis during the field work in
Colorado. Because there has been no development of the resources at NOSR-2 in
Utah, that site was not included in the assessment.
3.3

APPROACH

The EnvironAlenial SubteillA assessment of NPOSR-CUW was conducted in accordance
with the Tiger Team Guidance Manyal (February 1990) and the POE Enyironmental
Audit Prooram Guidance (January 1992) and followed accepted assessment
techniques . The assessment was conducted by a team lIIanaged by a Team Leader
and two Deputy TeillA ' Leaders frOID the Office of Environmental Audit. The teillA
consisted of a IlUltidiscipllnary group of technical speciallsts provided by a
support contractor and by DOE's Office of NEPA Oversight. The names,
responsibllities, afflliations, and biographical data of the tealD leaders and
speciallsts are provided in Appendix A-2.
The envirolUlental assesssaent of NPOSR-CUW Included three phases: planning and
prepilration, onsite activities, and reporting. During the planning and
prepilriltion phase, iI letter was sent to NPOSR-CUW requesting information about
the site . A preassesssaent site visit was conducted April 28-30, 1992.
Infonution gathered fro. both the response to the information request letter
ilnd the preilssesslllent site visit formed the basis for the Environmental
Subteall's Assesssaent Plan, provided in Appendix B, and onsite agenda. Once
onsite, the subtea. Alembers 1II0dified the original agenda as more information
was obtained and additional areas of interest were identified . The overall
schedule ilnd the dally agenda, which reflect the NPOSR-CUW areas addressed by
the Environsaental SubtealD, is included as Appendix C.
The NPOSR-CUW Tiger Tea. Assessment officially began on June 22, 1992, and
concluded on July 20, 1992 . However, since the Environmental Subteam was
3-1
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required to assess sites located in both Wyoming and Colorado, it was
necessary to begin the environmental portion of the assessment field work on
June 15, 1992. Field activities for the environmental portion of the
assessment concluded on June 29, 1992. These activities included a review of
internal documents and reports from previous audits and assessments;
interviews with DOE and site contractor personnel and personnel from Federal
and state regulatory agencies; and inspections and observations of facilities
and operations. The Environmental Subteam held daily debriefs, which were
open to DOE, site personnel, and regulatory agency representatives. During
the debriefs, the audience was encouraged to provide the Environmental Subteam
with additional information and clarification as appropriate. Using these
sources of information, the Environmental Subteam developed findings as
discussed in Sections 3.4 and 3.5. The findings development procedure
included validation employing a formal Factual Accuracy Review process with
DOE and site contractor personnel.
The Environmental Subteam identified findings in two categories: compliance
findings (CFs) and best management practice findings (BMPFs). Compliance
findings represent conditions which, in the judgment of the Environmental
Subteam, may not satisfy the requirements of environmental regulations, DOE
Orders (including internal DOE directive memoranda, where referenced), consent
orders, and agreements with regulatory agencies, permit conditions, or site
directives/procedures/action plans. Best management practice findings
represent situations where, in the judgment of the Environmental Subteam,
sound, accepted management practices are not being employed.
No noteworthy practices were identified as part of this assessment. A
noteworthy practice is a finding which, in the judgment of the assessment
team, will have general application at other DOE facilities/operations.
However, the lack of noteworthy practices is not an indication of a
deficiency.
3.4

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

The Environmental Subteam identified 62 findings and 1 special issue in the
assessment of NPOSR-CUW. Table 3-1 presents the title of e~ch finding. None
of the findings represent situations that present an immediate threat to
public health or the environment, or that require an immediate cessation of
operations. Fifty-nine of the findings reflect problems that may not meet the
requirements of Federal, state, or local regulations, DOE Orders, or NPOSR-CUW
directives or procedures. Three findings represent conditions where best
management practices have not been employed. A breakdown of environmental
findings by technical discipline is presented graphically in Figure 3-1. The
apparent causal factor(s) for each finding is based on the professional
judgment of the Environmental Subteam specialist. A listing of the causal
factors identified for each of the environmental findings is presented in
Table 3-2. The frequency of occurrence for the identified causal factors is
presented in Figure 3-2.
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TABLE 3-1
ENVIRONMENTAL FINDINGS

3-26

A/CF-1

Air Quali ty Management Program

P

P

3-30

A/CF-2

AnCient Air Surveillance Progr811

P

F

3-32

A/CF-3

Meteorological Monitoring Progr8IR

P

P

3-34

A/CF-4

Feeility Air Effluent Control Programs

P

P

3-36

A/CF-5

Operating Procedures for Emission Control

P

P

3-38

A/CF-6

Gasoline Purchasing and Labeling

II

II

3-39

A/BMPF-1

Management of Asbestos

II

II

SW/CF-2

Unpenaitted Discharge

P

P

3-49

SW/CF-3

Discharge Monitoring Reports

P

IIA

3-51

SW/CF-4

Secondary Conta i /1IIef\t

II

F

3-52

SW/CF-5

Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure Plan

II

F

3-54

SW/CF

water Treataent Systea Operator Certification

F

F

3-55

SW/CF-7

Backflow Prevent ion Devi ces

II

II

3-57

SW/BMPF-1

Lead Testing of the IIPR-3 Potable Water

II

II

eN
I

eN

TABLE 3-1 (Continued)
ENVlROfItENTAL FINDINGS

3-65

GW/CF-1

IircxnMter Protection

3-66

GW/CF-2

3-68

~t

F

F

Sitewide lIydrogeological Monitoring Well lIetwork

F

F

GW/CF-3

lircxrdwater s..pl i ng Procec1H'es

P

P

3-71

GW/CF-4

Closure end Protection of Wella end Boreholes

II

II

3-73

GW/CF-5

Oil Well Abeub_,t

II

II

3-76

GW/CF-6

lniuthorized Use of Disposal Wella

II

II

3-77

GWlCF-7

Cont_ineted Soil

P

II

3-85

YVCF-1

waste Mini.ization Plen

F

P

3-87

YVCF-2

waste

P

P

3-89

YVCF-3

Recordkeepi ng

P

P

3-91

YVCF-4

Satellite Hazardous waste Accu.ulation Areas

II

II

3-93

YVCF-5

TeIIIpOrary Hazardous waste Acclailation

P

P

3-95

YVCF-6

Treawent of Petroleul-Cont_ineted Soi la

P

II

3-97

YVCF-7

LandfHl

P

II

3-100

YVCF-8

~t

of Procb:ed Water Pita

P

P

3-101

YVCF-9

~t

of Road Appl icationa

P

P

~t

~t

Progr_ Plen

Progr_

end SurveHlenc:e

ion

~t

TABLE 3-1 (Continued)
ENYIROfI4ENTAL FINDINGS

3-111

TOI/eF-1

TOJti e end Chaieal Meterials

3-115

TOI/eF-2

Stonge of Toxie end ehellieal Meterials

3-118

TOI/eF-3

.

~t

Progr_

Erwironlental Monitori ng Progr_ and ArnJal Site

w

Envir~tal

P

P

F

F

P

P

Report

eweF-2

FOnlelityof Environlental Progr_

F

F

eweF-3

Environlental Quality Assurance Progr..

F

F

eweF-4

Environlental Operat i ng Proeedlrea

P

P

eweF-5

Training of

P

P

eweF-6

Qual ity Assurance Personnel IndepetdellC:e

N

NA

3-137

eweF-7

Internal Qua l i ty Assurance Audits

F

F

3-139

eweF-8

Envir~tal

F

P

3-141

eweF-9

P

P

(It

Envir~tal

Personnel

Data Val fetation

TABLE 3-1 (Continued)
ENVIRONMENTAL FINDINGS

w
I

0\

3-163

IWS/CF-1

Inactive Waste Site Progr...

F

F

3-165

IWS/CF-2

Ident if ic.a t ion and Evaluation of Inactive Waste Sites

N

N

3-161

IWS/CF-3

AdIIIinistrative Record File

P

N

3-169

IWS/CF-4

Spill Reporting

P

F

3-111

IWS/BMPF-1

EMergency Planning Co.munity Right-to-Know Act Hazardous
Reporting Progr..

P

P

3-112

IWS/SI-1

Status of Shale Pile at MOSR-3

NA

NA

55

Ch~ical

TABLE 3-1 (Continued)
ENVIRONMENTAL FINDINGS

3-178

NEPA/CF-1

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Review,
Docunentation

3-180

NEPA/CF-2

3-181

NEPA/CF-3

3-183
3-185

F
P
N
W

.....
I

NA

NEPA/CF-5

Dete~ination,

F

F

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Policies and Procedures

F

F

Adequacy of National Environmental Policy Act Documents

N

P

Project Plaming and Budget Review

F

F

Recordkeeping for National Environnental Policy Act (NEPA)
Docunentati on

F

F

Fully Identified
Partiall y Identified
Not Ident ified
Not Applicable

and

TABLE 3-2

SUMMARY OF APPARENT CAUSAL FACTORS IDENTIFIED BY ASSESSMENT FINDING

APPAREIIT CMJSAL fACTCItS

fUIUIii
IUIIEl

W
I

CD

.57

TABLE 3-2 (Continued)
SOMMARY OF APPARENT CAUSAL FACTORS IDENTIFIED BY ASSESSMENT FINDING

APPAIIEIIT CNJSAL. FACTCItS

W
I

\D

TABLE 3-2 (continued)
SUMMARY OF APPARENT CAUSAL FACTORS IDENTIFIED BY ASSESSMENT FINDING

APPAI£IIT CAUSAL FACTCItS

....

FlIIU . .

W
I

o

TABLE 3-2 (Continued)
SUMMARY OF APPARENT CAUSAL FACTORS IDENTIFIED BY ASSESSHEHT FINDING

APPARfIIT CAUSAL FACTORS

fllIUIMi
IIJIIB

W
I

..-

TABLE 3-2 (Continued)
SUMMARY OF APPARENT CAUSAL FACTORS IDENTIFIED BY ASSESSMENT FINDING

APPAREIIT CAUSAL fACTORS

W
I

N

tot

TABLE
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(continued)

SUMMARY OF APPARENT CAUSAL FACTORS IDENTIFIED BY ASSESSMENT FINDING

APPARE.' CAUSAl. FACTCltS

W
I

W

TOTAl

13

I

I

I

I

I

I

40

29

I

I

I

5

4

23

3

7

22

4

o

14

12

•

Compliance Findings

~

Best Management Practice Findings
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As part of the env i ronmental assessment of NPOSR -CUW , the Env i ronmental
Subt eam reviewed recent repo r ts related to environmental compliance . Most
Important among those were the Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves
Colorado , Utah , and Wyom i ng Self Assessment Report (April 1992) and the John
Brown E & C Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves Colorado, Utah , and Wyoming
Environmental Self-Assessment (Apr i l 1992) (referred to as the DOE/ NPOSR-CUW
self-as sessment (April 1992) and JBEC self-assessment (Apr i l 1992) throughout
Section 3. 0) . The Environmental Subteam evaluated the effect i veness of the se
assessments in relation to the Tiger Team environmental assessment findings .
Table 3-1 presents a summary of the results of t he evaluation. Tiger Team
find i ng s are categorized as having been fully identified, partially
Identifi ed , or not identified by the DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC self-assessments .
Of the 62 environmental findings identified by the Env i ronmental Subteam, 31
percent were fully identified , 47 percent were part i ally ident i fied , and 22
percent were not Identified In the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment . Of the 60
findings which appl ied to JBEC , 36 percent were fully i dentified, 42 percent
were part i ally ident i fi ed , and 22 percent were not Ident ifi ed I n the JBEC
Self-Assessment Report .
It should be noted, however, that the environmental portions of both
self-assessments appeared to be completed primarily by comparing exist i ng
pract ices to DOE/EH-0229, • Performance Ol.lject i ves and Criteri a for Conduct i ng
DOE Environmental Audits .' There Is relatively little evidence that direct
oliservat i on of spec ific noncomp 1i ances or envi ronmenta 1 management act i vit i es
contr ibuted very often to development of the self-assessment findings . Thus,
the f i nd i ngs were not well substant i ated wi th specifics, nor were their
impacts on DOE/NPOSR-CUW operations identified or documented. The
self-assessment programs are discussed further i n Section 6.0 of this report.
The Env i ronmental Survey Preliminary Report , February 1989, identified 19
relevant f ind i ngs . As of July 1992 , seven of these f i ndings have been
completely co r rected . The other 12 f i ndings, in t he judgment of the
Envi ronme ntal Subteam , have not been completely resolved and are reflected i n
th is as sessment repo r t.
EnY i ronmental Management Struct ure
DOE oversight is provided through the Di rector , NPOSR -CUW , who establi shes the
overall policy and gu idance to be used for oversight . The Ass i stant Di rector,
NPOSR-CUW, supe rvi ses DOE personnel and delegates primary oversight
responsibi l ity t o t he Env i ronmen t al Protect i on Special is t . Secondary
responsibility for oversi ght, obser vat i on , and information gathering is
assigned to the Director of Eng ineeri ng , his staff of eng i neers , and to t he
Director of Contract Su rvei llance and hi s staff of contract administrators .
Although the secondary oversi ght personnel have limi ted tra i ni ng in
environmental laws and regula ti ons, they are not fully trained to prov ide
special ized environmen ta l oversi ght . They are, however , very famil iar wi th
operational issues and serve t o prov ide Info rma ti on t o the Env i ronmental
Protection Specialist when ques t i onable situat i ons are observed during f ield
visits . The Environmental Protecti on Specialist can then evaluate the Is sue
and provide the correct guidance.
Observations are brough t to the atten t ion of the Award Fee Performance
Evaluation Committee on a monthly basis, dis cu ssed by the commi ttee members ,
and reduced to a monthly report provided t o th e mai nt enance and operat i ons

(M&O) contractor, John Brown Engineers and Constructors Inc . (JBEC). At the
end of the award fee period (6 months) the Award Fee Board cons iders the
performance for the entire 6-month period.
Management oversight of the contractor environmental program at NPOSR-CUW is
provided through the Facilities Manager and Environmental Manager, who reports
to the GEneral Manager . The responsibility for environmental programs lies
with the Environmental Manager and is monitored by DOE/NPOSR-CUW through the
award fee process .
Program execution is accompl i shed by operations personnel who receive guidance
from the Environmental Department Manager and staff . Operations personnel are
headed by the Field Operations Manager .
Funding for hazardous material tests and specialized equipment is budgeted
through an Environmental Job Order, which is separate from Operations Budgets .
In 1990, the contractor's position of ES&H Manager was eliminated by creating
separate positions for Environmental Manager and for Safety and Health
Manager. An Environmental Spec i alist was hired soon thereafter and a second
Env i ronmental Specialist was hi red in 1992 .
performance of NPOSR -CUW Enyi ronmenta1 program
Overall, the performance of the NPOSR-CUW environmental program requires
considerable i mprovement to fully ccmp1y with Federal, state , and local laws
and regulations, and DOE Orders. Programmatic environmental issues at
NPOSR -CUW are reasonably well understood, as demonstrated by the DOE and
cont.ractor's self-assessments . However, the self-assessments have not been
institutionalized and the corrective action program has not been implemented .
Hi storically , operations have been conducted with a lack of formal i ty , and
respons i bil it i es for envi ronmenta 1 comp 1i ance were f ragmented across the site .
There were some fundamental findings in the areas of fo rmal ity of
environmental operations, environmental monitoring , and quality assurance .
Current 1y, the site 1acks the necessary envi ronmenta 1 expert i se and resources
to develop effect i ve environmental protect i on programs and oversee line
organizations' i mplementation of these programs. There is no adequate system
i n place to ensure full commun i cations and implementat i on of regulatory
requirements and DOE Orders . However , the personnel were cooperative and
receptive to suggestions from the Tiger Team specialists .
Env i ronmental Key Finding s
Formal ity of Environmental Programs, Policies. Procedures. and
Training . NPOSR -CUW lacks a fo rmal i zed env ironmental manageme nt
prog ram wi th policies, plans, procedures, and train i ng suffic ient
to ensure compliance with all environmental laws, regulat i ons , and
DOE Orders . Many of t he env ironmental prot ection documents
requ ired by DOE 5400 .1 either do not exi st , or are not of
su ff icie nt quality or scope . These i nclude th e Was te Minimization
Plan, the Poll ut i on Prevent! on Awarene ss Plan , the Envi ronmen t a1
Mon itori ng Plan , and the Groundwat er Protec t i on Management Plan .
The impl ement at ion of the pl ans t hat have been wri tten is
deficient i n many areas. Most of the env ironmental protec t i on
acti vities are done wit hout fo rmal procedures and trai ning of
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personnel . This concern is prevalent across all of the
environmental protect ion disciplines. Additionally , documentation
related to env i ronmental protection and compl iance was found to be
chron i cally defi cient at NPOSR -CUW. The lack of formality of
NPOSR -CUW' s envi ronmental activities is partially the result of
the personnel assigned to implement and oversee the environmental
protect ion programs; they are not of sufficient number and do not
have adequate experience and training . The lack of formality in
environmental programs has contri buted to the slow progress si nce
1990 to resolve envi ronmental protection issues . The 1988 DOE
Environmental Survey and assessments conducted by subcontractors
in 1990 and 1991 identified many findings, concerns, and issues
that could have been addressed before the Tiger Team Assessment.
There has been a failure to properly communicate DOE polic ies and
requirements throughout NPOSR-CUW. Within DOE/NPOSR-CUW , not all
DOE Orders have been reviewed for
relevance at NPOSR-CUW and for those reviewed, guidance was less
than adequate in some cases .
Quality Assurance and Oversight. Environmental qual ity assurance
(QA) programs have not been completely implemented by NPOSR-CUW .
Environmental QA program plans have been prepared and submitted by
DOE/ NPOSR-CUW and John Brown Engineers and Constructors Inc.
(JBEC) to the DOE Office of Foss il Energy (FE) for approval.
However, NPOSR -CUW has not allocated resources to implement this
program. Elements of an environmental QA program that have not
been implemented include use of formal procedures, personnel
tra i ni ng, audits/corrective actions , oversight of the contractor
and subcontractors , data validation , and recordkeeping . Within
DOE/NPOSR-CUW , the QA Officer does not have sufficient
i ndependence , is not allotted suffi ci ent time to perform all of
t he elements of an environmental quality assurance program, and
has limi ted quality assu rance trai ning . Within JBEC, the QA
func ti on has improved recently due to the hiring of a key
spec ial is t who will add ress quality i ssues on a full -t ime basis .
The overal l QA funct i on , however , does not adequately address
environmental QA . Audits and ass essments have not been
effec tivel y implemented because of a lack of procedures and
trai ning. The lack of environmental QA at NPOSR-CUW is apparently
caused by a lack of DOE/N POSR-CUW and JBEC management recogn i t i on
of this need.
NPOSR-CUW lacks a bas ic overall understanding of QA oversight as a
fundamental man agement t ool to ensure that all environmental
activities are per fo rmed in compl i ance with env i ronmental laws,
regulations, and DOE Orders . QA overs ight is also essential to
ensure that the data ob t ained from analytical support services are
of known quality and are de fensi ble. DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC have
not instituted a formal program of overs ight to ensure that plans
and actions for QA are establ is hed, unders tood , and implemented .
Envirolllll!ntal Monitoring and Protecti on Progrilllls . Many of the
environmental monitoring and protection progr ams at NPOSR-CUW have
fundamental deficiencies . Deficienci es have been ident ifi ed in
3-18

the groundwater, ai r, and surface water programs, and the valid i ty
of monitoring data for all media is in question because of
weaknesses in sampling practices . Groundwater protection
management programs and sitewide hydrogeologic monitoring well
networks have not been establ ished. Inadequate pl ugging and
abandonment practices for inactive and abandoned monitor i ng wells
and cased boreholes present potential pathways for groundwater
contamination . A formal air quality management program has not
been developed to determine applicable Federal and state
requirements and to assess compliance status . Air qual ity
surveillance has not been performed to mon i tor the effects, if
any, of NPOSR-CUW activities on onsite and offsite environmental
and natural resources. There is no meteorological monitoring
program to provide meteorological information in support of air
management and emergency response activities . A complete source
control and assessment program to quantify emissions , which is
needed for evaluation of prevention of significant deterioration
source status, does not exist. A concern at NOSR-3 is the
possible collapse of the shale pile and its potential impact on
waters of the Uni t ed States .
Many of the deficienc i e; at NPOSR-CUWcan be attributed to a lack
of qualified personnel , inadequate allocation of personnel
resources, and a general lack of understanding of environmental
laws, regulat i ons, and DOE Orders. The roles , responsibilities,
and authorities have not been clearly defi ned in DOE/NPOSR-CUW and
JBEC, so that effect i ve environmental programs can be implemented .
The self-assessment program has not been institutional ized and a
corrective action program has not been implemented .
W.;te Management . NPOSR-CUW has not developed a waste management
program that defines ro l es and responsibil ities , procedures , and
training and qualifications . The lack of a program has resulted
in considerable def ici enc ies i n the area of waste management. The
cri t i cal waste management i ssue identifi ed during the Tiger Team
Assessment involved inadequate recordkeep i ng. NPOSR -CUW could not
provide documentation to determine its RCRA generator status,
wh ich i s necessary to establish applicable hazardous waste
management requ irements . Another significant i ssue is waste
characteri zation . NPOSR-CUW does not have procedures to
characteri ze both hazardous and nonhazardous wastes , re sult i ng in
several i nstances of noncompl i ance wi th Federal and state
requirements . NPOSR -CUW's management of waste accumulation ,
treatment, and disposal facilitie s i s defic i ent as evidenced by a
lack of required notificat ions to regulato ry ag enc ies, des ign
i nadequac i es, and improper operations . These defic i enci es can be
attributed to a lack of oversig ht (by both JBEC and DOE/NPOSR-CUW)
and a lack of procedu res to ensure compl i ance wi th DOE , U. S.
Env i ronmenta 1 Protec ti on Act (EPA), and state requ i remen ts.
Inte rv iews with employees responsi ble fer the day -to-day conduct
of waste man agement operat i ons i nd ica ted a consi stent lack of
knowl edge wit h res pect t o regulatory requ i rements. These
employees have not been provi ded with t rain ing and forma l
operational guidance t hat woul d ensure compl lance wit h regul at ory
requirements . Formal ity of Environment al Programs, Policies ,
3-19
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3.5.1
Procedures , and Training . NPOSR-CUW lacks a formal ized
environmental management program with policies, plans, procedures ,
and training sufficient to ensure compliance with all
envircnmental laws, regulations, and DOE Orders . Many of the
environmental protection documents required by DOE 5400.1 either
do not exist, or are not of sufficient quality or scope . These
Include the Waste Minimization Plan, the Pollution Prevention
Awareness Plan, the Environmental Monitoring Plan , and the
Groundwater Protection Management Plan. The implementation of the
plans that have been written Is deficient in many areas. Most of
the environmental protection activities are done without formal
procedures and training of personnel . This concern Is prevalent
across all of the environmental protection disciplines .
Additionally, documentat"ion related to environmental protection
and compliance was found to be chronically deficient at NPOSR-CUW.
3.5

ENVIROII400Al FINDINGS

The Envi ronmenta1 Subtearn fi ndi ngs are presented in Sect ions 3.5.1 through
3. 5.9. The findings are grouped by dlscipl ine and are preceded by an
overview. The overview describes the following: the scope of the assessment,
the approach taken by the technical specialist in conducting that .P?rtlon of
th~ assessment, a description of the NPOSR-CUW programs and activItIes I·elated
to that discipline, status of the 1988 Environmental Survey, an overall
characterization of strengths and weaknesses of the NPOSR-CUW programs , and a
brief sUlllllary of the findings.
Within each finding , references to other findings , interview~, ~nd ~ocuments
are presented parenthetically . An ex~~ple of a referenced fIndIng IS (see
Finding A/CF-I), where ' A' represents the air discipl i ne, ' CF' represents a
compliance finding , and ' I ' is the finding number. An example of a referenced
interview is (I -SW- 2) , where ' I' signifies Interv !ew, ' ~W' represents the
Surface Water di scipline, and ' 2' represents the IntervIew number . An example
of a referenced document is (WH-3), where 'WH' represents the Waste Management
disci pl ine, and ' 3' represents the document number . . Appendices D. and E list
the contacts/interviews and site documents, respectIVely, the Environmental
Subteam used to develop Its f indings . In addition, causal factor~ ~re
di scussed in each finding, as sUlllllarized in Table 3- 2. The defi nItIons of the
causal factors are presented in Appendix G.

3.5 . 1.1

Overview

The air portion of the Environmental Subteam assessment at NPOSR-CUW evaluated
current operating procedures and air qual ity programs with regard to
requirements of u.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations,
Wyoming Department of Environmental Qual ity (WYDEQ) Air Qual ity Standards and
Regul"tions, WYDEQ air permits, Colorado Department of Health Air Quality
Control COlllllission Regulations, DOE Orders , operating contractor policies and
procedures, and best management practices. The regulations, requirements, and
guidel ines used in this assessment are presented in Table 3-3 .
The primary focus of the air assessment was the activities at NPR-3. There
was a review in Casper of NOSR- I and NOSR-3 documents related to air quality
compliance and decontamination and demolit ion activities , including asbestos
abatement, and there was a 1 illlited assessmeilt of air issues by a member of the
Environmental Subteam during his field work at NOSR-I and NOSR-3. Because
there has been no rievelopment of the resources at NOSR-2 in Utah, that site
was not included in the scope of the air assessment.
The general approach to the NPOSR-CUW air assessillent was to inspect facilities
and operations, conduct interviews , and review documents related to air
quality to determine : (I) the regulatory and organizational context of the
sites, (2) the emission sources and the nature of the contaminants released,
(3) the adequacy of programs fur emission sources, controls, and permits , (4)
the adequacy of programs for " ,naging air quality compliance requirements, and
(5) whether appropriate air qU dl ity and meteorological monitoring programs are
in place .
The inspection of air emission sources, monitoring and control equipment, and
standard operating practices during the assessment provided information about
regulatory cOlllpliance status and conformance with DOE requirements. Site
documents, records, programs, and proceGures were reviewed for adequacy and to
determine whether they contained appropriate air quality and meteorological
information . The OOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC personnel were interviewed to discuss
their roles and responsibilities with regard to emission control and air
quality management. Regulatory documents and agency correspondence were
reviewed , and regulators were contacted to confirm interpretat i ons and
completeness of the varioas requirements known to apply at ~POSR - CUW.
NPR-3 is located i n Natrona County, Wyoming . One of the public air qual ity
mon itori ng stations for partic ulate is located in the city of Casper (Natr ona
County ) , and the WYDEQ Air Qual i ty Div ision does not operate continuous
monitors for other crit er i a pollutants anywhere in the state (I -A-38) .
However . the state Is in atta i nment for all criteria pollutant = regulated
under the Clean Air Act (I -A-35), with the sole exception of particulate in
the Trona Industrial Area (Sweetwater County) .
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NPR-3 is subject to various general state and Federal air regulations and
several air permits . lIyoming air inspectors have visited the site
periodically (A-5), most recently at OOE's request (I -A-25) . The state has
requested and received annual emission inventory reports from NPR-3 (A-7, A-9,
and A- 12) as well as information regarding air toxics (hazardous air
pollutants (HAPs) emitted.

TABLE 3-3
LIST OF AIR
REGULAT IONS/REQUIREMEKTS/GUIDEL I NES

~~-----r~~~

NOSR-I and NOSR-3 are located in Garfield County, Colorado, which is in
attainment for all criteria pollutants . These sites are subject to the
general Colorado and Federal air pollution regulations. There is an active
permit for the Parachute Field Gas Compressor and a permit to vent nitrogen
during stimulations of NOSR gas wells.
In the JBEC organization, environmental concerns at NPOSR-CUII were officially
the responsibility of the JBEC Safety and Environmental Manager. This
position has been spl it so JBEC has a separate environmental manager who must
cover air quality issues . An Environmental SpeCialist, who reports to the
Environmental Manager, is officially assigned to monitor air quality permit
compliance and prepare permits (A-137) . Several other departments are
involved in air compliance . The Technical Services Department provides
facility design for most of the larger air emission sources and expanded
production projects and contracts (I -A-8 and I-A-31), and the Administration
Department conducts procurement and budgeting. Production and maintenance
organizations at the field operate and maintain air emission sources .

OOE 5484 . 1

Environmental Protection, Safety and Health
Protection Information and Reporting
Requirements

OOE 5500 .3

Reactor and Nonreactor Nuclear Far.il ity
Emergency Planning, Preparedness and
Response Program for DOE Operations

DOE

40 CFR 50-52

Clean Air Act Ambient Air Quality Standards
and Regulations for State Implementation
Plans and Prevent i on of Significant
Deteriorat ion

EPA

Clean Air Act Regulations for New Source
Performance Standards; National Emissions
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants

EPA

40 CFR 60 -61

DOE/NPOSR-CUW created a full-time environmental position in 1991 with
reporting responsibilities to the Assistant Director. The Contracting and
Engineering offices performed many of the environmental oversight functions
before that time and continue to support the environmental program today.
Air contaminants at NPR-3 are produced or emitted by four steam generators ;
vented wells; heaters at the Low Temperature Separation (LTS) Gas Plant, tank
batteries, and test satell ites; production tanks; leaks or releases in gas
handl i ng systems; the fl are at the LTS Gas Pl ant; several mai ntenance and
machi ne shops; pi ts for evaporat i ng waste sl udges; and storage of fuels and
other volatile liquids. Road use, road maintenance, construction, WYDEQ and
well drilling create emissions as well.
Air emissions include nitrogen oxides (NO.), particulate (PM,o)' and carbon
monoxid2 (CO) which are emitted from the generators and heaters. Production
and organics storage activities emit volatile organic compounds (VOe) . PM,o
emi ss ions are produced by dri 11 i ng and road use . lie 11 s, storage tanks , and
pits emit methane, hydrog~n sulfide (H2S) , and other volatile organic
compounds . NPR-3 production, property control, warehouse, and the
environmental operations all collect various kinds of information that relate
to the types of air polluting equipment, operations , and emissions at
NPOSR-CUW. Several HAPs covered by the Clean Air Act Amendments (CMA) list
are used at NPOSR-CUW and may be emitted. These include methanol, ethylene
glycol , ethylene thiourea, benzene, ethyl benzene , methylene chloride ,
naphthalene, chloroacetic acid, hexane, xylenes, bis - (2 -ethylhexyl) phthala t e ,
and hydrochloric acid (A - 7) .
H2S and NO emissions at NPR-3 were negligible prior to development of the
enhanced o~l recovery project. After evaluating recovery technIques, JBEC
selected steam drive injection and designed and installed gas -fi red steam
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generators, each capable of producing 50 HHBtu/hr of steam. These have
increased the site's NO. emissions significantly, and steam injection has
resulted in increased HzS emissions from vented wells, test satellites, and
tank batteries.
JBEC has conducted some HzS emission source testing at tank batteries, test
satellites, and some production wells, but to date there is no definitive data
on ellission rates and totals from all sources (A-77 and A-125) .
Environlnenta1 staff are spot checking ambient HzS levels in designated "HzS
Areas" 200 feet around the three main crude oil storage areas in the Shannon
Stea. Drive Project, al 1 a multi-department project team is investigating
9i 5sion control options (A-37 and A-44).
Air emission control equipment and techniques used at NPR-3 include a floating
roof at the South Terminal Sales Tank, excess air controls on three of the
four operating steam generators, and an iron sponge HzS unit and flare at the
LTS Gas Plant. There are few procedures for operation and routine
mainten~nce, and none include environmental performance measures.
All sources
at NPOSR-CUII are subject to lIyoming Air Quality Standards and Regulations
(IIYAQSR), Section 14 (b), which limits visible air contaminants in any
emission discharge to 40 percent opacity.
NPOSR-CUII has submitted many preconstruct ion applications for air permits from
ttie IIYDEQ for its Firef100d Pilot Project, steam generators, Gas Plant, oil
storage tanks, and heaters (A-B6, 96, 127, 133, and 135) . The application for
a fifth steam generator was submitted in 1991, and the faci1 ity is now under
construction . Each JBEC department makes its own determination of whether new
production projects, material s, or facll ity modifications require air permits
or notice to the IIYDEQ Air Quality Division. Preliminary specifications for
significant projects are sent to all JBEC department heads for review (A-131
and A-132).
The steam generator permits include emission limitations for NO and
part iculate (A-85 , 93, 104, 107, and 108). A smokeless flare fOr the produced
gas em issions and quarterly reports were required by the permit for the in
situ combustion pilot project (A-88 and A-91). Some of the original heater
permits were c10sedout either because of removal of the heaters or IIYDEQ's
recognition that the source or modification was too small (A- II7 and A-l30) .
NPOSR-CUII has requested that the state issue the required operating permits
for their steam generators (A- II4, A-II8, and A-129).
Stack emission testing was conducted for Steam Generators No . I, No.2 , and
No . 4 as required by IIYDEQ (A - l3, IS, 19-26, 51, II3 , and 127). The test for
steam generator No.2 showed NO emissions to be above the permit limit (A-14,
A- IS, and A- 21), so an excess a1r monitor and control was installed to
maintai n the oxygen below 4 percent . This corrected the problem, and
additional generators have been des igned and installed with excess air
controls (A - 13 and A-25) . A number of different p'ermit and air emission
records in the NPOSR -CUII file s are also used in a variety of ways to evaluate
complhnce, develop an annual emission inventory report for IIYDEQ, and
determine the requirements for any new source permitting .
The NPR-3 site as a whole is defined as a "major" air pollution source under
the Prevention of Significant Deterioration rules because the aggregate size
of thE five permitted steall generators alone are above the threshold size
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(A-5, 6, 7, 12, 49, 67, and 86) . However, NPR-3 has no summary records of
source sizes, aggregate characteristics, or inventory of its emission quantity
(I-A-24, I-A-25, and I-A-34) to confirm and track this status.
NPR-3 facilities are relatively new and contain few, if any,
asbestos-containing materials (I-A-15). NOSR-I and NOSR-3 sites have a
significant amount of friable and nonfriable asbestos containing .aterials,
which poses a potential risk of release . Removal and abatement projects have
been planned, and site NEPA documents indicate that safety and environmental
regulations will be adhered to (I-A-8 and I-A-40).
NPOSR-CUII does not currently conduct meteorological monitoring, and ambient
air quality surveillance and source effluent monitoring activities are limited
(I -A-II, 23, 24, and 55). However, there are several discrete sets of onsite
air quality and meteorological data that have been collected over the past 10
years in conjunction with individual production enhancement projects.
Meteorological data from the Casper airport are used informally in conducting
the ongoing HzS monitoring study (A-I-II).
The site has not resolved any of the four air-related issues cited in the 1988
Envi ronmenta 1 Survey but has addressed, to some extent, the hydrocarbon
emissions from wells, batteries, and satellites and the lack of operating
permits. A project to remove asbe stos-containing materials from buildings at
NOSR-3 partially addresses the Envi r onmental Survey concern about release of
friable asbestos, but it has not been carried out. The fourth air quality
issue was related to the air monitoring program .
Generally, the site meets compliance levels . NPOSR -CUII has applied for
appropriate air quality permits over the last 12 years and has submitted
emi ss i on inventory reports to IIYDEQ each year as requested . The new
generators were stack tested during startup, as required, and ambient and
meteorological monitoring has been conducted. However, coherent and
comprehens i ve oversight does not currently exist at NPR-3, and there is no
formal air quality management program that would guide decisions on air
quality compliance at any of the three sites . This lack of a program is
reflected in some minor discrepancies and omissions on applications and the
poor level of information about emissions and impacts, as reflected in the
unreso 1ved issues about HzS emi ss ions from the Shannon Steam Dri ve Project.
The lack of a program COUld result in significant problems if emissions are
inadvertently increased or more sources are added at this major prevention of
significant deterioration (PSD) air quality source.
The air assessment i dentified six compliance findings and one best management
practice finding . The compliance findings relate to the absence of formal
monitoring programs for ambient air surveillance and for meteorological
information; deficiencies in operating procedures; the lack of an air quality
management program; an inadequate source control and evaluation program; and
an inadequate program to meet vehicle fuel requirements. The best management
practice finding is r elated to the absence of an asbestos management program .

3.5.1.2

and regulated activities, and to plan for compliance with upcoming
requirements under Wyoming and Federal air programs.

COIIPliance Fi ndings

FIIIlING A/CF- I :

Air Quality Managl!tlll!nt Progrill

Perforaance Objectives
DOE 5400.1, 'Genera1 Environmental Protection Program," states "it is DOE
policy to conduct the Department's operations in compliance with the letter
and spirit of applicable environmental statutes, regulations, and standards .
In addition, DOE is cOlllllitted to good environmental management of all of its
programs . ' Section 5.f. requires that Heads of Field Organizations "ensure
that all operations under their authority comply with applicable environmental
protection laws and regulations.'
DOE 5400.2A, Section 4.a, "Environmental Compliance Issue Coordination ,"
defines Significant Environmental Compliance Issues to include "results of
verification activities . . . that reveal non-compliance issues" and requires
that Heads of Field E1elM!nts shall "provide EH-23 information on all
environmental penlits."
40 CFR 52 . 21, "Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality, " (PSD)
defines the emission limits and capacity size of "major" sources subject to
this prograJII and provides threshold levels for emission increases and impacts
of nitrogen oxides (NO.), hydrogen sulfide (HzS) , and other pollutants that
trigger PSD preconstruct ion permit review for facility modificat i ons .
lIyomi ng Air Quality Standards and Regulations (WYAQSil) 5ection 21, "Permit
Requirements for Cons t ruction, Modification and Operation , " requires a permit
appl i cation for construct i on or modification of new or modified facilities, or
for use of existing facilities that will emit contaminants or increase
emis sions i nto the air of the state . Wyoming Department of Environmental
Quality (WYDEQ) approvals of these applications are waived for minor sources
which the Div i s i on of Ai r Quality's Administrator determines to be
insi gnifi cant .
WYAQSR, Sect i on 9(a) , "Hydrocarbons ," requires that "hydrocarbon emissions
sh a 11 be 1imi t ed by al l persons . . . to prevent unnecessary emi ssions . "
Section 14, ' Cont ro1 of Particulat e Emi s sions" requires that all persons must
prevent unnecessary fugiti ve du st emissions exceeding ambient air standards by
using control techn i ques s uch as us i ng oil or chemicals on roads and filter s
and enclosures for handli ng dusty mat er i als . Section 13(b)ii, "Open burning
restrictions,' r equ i res that appl i cations be submitted to the WYDEQ for
training fires after they have been approved by local fire departments .
Findi ng
NPOSR·CUII has not devel oped or i mplemented a formal program to determine the
applicable Federal and s tate air program requirements and to as sess compliance
status, as required by DOE Orders .
Discussi on
There is no air quality progral1l in place at NPOSR-CUII to determine what air
requirements apply and whether the facil i ties are in compliance , to plan and
prov i de gui dance for new or .adified facilit i es, to track permi tted facilities

NPOSR -CUW has not conducted a formal overview of its emission source
characteristics or aggregate inventory of its total emissions that would be
sufficiently comprehensive to determine what reqUirements apply and whether
the facil ities are in compliance with source limits or ambient standards . The
Environmental Subteam observed the following concerns :
NPOSR-CUW and JBEC personnel (I-A-24, I-A-34, and I-A -36) are
aware that PSD program emi ss i on thresholds have been exceeded, and
any permi tting for additional steam generators will likely be
subject to PSD requirements, such as 1 year of preconstruct ion
monitoring (A-6 and A- 49) . However, without a sUl1l1lary source list
and emiss i ons inventory, NPR-3 has no documentation of their its
allowable or actual emissions nor records showing when the
comb i ned capacity of the generators became greater than 250
HMBtu/hr and, thus, defined the site as a "major " PSD source. All
modifications at major sources that would increase emissions more
than 10 tons/year of HzS or 40 tons/year of NO. requi re PSD
permits.
There is no procedure to include information on new emi ssion
sources and emissions (A- 52, 53, 78, and 89 ; I -A-8 , 10, II, and
21) in the emission inventory or other environmental records.
Only limited amb i ent monitoring (A-42, 43, 44, and 60; I -A-25 and
I-A-22) has been conducted to determine facility impacts at the
NPOSR-CUW sites (see Finding A/CF -2) . NPOSR-CUW has not evaluated
these monitoring data (I -A- 25 and I-A-32) nor performed i mpact
assessment modeling (I-A- Il) to assess air quality over
appropriate periods of time to correspond with annual averages or
daily, hourly, or half- hourly maxima estab1 ished by ambi ent ai r
quality standards .
NPOSR-CUW has not determined whether i t can
b~ exempted from air qual ity analysis for a PSD permit because it
has not est i mated the impact of expected emi ss i on changes to see
i f they are less than 0.2 micr~rams per meter cubed ( g/m ) of
HzS , hourly average, or 14 g/m NO. , annual average .
NPOSR·CUW has not dete rmi ned how the regulatory definit i on of
ambient air appl i es at i ts f acil i ty (I -A-33) , and , t here fore,
where HzS impacts should be evaluated .
Wyoming particulate control regulations apply to dust control on
roads . Road maintenance practices required to control dust have
been curtailed because the permit for oily sludge applicat i on ha s
not been re iss ued (see Fi nding WM/CF -9).
There is no formal mechan ism to determine whet her future projects or change s
i n ai r emiss i ons from facili ti es, production , or other pr act ices would t rigger
new requirements or requi r e permi t appl i cat i ons . For example :
Modifi cat i ons of tank uses are not rev i ewed for potent i al emi ss i on
i ncreases, or whether the t anks will s till be used fo r pet roleum
l i quids pri or to cust ody t r ans fe r (A- l3S; I -A· 8 and I -A-21) .
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Modifications to store other volatile liquids may require state
permit applications and may subject these sources to performance
specifications or emission limits (see Finding A/CF - 4).
There is no formal process in place to ensure that all new sources
or production activities that increase air emi ss ions, s uch as the
steaM project expansion , are reviewed for environmental
requirements (A-78 and A-89 ; I -A-8, 10, 11 , 21, and 31) (see
Finding NEPA/CF-4).

or records are necessary; a iliII!Il in site operations and organization
addressing air quality concerns ; and a lack of 1I:iJ.nilig for NPOSR-CUW
personnel to implement laws and regulations . A secondary contributing factor
for this finding is inadequate appraisals/aydits/reyiews of existing projects
and equipment at NPOSR-CUW to ensure that all the necessary air permits have
been obtained .

Currently, there i s no formal review of purchase requisitions by
the Env i ronmental Department (i-A- I, I-A- 29 , and I-A-34); as a
result, site personnel are able to bring equipment and/or
materials onsite without an informed environmental review of
emission i mpacts.
Contract specifications for a new generator did not reflect New
Source Performance Standards or state permit envi ronmenta 1
performance spec i fications (A-86).
The permit tracking system is not formal and recently , perm i t compliance has
not been tracked . For ex amp 1e :
DOE/NPOSR- CUW relies on its contractor for compliance oversight at
per mitted facilit i es (i -A-25). Wh i le some documents summarize
permits issued to NPR-3 (A- 6) and a list was prepared for the
Environmental Subteam i nformation request , neither JBEC nor
DOE/NPOSR-CUW curr ently have personnel spec i fically desi gnated to
t r ack permi ts , determi ne whether other permi ts are needed, or
mon itor ai r permit compliance status.
There are no programs or procedures for a i r emiss i on and sour ce
r ecor dkeep i ng (see Fi nd i ng A/CF-5) or r eporting, although permi ts
CT -850 and CT - 937 have monitoring requi r ements .
DOE/NPOS R-CUW and JBEC have no systemat i c method of determ i ni ng the impact of
new regul ati ons . Fo r example, hazardous ai r pollutant (HAP) emiss i ons have
not been talli ed in a comprehen si ve way (A-7) , and i t is not known whether
more than 10 t ons of any HAP or 25 tons in the aggregate are emitted from
NPR- 3 and whether it is a "maj or " HAP source that will have to meet Clean Air
Act regulations t o be pr omulgated in the near future. DOE EH-23 request ed and
received some data concer ni ng HAPs f r om NPOSR- CUW in 1991 , but there has been
no further direction on implementing a program to pr epare for regulatory
changes.
This finding was part ially iden tifi ed i n t he DOE/NPOSR - CUW self- assessment
(April 1992) by generall y stati ng t hat a management program wa s needed , and
partially identified i n t he J BEC self- assessment (Apr i l 1992) because t he
assessment recommended pr ograms fo r regulatory awareness and perm i t
compl iante, but d i d not addres s site source and emission tracking .
The ilpparent causal fact ors f or this finding are a lack of Will
implementation of DOE Or ders with r egard to oversight of compliance and
development of management pl ans ; a lack of procedures at NPOSR - CUW to ensure
that new sources or emissi ons are evaluated to determine whether air permits
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F11IlING A/CF-2:

Ambient Air Surveillance Prograa

Perfol"lAnce Objecti ve
DOE 5400.1,"General Environmental Protection Program," Chapter IV, Section
5. b(I}, states "environmental surveillance shall be conducted to monitor the
effects, if any, of DOE activities on onsite and offsite environmental and
natural resources . An environmental surveillance screening program shall be
undertaken . . . to determine the need for a permanent program." It also
requires that a surveillance program use "measurement, monitoring and
calculation to determine the effects of the operations on the environment and
public health . "

activate a single monitoring station at NPR-3 during FY 1992 was not funded
(I -A-3, 11, 33, and 34).
This finding was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR- CUW self-assessment
(April 1992), but did not specifically refer to any ongoing or planned air
contaminant monitoring . The finding was fully identified in the JBEC
self- assessment (April 1992) .
The apparent causal factors for this finding are a lack of ~
jmp]ementation of the requirements of DOE 5400.1; inadequate resoyrces devoted
to planning and implementation; poor understanding of the riik of not having
air quality surveillance information available; and inadequate illinin9 to
understand and meet the requirements of the DOE Orders.

Chapter IV, Section 8.b , states that air surveillance "monitoring programs
should be designed to . . . determine representative pollutant concentrations
[impacts] at areas where publ ic health and other concerns should be considered
Where possible, background data should be gathered from existing
State and Local Air Monitoring Stations (SLAMS) • . . . "
DOE 5500 . 3A, "Planning and Preparedness for Operational Emergencies," Section
2. b, states "For each potential Operational Emergency considered, the [hazard]
assessment . . . must address environmental transport and diffusion, and
exposure considerations . "
Finding
NPOSR-CUW has not developed an air quality surveillance program, undertaken a
screening program to determine the need for a permanent program, nor evaluated
whether the transport and diffusion of its emissions have the potential for
causing s i gnifi cant pollutant concentrations or hazards, as required by DOE
5400 . 1, Chapter IV , and DOE 5500 . 3A .
Di scuss i on
NPOSR-CUW has not developed and implemented a Si t e-specific air surveillance
pr ogram t o mea sur e or cal culate the effects of its emissions (I-A-2 and
I· A-I I ). No ana lysi s of t he potential air quality impacts from site releases
has been performed , eit her to determi ne representat i ve pollutant
concentrations t hat may r esult or to define the highest concentrations
("hazards") and cons equences of nonroutine releases (I -A- II , 16, 21 , and 24) .
No air quality moni tor i ng has been conducted since 1989 (A-60; I -A-2 , I-A-25,
and I -A- 33), and NPOSR- CUW has not formally evaluated its current needs for
air quality monitoring at NPR-3, NOSR - I , or NOSR -3 (I -A- 23 and I -A-34).
Earl ier monitori ng st ud i es have not been reviewed or integrated to determine
whether data are of adequate qual i ty and completeness or sufficiently
representative (I- A- I I and I -A- 22) for use in complying with Wyoming air
qual ity standards; air permit t i ng r egulations , such as prevention of
significant deteriorati on (PSD) ; and DOE Orders, or whether additional data
will be needed .
Discussions to date to es tablish an onsite air quality monitoring program have
not determined appr opr i ate si t i ng parameters nor determined which pollutants
should be monitored (I -A-18 , 22 , 23 , and 33) . No air quality surveillance
siting or monitori ng plan has been prepared , and JBEC's proposal to DOE to
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FINDING A/CF-3:

Meteorologic~l

Monitoring Progra.

Perfor.ance Objective
DOE 5400 . 1, "General Environmental Protection Program, " Chapter IV, Section 6,
requires DOE facilities to have a specific component of their monitoring
programs that makes representative llleteorological information available.
These lleteorological progrHs must be designed to characterize atllOspheric
transport and diffusion conditions, determine the impact of the site's routine
and nonroutine air releases, and support environmental surveillance
activities.

This finding was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment
(April 1992), but contained no detail on what was needed. It was partially
identified in the JBEC self-assessment (April 1992), but JBEC did not address
the need for llleteorological information for emergency response nor the need
for complete data to support pennitting.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are a lack of JlJllill
implementation in that the requirements of DOE 5400.1 have not been
implemented; resoyrces have not been allocated for planning or IIOnitoring
activities; and personnel do not have adequate education and work experience
to develop an acceptable program.

Finding
NPOSR-CUW has not developed or implemented a meteorological monitoring
program , as required by DOE 5400 . 1.
Discussion
NPOSR-CUII does not have a formal meteorological monitoring program to provide
meteorological infonnation . The following deficiencies were observed related
to the planning and implementation of a llleteorological monitoring program:
Representative locations to establish onsite meteorological
IIOnitoring stations at NPR-3, NOSR-l , and NOSR-3 have not been
determined (I-A-1 8, 22, 23, and 33) .
A 1992 budget proposed by JBEC to reactivate the meteorological
tower at NPR-3 was not funded (I-A-ll, I-A-33, and I-A-34).
NPOSR-CUII has not form~lly evaluated its current needs for
meteorological information at NPK-3, NOSR-l , NOSR-2, and NOSR-3
(I-A-23 and I -A-34).
Meteorological data were collected for discrete periods i n
conjunction with air quality monitoring for individual production
enhancement projects, but meteorological monitoring equipment has
not been operated s i nce 1989 (A-60; I -A-22 through I-A-24) . The
data collected over the past 10 years have not been assessed to
determine their quality or completeness, or whether they were
representative (I - A-ll and I -A- 22) .
NPOSR-CUW does not have appropriate or complete meteorological
data a ailable to use i~ modeling to determine the air quality
impacts of new facilities or emission changes (I -A- 22 and I-A-36) .
Upper air data are needed to meet monitoring data requirements for
prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) permitting, for
example, and would have to be obtained from another location that
routinely collects this information.
NPOSR -CUII does not have a formal program for obtaining
meteorolog i cal monitoring data on a real-time basis during
accidental releases, fires, or other weather sensitive events
(I -A-33) .
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FINDING A/CF-4:

Facility Air Effluent Control Programs

Performance Objectives
DOE 5400.1, "General Environmental Protection Programs," requires that DOE
operations comply with environmental regulations and that the environmental
programs must quantify pollutant releases, such as emissions, to support
compliance decisions and understand the environmental effects of facility
operations.
Secretary of Energy Notice (SEN)-29 requires that facilities monitor
performance indicator trends, including air "effluent" releases (emissions).
New Source Performance Standards, 40 CFR 60.110-116b (Subparts K, Ka, and Kb),
"Standards of Performance for Storage Vessels for Petroleum Liquids and
Volatile Organic Liquid Storage Vessels," requires emission controls and
monitoring of storage tanks of various sizes constructed after certain
baseline dates.
Wyoming Air Quality Standards and Regulations (WYAQSR), Section 7, sets
standards for allowable hydrogen sulfide (HzS) concentrations in the ambient
air. Sectioa 21, "Permit requirements for construction, modification and
operation ~ ~ requires an application for construction of new facilities or
modifications to existing facilities, or use of existing facilities, that will
emit contaminants or increase emissions into the air of the state.
Applications cannot be approved unless they show that the facility will not
prevent attainment of any ambient standard.
Finding
NPOSR-CUW does not have a complete source control and assessment program to
quantify emissions and determine impacts and related compliance requirements.
Discussion
NPOSR-CUW has no procedure or plan for ensuring that new or modified
facilities, activities, emergencies, and emissions are evaluated for potential
air impacts and that emission controls are designed which will comply with
state and Federal requirements. There is no formal system to compile,
quantify, control, and track source emissions generated by all the activities
and sources at the site (see Finding A/CF-I).
Source emission increases have been addressed individually, and often without
resolution. For example, a November 1990 Wyoming Department of Environmental
Quality (WYDEQ) letter stated that a permit application should be submitted
reflecting well vent emission increases from steam flood wells and that
controls should be designed to meet best available control technology
requirements (A-122). Records show that well vent analyses and HlS emission
information were submitted to the state in 1990 and 1991 (A -65, lzl, 125, and
126), but the information provided was incomplete and relied on an
inappropriate monitoring method to evaluate emission rates and quantities
(A-12S; I-A-6 and I-A-9). While there has been pilot testing of HzS scavenger
chemicals at tank batteries and test satellites (I -A-12), and JBEC has
proposed to install flares (I-A -31), NPOSR-CUW has not yet developed a plan to
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control Hz.S emissions . Response to the November 1990 letter remains
unresolved (A-75; I-A-IO, II, 16, 17, 22, and 25).
Testing and investigation on H2S sources and impacts has continued through at
least late 1991 (A-124) . This effort now appears to be intertwined with the
recent HzS health and environmental survey and control project (P.- 2B, 29, 30,
31, 32, 35, 36, 37, 46, and 77). To date, NPOSR-CUW does not know the
quantities of H2S emitted from wells and tanks and has not conducted an
adequate monitoring program or impact modeling to evaluate potential maximum
impacts of the production enhancement project and whether it compl ies with
Wyomi ng ambi ent standards for H2S (I-A-IO, 24, 32, and 34).
Some flares, vapo~ recovery systems, and other controls have been designed and
purchased for proJects (A-39, A-102, and A-I03), but v·irtually none are in
operation (I-A-28). Some are in storage and are being considered for reuse or
in n~w.app~ications (I-A-21 and I-A-31). These may require new design
speclflcatlons under New Source Performance Standards or may require state
permit applications when reactivated in ways that were not originally
intended.
This finding was partially identified in the management section of the
OOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992), which contained no details on
~mission inventory or compliance needs. This finding was partially identified
In.th~ JBEC self-assessment (April 1992). JBEC did not address existing
emlSSlon control techniques nor the need to incorporate emission estimates and
review of control requirements for specified facilities and modifications into
the early stages of project planning.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are inadequate ~
implementation requiring source emissions monitoring/tracking and management
programs; poor understanding of the .t:ll!\ of not controlling source emissions;
and a lack of illin.iJ:!g. A secondary contributing factor for this finding is a
lack of adequate appra i sa 1s/audi ts/reviews of projects and overall plans.

FINDING A/CF-5:

Operating Procedures for Biission Control

Perforaance Objective
ODE 5400.1, "General Environmental Protection Program," states "it is ODE
policy to conduct the Department's operations in compliance with the letter
and spirit of applicable environmental statutes, regulations, and standards."
ODE 5480.19, "Conduct of Operations," Attachment I, Chapter II, requires that
there be effective equipment monitoring to detect abnormal conditions.
Chapter VIII requires that ODE equipment and systems be properly maintained
and controlled. It also requires formal operating procedures and records
systems to control site activities for consistent results in meeting
object 1ves .
Wyoming Air Qual ity Standards and Regulations (WYAQSR), Section 14, "Control
of particulate emissions," Subsection (b), requires that visible emissions
from any source cannot be higher than 40 percent opacity. Subsection (f)
requires that all persons must prevent fugitive dust emissions exceeding
ambient air standards by using control techniques such as appl ication of oil,
water, or chemi ca 1s on roads.
Finding
Operating procedures at NPR-3 lack provisions to control emissions to ensure
compliance with Wyoming air program requirements. In addition, there has been
no formal system established for incorporating emission requirements into
procedures or for operational recordkeeping that would support compl iance
determinat ions .
Discussion
General air program requirements in Wyoming and specific Wyoming Department of
Environmental Qual ity (WYDEQ) air permits issued for sources at NPR-3 include
various requirements to reduce or limit emissions from NPR-3 (A-88, 91, 93,
104, 107 and lOB) (see Finding A/CF-I). Personnel responsible for the
operation of various types of potential air emission sources are often unaware
of the activities that must be performed to comply with these requirements.
The Environmental Subteam observed the following concerns:
Operators at the steam generators periodically monitor exhaust
flue oxygen, but have not received guidance on how this relates to
compliance with permit limits for NO. (I-A-5, I-A-7 , and I-A-37).
While the gas burners used at the steam generators and heaters
will rarely emit particulates (smoke), general plume opacity
regulations apply to these sources and the LTS Gas Plant Flare .
There are no procedures that direct operators to control and
monitor combustion to ensure compliance with the opacity limit
(I-A-5, I-A-6, and I-A-9).
No personnel have been formally deSignated as responsible for
actions to limit air emissions, such as closing the parts
degreaser 1 id and ensuring that thief hatches are closed , or for
maintaining emission related records (I-A-7 , I-A-9, and I-A- 19).
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FINDING A/CF-6:
Operating records, such as gas and oil analyses (A-52, A-62, and
A-64) and steam generator logs (I-A-5 and I-A-37), are not in
formats that support air emission inventory and permit comp1 iance
needs.
There is no formal program to ensure that problems causing excess
emissions are correcterl expeditiously or resolved in a manner that
addresses environmental needs (I-A-16 and I-A-21) (see Finding
A/CF-4) .
There is no formal system for inspection and maintenance of emission sources
and effluent contrll1 equipment, as required by DOE 5480 . 19 . For example:
A probe to monitor the oxygen content of steam generator exhaust
had melted and was no longer sampling the appropriate area in the
unrestricted exhaust stream (I-A-5).
Formal procedures for maintaining the degreaser, vehicles and fuel
pumps, LTS Gas Plant, and production tanks to minimize emissions
have not been developed (I-A-19 and I-A-6).
Equipment, such as the floating roof at the South Terminal, has
been installed to limit emisSions, but there is no program to
check seals, gaskets, or val ves for hydrocarbon 1eaks (I -A-4,
I-A-6, and I-A-9) . Oil was observed on top of the floating roof
near the riser pipe opening (I-A-9).
This finding was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment
(April 1992). DOE did not identify the need for inspection and maintenance
procedures or who would develop environmental criteria for operations . This
findin~ was partially identified in the JBEC self-assessment (April 1992) .
JBEC dld not clearly address existing sources and operating procedures.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are inadequate 1l:ii!ling to
implement regulations, and incomplete procedyres to effectively operate
emission sources and air pollution control equipment.

Gasoline Purchasing and Labeling

Perfol"llance Objective
40 CFR 80, ·Regu1ation of Fuels and Fuel Additives,· includes controls and
prohibitions for wholesale purchaser-consumers of vehicle fuels with storage
tanks of more than 550-ga110n capacity.
40 CFR 80.27, ·Contro1s and Prohibitions on Gasoline Volatility,· requires
that gasoline, dispensed in Wyoming during May through September by wholesale
consumer-purchasers, have a Reid vapor pressure (RVP) of 9 . 0 pounds per square
inch (psi) or less. When higher RVP ethanol blends are used, slightly higher
volatility limits are allowed provided the ethanol content is documented and
pumps are labeled properly.
Finding
NPOSR-CUW does not have a system in place to ensure compliance with the
labeling and Reid vapor pressure provisions set forth in 40 CFR 80.
Discussion
Sites that di spense vehicle fuel s must ensure comp1 iance with EPA control sand
prohibitions on vehicle fuels. Gasoline is dispensed at NPR-3 from tanks
having a capacity greater than 550 gallons each; therefore, NPR-3 is
classified as a wholesale purchaser-consumer subject to EPA fuel programs
(A-139).
There was no information available to document whether the RVP of
the gaso1 ine and ethanol blend used during the summer was under 9.0 psi
(I -A-19) .
The Purchasing Department was unaware of the EPA requirement 1 imiting fuel
volatility and had no documentation available concerning fuel speCifications,
in part because gaso 1 i ne is purchased on a Department of Defense contract
through a simple delivery order (I-A-27 and I-A-29).
The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessmf'nt (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) did not identify t his finding.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are the absence of procedyres to
formal ize a gaso1 ine comp1 iance program with designated review
responsibilities, and the ~ in regulations and regulatory deadlines for
comp 1 i ance.
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3.5.1.3

Best Managelllent Practice Finding

FINDING A/BMPF-I:

Manage.ent of Asbestos

PerfoA.",nce Object ive
To ensure compl iance with EPA regulations regarding demol ition and renovation
activities that might disturb asbestos fibers and requirements for the
disposal of waste asbest os from these activities, best management practices
suggest that formal procedures be in place and appropriately certified staff
be available to manage asbestos abatement if and when it is discovered .
Finding
NPOSR·CUII has not developed or implemented an asbestos management program that
would provide direction and procedures for removing, abating , or handl ing
asbestos in a way that will prevent the release of asbestos t o the
environment.
Discussion
NPOSR-CUII has not establ ished a formal asbestos management program. Roles and
responsibil ities for oversight of asbestos removal activities have not been
formally defined, and no onsite personnel are certified to handle asbestos
(I-A-IS). There are no standard operating procedures to ensure that
demol ition and renovation activities meet the notification and work practice
requirements of EPA's National Emission Standards for Asbestos.

This page intentionally left blank.

Occasionally asbestos-containing materials are found at NPR-3 (e.g., in
transite thermal insulation behind a heater). Significant amounts are found
at NOSR-I and NOSR-3 (A-I, A-82, and A-83; I-A-4). Friable asbestos is found
in pipe insulation and sheet rock in two of four buildings on the mine bench
at NOSR-I and in the water treatment plant at NOSR-3 . limited testing shows
that nonfriable asbestos-containing material was used in building siding, and
an unknown amount of this material was disposed in a draw nor th of the Quonset
Hut lIarehouse at NOSR-3. The presence of these materials poses a continuing,
potential risk of asbestos release to the environment . Historically, safety
and health standards are used as guidance for asbestos handl ing at NPOSR-CUII,
but there were no references to EPA requirements in recent contract
spec ifi cations for work that might disturb asbestos at NOSR-3 (I-A-8 and
I -A-IS) .
The DOE/NPOSR-CUII self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) did not identify this finding.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are inadequate Will and
procedures to establish a compliance program, and inadequate regulatory
1I:i1D.1n!l for personnel . A secondary contributing factor for this finding is a
lack of coordinated and comprehensive appraisals/audits/reviews of abatement
project specifi cations among the Facilities Engineering, Environmental, and
Health and Safety Departments.
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3.5.2

Syrface Water/Drjnking Water

3.5.2.1

Overview

The surface water/drinking water portion of the EnVironmental Subteam
assessment at NPOSR-CUW evaluated compl iance with Federal, state, and local
water pollution control requirements establ ished for conformance with the
Clean Water Act, as well as drinking water regulations promulgated as part of
the Safe Drinking Water Act, and conformance with local sanitation, and local
and state plumbing codes. In addition, the assessment evaluated compliance
with DOE Orders, Secretary of Energy Notices (SENs), and water pollution
contro 1 pract ices in accordance wi th state and 1oca 1 requi rements and
industry-accepted best management practices. Table 3-4 lists the regulations
and/or requirements used to assess surface water and drinking water
compliance.
The scope of the surface water/drinking water assessment included document
reviews, interviews with DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC personnel, and inspection of
facil ities in both Colorado and Wyoming. Because there has been no
development of the resources at NOSR-2 in Utah, that site was not included in
the surface water/drinking water assessment. Inspections in Colorado included
the shale pile at NOSR-3, the potential direction for storm water runoff, and
notation of the potential implications of storm water runoff. Observations
were lIlade of wastewater and groundwater sampl ing in and near West Sharrard
Creek. Inspections in Wyoming included tanks and tank batteries, National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) outfalls, tank secondary
containments, and spill control equipment. Reviews were made of the Spill
Prevention Control and Countermeasure (SPCC) Plan, its implementing
proc'ldures, personnel spill control training records, calculation of secondary
containment volumes, NPDES records, permit applications, Discharge Monitoring
Report (OMR) submittals, and correspondence with state regulatory officials.
Sampl ing for NPDES compl iance was observed. The drinking water treatment and
distribution system was inspected, documentation reviewed, and the potential
need for treatment operator certification was assessed. as well as the need
for installation of backflow prevention devices in the water distribution
system. NPOSR-CUW manages IS NPDES permits, issued by the State of Wyoming .
The permits, available permit applications, the required sampling and
analYSiS, and requiSite data reporting were reviewed to determine compliance
with regulatory requirements. As part of the surface water/drinking water
portion of the assessment, interviews were coordinated with other
Environmental Subteam special i sts to ensure that all potential issues were
addressed.
NPOSR- CUW purchases drinking water in bulk from the town of Midwest for use at
NPR- 3, adds sodium hypoch l orite to the water on an "as determined needed
basis · for additional pur i fication, and softens the water by either passage
t hrough an ion exchange bed or through a reverse osmosis unit. The softened
water is di stributed through underground piping to buildings at NPR-3, as well
as be i ng suppl i ed to various water coolers in the buildings in 5-gallon
carboys f i lled at the outlet of the reverse osmosis unit .
NPOSR- CUW i s awa i ting response frolll state regulators in Wyoming (no permit is
cons i dered needed in Colorado) regarding how to proceed toward storm water
permi tting. The WYOMing Department of Environmental Quality (WYDEQ) is still
i n the process of determining how it will manage storm water permitting for
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TABLE 3-4
LIST OF SURFACE WATER/DRINKING WATER
REGULATIONS/REQUIREMENTS/GUIDELINES

DOE 5480.1B

Environment, Safety and Health Program
for DOE Operations

DOE

DOE 5480.19

Conduct of Operations Requirements for
DOE Facil ities

DOE

DOE 5484.1

Environmental Protection Safety, and
Health Protection Information Reporting
Requi rements

DOE

40 CFR 136

Guidel ines for Establ ishing Test
Procedures for the Ana lys i s of
Pollutants

EPA

40 CFR 141 and
142

National Primary Drinking Water
Regulations

EPA

40 CFR 122 and
123

40 CFR 143

EPA

Rules and
Regulations of
Wyomi ng Oil and
Gas Conservation
COlTlllission
WYDEQ, WQ
Division
Chapter I

Wyoming Water Quality Standards

State of Wyomi ng

WYDEQ, WQ
Division
Chapter II and
III

Wyomi ng NPDES Permit Program
Regulations

State of Wyomi ng

oil and gas industry operations in the state. The approach understood to be
currently favored is issuance of a general storm water discharge permit for
the entire oil and gas industry in the state.

TABLE 3-4
LIST OF SURFACE WATER/DRINKING WATER
REGULATIONS/REQUIREMENTS/GUIDELINES

WYDEQ Rules and
Regulations,
Chapter IV

\/yomi ng Oil and Hazardous Substances
Spill Regulations

WYDEQ, WQ
Division,
Chapter V

Chapter V, Certification of Operators
State of Wyoming
of Publ ic Water and Publ ic Wastewater
Treatment Plants, Public Collection and
Public Distribution Systems

WYDEQ, WQ
Division
Chapter VII

Wyomi ng Effl uent Guide1 i nes and
Standards for Oi 1 and Gas

State of Wyomi ng

5 C.C.R. 1002-2

Co lorado Di scharge Permi t System
Regulations

State of
Colorado

5 C. C.R. 1002-3
through 7

Colorado Water Qual ity Control
Regulations

State of
Colorado

5 C.C.R. 1002-8

Colorado Water Qual i ty Standards

State of
Colorado

5 C.C.R. 1003-5

Colorado Primary Drinking Water
Regulations

State of
Colorado

25 C. R.S.
Article 8

Co lorado Water Qual i ty Control Act

State of
Colorado

State of Wyomi ng

Fifteen NPOES permits have been Issued to NPOSR-CUII by WYDEQ to manage
wastewater discharges, primarily of produced water, from outfalls at NPR-3 .
Effluent limitations have been placed on the IS discharges for oil and grease,
specific conductivity, pH, and (in some cases) chemical oxygen demand. The
majority of the discharges are intermittent, and only four outfalls are
routinely sampled. One discharge is a lIixture of produced water and
subsurface water, the subsurface water bei ng added to produce a di scharge that
wi ll meet NPDES effluent limitations. DMRs for all permitted locations are
required to be submitted to both WYDEQ and EPA Region VIII on a semi-annual
basis. There are no NPDES permits for NOSR-I and NOSR-3; however, a major
concern at NOSR-3 is the possible collapse of the shale pile and its potential
impact on waters of the United States.
Three Category IV findings were identified in the DOE 1988 Environmental
Survey of NPOSR-CUW . These findings identified : (I) an NPDES DMR deficiency
in which the number of NPDES samples taken at the site, the results of all
ana lyses, and the number of exceedances were not bel ng reported on the DMRs as
required; (2) two minor unpermitted discharges identified during the survey at
the LTS Gas Plant and at the condensate collection tank at Well 68-26sx3LPL;
arid (3) seepage observed adjacent to the 8- 1-28 pit. The second and third
findings have been remediated and are considered closed ; however, a review of
the January through June 1991 DMRs for WY0028274 (8-Tp-IO) indicated that 28
samples were taken and only 20 were reported on the DHR. Therefore, this
finding is still an issue, and evidence of remedial action is not available.
Overall, assessment of the surface water/drinking water programs at NPOSR-CUW
indicates the need for considerable effort to bring the programs into
comp 1 iance. The apparent 1ack of procedures, coupled wi th the observed
deficiencies in the SPCC Plan, underscore the need for the stated effort .
The surface water/drinking water portion of the assessment identified seven
compl iance findings and one best management practice finding. No surface
water/drinking water findings were identified regarding observations made
during the Tiger Team's visit to NOSR-I and NOSR-3. Rather, information was
provided to the qual ity assurance special ist for incorporation into a finding
regardi ng the need for an Envi ronmenta 1 Surveil 1ance Pl an and an Envi ronmenta 1
Monitoring Plan at NOSR-I and NOSR-3 . The compliance findings address NPDES
Sampling ; an unpermitted discharge; incorrect DMRs; secondary containment ;
the SPCC Plan, plan implementation, and secondary containment inadequacies;
drinking water concerns regarding the need for the water treatment operator at
NPR-3 to be state-cert i fied; and the need for NPR-3 to install, maintain, and
inspect backflow prevention devices on the potable water system. One best
management practice finding addressed the need to prepare and implement a
program to monitor for lead in the potable water system at NPR-3 .
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3.5.2.2

Coapliance Findings

FINDING SV/CF -1 :

National Pollutant Discharge Eli.ination Systell
(NPDES) SilllPling

Perfor.ance Objective
40 CFR 122.1(b), "Scope of the NPDES permit requirement, " requires Nat i onal
Pollutant Di scharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits for the discharge of
pollutants from any point source to waters of the United States . The State of
Wyoming has been granted authority by the EPA to administer the NPDES program
in the State of Wyoming.

individuals was not performed in accordance with 40 CFR 136. Therefore, the
lack of procedures and incorrect sampling indicate lack of addressing the
finding.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are inadequate procedures to
ensure that wastewater sampling is done in accordance with the requirements of
40 CFR 136, and insufficient!riinin9 in proper wastewater sarapl ing and
analyti cal techniques .
A secondary contributing factor is
appra isals/audits/reviews in that these sampling and analytical deficiencies
had not been previously identified.

The State of Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality NPDES Permits ,
"Authorization to Discharge Under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System, " Part I.B.4, require analytical procedures used to determine
compliance with state-issued NPDES permits to conform with procedures cited in
40 CFR 136.
JBEC Pol icy and Procedure No . 1. 5-09, "NPDES Monitoring," Section B. 1., states
"Environmental Specialist or des i gnee collects water :;amples in accordance
with EPA sampl ing procedures . . . . "
Finding
Wastewater samp 1 i ng at NPR-3 is not conducted in accordance with the State of
Wyoming requirements (40 CFR 136); and JBEC Policy and Procedure No. 1.5-09.
Discussion
Fifteen NPDES di scharge permits, issued by the State of Wyoming to DOE ~equire
DOE or its desi gnee to sample, preserve , and analyze, or have analyzed 1n
accordance with 40 CFR 136, its wastewater being discharged from the permitted
poi nt sources.
Neither the instrument cal i bration nor the sample collection observed by the
Environmental Subteam were performed in accordance with 40 CFR 136 . The
Environmental Subteam observed the following: instrument electrodes for the
measurement of pH and specific conductivity were not prerinsed with
cal ibration 1 iquids prior to cal ibration; cal ibration solutions were reused
rather than being discarded after use; the same al i quot of sample was used for
both pH and conductivity measurements; instrument calibrations were not
ver i fied after sample coll ection; and the sample collected for oil and grease
was not collected from the surface of the outfall . Cal ibrat i on of instruments
and collection of samples in th i s manner will not conSistently and accurately
represent actual wastewater characteristics and may result in the reporting of
inaccurate data .
This finding was partially identified in the DOE/NPDSR-CUW self-assessment
(April 1992) in that DOE identified the need for training, but did not address
adequacy of procedures or lack of appraisals/audits/reviews. This finding was
partially identified in the JBEC self-assessment (April 1992) in that JBEC
identif i ed the lack of a formalized sampling plan, but stated that sampling
procedures have been written and "are performed in the field in a manner
representative of the monitored activity . " Sampling at two locations by two
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Perfor.ance Objective

However, JBEC did n"t ident i fy inadequate supervision for implementing
regulations and permit requirements nor did JBEC identify the lack of ~ol i CY
regarding the need to verify environmental compl iance prior to '1ttemptlng
modification to permitted outfall s .

40 CFR 122.41 , "Conditions applicable to all permits, " states "The following
conditions apply to all NPDES (National Pollutant Discharge Eliminati lln
Systeat) perm i ts." "(a) Duty to comply . The permittee must comply with all
conditions of this permit. Any permit noncompl i ance with all conditions
con~titutes a ~iolation of the Clean Water Act, and is grounds for enforcement
actlon . . . .

The apparent causal factors for th i s finding are a lack of 1I:!ining in
applitabl e Federal and state regulations regarding NPDES requirements ; lack of
written procedyres to effectively implement regulations; nonexistent ~
regarding the need to verify environmental compliance prior to attemptlng
modification to permitted outfalls ; and inadequate supervis i on for
implementing regulations and permi t requirements.

FINDING SV/CF-2:

Unpenlitted Discharge

The State of WYOllling NPDES Permit Number WY0031895, Part II .A. l, states ' Any
anticipated facility expansions, production increases or process modifi cations
which will result in new, different or increased discharges of pollutants must
be reported by submission of a new NPDES application or, if such changes will
not violate the effluent limitations specified in this permit , by notice to
the permit issu i ng authority of such changes."
Finding
The quality of the wastewater discharge at outfall WY0031895, North Waterflood
Plant at NPR-3 was changed i n 1988 without notification or submission of a new
NPDES application to the permit issuing authority, as required by NPDES Permit
Number WY0031895 Part II.A.l.
Discussion
The State of Wyoming has been granted authorization by the EPA to administer
the NPDES Program in the State of Wyoming. The Memorandum of Agreement
covering this authorization is detailed in 40 CFR 123 . Basic to this
agreement is that the state requirements can be no less stringent than those
required by the EPA .
According to available documentation (SW-68), water from the Madison format i on
was cORlllingled wi th produced water from B-I-20 beginning in December 1988 in
order to di lute the effluent at outfall WY0031895 to within permit effluent
limitations . This dilution was not accompanied . y a notification or new
permi t application to the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality (WYDEQ) .
There i s evidence that WYDEQ, if not aware of the modification, was in
possess i on of documentation i n which the modification was mentioned (SW- 69).
The purpose of cORlllingling the relatively clean Madison formation water with
t he produced water was to reduce the specific conductivity (by reducing the
t otal di ssolved sol ids content) of the effluent to within effluent
l imi tat i ons . Th i s dilution constitutes treatment , which is not specified i n
the permi t .
Th i s f i nd i ng was partially ident i fied i n the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment
(Apr i l 1992) i n that DOE identified the need for training in their
self-as sessment but aid not i dentify the lack of written procedures or the
absence of pol i cy regarding the need to ver i fy environmental compliance prior
t o attempt ing modifications to permitted outfalls. This finding was partially
i dent ifi ed i n the JBEC self- assessment (April 1992) in that JBEC ident i fied
that sampl ing personnel dQ not have formal operating procedures, and that
t r ai ni ng has been i nadequate and informal regarding regulatory requirements .
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FINDING SV/CF -3:

Oi scharge Monl tori n9 Reports

Perfonaance Object ive
DOE 5480.19, "Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities, " Chapter
I.B, states that a high-level of performance in DOE operations is accomplished
by establishment of high operating standards by management; communicating
operating standards to the working level; ensuring that personnel are well
trained; and closely monitoring performance in operations.
40 CFR 122.22, "Signatories to . . . reports, " Subsection B, states that all
reports required by permits must be signed by a senior executive officer
having responsibil i ty for the overall operations of a principal geographic
uni t, or by a duly author i zed representative of that person . 40 CFR 122.22
also identifies the need for a responsible person to sign, certify, and
oversee proper distribution of these monitoring reports, which have stringent
penalties for careless, inaccurate, or improper use.

The cover letter for the July - December reports is dated January 29, 1992,
indicating that the submission was not timely (SW-65).
Thi s finding was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment
(April 1992). DOE did not identify the requirements regarding certification
and signatories as stated in 40 CFR 122 .22 .
The apparent causal factors for this finding are a lack of Q2J.ID
implementation of Federal and state regulat ions regarding the preparation and
submission of regulatory reports, and a lack of procedures to subtAit DMRs in
accordance with the regulations, DOE Orders, and permits.

40 CFR 122 . 41, "Condition applicable to all permits," Subsection K, states
"All applications , reports, or information submitted to the Director [of EPA]
shall be signed and certified. "
Farts I . B. 2, "Authorization to Discharge Under the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System, " of NPDES Permits WY0031895, WY0034037,
WY0032115, WY0034584, WY0034126, WY0035076, WY0034495, WY0034029, WY0028274,
WY0028932 , WY0028924 , WY0028916 , WY0003484 , WY0028894, and WY0028908 state
that "Dupl icate signed copies of • . . reports required herein shall be
submitted to the Regional Administrat or and the State . . . . "
Part I.B . 2 also states "Monitoring results . . . shall be . . . postmarked no
later than the 28th day of the month follow i ng the completed reporting
period . "
Finding
Discharge Monitoring Reports for NPR-3 for the January - June 1991 and
July - December 1991 reporting periods were not submitted in accordance with
the requirements of 40 CFR 122, the NPDES permits, and DOE 5480.19.
Discussion
A certi f ied letter was sent to NPOSR-CUW by the Wyoming Department of
Environmental Quality (WYDEQ) stati ng the WYDEQ had noted the lack of
si gnat ures and the mi sdirected copies of the Discharge Monitoring Reports for
J anuary 1991 - June 1991 . In the letter , the WYDEQ di rected the NPOSR-CUW to
properly complete and submit reports in the future (SW-64) . The cover letters
for t he two reporti ng periods i n quest ion were signed by someone other than
the Director of NPOSR-CUW , who has responsibil ity for the overall operat ions
of NPR-3, indicat i ng that the Director may have been unavailable to sign and
date the report s (SW-65 and SW-66) .
DOE/NPOSR-CUWhas not submitted written notice to WYDEQ naming an authorized
desi gnee t o si gn t he Di scharge Monitori ng Reports (DMR) in t he absence of the
Direct or ( I- SW-7 ) . The July 1991 - December 1991 Discharge Mon i toring Reports
were signed by an unaut horized si gnatory.
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FUlliNG SV/CF-4:

Secondary Contain.ent

FINDING SV/CF-5:

Spill Prevention Control and Counteneasure Plan

Perfor.ance Objective

Perfor.ance Objective

40 CFR llZ.3, "Requirements for preparation and implementation of Spill
Prevention Control and Countermeasure Plans," Subsection A, stat es that owners
and operators of onshore faci1 ities that could reasonably be expected to
discharge oil in harmful quantities into or upon the navigable waters of the
United States shall prepare a Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure
(SPCC) Plan in accordance with 40 CFR llZ . 7.

40 CFR llZ.3, "Requirements for preparation and implementation of Spill
Prevention Control and Countermeasure Plans," stites that owners and operators
of onshore facilities that could reasonably be expected to discharge oil in
harmful quantities into or upon the navigable waters of the United States
shall prepare and implement a Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure
(SPCC) P1 an.

40 CFR l1Z.7, "Guidelines for the preparation and implementation of a Spill
Prevention Control and Countermeasure Plan," requires the use of appropriate
containment or diversionary structures to prevent discharged oil from reaching
a navigable water course.

40 CFR llZ.7, "Guidelines for the preparation and implementation of a Spill
Prevention Control and Countermeasure Plan," provides guidelines for the
preparation and implementation of the SPCC Plan.

40 CFR llZ . 7(e)(Z)(ii) requires that bulk storage tank installations "be
constructed so that a secondary means of containment is provided for the
entire contents of the largest single tank plus sufficient freeboard to allow
for precipitation."

Finding
The SPCC Plan prepared for NPOSR-CUW, dated September 1991, does not meet the
requirements of 40 CFR 112.7, nor does it reflect actual operating conditions .

Finding

Discussion

The secondary containment volumes for some of the bulk storage tanks at NPR-3
do not meet the requirements of 40 CFR llZ.7(e)(2)(ii).

40 CFR llZ.3 states that each prepared SPCC Plan must be "fully implemented."
Implementation includes written , operating, and documented procedures for the
routine inspection and maintenance of tanks and associated piping;
construction, maintenance, and inspection of appropriate spill containment;
adequate and accessible spill control equipment; and spill control training
which ensures t hat a facility is operated in a manner that complies with all
Federal, state, and local spill control regulations. A copy of the SPCC Plan
must be maintained at each operating facility if the facility is normally
attended at 1east 8 hours per day .

Discussion
The NPOSR-CUW SPCC Plan, September 1991, Section 8 . 3, states "Bulk storage
tanks are surrounded with secondary containment dikes to prevent a spill
event . These dikes are sized and constructed with sufficient capacity to
contain at least 110 percent of the fluid from the largest tank." Calculation
of secondary containment volumes, performed in August 1991, for 18 of the 38
bulk storage tanks listed in the SPCC Plan indicated that 9 of the 18
containment volumes are less than 100 percent of the capacity of the largest
contained tank (SW-66 ; I -SW-ll). One additional secondary containment volume
was calculated to contain 106 percent of the contained tank volume.
An inspection of six secondary containment structures for tanks at NPR-3
revealed dike wear due to personnel climbing over the dike rather than using
stairs that were provided, and in one case, wear from vehicular traffic was
observed . Thus, secondary containment volumes for these tanks are likely to
be less than previously calculated .
This findi ng was not identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April
199Z) and was fully identified in the JBEC self-assessment (April 199Z) .
The apparent causal factors for this finding are inadequate JIn1!m of
secondary conta inment; a lack of implementing procedyres for performing and
documenting routine inspection and preventive maintenance of containment
structures; inadequate 1I:i1Jl1.ng of employees ; and inadequate syperyision for
illlP 1ementing regulations and permit requirements.
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40 CFR l1Z . 7 states "the complete SPCC Plan shall follow the sequence outlined
(in lIZ . 7), and include a discussion of the facility's conformance with the
appropriate guidelines (stated in lIZ.7) . "
Items noted during review of the SPCC Plan and inspections of NPR-3, NOSR-l,
and NOSR-3, which do not meet the requirements of 40 CFR l1Z . 7, include:
The SPCC Plan available at NOSR-3 is not current (I-SW-8)
(40 CFR 112 . 3(e» .
The SPCC Plan does not accurately reflect secondary containment
volumes (see Finding SW/CF-4) .
Spill control equipment (listed in Section 6 . Z. 1 of the NPOSR-CUW
September 1991 SPCC Plan) is stored at NPR-3 at the Environment,
Safety, and Health (ES&H) Building and in a "sp il l box· located in
Section ZI at a point near the confluence of Little Teapot Creek
and Teapot Creek . The equipment i n both locations is in disarray ;
material is inconvenient to access (equipment stored near the ES&H
bu i ld i ng is located i n two large bins which would require
personnel to climb inside to access stored items) ; and not all
listed items were available (for example , rope was not ava i lable
3-5Z
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Water Treatllent Systetl Operator Certification

at the ES&H Beilding, and no shovels were observed at either
location).

FINDING SV/CF -6:

There are no procedures to regularly test 1 iquid-level sensing
devices to ensure proper operation (40 CFR 112.7(e)(2)(viii)(E».

Wyoming Statutes, Title 35, Chapter II, Section 302 (W.S. 35-11-302) states
that no person shall operate a public water treatment plant or public
distribution system in violation of the requirements co~tained in Chap~er V,
Rules and Regulations, Department of Environmental Quahty, Water Quallty
Division, State of Wyoming.

Spill prevention training records are nat sufficiently annotated
to permit verification that SPCC Plan requirements are being met.
No course outline or syllabus was available for review (I-SW-12)
(40 CFR 112. 7(e)(10».

Performance Objective

There are no procedures to subject aboveground tanks to periodic
testing (40 CFR 112.7(e)(2)((vi».

The Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality Rules and Regulations, Water
Quality Division (WYDEQ/WQD), Chapter V, states that the individual
responsible for treatment system operation must hold certification at the same
level as the classification of the system for which he is responsible.

There are no written procedures to ensure that 1iquid collected in
secondary containment meets applicable water qual ity standards
prior to release, and that records of the inspection, testing, and
release are maintained (40 CFR 112.7(e)(2)(iii)(A-D).

Section 6 of Chapter V, ·Criteria for classification of plants and systems,·
includes the criteria for evaluation of potable water treatment systems .

There are no written procedures to veri fy that all aboveground
valves and pipelines are subjected to regular examination by
operating personnel (40 CFR 112.7(e)(3)(iv» .

The operator of the water treatment system at NPR-3 does not hold the proper
level certificate.

The procedure for tank truck loading and unloading does not
address the requirements stated in 40 CFR 112.7(e)(4)(ii) and
(iii), which include a containment volume available to contain the
entire truck contents, and a signal system or physical barrier
system to prevent truck departure before uncoupling and securing
the fi 11 hoses.

Discussion

The SPCC Plan does not address dikes and drainage constructed for
containment of PCB fluids (40 CFR 761.65(c)(7)(ii».

Finding

NPR-3 buys potable water from the town of Midwest, Wyoming. The NPR-3 system
serves less than 7,500 persons, and tr,~ water is treated at NPR-3 with
disinfectant and through reverse osmosis. Based on the classification
criteria in WYDEQ/WQD, Chapter V, Section 6(a), the NPR-3 water treatment
system is Class IV; therefore, the operator is required to hold a Class IV
certificate. The water treatment system operator does not hold proper
certification under Chapter V to operate the treatment plant at NPR-3.

This finding was not identified in the OOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April
1992) and was fully identified in the JBEC self-assessment (April 1992).

The OOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992) and JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) fully identified this finding.

The apparent causal factors for this finding are inadequate knowledge of the
requirements for the preparation of an SPCC Plan by personnel, and ineffective
sypervision controls for implementing policies, plans, and regulations. A
secondary contributing factor for this finding is ineffective
appraisals/aydits/reviews prior to issuance of the plan .

The apparent causal factors for this finding are that JBEC has not provided
proper !n.i.lli.!!!i for the system operator to ensure that state regulatory
requi rements are satisfied, and lack . of Qyalitv ,ssyrance/gy,litv control on
the part of DOE in permitting a prevlously identlfied situatlon to continue
without remediation.
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FlIIUN6 SV/CF-7:

Backflow Prevention Devices

Perfonaance Objective
The Plumbing Code for the State of Wyoming, Uniform Plumbing Code, Chapter 10,
Section 1002(c), states "No plumbing fixture, device or construction shall be
installed or connected to any domestic water supply, when such installation or
connection may provide a possibility of polluting such water supply or may
provide a cross-connection between a distributing system of water for drinking
and domestic purposes and water which may become contaminated by such plumbing
fixture, device, or construction unless there is provided a backflow
prevention device approved for the potential hazard."

The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) did not identify this finding .
The apparent causal factors for this finding are the inadequate knowledge and
work experience of personnel in this area, coupled with a lack of proper
1J:J.in.ing in applicable Federal, state, and local laws and regulations.

Section 1003 of the Plumbing Code states "All devices installed in a potable
water supply for protection against backflow shall be maintained in good
working condition by the person or persons having control of such devices."
DOE 4330.4A, "Maintenance Management Program," states "The maintenance
management program for all DOE facilities be consistent with (OaF. 4330.4A) and
that property is maintained in a manner which promotes operational safety,
worker health, environmental protection and compliance . . . . " "Structures
components, and systems (active and passive) that are important to safe
operation of a property or facility shall be subject to a maintenance program
to ensure that they meet or exceed their design requirements throughout the
life of the . . . facility . " "Periodic examination of . . . systems . . . and
equipment be performed to determine deterioration or technical obsolescence
which threaten performance and/or safety ."
DOE 6430.IA, "General Design Criteria," Section 0266-2, states that the
quality of domestic water within distribution systems serving DOE facilities
sha 11 be protected from degradat i on by i nsta 11 at i on of backfl ow prevent i on
devices, and that domestic water shall comply with all state, regional, and
local requirements. New, modified, or newly acquired systems are to be in
comp 1 i ance with thi s Order .
Finding
NPOSR-CUW has not established a program to ensure that backflow prevention
devices are installed, tested, and maintained where needed throughout NPR-3 .
Discussion
Backfl ow prevent i 9n devices are requi red by the Uniform Pl umbi ng Code at
points or potential points of cross-connections to ensure the purity of the
potable water system. Within a facility, whenever potable water is used in an
industrial process, including water hoses laying in sinks or drains (as
observed in the NPR-3 office building men's room), the connection of the
industrial process to the water distribution system is considered a
"cross-connecti on ." The water distribution system in these cases must be
protected by approved backflow protection devices, which could include an air
gap, vacuum breaker, or check valve. When mechanical backflow prevention
devices are util ized to protect against cross-connections, they lIust be
properly lIIaintained, and periodically inspected to ensure proper operation.
NPR-3 has no program i n place to isolate its potable water system from sources
of potential contamination (I -SW-13).
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3.5.2.3

Best Manage.ent Practice Finding

FINDING SV/BNPF-I:

Lead Testing of the NPR-3 Potable Vater

Perfonaance Objective
Best lIIanagement practices suggest monitoring potable water systems for lead at
facilities whose water distribution systems were constructed using lead-based
products.
Finding
NPOSR-CUl/ does not have a formal program to monitor for lead in its potable
water supply system at NPR-3.
Discussion
The use of solder, containing 50 percent lead, to join copper pipe and tubing
in potable water systems was prohibited in June 1986 by the EPA. The potable
water supply system at NPR-3, 1r stalled in the 1970s, used copper supply lines
joined by using lead-containIng solder (SW-61 and SW-62; I-SW-13).
OOE/NPOSR-CUW recognized the potential for lead to be present in the drinking
water at NPR-3 and requested the management and operation contractor at the
time, Lawrence-All ison &. Associates West, to conduct sampl ing and analysis for
the presence of lead (SW- 62). Two samples were collected in 1987 , one from
the potable water transport truck and one from a building water tap. Analyses
performed by a subcontractor detected no lead at or above the maximum
permitted concentration level of 0.05 mg/L. No NPR·3 potable water samples
have been tested for lead since that initial event, and there is no formal
program to mon i tor for 1ead.

This page intentionally left blank.

According to EPA guidelines, a lead monitoring program is not necessary if
lead solder has not been used in the past 10 years. There are no records at
NPR-3 to document when the use of lead soldet· was discontinued .
The OOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self- assessment
(April 1992) did not identify this finding
The appar ent causal factor for this finding is a lack of Q2J.ky to sample for
lead i n potable water.
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3.5.3

Groundwater/Soils. Sedl"nts. and Bjota

3.5.3.1

Overview

TABlE 3-5
LIST OF GROUIOIATER/SOILS, SIDIMElfTS, All) BIOTA
REGULATIONS/REQUIREMENTS/GUIDELINES

The purpose of the groundwater/soils, sedi.ents, and biota portion of the
Environ.ental Subteam assess.ent of NPOSR-CUW was to: (1) evaluate the
progr....tlc and technical status of protection and monitoring programs for
groundwater, soils, sedi.ents, and biota; (2) evaluate the potentlal for, and
actual contllllination of, these IIIfdia by radiological and nonradiological
constituents as a result of past and present operations; and (3) evaluate
prograJlls and procedures established to prevent future contamination and to
prevent the spread of existing contllllination. The programs and field
activities were evaluated against the criteria established in DOE Orders;
Federal, state, and local regulations and guidance; industry guidance; and
best IRanagetllent practices 1 isted In Table 3-5.
The scope of the groundwater/soils, sediments, and biota assessment included
docu.ent reviews, interviews with DOE/NPOSR- CUW and JBEC personnel, and
inspection of facil ities in both Colorado and Wyoming . Because there has been
no development of resources at NOSR- 2 in Utah, that site was not included in
the groundwater/soils, sedi.ents, and biota assessment. Documents reviewed
included reports, depart.ental abstracts, .emoranda, regulatory documentation,
and an interagency agreement. Additional information was obtained through
consultation with inactive waste sites, surface water, waste management,
radiation, and qual ity assurance specialists on the Environmental Subteam.
Onsite inspections were conducted to eXlllline groundwater monitoring wells,
identify potential sources of groundwater contllllination, and verify documented
infonlation reviewed during the assess.ent . Sample collection, equipment
cal ibration, documentation, and recordkeeping were observed during a routine
groundwater sampling event .
This overview is divided into three sections: the groundwater environ.ent;
the soils, sedll11ents, and biota environment; and a sUlllllary of the findings.

DOE

Standards and Interim Status Standards
for Owners and Operators of Hazardous
Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal
Facilities

EPA

OSWER Di rect i ve
9283.1-2

Guidance on Remedial Actions for
Contami nated Groundwater at Superfund
Sites

EPA

OSWER Directive
9502.00- 60

RCRA Facil ity Investigation (RFI)
Guidance

EPA

OSWER Di rect i ve
9950.1

RCRA Ground Water Monitoring Techn ical
Enforcement Guidance Document/Guidance
for Conducting .Re.edial Inv~stigations

EPA

SW-846

Test Methods for Evaluation of Solid
Waste/PhYSical Chemical Methods

EPA

EPA-600/4-79-019

Handbook for Analytical Qual ity Control
in Water and Wastewater Laboratories

EPA

Groyndwater
Ongoing operat i ons at NPOSR-CUW have the potential to impact groundwater.
Potential contllllinant sources include historical and current industrial and
sanitary wastew~ter discharges , reserve and produced water pits, underground
storage tanks, the landfill and land fanl, well pads, tank batteries, and the
shale pile. The prinCipal types of potential contaJllinants are petroleull
hydrocarbons and those resulting frOil site operations and associated
exploration and production wastes.

DOl (BLM)

NPR-3 Is located approxi mately 35 mlles north of Casper, Wyoming. NPR-3 Is
located over the crestal axis of an asy.etrlcal doubly-plunging anticline In
the Teapot DOlle Oilfield. NPR-3 contains 9,481 acres located on a 7 IIlles
north-south and 2 IIlles east-west axis. The prllRary NPR-3 lIisslon is to
produce 011 at the lIaxl _ effiCient rate (MER) . As a result of MER
cOlllllt.ents, 1,189 well s, 10 production batteries, and 28 test satellites have
been constructed as of July 2, 1992.

WOGCC

WOGCC
Chapter
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Solid Waste Management Rules, General
Provisions
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TABLE 3-5
LIST Of GROIIIlIIATER/SOIlS, SIDIMENTS, AND BIOTA

REGULATIONS/REQUIREMENTS/GUIDELINES

Rules 10. 11. and
12

Water Well Construction and Pump
Installation Rules

Colorado Office
of the State
Engineer

The hydrogeologic setting at NPR-3 consists of two groundwater regimes:
shallow perched alluvial aquifers located in draws and arroyos and the deeper
aquifers. The perched aquifers are located beneath little Teapot Creek and
its tributaries and have resulted frOll discharged waters at the B- Tp-l0 and
the North Waterf100d continuous discharge points. Two formations, Tensleep
and Madison. produce Class III water suitable for 1 ivestock consumption . The
Madison aquifer 1 ies below the deepest oil producing formation at an
approximate depth of 6.000 feet . The high thermal gradient at NPR-3 results
in water temperatures of approximately I80·F. The Madison aquifer can be a
high yielding fresh water aquifer and is util ized for the North Waterflood
project. Tensleep water is used for drilling and steam generation.
No
significant upper or intermediate aquifers. of Class III or better qual ity.
have been detected during the drilling of oil wells at NPR-3. The upper and
intermediate aquifers produce saline. nonpotable water or a mixture of
hydrocarbons and water.
Groundwater monitoring wells at NPR-3 were installed as a result of Wyoming
Department of Envi ronmenta1 Qual ity regulatory requirements for 1 andfill s .
There are five groundwater monitoring wells at the landfill. Three of the
five wells were constructed by air drilling. which is not an approved drilling
method for environmental investigations. Groundwater monitoring at NPR-3 is
conducted by JBEC Environmental Department staff. The groundwater monitoring
wells are sampled to determine if contamination is impacting the perched
aquifer at the landfill operations. At present. environmental sampling has
not been conducted to determine whether NPR-3 operations have impacted the
Madi son or other aqui fers.
NOSR-J and NOSR-3 are located approximately 8 miles west of Rifle. Colorado .
NOSR-l has a mean elevation of approximately 9.000 feet above sea level.
NOSR-3 has elevations ranging from approximately 6,000 feet above sea level at
the southern boundary. to 9.300 feet above sea level at the northern boundary .
NOSR-l and NOSR-3 occupy 40.760 and 14.130 acres. respectively .
The hydrogeologic setting for NOSR-I consists of four groundwater regimes.
with complex recharge and discharge regimes. extensive geologic faulting. and
highly variable stratigraphy . Groundwater is available from four aquifers.
Test shale oil assay core holes, previously used to determine if industrial
quantities of groundwater were available for oil shale development . were
"retrofitted with monitoring wells. Groundwater monitoring at NOSR -J has not
been conducted since 1981 .
The primary NOSR-3 mission is to protect DOE's natural gas resources by
preventing other operators from draining NOSR-3 natural gas . Thirty-five
natural gas wells were operating on NOSR-3 as of 1992 . NOSR-l remains
inactivate since production of oil from shales is not economically viable at
present .
The hydrogeologic s~tting of NOSR-3 consists of two groundwater regimes:
shallow perched alluvial aquifers located in draws and arroyos and a reliable
groundwater source in the Mesaverde Formation. An approximately 400 . 000-ton
shale pile abuts West Sharrard Creek. which is a tributary to the Colorado
River. A perched alluvial aquifer is located beneath West Sharrard Creek.
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Groundwater monitoring at NOSR-3 is conducted by the Environmental Department
of JBEC. The existing groundwater monitoring well network at NOSR-3,
consisting of 19 perched alluvial groundwater monitoring wells, was developed
as a result of a Cooprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) investigation of the shale pile . Information is
available to document that NOSR-3 operations have impacted the perched
all uvi a1 aquifer.
Soil s . Sediments. and Bjota
NPR-3 lies along the eastern flank of Teapot Dome in the Powder River Basin.
Strata dip approximately 11' to the east . Surface formations at Teapot Dome
include Upper Cretaceous Parkman Sand and Steele Shale. Other cretaceous
fOl'1lations that have been penetrated in drilling include: Parkman Sandstone,
Upper Steele Shale Member, Sussex Sandstone Member, Middle Steele Shale
Metaber, Shannon Sandstone Member, lower Steele Shale Member, Niobrara Shale,
Frontier, Mowry , Muddy and Thermopolis, Dakota and lakota .
NPR-3 is part of a vast grassland biome located in a semi-arid vegetative zone
occurring at approxilHtely 5,200 feet above sea level. The vegetation is
lIainly shortgrass and big sagebrush. However, the area exhibits signs of past
alteration, including sagebrush control and invasion of non-native plant .
NPR-3 supports large game consisting primarily of mule deer and North American
pronghorn . There are numerous other maJIIIIals including mountain lions,
coyotes, raccoons, striped skunks, badgers, foxes , prairie dogs, rabbits , and
deer lIice . Reptiles and amphibians include salamanders, lizards,
non-poisonous snakes, and prairie rattlesnakes . There are many species of
birds at NPR-3 including prairie falcons , golden eagles, red tailed hawks,
great horned owls, and kestrels. Based on reports by the WYOiling Game and
Fish Department , the bald eagle, an endangered species, is known to forage
over NPR-3 during the winter months.
There are no prograJlls to monitor the illPact of site operations on soils and
sedillents, and programs to monitor biota are inforIH1. NPOSR-CUII does not
issue soils, sediments, or bi ota monitoring or surveillance reports for NPR-3.
No onsite or offsite terrestrial wildlife and vegetation are sampled.
The most significant structure on NOSR-I is a syncline trenching northwest
frOll the southwestern portion. NOSR-I is underlain by oil shales of the Green
River fonaation . The following formations underlie NOSR-I and NOSR-3:
Evacuat i on Creek, Parachute Creek, Garden Gulch, Douglas Creek, Wasatch, Fort
Union , Upper Mesaverde , Cameo, Poll ins, Mancos Tongue, Cozzetle, Corcoran, and
Mancos Shale . Oil shale occurs in three lIaj or zones, the rich Mahogany and
Upper and lower Mahogany Zones.
NOSR-3 cons i sts of the Caesta Scarp of the Roan Pl ate au . The escarpment ri ses
nearly 4,000 feet above the Colorado River. The top 1,000 feet is a vertical
cliff eroded by chemical and physical weathering, subject to rock fall and
sheet wash . Moderate slopes are under the influence of talus creep. A change
in degree of slope is evident at contact between the Green River and Wasatch
fOrlHtions . NOSR-3 contains 1 ittle oil shale; however, natural gas
reservoirs, the Parachute, Rulison, and Grand Valley, underlie
NOSR-3 .
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The NOSR-I and NOSR-3 sites contain 14 plant cOllll1unities located in 3
vegetative zones: semi-desert, escarpment, and plateau area. The lower
vegetative area , the semi-desert, occurs between 5,200 and 6,400 feet above
sea level. Vegetation in this area is typically salt bush, greasewood, and
sagebrush shrubs . At the escarpment area of the Roan Cliffs, at elevations
ranging from 5,400 to 8,400 feet above sea level, much of the area is eroded
and devoid of plant growth, but juniper woodland cover occurs in sheltered
areas . The plateau area occurs at elevations frOil 8,000 to 9,100 feet above
sea level . Northern slopes support aspen, Douglas fir, and mountain grasses,
whereas the southern slopes typically support sagebrush.
NOSR-I and NOSR-3 support a diverse wildlife population consisting of bighorn
sheep, deer, elk, black bears, mountain lions, coyotes, beaver, and bobcat.
There are numerous small mannals including squirrels, moles, weasels, mice,
and rabbits. There are approximately 65 species of birds identified,
including the peregrine falcon, an endangered species. The Colorado River,
which is adjacent to NOSR-3, supports a variety of aquatic wildlife.
Soil and sediment sampling and monitoring are not performed. NPOSR-CUII does
not issue soils, sediments, or biota monitoring or surveillance reports for
NOSR-I and NOSR-3. No onsite or offsite terrestrial wildlife or vegetation
are sampled.
The 1988 Environmental Survey identified one category III issue at the Anvil
~oints Oil Shale Experiment Station: groundwater and soil contamination from
the NOSR-3 shale pile. Groundwater monitoring wells and lysimeters have been
installed to sample and analyze groundwater in proximity to the shale pile .
Concentrations of contaJllinants are steadily declining in the groundwater
monitoring wells. JBEC has not scheduled remedial activities for the shale
pile.
The overall assessment is that NPOSR-CUII's monitoring activities for
groundwater have been informal, inconSistently implemented, and insufficient
to fully determine the impacts of DOE operations on the environment.
Additionally, there are no formal monitoring programs for soils, sedimen · s,
and biota . The activities have been implemented by a small number of
technical personnel, without significant oversight from DOE/NPOSR-CUW or JBEC
managel1!ent. The JBEC personnel responsible for environmental program
implementation do not have the requisite environmental technical knowledge and
expert i se in these areas .
The groundwater/soils, sediments, and biota assessment identified seven
compliance findings. The findings were related to the groundwater protection
management program, hydrogeologiC monitoring well networks, groundwater
sampling procedures, closure and protection of wells and boreholes, oil well
abandonment management and surveillance , unauthorized use of disposal wells,
and contami nated soil management.
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3.5.3.2

F1IGlING GV/CF-2:

Ca.pliance Findings

FIIIlING GV/CF -I:

Groundwater Protection Manage.ent Progra. Plan

Perforaance Objective
DOE 5400.1, "General Environmental Protection Program," Chapter III, Section
4. a, requires that a Groundwater Protection Management Program Plan (GPHPP) be
cOllPleted by May 1990.

Sitewide

~drogeological

Monitoring Well Network

Perfor.ance Objective
DOE 5400.1, Chapter IV, Section 9, specifies "Groundwater that is or could be
affected by DOE activities shall be monitored to determine and document the
effects of operations on groundwater quality and quantity to demonstrate
compliance with DOE requirements and applicable Federal, state, and local laws
and regulations." This was to have been implemented by November 9, 1991.

NPOSR-CUW has not prepared a Groundwater Protection Management Program Plan
(GPHPP) in accordance with DOE 5400 . 1.

Chapter I, Section 4, "Exemption Procedures," states "Requests for exemptions
from appl icable environmental protection standards are not encouraged.
However, in limited cases, progralll1latic circumstances or operational
conditions may warrant such requests in accord with the following procedures ."
Subsection 4.b includes procedures to be followed to obtain exemptions.

Discussion

Finding

A GPHPP has not been prepared for NPOSR-CUW as requi red by DOE 5400.1.
The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) fully identified this finding .

NPOSR-CUW has neither installed sitewide hydrogeological monitoring well
networks for NPR-3, NOSR-l, and NOSR-J that are sufficient to characterize the
impact of DOE operations on groundwater quality, as required by DOE 5400 . 1,
nor have they applied for an exemption from these requirements.

The apparent causal factor for this finding is Dol icy implementation in that
DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC have not impleaented the GPHPP requirement of
DOE 5400.1.

Discussion

Finding

NPOSR·CUW has not installed a sitewide hydrogeological monitoring well network
for NPR-3 and NOSR-3, as required by DOE 5400 . 1. The existing groundwater
monitoring well network at NPR-3 was developed as a result of Wyoming
Department of Environmental Quality regulatory requirements for solid waste
disposal landfills and does not fulfill the requirements of DOE 5400 . 1. The
existing groundwater monitoring well network at NOSR-l was developed as a
result of a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and liabili t y
Act (CERCLA) investigation of the retorted shale pile and also does not
ful fill the requirements of DOE 5400.1.
In addition to the issues noted above, the Environmental Subteam observed the
following concerns with the NPR-l and NOSR-l hydrogeological monitoring well
network programs:
The surface and subsurface geology, stratigraphy, and
hydrostratigraphy have not been defined and described, includ ing
regional setting and site-specific conditions . The descript i ons
do not include identification of aquifers, surface
water/groundwater re 1at i onshi ps, and 1oca1 water-use factors
(I-GW·47) .
The di recti on of groundwater flow has not been defined for each
aquifer or hydrostratigraphic unit . Contour maps showing the
configuration of the piezometric surface of each unit are not
available (I-GW·47) .
The vertical gradients between aquifers and intervening confin ing
units to define geology and structure between aquifers have not
been determined (I·GW-47).
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Hydrogeologic characteristics such as hydraulic conductivity,
transmissivity, saturated thickness, and effective porosity have
not been measured. This information will determine groundwater
flow direction and recharging capacity of the aquifers to support
sitewide characterization required by DOE 5400.1 (I-GII-47).
The monitoring well networks do not have sufficient stations to
determine the quality of the groundwater entering and leaving the
site. Thus, comparisons between upgradient and downgradient
conditions in all defined hydrostratigraphic units to detect and
evaluate potential offsite releases of contaminants is not
possible (I-GII-47).
The monitoring well network described in the NOSR- l Hydrology Data Book,
Volumes I-IV, was developed for a groundwater feasibility study to determine
if industrial quantities of groundwater were available for oil shale
development. These groundwater monitoring wells were not designed to address
sitewide issues and are not adequate to characterize the complex
hydrogeological conditions of the NOSR-l geology. The following deficiencies
in the NOSR-l sitewide hydrogeological monitoring well network were identified
by the Environmental Subteam:
The monitoring wells were constructed utilizing oil field
technology. Pipe dope, which could affect groundwater monitoring
analytical results, was observed on pipe thread protectors in the
nested monitoring wells (I -GII-4 and I-GII-4B).
There are no contour maps showing configuration of the piezometric
surface of each aquifer and hydrostatic unit to define groundwater
flow direction to support sitewide characterization required by
DOE 5400 . 1 (I-GII-48).
No documentation of plugging and abandonment of United States
Bureau of Mines (USBM) coreholes is available (I-GII-8).
Three noncontiguous NOSR-l parcels of land have no groundwater
mon i tori ng wells to define groundwater conditions to support
s itewide characteri zation required by DOE 5400 . 1 (I-GII-48) .
The DOE/NPOSR-CUII self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(Apri l 1992) fully identified this finding .
The apparent causal factor fo r this finding is policy implementation in that
NPOSR-CUII has not adequately implemented the DOE 5400 . 1 policy to establish a
sitewi de hydr ogeological monitoring well network, nor applied for an
exempt i on.

FilmiNG GV/CF-3:

Groundwater Sa.pling Procedures

Perfor.ance Objective
DOE 5400.1, "General Environmental Protection ProgrUl," Chapter IV,
"Environmental Monitoring Requirements," requires that a quality assurance
program (QAP) consistent with DOE 5700.6B [superseded by DOE 5700.6C],
"Quality Assurance," be implemented by Noveillber 9, 1991. Specifically, the
QAP must include field quality control and chain-of-custody procedures.
DOE 5400.1, Chapter III, Section 4.a, "Groundwater Protection Management
Program [Plan]," lists comprehensive requirements for groundwater monitoring.
The plan was required to be completed by November 9, 1991.
DOE 5400.1 lists SII-846, Test Methods for Eva]yating Solid lIaste.
PhYSical/Chemical Methods, and EPA-600/4-79-019, Handbook for Analytica]
Oyality Control in lIater and lIastewater Laboratories, as selected references
for environmental monitoring.
EPA-600/4-79-019, Chapter 12, states that samples must be accompanied by a
chain-of-custody record that includes the name of the study, collectors'
signatures, station number, station location, date, tillie, type of sample,
sequence number, number of container, and analyses required .
SII-846 states that an essential part of any sampling/analytical scheme is
ensuring the integrity of the sample from the time of collection to data
reporting . The possession and handling of samples should be traceable from
the time of collection through analysis and final disposition.
Office of Solid lIaste and Emergency Response (OSIIER) 9950 . 1, "Groundwater
Monitoring Technical Enforcement Guidance Document," discusses specific
procedures for sample collection, including Section 4.2.4, "Sample
lIithdrawal"; Section 4.3.3, "Special Handling Requirements"; and Section 4. 4,
"Chai n-of-Custody. "
Finding
NPOSR-CUII groundwater sampling activities are not consistent with the DOE
5400 . 1 requi rements for QAPs and OSIIER 9950.1.
Discussion
DOE 5400 . 1 requires that a QAP must be implemented that includes field quality
control and chain -of-custody procedures. Sampling and chain-of-custody
guidelines specific to groundwater monitoring are outl ined in OSIIER 9950.1.
JBEC personnel indicated that no site-specific groundwater sampling procedures
have been written to implement DOE 5400.1 and the OSIIER guidelines (I -GII-5).
The Environmental Subteam observed one demonstration groundwater sampling
event (June 17 , 1992). Dur i ng the sampling event, the following deficiencies
were observed:
Preparation for pH measurement included "wetting" the probe with
the protect i ve cap in place . This would not allow the probe to be
in contact with the sample (I - SI1- 5) (see Finding QA/CF-4).

3-67

/1&

3-68

JI7

lIell No. OR-5, a low yield well, was not purged prior to sampling.
low yield wells, while they present unique purging problems,
should be purged prior to sampling to ensure that a representative
groundwater sample is taken.
A calculation of groundwater well volume, which is necessary to
detel"lline well-specific purging and sampling requirements, was not
perfonll!d.
Bailed water was Simply poured on the ground, rather than
collected. Groundwater IIIay contain hazardous constituents and
IlUSt be collected, analyzed, and properly disposed .
Only one field lleasurement of pH, temperature, and conductivity
was llade at the time of the sample collection . Ty.pically, these
field measurements are taken at a lIinilllllll of the first, second,
and third well bore purge volumes in order to ensure that
groundwater has flowed into the well bore (I-GII-5).

Training is not provided to sampling technicians to ensure that
proper sampling techniques are used to collect samples (see
Finding QA/CF-5).
This finding was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUII self-assessment
(April 1992) and was partially identified in the JBEC self-assessment (April
1992). Neither of the self-assessments identified all of the deficiencies
observed by the Envi ronmenta 1 Subteam.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are procedures, 1n1nirul, and
syperyision. The sampling team did not adhere to OSIIER guidance for sample
collection, and there was no fonnal procedure to train sampl ing technicians.
No direction has come from management to implement an aggressive sampling
training program. A secondary contributing factor is a lack of
appraisals/aydits/reyiews to ensure compliance with current sallJ)ling
requirements.

JBEC does not have fOl"llal equipment decontamination procedures to
prevent sample contamination (I-GII-5).
Sampling personnel did not wear clean gloves during well
evacuation and sampling, which is a suggested practice of the
Technical Enforceillent Guidance Document and helps to ensure sample
integrity.
The electronic water level probe was decontaminated only with
deionized water and a paper towel, which does not meet the
recolll1K!ndat ions of OSIIER 9950. I.
Groundwater samples collected for dissolved metal analysis were
not filtered prior to being preserved, which results in a total
metals value rather than a dissolved metals value.
Volatile organic samples were not collected first, and when
collected, they were transferred to the sample vials in such a
manner that air bubbles were trapped in the vial (I-GII-5) .
According to OSIIER 9950.1 , volatile organic samples should be
collected prior to other samples. Sample vials with air bubbles
will not provide an accurate analytical concentration of volatile
organics.
Chain-of-custody procedures did not contain the following
elements:
Sample labels did not indicate the type of analytical
parameters to be tested froll each bottle;
Sample seals were not used to ensure integrity; and
No chain-of-custody record was available to track sample
possession (I -QA-23) (see Finding QA/CF - ll).

3-69

3-70

II/{

I/q

FIlIlING GII/CF-4:

Closure and Protection of Wells and Boreholes

Perforuoce Object ive
DOE 5400 .1, "General EnvironllN!ntal Protection PrograJI, " Section 5.a, "Policy ,·
requires that DOE "lIIinillllze risks to the environment or public health, and
anticipate and address potential environmental problellls before they pose a
threat to the quality of the environllN!nt or public welfare.·

This finding was not Identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUII self-assessllN!nt
(April 1992) or i n the JBEC self-assessllN!nt (April 1992).
The apparent causal factor for this finding is policy imoleillentation In that
NPOSR-CUII has not adequately illlpleillented WYOlling and Colorado regulatory
requireMents. A secondary contributing factor for this finding is
appraisals/aydits/reylews in that the well s have not been previously
identified as needing either peT'llits and IIIlntenance or abandonllent.

Revised and Allended Rules and Regulations of the Colorado Office of the State
Engineer Board of EXillliners of Water Well Construction and Pump Installation
Contractors, Rule 10, requires that all wells, when unattended, be securely
sealed, capped, or covered. Rule 11 requires that abandoned wells be plugged
and sealed to prevent groundwater conta-ination. Rule 12 requires that all
IIOnitoring wells be plugged and abandoned within 1 year of their construction
unless a pel'1llt is obtained for continued use.
WYOlling DepartllN!nt of EnvironllN!ntal Quality (WYDEQ), Water Quality Rules and
Regulations, Chapter XI, Part G, "Well Construction," Section 62, lists
cOllPrehenslve requireillents for closure and protection of wells and boreholes.
Finding
Active, inactive, and abandoned IIOnitoring wells, piezometers, and cased
boreholes at NPOSR-CUII have not been adequately closed or sealed as required
by Colorado Office of the State Engineer and WYDEQ requirellN!nts .
Discussion
At NPOSR-ClTII sites, there are IIOnltoring wells, lysillN!ters, and cased
boreholes that are not properly secured or protected In accordance with
Colorado and WYOlllng regulations. These unsecured wells, lysillleters, and
cased boreholes present potential pathways for groundwater contaJIination.
During inspections of IIOnltorlng wells, lysilleters , and cased boreholes the
Environllental Subtealll Identified the following deficiencies:
At the NPR-3 industrial landfill, no locks had been installed on
three groundwater IIOnitorlng wells : 17-32-X-3 , A-7-63-X-4 , and
17-33-X-3 (I-GW-l7).
At NPR-3, no locks had been installed on two groundwater wells
located at the land faT'll: 88-13-X-4 and 78-55 - X-4 (I -GW-54).
At NOSR- 1, the lock on Corehole No. 22 was lIIissi ng, and the well
had been vandalized (I-GW-4).
At NOSR-3, no locks had been installed on groundwater IIOnitorlng
wells, ciSed test borings, and one lysilleter : AV-1, AV-9, OR- 7,
AV - 4A, AV-4B, ORC -1, and two cased bore holes at the Rulison Mine
spent shale pile.
NPOSR-CUII has not plugged and sealed abandoned wells at NOSR-1 and
NOSR-3 to prevent 9roundwater conta-Inatlon nor have t hey obtained
a continued use pefillit is required by Rule 11 and 12,
respectively. All wells were Installed prior to 1988.
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Oil Ve11 Abandon.ent Manage.ent Progra.

F1I1lII1G CF/GII-5:
Perfonunc:e Objective

Navy lIell 101 A 29 was plugged by welding a plate to the
casing. Additionally, the well does not have an abandonment
Arker (I-GII-36).

No abandoned well Anage.ent progra. is in place to ensure the integrity of

DOE 5400.1, "General Environllll!ntal Protection PrograJII, " Section 5.a, "Policy,"
requires that DOE ".i ni.ize risks to the environment or public health, and
anticipate and address potential environmental problems before they pose a
threat to the quality of the environment..or public welfare."
Vyo.ing Oil and Gas Conservation Coaaission (WOOCC) Rules and Regulations ,
Section III, Rule 315, "Plugging of wells, stratigraphic tests, core , or other
exploratory holes," (For. 4) states "It shall be the duty of any owner or
person who assWll!s ownership, operator, or contractor drilling any well,
seis.ic, stratigraphic test, core or other exploratory hole, whether cased or
uncased, regardless of diueter, to plug said hole in accordance with the
require.ents of the Supervisor or as set forth hereinafter and in a manner
sufficient to properly protect possible and probable oil or gas bearing
fOrAt ions. "
WOOCC Rules and Regulations, Section III, Rule 317, requires that all
abandoned wells be Arked wi th a permanent monument, plug, or seal and
specifies the infonaation that must be shown on the marker.

previously plugged and abandoned oil wells . It is illPortant to inspect
plugged and abandoned oil wells periodically to deter.ine if ce.ent plugs are
holding and to inspect the integrity of the casings. lIithout such a progra.,
the potential exists for surface water to i8pact oil bearing fOrAtions. The
Environ8enta1 Subtea. observed the following deficiencies in the integrity of
abandoned wells:
lIell No . 108 A 29 was observed to be leaking. lIater frOll an
unknown source has pooled aro~nd the abandonment IIOnWll!nt ins i de
the well casing (I-GII-36).
lIell No. 111 A 29 was observed to be leaking. lIater fro. an
unknown source is located in the annulus between the tubing and
the casing .
lIell No. 51 SHX 15 is not properly cetaented . This has resulted in
the abandonment monument IIOving freely in the casing.
Additionally, fluid was observed in the casing approxillately 10
feet fro. the surface .

Finding
Abandoned, temporarily abandoned, or plugged and abandoned oil wells at NPR-3
are not adequately managed to protect possible or probable oil or gas-bearing
formations.
Discussion

There are abandoned oil wells located throughout NPR-3 that are not adequately
secured. These oil wells were never put into production, and no effort has
been Ade to effectively secure these wells . The oil well casings are open to
the environment , which creates an i_diate pathw~ to groundwater and/or oil
bearing fonaations. EXillples of unsecured open-ended oil well casings are as
follows:

NPOSR-CUII has not developed an oil well abandonment management program at
NPR-3. The J8EC Technical Service group has generated a series of inventory
prograJlls for listing oil well status (I -Gil-57) . However, no formal
abandonment management program exists for utilizing the inventory program as a
management tool to assess the condition of plugged and abandoned oil wells .

lIell No. 48 SHX 2 was observed to have water in the casing.
Additionally, approximately 20 cubic yards of diesel-contaJllinated
. oil is located approxillate1y 30 feet upgradient frOll the oil well
casing. The potential exists for rain to transport this
contaJllinated soil into the well bore .

The following issues regarding oil well abandonment were identified by the
Environmental Subteam:

lIell Nos. 84 SHX 4, 33 X 23, and 25 JX 10 were covered with
plastiC buckets .

The U. S. Navy oil wells were improperly plugged and abandoned when
operation of the oil field was shut down during the Teapot Dome
affair i n 1928. For example :

11,11 No. 51 STX 26 was covered with a road cone.
lie11 No. 32 SX 23 was covered wi th a thread protector over the
casing .

The Navy lIell 204 A 34 plugging log indicates that the well
was mudded up and the casing was plugged with SOil. and not
properly plugged and abandoned (I -GII-36) .

The DOE/NPOSR-CUII self- assessment (April 1992) and the J8EC self-assessment
(April 1992) did not i dentify this finding.

The Navy lIell 201 2 38 79 plugging log indicated that the
well was plugged with rocks and cement , which is not an
accepted plugging technique. In addition, the well is not
i dent i fi ed wi th an abandonment marker .

The appar ent causal factors for this finding are policy implementation and
~. NPOSR-CUII has not implemented an oil well abandonment Anagement
progra. that complies with \IOGCC Rules 315 and 317 . The pluggingfabandonllent
..thods used are not sufficient to protect groundwater and oil-bearing

The Navy lIell 101 A 28 plugging log indicated that the well
was not properly abandoned (I-GII-36) .
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fOnAtions. A secondary contributing factor for this finding is insufficient
appraisals/audits/reviews to periodically assess the condition of all oil
wells at NPR-3.

FIlIlING GV/CF-6:

Unauthorized Use of Disposal Wells

PerfonAnce Objective
DOE 5400 . 1, 'Genera1 Environmental Protection Progrill,' Section 5.a, states
'It is DOE policy to conduct its operations in an environmentally safe and
sound llanner. Protection of the environment and the public are
responsibil ities of parillOunt illlPortance and concern to DOE. Accordingly , it
is DOE policy to conduct the Department's operations in cOlllj)liance with the
letter and spirit of applicable environmental statutes, regulations, and
standards .•
The IIYOlling Oil and Gas Conservation Ca.ission (IIOGCC) approved amendments to
disposal well peT1lit 34-00-10 and 74-CMX-I0 on February I , ' 990. These
amendments stipulate that only (1) fluids recovered froa a variety of drill ing
and production operations froa designated geol ogiC fOrllations and (2) filter
backwash and softener regeneration brine from the steam generators be
injected .
Finding
JBEC has used IIOGCC permitted wells for unauthorized disposal of rainwater .
Discussion
Three disposal wells are located at the NPR-3 lIater Disposal Facility . The
two exist i ng well permits stipulate that only fluids recovered frOll a variety
of drill ing and production operations frOll designated geologic formations and
filter backwash and softener regeneration brine f rOll the steam generators be
injected. No peT1lit for well 51-CMX-I0 was available for review . The three
wells have been used for unauthorized disposal of rainwater (I-Gil-52) .
Two concrete containment basins are provided for acculDU1ation of drums of
wastes at the Hazardous lIaste Accumulation Area at NPR-3. Dur i ng 1991, it was
considered possible that rainwater which had collected in these basins had
been contaminated by the contents of the drums within the basins. One of the
drums contained dibuty1 phthalate, listed as hazardous waste number U069 in 40
CFR 261 . The other drums contained unknown materidls . The rainwater was
transferred to four drums. A composite sample from the drums of water was
analyzed in August 1991, and it was determined the material did not require
management as hazardous waste (I-GII-36).
In June 1992, JBEC disposed of t he rainwater by injection into the disposal
wells at the NPR-3 lIater Disposal Facility . The 1I0GCC was not contacted for
authorization to dispose of this water.
The DOE/NPOSR- CUII self- assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self- assessment
(April 1992) did not i dent ify this finding .
The apparent causal factors for this finding are policy jmp1ementatjon, in
that DOE/NPOSR-CUII and JBEC have no programs to prevent unauthori~ed materials
from disposal by injection; and human factors, in that unauthorized disposal
of waste was allowed .
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FIIIDIIIG G1tI/CF -7:

Cont~inated

SOil Managelent and Surveillance

Perfor.ance Objective
DOE 5400.1, ·Genen1 Environlll!nh1 Protection ProgrUl,· Chapter IV, Section
S.b(l), requires that environlll!ntal surveillance be conducted to IIOnitor
effects, if any, on onsite and offsite envlronllenh1 and natural resources .
Environlll!nh1 surveillance Is required to satisfy the following progra.
objectives: verify c0llP1iance with environlll!nh1 laws and regulations; verify
c0llP1iance with environlll!nh1 ca.itlll!nts in environlll!ntal assesslll!nts,
environlll!nh1 illp.ct statelll!nts, and safety analysis reviews; characterize and
define trends in environlll!ntal lledia; establish baselines of environlllental
qual i ty; continually assess pollution abatelllent programs; and identify and
quantify new or existing environlllental prob1l!11s. Section S.b(2) requires that
envl ronllenta 1 surveillance progrUls reflect facil i ty characteri st ics.

NPOSR-CUV does not have a surveillance proyrUl to IIOnltor llipacts frOll the
unauthorized contUllnated soil stockpiles ocated at NPR-3 as well as the
perllitted land farll (I-GW-S5 and I-GW-S6).
The DOE/NPOSR-CUV self-assessllent (April 1992) partially Identified this
finding In that they did not identify any of the current eXallp1es of
prOlllscuous dllllPlng. The JBEC self-assesslll!nt (April 1992) did not Identify
this finding.
The apparent causal factor for this finding Is a lack of policY hll1e111!ntatlon
to ensure that the requ I relll!nts of DOE Orders and WYDEQ are III!t. A secondary
contributing factor for this finding is a lack of appralsals/aydlts/reylews In
that the current examples of prOlllscuous dUIIPlng had not been Identified.

WYOlli ng Department of Envi ronillenta 1 Quality (WYOEQ) SO lid Waste Managelllent
Rules Chapter I, ·Genera1 Provisions,· Section l(e)(PP), defines ·promiscuous
dUlllping· as the ·unauthorized placelllent of solid wastes in an area that is not
approved by the departlll!nt as a solid waste llanagellent facility.· Section
l(e)(XX) defines ·solid waste· as •. . . solid Iliterla1s resulting frOll
industrial . . . activities . . . ••
VYOEQ Solid Waste Managelll!nt Rules Chapter I, Section l(h)(i), states that
prOlliscuous dlllllPing is prohibited.
VYOEQ Solid Waste Managelll!nt Rules, Chapter VIII, ·Specla1 Waste Managelll!nt
Standards,· Section 2(f), shtes • . Petro1eUll-contUlinated soil s ' lleans sol id
waste consisting of any natural or .anllide soil or rock material into which
petro1eUII product has been added, excluding hardened asphalt rubble.·
Findi ng
PrOlliscuous dUlllping of contUlinated soils, which is prohibited by VYOEQ, has
occurred at NPR·3 . NPOSR-CUV has not developed a surveillance progru to
IIOnitor the illpact of previously disposed contaJIinated soils as required by
DOE 5400 . 1.
Discussion
PrOlliscuous dlllllPing of contuinated soils has occurred In at least two
locations at NPR-3 which are not solid waste disposal areas perllitted by WYDEQ
(see Finding IIM/CF-6) .
Approxillately 20 cubic yards of dlese1-contUllnated soil was
IAlproper1y disposed at well location 48-SHX-2 . The contaJIinants
have not been analyzed to deterlline potential adverse effects on
the envl ronllent (I -GW-36) .
An unknown quantity of contUlinated soil of unknown origin was

lliproperly disposed at well location 61-STX-IS (I-GW-37) . The
.ateria1 has not been analyzed to deteriline the type and
concentration of contuinants, and thus Its potential to harll the
envlronllent (I-GW-58).
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3.5.4

Vlste llinaqetl!!nt

3.5.4.1

OVerview

The purpose of the waste llanagellent portion of the Environmental Subteam
assesseent was to evaluate the current status of hazardous and nonhazardous
waste llanag_nt practices at NPOSR-CUlI with respect to compl iance with
Federal and state regulations, state perllits and guide1 ines, DOE Orders,
NPOSR-CIllI procedures, and best lIanag_nt practices. The regulations,
requir_nts, and guidel ines used in this assessment are presented in
Table 3-6.

DOE

The assess.ent included discussions and interviews with state regulators,
DOE/NPOSR-CIllI, the Environllenta1 Oepartllent of JBEC, JBEC employees within the
Operations Oepartllent with waste llanag_nt facility responsibilities, and
other JBEC personnel involved in waste generation and management ; a review of
waste lIanagement documents, including policies, procedures, plans, logbooks,
contracts, and hazardous waste lIanifests; observations of waste generation and
lIanag_nt practices; and inspections of waste lIanagement facilities .
This overview is intended to fralle the scope of waste lIanagement activities at
NPOSR-CIllI including waste lIanagellent responsibility, waste generation , waste
llanag_nt systells, and a sUllllary of findings. Also included is an evaluation
of the status of corrective action with respect to findings of the 1988
Envi ronllenta 1 Survey.
Respons i bil ity for hazardous and nonhazardous waste lIanagellent at NPOSR·CUlI is
divided between the Operations Department and the Environmental Department .
General oversight is provided by the Environmental Department of JBEC and,
recently, by the DOE Environllental Protection Specialist . Roles and
responsibilities for waste lIanag_nt at the active NPOSR-CIllI sites (NPR-3,
NOSR- l , and NOSR-3) have not been fOrllllly defined but an ad hoc division of
responsibi lity has developed between the two departments (Environmental and
Operations) that perform the day-to-day functions pertaining to waste
llanag_nt. JBEC recently established a position for a waste lIanagellent
specialist; however, that position has not yet been filled. JBEC has also
recently hired a training speC i alist . However, training programs specific to
waste llanage.ent have not yet been fully developed, tracked, or implemented.
NPOSR.CIllI consists of four distinct sites: two in Colorado and one each in
IIYOillng and Utah. There has been no developtDent of resources at NOSR-2 In
Utah , and no wastes have been generated; therefore, NOSR- 2 was not Included In
t he waste lIanagellent assessllent . The two sites in Colorado, NOSR-l and
NOSR-3 , host DOE work r elated to enviroDllental restoration and drilling and
operat i ng of fset wells . Environllenta1 restoration activities at NOSR-l and
IIlSR-3 ar e not presently generating appreciable quantities of waste. Most
operati ons of t he NPOSR-CUlI, and therefore most waste generation, occur at
NPR-3 .
Hazardous wastes generated at NPR-3 Include spent solvent and characteristic
wastes . The most si gn i ficant point of hazardous waste generation appears to
be the grlndout laboratori es , where crude oil quality is tested. This test
results In a 75:25 IIb t ure of Ignitable solvent (Solvent 140) Ind crude oil.
Another r outine source of hazardous waste is the parts washer In the
llalntenance s hop. NPR-3 also has generated hazardous waste associated
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with site cleanup activities. NPOSR-CUW has effectively reduced the amount of
hazardous waste generated by substituting nonhazardous lIIateria1s whenever
possible and recycling hazardous wastes such as batteries.
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NPOSR-CWU was issued two EPA hazardous waste generator identification numbers:
one for NPR-3 and one for NOSR-I and NOSR-3. NPOSR-CUW does not continually
track the amount of hazardous waste generated on a IIIOnth1y basis to deteY'lline
generator status at NPR-3 or NOSR-I and NOSR-3. NPOSR-CUW currently aanages
its waste at NPR-3, NOSR-I, and NOSR-3 as conditionally exempt small quantity
generators (CESQGs). If NPR-3 or NOSR-I and NOSR-3 generate more than 100
kilograms of hazardous waste in a month or accumulate IIIOre than 1,000
kilograms at any time, then that facility would be considered a sillall quantity
generator, which places restrictions on the amount of time that hazardous
waste may be accumulated, and affects the design, operations, and emergency
planning requirements for temporary hazart'ous waste accuillulation areas .
NPOSR-CUW could not provide documentation to prove that the 100 kilogralll
monthly limit and/or the 1,000 kilogram accumulation lilllit had not been
exceeded. Thus, NPR-3 was evaluated as though it was a small quant i ty
generator . NOSR-I and NOSR-3 were evaluated as a CESQG due to the lack of
ongoing waste generation at these sites.
NPR-3 is engaged in oil and gas production using a variety of primary,
secondary, and tertiary techniques. Much of the waste associated with oil and
gas production is exempt from the Federal hazardous waste regulations (FR
25446) . Drilling and reworking activities associated with production wells
(including oil, water, and injection wells) produce drilling mud, cuttings and
well cement, produced waters, and sediments and sludges from produced water
pits. Oil from the wells is routed to test satellites and tank batteries,
where water and other impurities are removed to produce crude oil for sale.
Produced water from the tank batteries is discharged to pits. This water
contains residual petroleum products. Other Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) Subtitle C-exempt wastes generated at NPR-3 include :
sediment and tank bottoms from pits and storage tanks; pigging wastes; soil
contaminated with crude oil; and spent filters.
NPR-3 also generates nonhazardous waste that is not associated with oil and
gas exploration and production including, construction debris, scrap metal,
office waste, and waste oil from vehicle and pump maintenance . NPOSR-CUW has
implemented recycling programs for office paper and aluminum cans.
Naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) is generated at NPOSR-CUW,
some of which eventually becomes waste. It appears that no mixed waste is
stored or generated at NPOSR-CUW .
NPR-3 has a number of operations to treat and dispose of oil and gas
production waste and nonhazardous waste including : dewatering and backfill of
reserve pits, Oil/water separation i n produced water pits (including the 8ad
Oil Facility), road application, petroleum-contaminated soil treatment, and
1andfi11ing of industrial waste.
Reserve pits are constructed whenever wells are constructed or reworked.
These pits are used t o contain drilling muds, cuttings, produced waters,
grout, and other fluids . Following completion of the well work the pits are
dew ate red and buried in place. NPOSR-CUW has received a general approval frOlll
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the IIYOlling Oil and Gas Conservation COlll11ission (WOGCC) to construct reserve
pits.
The produced water
the lIater Disposal
Oil atop the water
Facility . The Sad
at NPR-3, where it

pits are associated with tank batteries, test satell i tes,
Facility, and the steamflood and waterflood operations.
is skimmed using a vacuum truck and hauled to the Sad Oil
Oil Facility also receives crude oil from various locations
is treated to improve quality.

Sludge frOll the Bad Oil Fac ili ty and sediments froll produced water pits ilnd
tank cleanouts are stored in three aboveground tanks and then appl i ed to roads
at NPR-3. NPOSR-CUII has not received the necessary permi t from WYDEQ to
conduct road applications in 1992 so the last road application event occurred
in 1991. Road application involves spraying the waste on the roads using a
vacuum truck ; prior to application a berm is built along each side of the road
to contain road applied fluids . Periodic testing of the fluids is also
required by WYDEQ .
NPOSR-CUII operates an area for the treatment of petroleum-contaminated soils ,
where oil-soaked dirt is left to weather and is periodically spread. The area
is also used for drying other wastes, such as spent iron sponge from the LTS
Gas Plant, prior to disposal in the landfill. The area has operated for
nearly 1 year ; however, none of the treated soil has met the decontamination
requi rements for di sposa1 .

NPOSR-CUW has eliminated disposal of wastes in the tank rings.
This finding should be considered closed.
NPOSR-CUW has corrected its UST notification in respon se to the
finding in the survey. This finding should be considered closed
with respect to the specific tank mentioned in the survey report;
however, there is a more recent example of failure to file UST
notifications .
The overall assessment wi th regard to waste management is that NPOSR-CUII is
operating below compliance levels. The waste management findings indicate an
overall lack of definition for roles and responsibilities, a lacj( of formal
poliCies and procedures to implement effective waste management, and a lack of
qualified personnel and resources charged with ensuring that waste lIanagement
confonns to a complex set of regulatory drivers.
There are 11 waste management compliance findings. The following is sues are
addr essed in compliance findings: waste minimization program implementation,
waste characterization, recordkeeping, satellite accumulation areas, temporary
hazardous waste accumulation , petroleum-contaminated soil treatment area,
operat i on of the landfill, management of produced water pits, management of
road applications, management of underground storage tanks, and the lack of
adequate oversight of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal
facilities wi th which NPOSR-CUII has contracts .

NPR-3 also hosts an industrial landfill where general nonhazardous wastes are
buried. The landfill is located within a fenced area and disposal is
accomplished using the trench method. The facility operates 3 days a week for
a half-hour each day; during these periods employees may dump trash directly
into the trench. A dumpster is located outside the fenced area for general
use during non -operating hours . The landfill permit expired on July I, 1992 ,
and DOE has submitted a renewal application to WYDEQ .
NPOSR-CUW has underground storage tanks (USTs) at NOSR-l and NPR-3. DOE
recently became aware of the two tanks at NOSR-l when they were exposed due to
nat ural eros i on and subsidence. The tanks have not been registered with the
Colorado Department of Health. The size and previous use for these tanks are
not known at thi s time; however, NPOSR-CUW is currently characterizing the
condition and contents of the tanks . Three USTs are operating at NPR-3: a
4,OOO-gallon tank and a 2,OOO -gallon tank for unleaded gasoline and a
4,OOO-gallon tank for diesel fuel . The tanks were installed in 1919 and
feature a pressurized piping pump system with cathodic protection which was
installed around 1984 . In addition, two USTs have been removed from NPR-3
within the last 3 years.
The 1988 Environmental Survey identified three Category IV issues at the site:
inadequate management of retaining pi ts, unauthorized disposal of some pit
wastes in the tank rings, and incomplete notification of USTs . The status of
corrective action on these findings is as follows:
rlPOSR-CIlW has corrected the notification and permitting
requir'ements for retaining pits identified in the survey.
Ho",~ver, the site st ill has not nformed the IIOGCC of pit closures
and reclamation.
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3.3.4. 2

,-,.f the programs contained in the waste 8ini8ization plans have not been

Ca.plilnce Findings

filmiNG IIVCF -1 :

f_lly implemented .

\lute Mini8ization Phn

Perfol"UllCe Objective
DOE 5400 . 1, "General Environmental Protection Program, " Chapter III, Section
4.b, requires that a waste 8inimization plan and program be in place by May 9,
1990 . As part of that program, a plan i s to be developed that would include
goals for 8inillizing wastes with annual reductions, a comparison of reductions
achieved with the reductions of the previous year, and the methods that
accOllPlish waste 8inimization.
The illPle.entation guidance for DOE 5400.1, "Wa$te Minimization Plan , and
Waste Reduction Reporting of DOE Hazardous, Radioactive , and Radioactive Mixed
Wastes," March 1990, provides information on the development of waste
minimization plans.
Finding
The NPOSR-CUII waste lIinillization plans have not been fully implemented and do
not fully meet the requi rements of DOE 5400.1.
Discussion
JBEC prepared draft waste lIinimization plans for NPR-3 (1IM-11) , NOSR-l , and
NOSR-3 (1IM- 12) to satisfy the requirements of DOE 5400.1. These plans were
prepared in April 1990 and approved by DOE in May 1990 (1IM-44) .
NPOSR-CUII has not implemented the waste mi nimization requirements of DOE
5400 . 1 (1 -1IM-23 and 1-1IM-25) :

For example :

Waste accountability at the llanagerial, organizational, or project
level has not been established (1-1IM-24 and 1-1IM-26);
The site Waste Mini 8ization COIIIIittee does not meet monthly
(1-1IM- 23 and 1-1IM-25);
Satellite storage areas have not been established, and there 15 no
documentation of waste generation at the llanagerial level
(1-1IM-12);
A Pollution Prevention and Awareness Program has not been
developed (see Fi nding TCM/CF-4);
An employee awareness program has not been illlPlemented (1-l1li-10
and 1-1IM- 13); and
There has been no training specific to waste 8ini8ization
(1-1IM-7) .
This f i nding was fully identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self- assessment (April
1992)
This finding was partially identified in the JBEC self-assessment
(Aprii 1992). The JBEC self-assessment only identified the lack of an annual
rev i ew of the waste lIinimization plans.
The apparent causal factors for th15 finding are policy implementation and
procedyres . NPOSR-CUW has not implemented DOE requirements on waste
8ini 8ization. Procedures for waste 8ini llization as described in the waste
.inillizat i on plans have not been developed .

There have been no annual reviews or updates of the plans;
Annual changes in waste volume and tox i city have not been tracked
(1-1IM-12 and 1-1IM-21); and
The propos ed techn i cal and economically practical methods of
treatment , storage, and di sposal to accomplish waste minimization
have not been reported .
The waste minimizati on plan s do not contain the following elements as
recommended by the "Implement at ion Gu i dance for DOE Order 5400 . 1":
Spec ific numer i c goal s for reducing the volume or toxicity of each
waste stream;
Accurate cost accounting i nclud i ng the assessment of charges to
departments f or waste dispos al ;
Mechanisms fo r t ec hnology t r ansfer; and
Opportunities t o r educe waste generated by non - rout i ne activities
(e.g . , decontami nati on and decommi ssi on i ng , remediati on
activities) .
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FIIIlING lII,ICF-2:

lIaste Characterization

Perforwanc:e Objecti ve
40 CFR 262.11 states that any person who generates a solid waste must
detenline whether that waste is a hazardous waste. If the waste i s determined
to be huardous, the generator must refer to 40 CFR 264, 265, and 26S for
possible exclusions or restrictions on this waste.
Chapter II of the lIya.lng Hazardous lIaste Management Regulat i ons set s forth
the criteria used by the IIYOlling Department of Environmental Qual ity (IIYDEQ)
to identify characteristics of hazardous waste.
Title 6 of the Code of Colorado Regulations, Part 261 (6 C. C. R. 261) , defines
the characterization requirements to detenline if a waste i s hazardous.
IIYDEQ Solid lIaste Management Program Guideline No . 2, "Petroleum Contaminated
Soils," requires treated soils to be tested prior to disposal. The guideline
also requires that all contilllinated sOils received for treatment and disposal
be acca.panied by written documentation which describes the source of the
wastes, volume of contilllinated soils, and the type of contamination .
The IIYDEQ Solid lIaste Management Program Gu i deline No . 7, "Natural Gas
Processing lIastes," outlines acceptable sampling, laboratory testing, and
reporti ng procedures for process wastes that may be generated at natural gas
processing plants .

are no guidelines specifying : sampling llethods for gaseous, liquid, solid and
semi -solid wastes; analytical parameters; and quality assurance, including
dup 11 cate samples and blanks. The 1ack of procedures has resulted in SOlIe
wastes not being properly characterized. For example:
Hazardous waste discovered at NOSR-I and NOSR- 3 was detenlined by
NPOSR-CUII to be nonhazardous. This waste was subsequently
returned by the vendor because It was found to be ignitable
(I -11M-IS and 1-1/M-21). NPOSR-CUW did not test the waste for
ignltabil ity prior to shipment as nonhazardous (I -11M-IS) .
Uncharacterized wastes have been accumulating In the Temporary
Hazardous Waste Accumulation Area at NPR-3 for over a year (1IM-17;
I-WM-l2) •
Grindout waste consisting of approximately 75 percent Solvent 140
and 25 percent crude oil is not currently being managed as a
hazardous waste despite analytical results that indicate the
mixture meets the 40 CFR 261.21 definition of Ignltabil ity (1IM-27
and WM-2S).
There is no adequate method to ensure that samples of
petroleum-contaminated soils are representative, and required
testing of petroleum-contaminated soils resulting from spills of
diesel fuel and lubricating oil has nof been' performed (1-1IM-21).

Land Application Penait No . 90- 073R, issued by the WYDEQ, requires testing of
waste once per every 1, 500 barrels of waste app 1 i ed to roads.

Each unique waste stream generated at the LTS Gas Plant has not
been characterized in accordance with the waste characterization
criteria of WYDEQ Guideline No.7 (I-WM-21) .

IIYDEQ Issued a one-time authorization on September 27, 1991, to dispose of
spent i ron sponge waste in the NPR-3 landfill provided the waste did not
contai n any free liquids as determined by the Paint Filter liquids Test (EPA
Method 9095). WYDEQ issued a similar one- time authorization for the disposal
of polyacrylami de waste on July 23, 1991 .

The holding tanks for sludge awaiting road application are sampled
at a single point in the tank (I-WM-23) . The tanks are not mixed,
therefore the sample would not account for any differences in
waste composition caused by stratification in the tank (1-1IM-24) .

Finding

Iron sponge waste and polyacrylamide waste were placed in the
landfill without required testing for free liquids (WM-35; I -WM- l6
and I-WM- 21).

Ther e are no wute characterization programs or procedures at NPOSR-CUII to
satisfy t he requ i rement s of 40 CFR 262.11 and the WYDEQ.
Discussi on
lIaste charact eri zat ion begins at the point of generation and is based on
process knowl edge . Most dec i s i ons regarding waste processing occur at this
level. lIastes t hat are suspected to be hazardous or require special testing
as a result of r egulati on or permit must be sallpled and analyzed to detenline
ca.positl on. This Inforllation can be used to prescribe proper treatment and
disposal and also pr ov i des the generator with important inforllation on waste
vo1uIIe and t oxicity , which is necessary to determine regulatory status under
the Resource Conservat i on and Recovery Act (RCRA) (see Finding IIMICF-3) and to
Implellent an effecti ve was te mi nimization program (see Finding IIMICF-l) .

The OOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self· assessment
(April 1992) part i ally identified th i s finding. Both self- assessment s
Identi f i ed t he lack of a waste characterization program; however, ther e were
no specifi CS as t o defi ciencies in compliance wi t h Federal and state
r equirement s .
..
'
The apparent causal factors for this finding are pol icy imp1 ementation ,and
procedures . NPOSR-CUW has not i mplemented wr i tten poliC i es for Fede r al and
st at e wast e char act eri zat i on requ irements. Pr ocedur es fo r waste
char acter izat i on have not been developed .

NPOSR-CUII does not have fo n.a1 written sampli ng and analysis procedures to
characterize huardous and nonhazardous waste (1 -1IM- 12 and 1-1IM-23). There
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FIlIlING III/CF-3:

Recordkeeping

Perfol"Allce Object ive

In addition to recordkeeping deficiencies related to hazardous waste
generat i on, NPOSR-CUII also does not Ilaintain r~quired records for treatment
and/or disposal of nonhazardous waste. For example :

40 CFR 261. 5 contains specific regulations for generators of less than 100
kilogra.s of hazardous waste in a calendar month that accumulate less than
1,000 kilograJlls of hazardous waste at any given time (conditionally exempt
slNll quant i ty generator) .

The permit for road application at NPR-3 issued by the IIYDEQ
requires salllpling once per every 1, 500 barrels of waste applied .
No records exist at NPR-3 to indicate the amount of waste appl ied
to the roads to determine sampling requirements (1-1IM- 21) .

40 CFR 262.34 contains specifi c regulations for generators of between 100 and
1, 000 kilograJlls of hazardous and mixed waste i n a calendar II10nth (small
quant i ty generator) and generators of greater than 1,000 kilograms of waste i n
a calendar month (generator) .

JBEC i nformed the IIYDEQ that i t would record the location in the
NPR-3 landfill where 33 elllpty drUIDS were disposed (1IM-31) . No
such records were found at NPR-3 (1-1IM-21) (see Finding IIM/CF-7) .

40 CFR 262.42(b) requires small quantity generators of hazardous waste to
report to the EPA if a signed copy of the manifest is not received frOil the
designated treatment, storage, or disposal facility within 60 days of the
waste being accepted by the initial transporter. Best management practice
suggests that manifests should be mai ntained in a s i ngle location to
facil itate tracking of hazardous waste shipments .
lIyOlling De~artment of Env i ronmental Qual ity (IIYDEQ) Sol id lIaste Management
Progra. GU1del i ne No.2, 'Petroleum Contaminated Soils ,' requires treated
so i ls to be tested prior to disposal . The guideline also requires that all
contaJlli nated soils received for treatment and disposal be accOllpanied by
writte~ docUllentat i on which describes the source of the wastes , volume of
contam1nated soils, and the type of contamination.
La ~d Appl ication Permit No . 90 -073R , issued by the IIYDEQ, requires testing of
waste once per every 1,500 barrels of waste applied to roads.

Finding
NPOSR-CUII does not have pol i c i es or procedures i n place to monitor hazardous
waste generator st at us to ensur e compl i ance with 40 CFR 261.5 or 262 . 34 .
NPOSR-CUII does not adequately maintai n records of hazardous and nonhazardous
waste , as r equ ired by IIYDEQ and suggested by best management pract i ces .
Discussi on

Records of source, volume, and characteristics of contuinated
soils at the land fana are not kept as required by IIYDEQ Guideline
No . 2 (1-1IM-16 and 1-1IM-21) (see Finding IIM/CF-6) .
NPOSR-CUII also does not have a formal procedure to ensure that Signed copies
of lIanifests are provided by the deSignated treatment, storage, or disposal
facility in a timely lIanner and that EPA is notified if the signed lIanifest is
not r eceived within 60 days of shipment . The Environmental Subtea. observed
that original copies of IAnifests were on file at the NPOSR-CUII offices in
Casper, IIY, and at the NPR- 3 site. Neither location had a cOlllplete set of
lIanifests for hazardous waste shipments from NPOSR-CUII (1-1IM- 12 and 1-1IM-18) .
Best management practices suggest that cOllplete manifest records be lAintained
at a single location to enable tracking of hazardous waste shipments.
Th i s finding was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUII self-assessment
(April 1992). The DOE self-assessment did not identify the absence of a
system at NPOSR-CUII to track and monitor Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) generator status. This finding was partially identified in the
JBEC self-assessment (April 1992). The JBEC self-assessment identified the
lack of formal recordkeeping , but did not specify instances of noncompliance .
The apparent causal factors for this finding are pol i cy implementation and
procedyres. NPOSR-CUII has not implemented written pol icies for Federal and
state waste recordkeeping requirements, and has not developed fonaal
procedures to cOllply with these regulations.

NPOSR-CUII does not conti nual l y track the amount of hazardous waste generated
on a IIOnthly basis ( 1-1IH-1 2, 1-1IH- 23 , and 1-1IH-25) . This tracking is required
to detenlline NPOSR-CUII 's gener ator status. NPOSR-CUII currently manages its
waste as if NPR- 3 and NOSR-I ant! NOSR-3 are conditionally exempt small
quantity generators . If NPR -3 or NOSR-I and NOSR- 3 gener ate more than 100
kilogra.s of hazardous waste i n a month or accumulate more than 1,000
kilograms at any time, then the fac il i ty would be considered a sllall quantity
generator, which places r es tr icti ons on t he amount of t ime that waste may be
accumulated, and affects t he deSi gn, operat i ons, and emergency planning
requirements for teliPorary hazardous waste accumulati on areas . NPOSR-CUII
could not provide documentati on t o prove t hat the 100 kilogram monthly liAli t
and/or the 1,000 kilogra. accumul at i on limits had not been exceeded (1-1IH- 12
1-1IM-23, 1-1IM-24, and 1-1IM- 26 ) .
'
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Perforwanc:e Objective

The collection system for the grindout wastes allows for the
accumulation of 100 - 200 gallons of waste in the tank. The
maximuID allowable accumulation at or near the point of generation
is 55 gallons (40 CFR 262 . 34(c)(I».

DOE 5480.19, "Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities," states
"It is the policy of the Department that the conduct of operations at DOE
facil ities be Ilinaged with a cons i stent and auditable set of requirements,
shndards, and responsibil ities . . . . "

Hazardous waste containers must be closed except when adding or
removing waste (40 CFR 265.173). The waste collection systlltl at
the grindout laboratory is filled by a sink drain, which is not
closed when not in use.

40 CFR 262.34(c)(l) allows the accll1lUlation of "as lIuch as 55 gallons of
haurdous waste or one quart of acutely hazardous waste . . . at or near any
point of generation where wastes initially accumulate, which is under the
control of the operator of the process generating the waste, without a permit
or interi. status . . . provided he: Complies with [40 CFR] 265.171, 265 . 172,
and 265.173(a) . • . . " In addition, 40 CFR 262 . 34(c)(l) requires containers
to be labeled with the contents or the words "hazardous waste . "

Rags soaked with grindout waste are not lIanaged as hazardous waste
nor are the containers used to collect these rags marked either
with the name of the contents (i.e., waste Solvent 140) or with
the words "hazardous waste," as required by 40 CFR
262.34 (c)( 1)( i i ) •

FIIIlING III/CF-4:

Satellite Hazardous Vaste Accu.ulation Areas

40 CFR 265 . 173 states that hazardous waste containers must always be closed
during storage except when adding or relllOving waste.

In addition, NPOSR-CUV does not have proced'Jres for managing the satellite
hazardous waste accumulation areas, which are necessary to ensure compl iance
with DOE 5480.19.
The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992) and the J8EC self-assessment
(April 1992) did not identify this finding.

Finding
Satellite accll1lUlation areas at NPOSR-CUV do not fully comply with 40 CFR
262.34, and .anagetaent techniques are inadequate to ensure compliance with EPA
requi retlents.
Discussion

The apparent causal factors for this finding are lIlli9n, in that the grindout
waste tanks are too large for a satellite hazardous waste container; and a
lack of ~ and procedyres to implement a program to manage satellite
accumulation areas to ensure compliance with Federal regulations and DOE
5480 . 19 .

As a conditionally exetlpt sllall quantity generator, NPR-3 would be exempt from
the requiretlents of 40 CFR 262. However, due to deficiencies in recordkeeping
(see Finding WM/CF-3) and waste characterization (see Finding WM/CF-2),
NPOSR-CUV cannot detlOnstrate that 't has not stored .ore than 1,000 kilograms
of haurdous waste onsite at anyone ti.e . As a small quantity generator,
NPR-3 would be subject to cerhin provisions of 40 CFR 262 including 40 CFR
262.34(b), which regulates the operation of satell ite hazardous waste
accu.ulat ion areas.
Most hazardous waste at NPR-3 is stored at the onsite Hazardous Vaste
Accu.u lat i on Area; I!owever, gri ndout waste fro. test sate11 i tes, tank
batteries, and the South Te,..inal is collected into aboveground tanks. Rags
fro. the gri ndout laboratori es are collected ina covered conta i ner and
delivered to • subcontractor where they are laundered and reused. The
Environ.enhl Subteu observed that the grindout waste was not identified as
hazardous waste; however, laboratory analyses indicated that the grindout
waste, wh i ch consists of about 75 percent waste solvent and 25 percent crude
oil , is hazardous because it exhibits the characteristic of ignitability (40
CFR 262.21).
The grindout laboratories are satellite hazardous waste accumulation areas
and , therefore , must cOllPly with 40 CFR 262.34(c) . There were, however,
several deficiencies in the manage.ent of these areas . For example:
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FIIIlING III/CF-5:

TeIpOrary HiZardous Vaste Accuaulati on

Perforunce Objective
DOE 5480.19, "Conduct of Operations Requirements for ODE Facilities ," states
"It is the policy of the Department that the conduct of operat i ons at DOE
facil i ties be llanaged with a consistent and auditable set of requirement s,
shndards, and responsibilities . . . . "
40 CFR 262.34(d) contains requirements for temporary hazardous and mixed waste
storage areas applicable to small quantity generators. These requirement s
include : container management (compatible material, labeling, dating,
integrity) , preparedness and prevention (40 CFR 265 Subpart C) , and emergency
procedures (40 CFR 262.34(d)(5».
40 CFR 262.34(f) states that a small quantity generator i s considered an owner
or operator of a storage facil ity, and is subject to the requirements of 40
CFR 264 , 265 , and 270, if hazardous waste accumulates for more than 180 days
«(lr 270 days if hazardous waste must be transported greater than 200 miles) .
Finding

NPOSR-CUW is storing hazardous waste beyond statutory accumulat i on times
without a permit or interim status as required by 40 CFR 262.34(f), and
operati on of the temporary hazardous waste accumulation area at NPR-3 is not
in accordance with 40 CFR 262 . 34(d) or DOE 5480.19.
Discuss ion

Each container is not labeled or marked with the words "Hazardous
Vaste" (40 CFR 262.34(a)(3»; and
There are no provisions for testing and maintaining emergency
response/communications equipment (40 CFR 265 . 33).
In addition to the above deficiencies, there are no procedures to ensure that
suspected hazardous waste is characterized and processed within the 270-day
timeframe (180 days for wastes transported less than 200 miles) in cOllPliance
with 40 CFR 262.34(f) . Since some of the hazardous wastes at NPR- 3 have been
stored beyond 270 days, the facil ity is technically operating as an
unpermitted storage facility and must meet the requirements of 40 CFR 264 ,
265, and 270 . NPOSR-CUW does not have a permi t for continued storage of
hazardous waste in the Hazardous Waste Accumulation Area nor has it applied to
EPA for an extension to accumulation times.
This finding was partially identified in the ODE/NPOSR-CUW self- assessment
The ODE self-assessment correctly identified deficiencies in
(April 1992).
overall conduct of operations at NPOSR-CUW. However, it did not identify
specifi c shortcomings with hazardous waste accumulation .
This finding was
partially identified in the JBEC self-assessment (April 1992). The JBEC
self-assessment did not identify several of the deficiencies at the Temporary
Hazardous Waste Accumulation Area including weekly inspections, maintenance of
equipment, and waste compatibility.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are personnel who do not have the
knowl edge and experi ence to effectively manage the waste management program at
NPOSR-CUW ; and a lack of R2l.1.U and procedyres to ensure compliance with
hazardous waste regulations and ODE 5480 . 19.

As a cond iti onally exempt small quantity generator, NPR-3 would be exempt from
the r equ i rements of 40 CFR 262. However, due to deficiencies in recordkeep i ng
(see Fi nd i ng WM/CF -3) and waste characterization (see Fi nd i ng WM/CF-2),
NPOSR-CUW cannot demonstrate that it has not stored more than 1,000 kilograms
of hazardous waste onsite at anyone time . As a small quantity generator,
NPR -3 would be subject to the applicable provisions of 40 CFR 262 including 40
CFR 262 .34(d) , whi ch regulates temporary accumulat i on of hazardous waste for
small quant ity generators .
Hazardous waste generat ed at NPR-3 is brought to the Temporary Hazardous Waste
Accumulation Area by J BEC personnel. There are no formal procedures governing
the operati on of thi s f acil i ty . Th i s has resulted in several instances of
noncompliance with Federal regulati ons . For example:
Not all contai ners ar e i n good cond i t i on (40 CFR 265.171);
Suspected haza rdous waste i s being stored, uncovered, without
regard for pot ential incompat i bili ty with other wastes within the
same containment structure (40 CFR 265.172) ;
Wee kly inspecti ons ar 2 not performed (I -WM - 12) (40 CFR 265 . 174) ;
The st art date of accumulat i on i s not marked on each container
(40 CFR 262 . 34(a )( 2» ;
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FIIIlING III/CF-6:

TreatDent of Petr oleua-Contalllinated Soils

Perforaance Objective
DOE 5480.19, ·Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facil ities,· states
·It is the policy of the Department that the conduct of operations at DOE
facil Hies be managed with a consistent and audi table set of requirements,
standards, and responsibilities . . . . •
IIYOllling Department of Environmental Quality (IIYDEQ) Guideline No.2,
·Petro1eulII Contaminated Soil s,· provides guide1 ines for the treatment and
disposal of soils that are contaminated with petroleum products. Section I.C .
of these gu i de1 i nes provides testing and notification requirements for soils
contaminated with petroleum products that are not related to either leaking
underground st orage tank products or exploration and production exempt wastes.
Section III l is s treatment requirements for contaminated soils .
On July 5, 1991, IIYDEQ authorized treatment at NPR-3 of petroleum-contaminated
soils generated from crude oil and produced fluid spills.

There are no written waste characterization procedures to ensure
that contaminated soils are properly tested (see Finding IIH/CF-2).
There are no records of source, volume, and characteristics of
contalllinated soils at the land farm, which is required by
Guideline No . 2 (I-IIM-16 and I-IIM-21) .
This finding was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUII self-assessllent
(April 1992). The DOE self-assessment correctly identified the lack of
procedures; however, the fact remains that operation of the land fanl was not
In compliance with the IIYDEQ guidelines and authorization was not
acknowledged . This finding was not identified In the J8EC self-assessment
(April 1992).
The apparent causal factors for this finding are inadequate P.!!l.iu and
procedures to comply with state guidelines and authorizations and DOE 5480.19.
A secondary contributing factor for this finding is inadequate
appraisals/aydlts/reviews to identify areas of noncompliance .

Finding
Operation of the land farm at NPR-3 does not comply with IIYDEQ Guideline No.
and the IIYDEQ authorization, and formal procedures to ensure compliance have
not been developed, as requ i red by DOE 5480.19 .
Discussion
NPOSR-CUII has constructed a treatment area for petroleum-contaminated soils at
NPR-3 . This facility consists of a cleared area surrounded by berms and is
operated by the Maintenance Supervisor. There are no formal procedures to
operate this facility in compliance with IIYDEQ Guideline No.2 and the IIYDEQ
authorization. For example:
The facility has received contaminated soils from recent spills of
diesel fuel and refined compressor oil (1-1IM-16). These materials
were not included in the IIYDEQ authorization for the facil ity
(1IM-37) . The IIYDEQ has not been notified, nor have required tests
been conducted on these contaminated soils.
Contaminated soil at the facility is not placed in 6-inch lifts in
accordance with Guide1 ine No . 2.
Soi ls are not weathered and tilled in accordance with Guideline
No . 2 .
Soil Is not being sampled for total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH)
after the second weathering period in accordance with Guideline
No . 2.
There are no records to Indicate the date on which contaminated
soil is brought to the facility for the purpose of determining the
one -year reporting time required by IIYDEQ if soils have not met
the required treatment standard (I -1IM-16).
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FINDING IIVCF -1:

Landfi 11 Management

Perfo\'1lance Objective
DOE 5480.19, "Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facil Hies,' states
"It is the policy of the Department that the conduct of operations at DOE
facilities be managed with a consistent and auditable set of requirements ,
standards, and responsibil ities . . . . "
lIyoming Solid lIaste Management Rules and Regulations, Chapter III, Section 2,
"Industrial Landfill Regulations," requires existing industrial landfills to
submit a permit renewal application by July I, 1992, or close the faCility.
All existing industrial landfills shall be subject to the standards contained
in the lIyoming Solid lIaste Management Rules and Regulations, Chapter XV, until
such time as they are permitted under Chapter I .
Chapter VIII, "Special lIaste Management Standards,' contains requirements for
the disposal of nonfriab1e asbestos.
The lIyoming Department of Environmental Qual ity (WYDEQ) issued a renewal
authorization to operate an industrial sol id waste disposal facil ity at NPR-3
on September 6, 1991.
Finding
Operation of the landfill at NPR-3 does not comply with IIYDEQ requirements and
forma 1 procedures to ensure comp 1 i ance wi th regulat ions have not been
developed, as required by DOE 5480.19 .
Discuss i on
NPOSR-CUII operates an i ndustri all andfil1 at NPR-3 that is used to di spose of
nonhazardous sol id waste. The facil ity di sposes of industrial waste generated
at NPR-3 as well as some special wastes such as small amounts of asbestos,
empty drums, and LTS Gas Plant wastes (e.g ., iron sponge, glycol filters).
The landfill is normally open between 11:00 am and 11:30 am on MClday,
lIednesday, and Friday. NPOSR-CUII personnel may drive directly to the landfill
working face and dump during these periods. A J8EC employee supervises
dumping during operating hours. A dumpster is maintained outside the landfill
fence to permit waste disposal during off- hours .
Disposal is accomplished
using the trench method.
The Maintenance Supervisor is responsib1e .for the operation of the NPR-3
landfill. He has received tra i ning in landfill operations from the IIYDEQ ,
however, there are no qual Hied personnel trained to act as an operator in his
absence . In add ition, not all personnel disposing of waste at the landfi ll
are familiar with the types of waste prohibited from the facility . During the
Tiger Team Assessment, an employee was observed disposing of acid batteries
into the trench .
There i s a lack of formal operating procedures for the landfill, which are
requ i red by DOE 5480.19. The lack of procedures and formality of operations
has resulted in the following problems:

Cell development has not adhered to design plans submitted to
IIYDEQ as part of the permit appl ication (I-1IM-16).
Nonfriable asbestos was placed in the dumpster prior to placement
in the landfill (I-IIM-22). IIYDEQ regulations require nonfriab1e
asbestos to be covered with 6 inches of cover material illllH!diate1y
upon receipt (Chapter VIII, Section 3).
Closed cells have not been promptly revegetated as described in
the permit application for the landfill (1IM-46) .
The location of 33 empty drums placed in the landfill has not been
noted for future reference as stated by JBEC to IIYDEQ as a
condition for disposal (1IM-31; I-IIM-16).
litter fences are not being anchored with sucker rods as indicated
in the permit application (IIM-46).
Required paint filter tests have not been performed on some wastes
disposed in the landfill (see Finding IIM/CF-2).
A landfill management plan was developed by JBEC in October 1990, but was
never approved by DOE. Although this represents the only operating plan for
the 1andfi 11, the 1andfi 11 operator has not recei ved a copy of the plan.
Current operation of the landfill does not adhere to some of the conditions of
the plan . For example:
Although a sign has been posted that prohibits disposal of
hazardous materials and scrap, a sign directing employees to place
fill on the working face has not been posted.
A fire extinguisher is not positioned at the active trench .
The facility operator does not maintain required records
including:
A log of litter collection activities;
As-bu i lt specifications of trench boundaries ; and
Dates of completion and contents of trenches .
NPOSR-CUII must submit a permit renewal application to IIYDEQ by July I , 1992
(I-IIM-8). As of June 26, 1992, JBEC had not provided a draft copy of the
permit t o DOE for review (I -WM-25). Best management practice suggests that
more than I week be allowed for proper review by DOE and revision of complex
permit applications.
This finding was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment
(April 1992). The DOE self-asses sment correctly identified the lack of
procedures; however, there was no indication that landfill operati on was not
in compliance with the permit. This finding was not identified in the JBEC
self-assessment (April 1992) .
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The apparent causal factors for this finding are inadequate 1!2l~ and
procedures to comply with state regulations and DOE 5480.19. A secondary
contributing factor for this finding is inadequate appraisaJs/aydjts/re~ to
i dent i fy areas of noncompliance.

FINDING IIIICF-8:

Manage.ent of Produced Water Pits

Perforaance Objective
DOE 5480.19, "Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facllities," states
"It is the policy of the Department that the conduct of operations at DOE
facll ities be l1anaged with a consistent and auditable set of requirements,
standards, and responsibllities . . . . "
Rules and Regulations of the lIyoming 011 & Gas Conservation Connission
(IIOGCC), Section III, "Operational Rules, Drilling Rules," Rule 326, sets
forth operational standards to minimize pollution and surface damage froll
development and operation of produced water pits.
Finding
Management of produced water pits does not ensure compliance with WOGCC
requirements, as required by DOE 5480.19.
Discussion
Earthen pits are used at NPR-3 to hold produced waters. These pits are
associated with activities at individual wells (temporary), tank batteries,
test satellites, and enhanced 011 recovery facllities. These pits have been
registered with the IIOGCC in accordance with Rule 326 .
NPOSR-CUII does not have formal procedures for development and operat i on of the
produced water pits that would ensure compliance with IIOGCC requirements
(I-IIM-14). For example:
There are no procedures at NPR-3 to inspect produced water pits
and ensure that surface accumulations of oil are removed within 10
days, as required by Rule 326 (I-I/M-14); and
NPOSR-CUII has not notified the State Oil and Gas Supervisor of the
completion and reclamation of produced water pits, as requi red by
Rule 326 (I-IIM- 29 and I-IIM-31).
In addition, there are no procedures at NPOSR-CUII to ensure that pits are
properly located, constructed and maintained, and closed in a timely manner.
This finding was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUII self-assessment
(April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment (Aprll 1992) . The self-assessments
correctly identified the lack of procedures ; however, there was no indication
t hat the produced water pits are not be i ng managed in accordance with IIOGCC
Rule 326.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are inadequate I22.l.i£t and
procedures to comply with state regulati ons and DOE 5480.19 . A secondary
contributing factor for this finding is inadequate appraisals/audits/reviews
to identify i nstances of noncompliance.
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FIIIlING III/CF-9:

Managf!lll!nt of Road Applications

Perforaance Object lYe

DOE 5480.19, ·Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities, · states
·I t is the policy of the Department that the conduct of operations at DOE
facilities be Alanaged with a consistent and auditable set of requirements,
standards, and responsibilities . . . . •

that road application had not been conducted in accordance with state
requ I reAlents .
The apparent causal factors for this finding are Inadequate Rlill:t and
procedures to cOlllllly with state requirements and DOE 5480 . 19. A sec on dary
contributing factor for this f i nding is inadequate appraisals/audits/reviews
to i dent i fy areas of noncompliance.

The IIYOiling DepartAlent of Environmental Quality (IIYDEQ) authorized NPR-3 on
June II, 1990, to apply produced fluids to roads for dust control. This
penlit expired November I, 1991, and has not been renewed .
Finding
The aanageAlent of road application of produced fluids does not ensure
comp li ance wi th DOE 5480.19 and IIYDEQ requ i rements .
Discussion
Road appl ication of pruduced fluids has not occurred at NPR-3 in 1992 because
IIYDEQ has not issued a permit . Road applications did occur prior to the
expiration of the permit; however, there were no formal procedures to
implement the road application program to ensure compliance with application ,
testing, and reporting requirements. For example:
There are no records of the amounts, dates, locations, and sample
numbers of the materials applied as required by the permit
(1-1/H-21) ;
There are no procedures to obtain a representative sample of
fluids to be applied to the road (see Finding I/H/CF-2);
There are no procedures to ensure that fluids are tested after
every 1,500 barrels of fluids are applied;
There is no inventory of roads that are within 300 feet of the
definable high water mark of perennial or intermittent drainages ,
upon which road appl ication is prohibited;
There is no inventory of roads whose slopes exceed 8 percent, upon
which road ap~llcation Is prohibited; and
There are no procedures to determine when soils are saturated and
therefore unsuitable for road appl icati on .
In addition to the lack of formal procedures to perform road applications ,
NPOSR-CUII did not apply for a permit renewal i n a timely manner . NPR-3 Is
presently accumulating sludges to be road applied If a permit Is Issued;
however, the available storage capac ity for th is material Is limited (1/H-32).
The DOE/NPOSR-CUII self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) partially Identified this finding . The self-assessments
correctly Identified the lack of procedures; however , there was no observation
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FIIIlING III/CF-I0:

Minage.ent of Underground Storage Tanks

Perfonaance Objective
DOE 5480.19, "Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities," states
"It is the policy of the Department that the conduct of operations at DOE
facilities be aanaged with a consistent and auditab1e set of requirements ,
standards, and respons i bil i ties . . . ."
Wya.ing Statutes Title 35, Chapter II, Article 14 (W.S. 35-11-14), "Water
Pollution fra. Underground Storage Tanks Corrective Action Act of 1990," sets
forth standards for design, notification, testing, and recordkeeplng for
underground storage tanks (USTs) in Wyoming .
Code of Colorado Regulations Title 7, Article 14 (7 C. C. R. 14) and 6 C.C.R. 5,
"Colorado Underground Storage Tank Regulations," requires an owner or operator
of USTs to register each tank with the State Inspector of Oils .
Finding
Underground storage tanks at NPOSR-CUW are not managed in compliance with
W.S . 35-11-14, 7 C. C. R. 14, and 6 C.C . R. 5; and formal procedures to ensure
ca.p1lance with these requirements have not been developed , as required by
DOE 5480 .1 9.

fill ing USTs at NPR-3, and the technician responsible for oversight of the
filling operation has not received formal spill prevention and response
training (1-1IM-19) . Although inventory records are maintained in the
Warehouse, there is no procedure to compare the inventory to fuel use records
as a means of leak detection (1-1IM-30). Additionally, there are no written
procedures to follow in the event of a release from a UST .
Two USTs (capacity unknown) have recently been discovered at NOSR-l. These
tanks have not been registered with the Colorado Inspector of Oils, as
required by regulation (1-IIM-Z5) .
This finding was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment
(April 199Z). The DOE self-assessment correctly identified the lack of
programs but did not identify deficiencies in notification or reporting. This
finding was partially identified in the JBEC self-assessment (April 199Z).
The JBEC self-assessment did not identify that UST notifications were not
submitted in a timely manner and that maintenance records were not in order.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are inadequate Ill!l.ill and
procegyres to comply with state regulations and DOE 5480 . 19 . A secondary
contributing factor for this finding is inadequate appraisals/audits/reviews
to identify areas of noncompliance.

Discussion
NPR-3 has records of five USTs onsite . Two of these tanks have been removed
and the sites have been closed . The remaining three tanks (a 4,OOO-ga110n
diesel tank, a 4,OOO-ga110n unleaded gasoline tank, and a Z,OOO-ga110n
unleaded gaso1 ine tank) are located near the maintenance shop and contain fuel
for vehicles and equipment. There are no formal procedures to manage these
tanks in compliance with state requirements . For example:
The annual tank registrations, due July I, 1991, were not filed
with the WYDEQ until August ZI, 1991 (I-IIM-Zl).
An amended notification for USTs filed In September 1991 (1IM-14)
Indicated that tank tightness testing was last performed
January II, 1991. However, the test results were dated September
11, 1990 (lIM-14) .
The tank tightness test results filed with WYDEQ in September 1991
(lIM-14) reported tank diameters that differ from the manufacturer
specifications kept at NPR-3. These specifications are used to
determine fuel filling requirements for the two 4,OOO -gallon tanks
and one 2,OOO-ga110n tank (1-1IM-19) .
There were no records in the NPR-3 UST files Indicat ing when
cithodic protection was installed on the three tanks, as required
by W. S. 35-11-1416(a)(vl) (l-lIM-Zl).
In addition to the above Issues, the aanagellent of USTs at NPR- 3 is not
fonaa11y defined, and roles and responsibilities for compHance activities
have not been established (IIM- Z4). There are no written procedures for
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FIIIlING IIIICF- II:

Overs i ght of Offsite Hazardous Waste Treat.ent,
Storage, and Disposal Facilities

Perfor.ance Objective

The OOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) fully identified this finding.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are inadequate ~ and
procedures to implement an effective offslte vendor evaluation program .

The Comprehensive Envi ronmenta 1 Response, Compensat ion, and li abi 1 ity Act
(CERCLA), Section 107, establishes that generators of hazardous substances may
be considered to be strictly liable for any releases of those hazardous
substances from a treatment, storage , or disposal facility.
DOE 5700.6C, "Qual ity Assurance," Section 9.b(2)(c), requires that "The
organization shall ensure that procured items and services meet establ ished
requirellents and perform as speCified" and that "prospective suppliers be
evaluated and selected on the basis of specific criteria . "
Finding
NPOSR-CUII does not conduct formal evaluations of vendor facilities that treat
and/or dispose of hazardous waste generated by NPR-3, NOSR-l , and NOSR -3, in
accordance with DOE 5700. 6C.
Discussion
NPOSR-CUII has used several commercial facilities to treat and/or dispose of
hazardous waste . These facilities are contracted on an as-needed basis by
JBEC. The procurement process does not involve a complete assessment of the
permit status, compliance history, and other relevant environmental issues
associated with the vendor either upon initial contact with the vendor, or
through ongoing evaluations of performance (I-I/M-IS and I -I/M-23). Some, but
not all, of the treatment and disposal facilities ~. hat received waste from
NPOSR-CUII have been assessed ; however, the facil ities assessed were not
evaluated and selected on the basis of specific criteria and observations and
findings resulting from these evaluations were not documented.
In accordance with DOE 5700 . 6C, and due to the potential liability fnr DOE
related to the treatment or disposal of waste, it is required that NPOSR-CUW
thoroughly evaluate any facility that receives waste. Such an evaluation
would i nclude, but not be limited to, the following:
Reviewing permit applications, permits , inspection records, and
other pert inent documentation;
Contacting appropriate regulatory agencies to ascertain compliance
history and current status;
Reviewing the adequacy of hazardous waste treatment processes;
Conducting an inspection or audit of t~e facility using personnel
adequately trained in auditing and fomlall) reporting findings;
and
Evaluating if NPOSR-CUW can comply with waste acceptance criteria
required by the facll ity and the host state .
Some of these practices have been Informally implemented by NPOSR-CUW.
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3.5.5

loxi c and Chelli caJ Materials

3.5.5 . 1

Overview

TABLE 3-7
LIST OF TOXIC AND CHEMiCAl MATERIALS
REGULATIONS/REQUIREMENTS/GUIDELINES

The tox ic and chemical material s port ion of the Environmental Subteam
assessment evaluated the compl iance status of NPR-3, Casper, Wyoming, and
NOSR-I and NOSR-3, Rifle, Colorado, with regard to the Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA) ; the Federal InsectiCide, FungiCide , and Rodentic ide Act
(FIFRA) ; the Hazardous Materi als Transportation Act (HMTA); DOE Orders ;
Wyomi ng and Colorado regulations ; NPOSR-CUW policies and administrative
memoranda ; and best management practices. The use, storage, and disposal of
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and pesticides were compared to regulations
promulgated under TSCA and FIFRA, respectively , as well as state requirements.
The purchase , receiving, handling, and storage of chemicals were assessed for
compliance with DOE Orders, Federal and state regulations , and current
industry practices. The regulations , requirements and guidelines used in this
asses sment are presented in Table 3-7.

DOE

OSHA

The pri mary focus of the toxic and chemical mater ials assessment was the
activ i t ies at NPR-3. There was a review in Casper of NOSR-l and NOSR-3
documents related to tox ic and chemical materials management, and there was a
l imited assessment of toxic and chemical materials is~ue s by a member of the
Env i ronmental Subteam during hi s field work at NOSR- l and NOSR-3. Because
there has been no development of the resources at NOSR-2 i n Utah, that site
was not incl uded in the toxic and chemical materials assessment.

OSHA

EPA

Th is assessment was accomplished through i nterviews and discussions with
DOE/NPOSR-CUWand contractor personnel and review of pol icies , procedures,
t rai ni ng records , i nspection reports, inventories, and audit reports. In
add i t ion , phys ical i nspection of field locations , and observation of chemical
storage and use act iv ities at tank batteries , steam generat i ng plants,
chemi cal storage areas, the LTS Gas Plant, shop areas, storage yards, and the
Wat er Treatmen t FJcll i ty were conducted .
Responsibility for t he management of toxic and chemical materials (TCM) at
NPOSR-CUW is shared among the different operat i ng groups at NPR-3 and a single
JBEC employee at NOSR- I and NOSR-3. Each department or operating un i t reta i ns
primary responsi bllity f or proper management of materials under its control.
The environmental and safe ty and health personnel and individual superv i sors,
such as the Chemical and Cat hod ic Protecti on Coordinator at NPR-3, are
knowledgeable about chemi cal s and prov ide technical assi stance to NPR-3' s
operating units. Techni cal assistance i nc l udes management of product materi al
safety data sheets (HSOS), informa l t rain i ng on chemical handling and use , and
hazard identificati on.

40 CFR 761

Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs)
EPA
Manufacturing, Processing, Distri but ion
in Commerce, and Use Prohibitions
49 CFR l7l , 173 , Transportation of Hazardous Material s,
DOT
177 , 178 , and 397 Packag i ng , Mar king, Spi ll Reporting,
etc .
Wyomi ng 011 and Hazardous Substances
State of Wyomi ng
WYDEQ Rules and
Regul ations
Spi ll s Regul at ions
Chapter 4

Oil - filled electrical equi pment in use or i n storage at NPR-3 is managed by
the Env i ronmental Departmen t with the aid of a sen ior electrician . Although a
formal PCB management program has not been developed , management activ i ties
conducted informally include identlfyi ng, sampl : ng , and labeling of oll -filled
electrical equipment in use or stored for reuse or repair.
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The practice of application and storage of restricted pesticides by employees
at NPR-3 has been discontinued. In 1990, environmental staff drafted a
pesticide management plan which established that all future pesticide
app1 ications be conducted by subcontractors with the exception of GSA spray
insecticide and commercial mouse kill bait . Stored excess pesticides and
herbicides have been transferred to the local Natrona County Park Service for
use on pub1 ic lands and to NOSR-I and NOSR-3 in Colorado for onsite use .
Currently, no pesticides other than small quantities of GSA spray insecticide
and commercial mouse kill bait are stored at NPR-3.
NPOSR-CUW procurement of toxic and chemical material s at NPR-3 follows a
formal purchase requisition process. Chemical purchases must be approved by a
Job Supervisor, the Warehouse Supervisor, and JBEC's Procurement Department
prior to purchase and delivery. Environmental Department personnel do not
conduct a formal review of chemical purchase requests for potential hazards or
product substitution opportunities prior to procurement. Once chemicals are
in stock, JBEC employees can wi thdraw stock items from the warehouse without a
supervisor's approval. Subcontractors' use of toxic and chemical materials is
primarily governed through the Procurement Department by contract language and
i nformal oversight of subcontractor activities by site supervisors .
Once materials are received at individual NPR-3 locations, TCM management
becomes informal . Users and their line management supervisors retain final
responsibility for management of TCM. This responsibility includes hazard
identification, assessment of potential off-normal situations, proper storage,
contractor oversight, and employee training. Much of the training is
conducted as part of weekly safety meetings or "on the job" and is not part of
a well-documented, formalized program . The Environmental Department at NPR-3
provides technical guidance regarding chemical use; however, this is on an
as -needed basis only . NPR-3 does not have consistent, sitewide procedures or
poli ci es to i ntegrate the var i ous department responsibilities and activities .
NPR-3 personnel st ore and use tox i c and chemical materials, including
compressed gases , i n warehouses , storage yards, operations areas, shops, and
on vehic les . The chemi cal s are stored in various amounts from shop quantities
(s pray cans and pa i l s) to bulk storage tanks .

In response to the 1988 Environmental Survey, the only area in which progress
has been noticeably achieved is pesticide management. By choosing to
subcontract all future application of restricted pesticides, JBEC has
eliminated the need to train and oversee employee activities in this area .
The use of GSA spray insecticide and commercial mouse kill bait for spot
application by employees at NPR-3 will continue and application of
unrestricted pesticides for weed control at NOSR-l and NOSR-3 will be done by
a single individual prior to commencing work on gas well s in those areas.
The environmental issues identified at NOSR-I and NOSR-3 are significant in
that limited action was apparently taken by NPOSR-CUW to address the
environmental concerns identified in the 19B8 Environmental Survey. Chemicals
located at the Anvil Points Mine Bench and the Water Pump House have not been
removed or managed in accordance with applicable regulations . Deteriorated
asbestos insulation on interior pipes and badly weathered transite siding on
and around buildings located on the mine bench remain where they were observed
in 1988.
Activities in the area of toxic and chemical materials management at NPOSR-CUW
are currently below compliance levels. Programs, policies, and procedures to
handle, store, and manage toxic and chemical materials at NPR-3 have not been
formalized. The lack of formality of procedures has resulted ill fragmented
line responsibilities, inconsistent recordkeeping and documentation, and
incomplete training or formal instruction for NPR-3 and site support
contractors and subcontractors . Chemical use and storage, and PCB management
are not in compliance with regulatory requirements while the formality of
operations (i . e. , policies and procedures) does not conform with the
requirements of DOE Orders . Training of contractor personnel is not
comprehensive or formalized . In addition, DOE personnel responsible fo r
oversight of the contractors' activities are not adequately trained to carry
out this function.
The toxic and chemical materials assessment identified four compliance
findings . These findings address toxic and chemical material s management and
storage , storage of toxic and chemical materials, the management of oil-filled
equipment and PCBs, and NPOSR-CUI/'s Pollution Prevention Awareness Program
Plan.

Oil and wa ter t reatment chemical s are provided primarily through a contract
with Na1co Chemical Cor p. Na1co operates, manages, and services "porta- feed"
units whic h provi de aut omatic i nject i on of scale i nhibitors, bactericides , HzS
and oxygen scavengers, and demu1s i f i ers to well injection and pumping
operations. Most uni t s are ent irely automated and hard piped to
pumping/injection units, and t he chemi cals are replenished by Na1co employees .
This service constitut es the la rgest use of toxic and chemical materials at
the NPR-3 oil fields and cont ractor oversight is provided informally by the
site Chemical and Cat hod i c Protect i on Coordinator . Although JBEC employee
contact with the "por t a-feed " un i t s i s i ntermi ttent, some slugging operati ons
require manual operation of the un its by site employees.
Warehouse person nel manage stored, excessed , and scrap equipment from NPR -3
operations . Equi pment stored for i nd ivi dual users or a sitewide pool prior to
designation as excess or sc rap, are placed i n t he excess yard or warehouse.
Such equipment may cont ai n hazardous materials dur i ng storage, excess, or
scrap stages at NPR- 3.
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3.5.5.2

COIIPliance Findings

FINDING TCMVCF-1:

Toxic and Che.ical Materials Management Progra.

of chemical use onsite. In addition, TCM hazard identification and spill
response training is informal and documentation is incomplete . The following
are examples of speci fi c programmatic deficiencies.

Perforwance Objective

Contractor/Sybcontractor Oversight

ODE 5400.1, 'General Environmental Protection Program," states "It is DOE
policy to conduct its operations in an environmentally sound manner that
limits risks to the environment.' Heads of Field Organizations shall "develop
and implement programs that direct contractors to execute environmental
protection compliance programs and policies and provide for oversight,
confirmation, and independent verification of those contractor programs."

NPOSR-CUW does not have formal ized procedures for overseeing chemical use by
subcontractors and contractors (1- TCM-I and 1-TCM-24) . A systematic hazard
review of chemicals used by JBEC during maintenance, water treatment, and oil
testing activities is not formally conducted by environmental personnel.
Also , tracking of the types and quantities of chemicals such as lubricants,
equipment maintenance products, and downhole materials is inconsistently
conducted because there are no procedures . DOE surveillance of JBEC field
activities does not i nclude evaluation of the use, storage, and tracking of
chemicals (I-TCM-30) .

ODE 5480.19, 'Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities,' requires
that 'the conduct of operations at DOE facilities be managed with a consistent
and auditable set of requirements, standards, and responsibilities and that
. . . Operators at ODE facilities have procedures in place to control the
conduct of their operations .'
ODE 5480.19, Attachment I, Chapter VIII, states ' Operators should be
knowl edgeabl e about aspects of facility processes and s.l fety that affect
operation and should be able to analyze off-normal situations and take
appropriate action to cori'ect the cause(s) of problems.' Examples of the
types of concepts and processes with which operations personnel should be
fam i l i ar include: ' The purpose and hazards associated with facility storage
and use of such chemicals as . . . acids, caustics, . . . and chemicals
containing organics .'
29 CFR 1910 . 1450, "Nati onal Research Council Recommendations Concerning
Chemical Hygi ene i n Laboratories (non-mandatory), " Section D.2(a) , states
' before a substance is received, information on proper handling , storage, and
disposal should be known to those who will be i nvolved .' Section D. 9(c),
states that a spill control pol icy should be developed and should include
consideration of prevention, containment, cleanup, and reporting.
Finding
NPOSR-CUW does not have a comprehensive sitewide program that manages the
procurement, receipt, tracking, handling , and response to releases of toxic
and chemical materials to ensure compliance with DOE 5400 . 1, ODE 5480 . 19, and
29 CFR 1910.1450.
Discussion
Comprehensive manageme nt of toxic and chem'Ical materials (TCM) must
incorporate and integ rate aspects of project planning, procurement, receipt,
tracking, handling, storage, spill response, and use. Management systems for
hazard identification and oversight by contractors and DOE should ensure
compliance and minimize potential releases to the environment.
NPOSR-CUW lacks the elements of a comprehensive system to manage TCM.
Specific elements not available include: formal procedures to oversee
chemical material use by subcontractors onsite; a system for environmental
reviews of purchase requests to ensure that procured mater i als will not result
in environmental concerns; and procedures to govern the inventory and tracking

The most significant use of chemicals in the field is accomplished by
' porta-feed' units supplied and maintained by Nalco Corp. These chemicals are
used for the treatment of crude oil and produced water and include biocides,
scale inhibitors, hydrogen sulfide and oxygen scavengers, oil demulsifiers ,
and chemi cals for adjusting pH. Although a Nalco representat i ve services and
replenishes the ' porta-feed " units weekly, and a JBEC employee observes this
activ i ty, a formal procedure for conducting this oversight has not been
developed (1 - TCM-I) .
Procyrement
Chemical procurement at NPOSR-CUW follows a written procedure that requires a
mater i al requestor to complete a purchase request form (I-TCM-II) . This
request form must receive a job order supervisor's signature and be approved
by warehouse and procurement staff prior to chemical purchase . Although a
formal procedure exists for procurement of materials (TCM-17) , there are no
prov i si ons that require envi ronmental review of requested materials to
evaluate the environmental concerns or potential substitutions of these
materials. The written procedure also does not require material safety dat a
sheets (MSDSs) to be obtained prior to receipt and distri buti on of chemicals
onsite. Three areas inspected at NPR-3 duri ng the Tiger Team Assessment (the
electrical shop, maintenance shop, and Steam Generator No. I) did not have
MSDSs for several of the chemi cal products used and stored in these areas.
Some examples of these products include: methanol, Mis ty Choke and Carburetor
Cleaner, CRC Cutt ing Oil, Johnson Over and Under Floor Cleaner and Macklanburg
Duncan Contact Cement (I -TCM-2, 1- TCM-9 and 1- TCM"21) .
Department supervisors have drafted lists of chemicals for which MSDSs are not
available. However, a process t o expedite procurement of the data sheets has
not been formalized (TCM-13 and TCM-15). Currently, informal responsibility
for acquir ing needed MSDSs is shared among environmental personnel , safety and
heal t h personnel, department supervisors, and the JBEC Procurement Department .
Over 35 chemical products, for which the site does not have MSDSs, are
currently in use throughout NPR -3.
Inyentory/Tracking
A comprehensive inventory of all TeM used onsite is not maintained . In
addition, individual chemical use areas, such as shops, the Water Treatment
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Facility, and the Warehouse do not maintain an inventory of the types and
aMOunts of chemicals in storage or in use . Stock chemical products stored at
the Warehouse at NPR-3 can be withdrawn from stock by employees wi thout a
superv i sor's approval, and a system is not in place to ensure that an MSDS
accompanies any chemical received and used in the field .

Written job descriptions indicating required training for all
positions that use and handle TCM have not been developed
(1- TCM-20).

TCM Hazard Identification and Spill Response Trajning

Procedures for conducting water treatment tests at the Water
Treatment Facil ity and steam generators, and grind-out tests at
tank batteries are informal and do not address the hazards and
spill response techniques associated with TCM use .

General hazard communicat ion train i ng per 29 CFR 1910 . 1200 is prov ided to all
NPOSR-CUW employees as part of a routine orientation program. This tra i ni ng
is not job-specific with regard to hazards associated with chemicals employees
will be handling as part of their individual job responsibilit ies .

Newly acquired spill response kits are located in several
locations throughout the NPR-3 site including the Water Treatment
Facility and steam generating plants; however , training on use of
this equipment has not been conducted (I-TCM-21 and I-TCM-8).

NPOSR-CUW lacks a formal comprehensi ve chemical awareness training program.
Training regard i ng TCM is currently conduc·ed at weekly departmental safety
meet i ngs and consists primarily of a review of information available on
specific chemical MSDSs . Although weekly safety meeting attendance is
documented, course outlines and syllabuses are not prepared . Should any
employee miss a safety meeting, provis ions do not exist to ensure that
materi al covered is reviewed and understood by that employee . The follow i ng
examples i nd icate the lack of comprehensive training regarding TCM:
A pumper at the Tensleep Tank Battery was not familiar with the
safety hazards associated wi th Na1co 4818 (I-TCM-l7) .

The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self- assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) partially identified this finding in that each of the
self-assessments failed to identify specific deficiencies in this area .
The apparent causal factors for this finding are 1riin1n9, in that NPOSR-CUW
personnel handling TCM are not formally trained regarding the hazards
assoc iated wi th chemical use or in spill response procedures required t o
adequately minimi ze the effects of spilled hazardous materials to the
environment; and the lack of procedyres for use and handling of TCM and
responding to TCM releases wh ile conducting these activities .

A pumper at the B- I- IO Tank Battery was not famil iar wi th the
safety hazards assoc iated with Solvent 140 (I -TCM-18) . This
operator was also not aware of tra i ning requirements for her job .
Spill Response Trai ni ng
NPOSR-CUW has prepared an SPCC plan t o mi nimize the effects of spilled oil at
NPR-3; however, t his pl an does not add ress the release of toxic and chemi cal
materials incl uding oil from oi l -fil l ed equipment at NPR-3 or NOSR-I and
NOSR-3 (TCM-18) (see Fi nd i ng TCM/CF-3) .
Oil spill response traini ng is fo rmall y conducted at NPOSR-CUW ; however ,
chemical spill response training is no t. Chemical spi ll re sponse trai ni ng is
conducted informally at weekly safety meeti ngs and consi sts pr imari ly of a
supervisor ' s review of spil l res ponse procedure s outl i ned in chemical product
MSDSs. JBEC employees working i n are as wh ere chemical s are widely used ,
includ i ng the LTS Gas Plant, tank ba tteries , the Wat er Treatment Facil ity,
shops, and steam generating plants, have not received formal spi ll response
tra i ni ng and procedures for chemi ca 1 spi 11 res ponse have not been developed .
Specific examples that indicate t he site has not developed an integrated
sitewide spill response program for TCM are as follows :
The chemical truck driver has received 40 hour s of haza rdous
materials training offsite; however , t he t r uck wh ich transpor t s
chemicals to many l ocati ons th roughout the NPR-3 oil f ield is not
equipped with spil l response equi pment (I -TCM- IO) .
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FINDING TCMVCF-2:

Storage of Toxic and Chemical Materials

PerfoJ'llance Object ives
DOE 5400 . 1, "General Environmental Protection Program," requires DOE
facilities to conduct operations in an environmentally sound manner that
limits risks to the enviromllent and to develop and implement programs to
execute environmental protection cumpliance programs and policies .
DOE 5480 . 19, "Conduct of Operation Requirements for DOE Facilities,"
Attachment I, Chapter VIII, states "Operators should be knowledgeable about
aspects of facil ity processes and safety that affect operation and should be
able to analyze off-normal situations and take appropriate action to correct
the cause(s) of problems ." Examples of the types of concepts and processes
with which operations personnel should be familiar include : "The purpose and
hazards associated with facil ity storage and use of such chemical s . . .
acids, caustics, . . . and chemicals containing organics ."
29 CFR 1910 establishes requirements for the handling and storage of toxic and
chemical materials. 29 CfR 1910 . 106(b)(2)(vii) requires that "the area
surrounding a group of tanks shall be provided with drainage, or shall be
diked, to prevent accidental discharge of l i quid from endangering adjoining
property or reaching waterways."
29 CFR 1910 . 1450, "National Research Council Recommendations Concerning
Chemical Hygiene in Laboratories (non-mandatory) ," Section 0,2 . (b), suggests
that toxic substances should be segregated in a well identified ar ea . . .
It also suggests that "Stored chemicals should be examined periodically (at
least annually) for replacement, deterioration, and container integrity."
Finding
NPOSR-CUW does not have formal procedures to identify, segregate, label, and
manage toxic and chemical materials as required by DOE 5480.19 and 29 CFR
1910.

Discussion
NPR-3 personnel store and use toxic and chemical materials , including
compressed gases, in warehouses, storage yards, operations areas , shops, and
on vehicles . The chemicals are stored in various amounts from shop quantities
(spray cans and pa il s) t o bul k storage tanks.
Storage practices for toxic and chemical materials at facilities operated by
J8EC at NPR -3 vary. Instances were observed where incompatible materials at
NPR-3 were not segregated and several containers were observed improperly
labeled or not labeled . The lack of comprehensive, formal procedures to
ensure consistent hazard ident ificat i on, labeling, segregati on , and storage of
TCM at NPOSR-CUW sites increases the potential for releasing chemicals to the
envirorunent.
The following deficiencies in meeting DOE and regulatory requirements were
observed:

Incompatible materials were stored together in the following
locations:
Bleach (oxidizer) and an organic combustible deodorizer were
stored together on a shelf at the Warehouse and under a sink
at the Water Treatment Facility (I-TCM-4 and I-TCM-8).
Quart bottles of 5.25 Normal (N) sulfuric acid and 5. 0N
sodium hydroxide were stored together at the Water Treatment
Facility and at Steam Generator No. I (I -TCM- 21 and
I-TCM-8).
Containers were found mislabeled or unlabeled in the following
locations :
A 55-gallon drum of oil located at the Warehouse Storage
Yard was not labeled such that the identifying markings
could be easily seen (I-TCM-3) .
A 55-gallon drum and a 5-gallon pail at the Chemical Dock
Area were not labeled (I-TCM-I0) .
A 5-gallon can containing Solvent 140, located outside the
Dog House at Tank Battery B-I-3 , was marked only with the
word "solvent ," which did not describe the actual contents
of the can (I-TCM-19) .
The contents of a I-quart bottle located at the Water
Treatment Facil ity could not be determined due to a damaged
label . JBEC personnel indicated that the bottle conta ined
5.25N sulfuric acid ; however , this was not confirmed
(1- TCM-8) .
An oxy~en test kit unit located at Steam Generator No . I
contained a hydrochloric acid solution (Fyrite) which was
not labeled (I-TCM- 21).
Two 30,OOO-gallon liquid butane/gasoline (BG Mix) pressure
tanks located at the LTS Gas Plant were not marked to
identify the ccntents (I-TCM-29).
Two 55-gallon drums of water treatment chemicals located at
the LTS Gas Plant were not marked for their contents;
however , National Fire Protection Ass ociation (NFPA) hazard
warnings were affixed (I -TCM- 14) .
The secondary containment structure shared by two methanol tanks
and one ethylene glycol tank at the LTS Gas Plant is inadequate to
prevent the discharge of methanol to the environment as requi red
by 29 CFR 1910.106. The I,OOO -gallOn methanol tank is positioned
too close to the perimeter. and associated piping extends beyond
the perimeter of the containment. Product from this tank and
piping has the potential to be discharged outside the containment.

3-116
/~

A box of empty propane cylinders was found on the floor near the
garage door in the NPR-3 Warehouse . "Empty" propane cylinders may
contain some residual product under pressure, and their present
location creates the potential to damage the valves or puncture
the cy1 i nders and release propane (I- TCM-4) .
A 55-gallon drum of Solvent 140 located on a stand at Tank Battery
B-I-IO was not properly seated in the stand. The stand was rusted
and a weld was broken (I- TCM-IB) .
In 1988, an environmental survey conducted at NOSR-I and NOSR-3
discovered various maintenance chemicals abandoned in place
(TCM-19). The Environmental Subteam observed these same
chemicals, including hydraulic fluid and paints, stored at the
Anvil Points Mine (I-SW-9) . ThesE chemicals have not been
evaluated for use nr disposal since the 1988 Environmental Survey .
NPOSR-CUW has not developed formal procedures for inspecting and
decontaminating equipment which comes into the Warehouse Yard
prior to its being scrapped. Metal scrap (pipe jOints and valves)
is collected in a dumpster box in the Warehouse Yard. Much of
this material appears to contain scale and deposits (I -TCM-3) .
The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) fully identified this finding .
The apparent causal factors for this finding are inadequate R2l.iu
imp1ernentatl2n of existing DOE Orders and regulatory guidelines; insufficient
1J:iin1ng of NPOSR-CUW personnel; inadequate lIill9.n of the secondary
containment structure for the methanol and ethylene glycol tanks; and
inadequate supervision to ensure compliance with DOE Orders . A secondary
contributing factor for this finding is inadequate appraisa1s/audits/reyiews
by NPOSR-CUW for not identifying and correcting the deficiencies in current
TCM identification, storage, segregation, and labeling practices.

FINDING TCH,ICF-3 :

Managl!llent of Oil-Filled Equipment and
Polychlorinated Biphenyls

Perfonaance Objective
DOE 5400.1, "General Environmental Protection Program," states "it is DOE
policy to conduct the Department's operations in compliance with the letter
and spirit of the applicable environmental statutes, regulat ions, and
standards. " In addition, DOE is committed to good governmental management of
all its programs and at all its facilities to correct existing environmental
problems, to minimize risks to the environment or public health, and to
anticipate and address potential environmental problems before they pose a
threat to the quality of the environment or the public welfare .
DOE 6430 . IA, "General Design Criteria," 1630-2.3.5, "Oil-Filled Equipment ,"
states that for oil-filled equipment "Dikes and drainage provisions shall be
built as required by the local SPCC Plan in accordance with 40 CFR 112." It
also states "Existing PCB or PCB-contaminated equipment shall be provided with
warning signs and shall not be relocated or reused in other existing or new
facil ities."
DOE 5480 . 19, "Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities," requires
that "the conduct of operations at DOE facilities be managed Hith a consistent
and auditab1e set of requirements, standards, and responsibil ities and that
. . . Operators at DOE facilities have procedures in place to control the
conduct of their operations. "
40 CFR 761, "P01ych10rinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Process ing,
Distribution in Commerce, and Use Prohibitions," ". . . establishes
prohibitions of, and requirements for the manufacture, processing,
distribution in commerce, use, disposal, storage, and marking of PCBs and PCB
Items. " 40 CFR 761.3 states "Oil -fil led Electrical Equipment . . . whose PCB
concentration is not known must be assumed to be PCB-Contaminated ."
40 CFR 112.7(c), "Guidelines for the preparation and impl ementation of a Spill
Prevention Control and Countermeasure Plan ," states "Appropriate containment
and/or diversionary structures or equipment to prevent discharged oil from
reaching a navigable water course should be provided."
Finding
NPOSR -CUW lacks a comprehensive set of procedures to manage PCBs to ensure
comp 1i ance with DOE Orders, 40 CFR 761, and 40 CFR 112 . 7.
Discussion
In the early to mid - 1980s, transformers were surveyed at NPR-3 to identify and
dispose of PCBs in order to comply with recently promulgated regulations .
Since that time, management of oil - filled electrical equipment (primarily
transformers) has not progressed Significantly, and data collected during
previous surveys are incomplete and inconclusive regarding the amount of
PCB-c;;ntami nated equi pment OilS ite (I -TCM -15) .
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NPR-3 utilizes and stores oil-filled equipment in the form of pole mounted
transformers, pad transformers, and capacitors. However, a formal program to
manage this equipment has not been developed .
The following observations indicate deficiencies in the management of
oil-filled equipment at NPR-3:
An accurate inventory of oil-filled equipment and tracking of this
equipment has not been developed per 40 CFR 761 . 1BO(iv) . Due to
incomplete records of analyses and test results from a previous
transformer sampling event, thp. total number of PCB-contaminated
devices onsite is not known (I-TCM-IS and I-TCM-2B).
A pole mounted transformer at location 12 -N- IO, which was
bel ieved to be PCB-contaminated, was not labeled as such .
The transformer was either changed, and its whereabouts
unknown, or it was mislabeled (I-TCM-2B).

The listed deficiencies support the concern that NPOSR-CUW does not have
programs in place to ensure that PCB management meets the DOE requirements and
Federal regulations. In addition, compliance with regulations is hampered
because the site personnel responsible for the management of oil-filled
equipment are not trained in or familiar with the PCB regulatory requirements
of 40 CFR 761 (I-TCM-2, I-TeM-IS, and I-TCM-2B) .
The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC se1 f-assessment
(April 1992) partially identified this finding in that each of the
self-assessments failed to identify specific deficiencies in this area.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are inadequate I!l!l..kx
imo1ementation of PCB management requirements; sitewide and functional group
procedures which do not address regulatory requirements; and insufficient
1J:lln!.ng of env.ironmenta1 and other NPOSR-CUW personnel in compl hnt
regulatory practices and recordkeeping .

A pole mounted metering station that belongs to Pacific
Power and Light (PP&L) contains several small transformers.
The site does not know if these transformers contain
PCB-contaminated oil (I-TCM-2B).
Existing PCB documentation including transformer locations and
manufacturers' certification for non-PCB fluids is not organized,
and lab analysis required to substantiate test results for many of
the transformers is not available. JBEC personnel responsible for
managing oil-filled equipment cannot confirm with supporting
analytical data the PCB-concentration of 9 out of 33 transformers
stored in the Excess and Pipe yards. These transformers are not
managed as PCB-contaminated, as required by 40 CFR 761.3, which
states that any oil-filled transformer whose PCB concentration is
not known must be assumed to be PCB-contaminated (I-TCM-IS) .
Oil-filled equipment storage ilreas in the Excess and Pipe
Yards do not meet the requirements for spill containment in
40 CFR 1I2 .7(c) as referenced by DOE 6430 . IA .
The nine transformers have exceeded the I-year storage
requirement of 40 CFR 76I.6S(a).
The nine transformers do not contain warning signs required
by DOE 6430 . IA (i-TCM-IS and I-TCM-Il).
The nine transformers are not dated to indicate the day on
which storage began per 40 CFR 76I.6S(b)(B).
Procedures for proper PCB transformer decontamination and
retrofi11ing, as defined in 40 CFR 761.79, have not been developed
(I -TCM-IS and I-TCM-3 ) .
The site has not developed specific spill response procedures for
PCB-contaminated oil nor addressed the spillage and subsequent
cleanup of PCB-contaminated oils in its SPCC Plan (TCM-IB).
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FINDING TCMVCF-4:

Pollution Prevention Awareness PrograJI Plan

Perfol'llance Objective
DOE 5400 .1, "General Environmental Protection Program ," establishes DOE pol icy
on environmental protection. Chapter 111.4 .c requires the Head of Field
Organization to prepare a Pollution Prevention Awareness Program Plan (PPAPP)
that includes elements for employee awareness. "All mission statements and
project plans shall recog ~ i ze a requirement for pollution prevention, where
appropriate. The documer ted program, including elements for employee
awareness through specif l ~ training . . . campaigns, and incentives and
awards programs shall be implemented. " The plan was to be implemented by
November 9, 1989.
Fi nding
NPOSR-CUW's PPAPP does not meet the requirements of DOE 5400 . 1, Chapter III,
and the pollution prevention awareness program has not been implemented.
Discussion
NPOSR-CUW has drafted a PPAPP . The plan was completed and approved by the
Director of NPOSR-CUW in December 1989. However, the plan was not completed
prior to the November 1989 deadline and, to date, has not been formally
implemented .
The PPAPP consists of a two-page outline of issues to be addressed and actions
to be taken by specific dates. However, some elements of the PPAPP required
by DOE 5400 . 1 are not addressed. The specific elements not addressed include:
prov idi ng for pollution prevention i n mi ssion statements and project plans,
spec i fic tra i ning , and related employee awareness campaigns and incentives
(TeM-6) . Comprehensive, formalized training programs specific to pollution
prevent i on fo r subcontractors, contractor, management, and field employees
have not been established or implemented .

This page intentionally left blank.

The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (Apri l 1992) and the J8EC self-assessment
(April 1992) fu l ly ident i fied t his finding .
The apparent cau sal facto r for this finding is a lack of policy implementation
conce rni ng PPAPP elements as required by DOE 5400 . 1. A secondary contributing
fact or for t his f i nd i ng Is the lack of appraisals/audits/reviews by
DOE/NPOS R-CUW t o effecti vely oversee implementation of this requirement .
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3. 5.6

Quality Assurance

3. 5.6.1

Overview

TABLE 3-8
LIST OF QUALITY ASSURANCE
REGULATIONS/REQUIREMENTS/GUIDELINES

The quality assurance (QA) portion of the Environmental Subteam assessment at
NPOSR-CUW evaluated current operat ional pract ices and programs to determine
the compliance status with Federal regulations and DOE Orders , as well as
commonly accepted industry QA practices and standards of performance .
Table 3-8 lists environmental quality assurance regulations, OOE Orders , and
gu ide1 ines that were used during this assessment.
The primary focus of the quality assurance assessment was the activit ies at
NPR-3. There was a review in Casper of NOSR-I and NOSR-3 documents related to
environmental quality assurance , and there was an assessment of quality
assurance associated with groundwater and surface water sampling events
observed by a member of the Environmental Subteam during his field work at
NOSR-I and NOSR-3. Because there has been no development of the resources at
NOSR-2 i n Utah , that site was not included in the quality assurance
assessment.
The environmental quality assurance assessment included interviews with
NPOSR-CUW and contract laboratory employees; inspection of NPOSR-CUW
facilities, leased records archives, and contract laboratories; observation of
environmental sampling and analysis activities; and a review of documents,
procedures, and records associated with environmental monitoring and
surveillance programs.

Requirements for

QAMS-004/80
EPA-600/4- 79-019
SW-846
ASME NQA-I-1989

Gu ide1 ines and Specifications for
Preparing QA Program P1 ans
Handbook for Analytical Quality Control
in Water and Wastewater Laboratories
Test Methods for the Evaluation of
Sol id Waste, Physical/Chemical Methods
Qual ity Assurance Program Requirements
for Nuclear Facilities

As a part of the quality assurance assessment, reviews were coordinated with
other Environmental Subteam special i sts in the areas of soils , sediments, and
biota; groundwater ; surface water; air; radiation; and waste management to
ensure that potent ial environmental monitoring and surveillance QA problems
were identified and eva1uated.
Within DOE/NPOSR-CUW, development and implementation of a quality assurance
program (QAP) that meets the requirements of DOE 5700.6C is normally the
responsibility of the QA Officer. However, responsibilities for evaluating
the quality of env i ronmental monitoring and surveillance operations are
primarily i ntradepartmental as are quality assessments and audits.
Individuals responsible for overSight, mon itoring , verification, and
development of performance standards do not have sufficient independence and
authori ty to conduct act i vit ies and resolve issues.
NPOSR-CUW has neither an approved Environmental Monitoring Program nor QAP
that meets the requirements of DOE Orders. At the time of this asses sment, a
QAP document based on the requirements of DOE 5400.1, DOE 5700 . 6C, and ASME
NQA-1 has been prepared and submitted to FE-I for approval . In addit ion, a
self-assessment program document has been approved by FE-I. However,
NPOSR-CUW has not allocated resources to implement the program.
NPOSR-CUW has not developed and implemented many of the plans and programs
requi red by DOE 5400.1. An Environmental Monitoring Plan and Groundwater
Protection Management Plan have not been developed . The Pollution Prevention
Awareness Program Plan and Waste Minimization Program Plan have been
deve loped, but not implemented.
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DOE

EPA
EPA
EPA
ASME

Other required plans and programs that have been implemented lack the required
formality to ensure compliance with ODE 5400 . 1 requirements. Of further
concern is the lack of a system within NPOSR-CUW to translate regulations and
DOE requirements into formal policies, standards, and procedures.
As a result of the lack of policy implementation, environmental monitoring and
surveillance operations at NPOSR-CUW are conducted without attention to proper
procedure by personnel who lack the training or who are otherwise unqualified
to perform the assigned tasks. Insufficient attention is paid to the
assessment of quality of completed work, periodic monitoring of
work-in-progress, and oversight of subcontractors by means of internal audits.
Within JBEC operations, QA is the responsibility of the Quality Management
Coordinator who was assigned the responsibil ity to coordinate the development
and implementation of a QAP to bring JBEC into compliance with DOE 5700 .6C.
Prior to the appointment of the Quality Management Coordinator in March 1992,
JBEC had no QA organization that conducted independent monitoring of
environmental quality-related issues and reported problems to management for
resolution. Responsibilities for evaluating the quality of envi ronmental
monitoring and surveillance operations were primarily intradepartmental as
were quality assessments and audits .
The 1988 Environmental Survey recorded one environmental quality assurance
finding: there were no written procedures for National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) sampling. No corrective action has been taken to
address this finding.
The present environmental monitoring and surveillance activities do not meet
ODE requirements for quality assurance and data verification necessary to
minimize risks and environmental impacts. The recent JBEC decision to
implement a total quality management program and to hire a Quality Management
Coordinator has led to the production of a QAP manual and a self-assessment
program manual for JBEC that, when fully implemented, will meet DOE
requirements for environmental monitoring and surveillance.
The qual ity assurance portion of the Environmental Subteam assessment
identified 12 compliance findings. The findings pertain to environmental
monitoring programs, formality of environmental programs, management of the
environmental QAP , environmental operating procedures, training of
environmental personnel, QA independence, internal QA audits, environmental
data validation, records management, standards and calibration,
chain -of-custody, and procurement of analytical services .

3. 5.6.2

Compl iance Findings

FINDING QA/CF -1 :

Enyirollllll!ntal Monitoring PrograJIs and Annual
Site Eny i ronllenta1 Report

Perfonaance Object i ye
DOE 5400.1, "General Environmental Protection Program," Chapter III , requires
DOE operations to develop and implement specific environmental programs.
DOE 5400.1, Chapter IV, requires that a written Environmental Monitoring Plan
be prepared for each site, by November 9, 1991.
DOE 5400.1, Chapter III (2.a-d), requires that an Environmental Protection
Implementation Plan be prepared for implementing the requirements of the
Order. The plan is to provide management direction, including assignment of
responsibilities and authorities, to ensure that DOE facilities are operated
and managed in a manner to comply with environmental regulations and DOE
policies .
DOE 5400.1, Chapter III (3.a), requires the development of a Long Range
Environmental Protection Plan .
DOE 5400.1, Chapter III (4.a), requires the preparation of a Groundwater
Protection Management Program Plan that includes specified elements listed in
the Order.
Office of Environmental Compliance Division (EH-22) Final Guidance for the
Preparation of Site Environmental Reports for Calendar Year 1991, requires
final Site Environmental Reports to be submitted to EH-l by June I, 1992 .
Finding
NPOSR-CUW environmental monitoring programs, reports, and plans do not fully
meet the requirements of DOE 5400 . 1 and DOE Headquarters guidance .
Discussion
The Environmental Subteam reviewed environmental monitoring programs and plans
to determine if they meet the i ntent and spirit of DOE 5400.1 . These programs
and plans are used to help ensure compliance with legal and regulatory
requirements, confirm adherence to DOE environmental protection policies, and
support environmental management decisions . The Environmental Subteam
identified the following deficiencies during this review:
The Environmental Protection Implementation Plan (EPIP) appears to
contain errors . The EPIP states that a formal Groundwater
Protect ion Management Plan was developed and reviewed by
DOE/NPOSR-CUW. However, this plan does not exist, and
DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not reviewed any drafts of this plan (R-13;
I-R- I0) (see Finding GW/CF-l) .
An Environmental Monitoring Plan has not been developed for
NPOSR-CUW, as required by DOE 5400.1 (R-13) .
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The 1991 Annual Site Environmental Monitoring Report was not sent
to EH-l by June 1, 1992, as required by DOE Headquarters guidance.
A Pollution Prevention Awareness Program Plan has been developed ,
but it does not meet the requirements of DOE 5400 . 1 (see Finding
TCM/CF-4) .
A Waste Minimization Program Plan has been developed, but it does
not meet the requirements of DOE 5400.1 and has not been
implemented. This plan was required to be implemented by May 9,
1990, by DOE 5400.1 (see Finding ~'M/CF-l).
There are no procedures for survei 11 ance and monitori ng of surface
waters, as required by DOE 5400.1 (I-SW-5).
A Groundwater Monitoring Plan has not been developed, as required
by DOE 5400.1 (see Finding GW/CF-I).
Air and meteorological monitoring programs have not been
developed, as required by DOE 5400 . 1 (see Findings A/CF-2 and
A/CF-3) .
The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) fully identified this finding.
The apparent causal factor for this finding is policy implementation, in that
DOE policy has not been implemented by NPOSR-CUW.

FINDING QA/CF-2:

Fonaality of Envirolllll!nhl Progrillls

PerfoJ"llance Object i ve
DOE 5480.19, 'Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities,' provides
requirements and guidelines for the development of directives, plans, and
procedures relating to the conduct of operations. This Order states that it
is the policy of DOE that the conduct of operations at DOE facilities be
managed with a consistent and auditable set of requirements, standards, and
responsibilities. The policy statement also addresses the use of procedures
to control conduct of operations, review of programs, and assessment of
program effectiveness.
DOE 5700.6C, "Quality Assurance,' Criterion 4, 'Document and Records," states
"Documents shall be prepared, reviewed, approved, issued and revised to
prescribe processes, specify requirements or establ ish design .'
DOE 5700 . 6C, Criterion 5, "Document and Records,' states "work shall be
performed to establish technical standards and administrative controls' and
"work shall be performed under controlled conditions using approved
instructions, procedures, or other appropriate processes .'
Fi.nding
NPOSR -CUW environmental protection activities are not conducted in accordance
with formal programs supported by controlled documentation, as required by
DOE 5480 . 19 and 5700.6C.
Discussion
NPOSR-CUW environmental programs are striving to achieve compliance with
regulatory requirements and DOE Orders. There are many informal practices,
procedures, and policies that sometimes are helping this process, but i n most
cases hinder this effort . The Environmental Subteam observed the following
concerns with these i nformal programs:
A formal system is not in place to identify and translate
regulations and DOE Orders into policies, standards, and
procedures. The Environmental Subteam identified many Orders,
such as DOE 5400.5 and DOE 5820 .2A, that have not been reviewed
and transmitted by DOE/NPOSR-CUW . Some of these Orders have not
been acted on for over 2 years (I-R-IO).
There is no system in place to ensure that subcontractors will
follow DOE environmental Orders (I -R- I and I-R-4) (see Finding
RAD/CF -2). Although there are informal reviews of subcontractor
procedures, there are no formal requirements and review
specifications to evaluate procedures.
Subcontractors do not have policies and procedures that are part
of a formal, auditable document control system (I-R-II) (see
Finding QA/CF-12).
A review system is not in place to ensure that JBEC procedures
address all activities necessary to implement environmental
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policies, are technically correct and current, and have a level of
detail appropriate for the activities to which they apply (I-R-9) .
The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) fully identified this finding.
The apparent causal factor for this finding is a lack of policy implementation
to ensure that the requirements of DOE 54BO.I9 are met.

FINDING QA/CF-3:

Environl.ental Quality Assurance Prograll

Perfol'llance Object i ve
DOE 5400.1, "General Environmental Protection Program," Chapter IV, Section
10.a, states "A quality assurance program consistent with DOE 5700.6B
[superseded by DOE 5700 .6C] shall be established covering each element of
environmental monitoring and surveillance programs commensurate with its
nature and complexity. The quality assurance program shall include, but not
be limited to, the following: (I) Organizational responsibility; (2) Program
design; (3) Procedures; (4) Field quality control; (5) laboratory quality
control; (6) Human factors; (7) Recordkeeping; (B) Chain-of-custody
procedures; (9) Audits; (10) Performance reporting; and (II) Independent Data
verification."
DOE 5700.6C, "Quality Assurance," Section 9. b, requires the development of a
quality assurance program based on the following 10 criteria: program,
personnel training and qualification, quality improvement, documents and
records, work processes, deSign, procurement, inspection and acceptance
test i ng, management assessment, and independent assessment .
Finding
NPOSR-CUW has not implemented an environmental quality assurance program that
meets the requirements of DOE 5400.1 and DOE 5700.6C.
Discussion
The Environmental Subteam reviewed environmental quality assurance programs
and plans to determi ne if the programs and plans meet the intent and spirit of
DOE 5400.1 . During this review, the Environmental Subteam identified the
following deficiencies:
JBEC doe s not have an approved and implemented Environmental
Qua 1ity Assurance Program and Imp 1ementat i on Pl an (I-QA-3).
However , a plan that meets the requirements of DOE Orders has
recently been prepared and submitted by the site t o DOE
Headquarters for approval (QA-2B and QA-32) .
DOE/NPOSR-CUW does not have an approved and implemented
Environmental Quality Assurance Program and Implementation Plan
(I-QA -IO). However, a plan that meets the requirements of DOE
Orders has been prepared and submitted for approval to DOE
Headquarters (QA-26 and QA-27).
There is no system in place to ensure the quality of environmental
analytical services procured from subcontractors (I-QA -3, I-QA-7,
and I-QA-B) (see Finding QA/CF -12) .
There is no system " place to ensure that environmental
monitoring tasks are assigned t o and conducted by qual i fied
personnel (I-QA-I and I-QA-8) (see Finding QA/CF -5).
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The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) fully identified this finding.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are policy implementation and
risk evaluation, in that DOE Orders have not been implemented by the site and
the site did not evaluate the risk associated with an unapproved and
unimplemented quality assurance program.
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FINDING QA/CF -4:

Environllental Operating Procedures

Perforwance Objective
DOE 5400.1, "General Environmental Protection Program," Chapter IV, Section
10. a, states " a qual i ty assurance program consi stent wi th DOE 5700. 6B
[superseded by DOE 5700.6C] shall be established covering each element of
environmental monitoring and surveillance programs . " This Order further
requires development and implementation of procedures, field qual ity control,
1aboratory qual ity control, recordkeeping, chain-of-custody procedures, and
independent data verification .
DOE 54BO.19, "Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facil ities," requires
"that conduct of operat ions at DOE facll it i es be managed wi th a cons i stent and
auditable set of requirements, standards, and responsibilities."
DOE 5700.6C, "Qual ity Assurance," Section 9.b(2)(a), states "work shall be
performed under controlled conditions using approved instructions, procedures ,
or other appropriate means . "
DOE 5700.6C, Attachment I, Page 2, Paragraph 2, states "Program developed and
properly implemented using ASHE/NQA-l will meet the majority of requirements
of this Order." DOEINPOSR-CUW Qualitv AssuraDce Program Hanual (Harch 1992)
preamble states, "This manual is also designed to meet the requirements of
ANSI/ASHE NQA-l." JBEC Qual itv Assyrance program HaDual (April 1992), Number
ii, states,"This manual is also designed to meet the requirements of ANSI/ASHE
NQA-I to maintain consistency with DOE at NPOSR-CUW."
ASHE NQA-I, Basic Requirement 5, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,"
states "activities affecting quality shall be prescribed in and performed in
accordance with documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type
appropriate to the circumstances . " Basic Requirement 6, "Document Control , "
states "preparation, issue, and change of documents that specify quality
requirements or prescribed activities affecting quality shall be controlled to
ensure that correct documents are being employed. Such documents, including
changes thereto, shall be reviewed for adequacy and approved for release by
authori zed personnel."
Finding
Operations at NPOSR-CUW in support of environmental monitoring and
surveillance are not conducted using approved procedures as required by DOE
5400 . 1, DOE 5480 . 19, DOE 5700. 6C, and NPOSR-CUW qual i ty assurance program
manuals.

Operations noted by the Environmental Subte~m that are conducted without the
benefit of approved written procedures include, but are not limited to, the
following examples:
NPOSR-CUW personnel, observed taking groundwater and surface water
environmental samples at NQSR-3, had no written operating
procedures for preparing, operating, cleaning, or decontaminating
sampling equipment; taking and preserving samples; or instituting
and maintaining a chain-of-custody, and were not familiar with
some requi rements that are necessary to obtain an uncontami nated
sample (I-SW-5) (see Finding GW/CF-3).
There are no approved written procedures for monitoring H2S
concentrations in ambient air at NPR-3 . The JBEC air specialist
had prepared, and was using, a draft procedure (QA-ll; I-QA-4).
Procedures, or changes thereto, should not be implemented until
approved .
NPOSR-CUW personnel, observed taking National Pollutant Discharge
El imination System (NPDES) surface water samples at NPR-3, had no
approved written operating procedures for preparing, operating,
cleaning, or decontaminating sampling equipment; taking and
preserving samples; or instituting a~d maintaining a
chain-of-custody. There were no approved written procedures for
the use and maintenance of equipment used to measure pH and
conductivity of NPDES samples (I-QA-14) (see Finding SW/CF-I).
NPOSR-CUW personnel, observed sampl ing potable water at NPR-3, had
no approved written operating procedures. Procedures provided by
the Natrona County Health Department laboratory and others were
available but not followed (QA-35) . lines were inadequately
flushed . Aerators on three out of five sampling points were
frozen by scale and cou 1d not be removed. Samp 1i ng personnel were
unaware that attachments such as aerators should be removed prior
to sampling (I-QA-12) .
This finding was partially id.entified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment
(April 1992) and partially identified in the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) . Each of the self-assessments failed to identify specific
deficiencies in preparation and implementation of environmental monitoring and
survei 11 ance operat ing procedures.
The apparent causal factor for this finding is a lack of ~
implementation, in that NPOSR-CUW has not implemented an effective
environmental qual ity assurance program.

Discussion
Controlled operating procedures are a mechanism that can ensure that
ope rat ions are conducted in accordance wi th regul atory requi rements . They are
the functional implementation of environmental policy . The use of approved
procedures ensures that environmental activities are performed in a uniform,
consistent, and auditable manner. The present NPOSR-CUW systems for procedure
control, including preparation, review, revision, and approval, have not been
consistently implemented. As a result, environmental operations at NPOSR-CUW
are not routinely performed in conjunction with approved written procedures.
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Training of Environmental Personnel

FINDING QA/CF-5:
Perfonaance Obje.:t ive

DOE 5400 . 1, "General Environmental Protect i on Program," Chapter IV, Section
10. a , states "a qual i ty assurance program cons i stent wi th DOE 5700. 6B
[superseded by DOE 5700 . 6C) shall be establ ished covering each element of
environmental monitoring and surveillance programs . " Th~s Order further
requires development and implementation of procedures , fleld quallty control,
laboratory qual ity control, recordkeeping, chain-of- custody procedures , and
independent data verification.
DOE 5700.6C, "Qual ity Assurance, " Section 9.b(l)(b), Crite~ion 2, " Pers~n~el
Training and Qualification, " states "personn~l shall be tralned and quallfled
to ensure that they are capable of performing their assigned work. Personnel
shall be provided continuing training to ensure that job profi ciency is
maintained. "
DOE 5700 6C Attachment I Page 2, Paragraph 2, states "Programs developed and
properly ' implemented using ASME/NQA-I will meet the majority of requirements
of this Order." DOEINPOSR-CUIl Ouality Assurance program Manyal (March 1992)
preamble states "This manual is also designed to meet the requirements of
ANSI/ASME NQA-l. " JBEC Oyal lty Assyrance program Manual (April 1992), Number
ii, states "This manual is also designed to meet the requirements of ANSI/ASME
NQA-I to maintain consistency with DOE at NPOSR-CUII. "
ASME NQA-I , Basic Requirement 2, "Quality Assurance Program, " states "the QA
Program shall provide for indoctrination and training, as necessary, of
personnel performing activities affecting qual ity to ensure that suitable
proficiency is achieved and maintained."
Findi ng
NPOSR -CUII personnel performing environmental sampl ing and field measurements
are not provided adequate training to ensure that qual ity assurance objectives
are maintained while per forming their duties , as requ i red by DOE 5400 . 1, DOE
5700 . 6C , and NPOSR- CUII quality assurance program manuals.
Discussion
To carry out DOE pol icy , personnel who perform functions vital to the
gener ati on , ma i nten.nce, and preservat i on of defensible envir~nmental data
must know and understand environmental quallty assurance requlrements. Some
NPOSR-CUII personnel do not have the fOrf!1al ~d~cation or tr~ining to fully
understand t he requ i rements and responslbilltles of their Job assignments .
Deficienc i es in train i ng across NPOSR-CUII noted by the Environmental Subteam
i nclude , but are not limited to , the following examples:

lIere taking field measurements with improperly cal ibrated
instruments (see Finding SII/CF-I) .
Sampl ing personnel at NPR-3 and NOSR-3 indicated that they had not
been formally trained to perform assigned tasks (I - QA- 12), that
training was not current (I-SII- 5), and that there is no program to
provide periodic training updates (I-QA-4, I-QA-ll, and I - QA-12)
(see Finding GII/CF -3).
Sampling for environmental monitoring and surveillance of potable,
ground , and surface waters is being conducted by an admini strative
assistant, rather than an environmental specialist, contrary to
qual ification and responsibil ity requirements of NPOSR-CUII job
descriptions (QA-33 and QA-34; I-QA-I and I-QA-8) .
The JBEC Health and Safety Procedure and Training Program
developed by URIE Environmental Health Systems has not been fully
implemented (QA-34; I-QA-ll).
lIaste generators are not trained to ensure that wastes are
properly characterized (I -WM-7) .
Landfill operators are not trained to ensure that the landfill is
operated in accordance with permit and regulatory requirements
(I -IIM- 16).
Personnel responsible for road applications are not trained to
ensure compliance with IIYDEQ requirements (I-IIM- 14) .
Personnel operating the land farm are not formally trained to
ensure compliance with IIYDEQ requirements (I-IIM-16) .
Documentation is not available to verify implementation of a sp i ll
control train i ng program (see Finding SII/CF - 5).
This f i nding was part i ally ident i fied in t he DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment
(April 1992) and partially i dentifi ed in the JBEC self- assessment
(April 1992) . The DOE/NPOSR- CUII self-assessment fail ed to identify spec i f i c
deficiencies i n th is area , and the JBEC self- as sessment incorrectly assumed
t hat personnel had sufficient technical knowledge and understanding to perform
their ass i gned tasks without supervision .
The apparent causal f actor s f or t hi s fi nd i ng are alac k of Ml.i£l
implementat i on , i n that t ra i ni ng polic i es were not appropriately i mplement ed
and updated ; rll!I as soc i ated with potent i al product i on of unacceptable
env i ronmental data was not evalu ated ; and allocation of ~... i n that
NPOSR-CUII has not prov i ded adequat e resources for formal t rain i ng and
continui ng on- the - job trai ning .

NPOSR-CUII personnel observed taking environmental samples:
lIere not famil iar with some requirements that are necessary
to maintain defensibil ity of data (e . g., the need to
document all steps in the sampling process) (I - QA-I, I-QA-4,
and I-QA-l2) .
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FIlIlING QA/CF -6:

Quality Assurance Personnel Independence

FINDING QA/CF-7:

Internal Quality Assurance Audits

Perfol'llance Objective

Perfol'llance Objective

OOE 5400.1, "General Environmental Protection Program," Chapter IV, Section
10.a, states "a quality assurance program [QAPl consistent with DOE 5700.6B
[superseded by OOE 5700.6Cl shall be established covering each element of
environmental monitoring and surveillance programs."

OOE 5400.1, "General Environmental Protection Program" states "a quality
assurance program consistent with OOE 5700.6B [supers;ded by OOE 5700 6C)
shall. be established covering each element of environmental monitoring and
surveIllance programs cOlllllensurate with its nature and complexity."

OOE 5700 . 6C, "Quality Assurance," Section 9.b(l)(a), states "the QAP shall
descri be the organi zat i ona 1 structure, funct i ona 1 respons i bili ties, 1evel s of
authority, and interfaces for those managing, performing, and assessing
adequacy of work." This Order also states "the organization performing
independent assessments shall have sufficient authority and freedom from the
line organization to carry out its responsibilities."

DOE. 57~0.6C, "Qual ity Assurance," Paragraph 9.b(3)(b), states "Planned and
perIodIC independent assessments shall be conducted to measure item quality
and process effectiveness and to promote improvement."

OOE/NPOSR-CUW has an organizational structure in which quality assurance
personnel report directly to 1 ine departments, restricting t heir independence.

OOE 5700.~C, Attachment . 1, Page 2, Paragraph 2, states "Programs developed and
properly Implemented uSing ASME/NQA-I will meet the majority of requirements
of this Order." "OO~/NPOSR-CUW Quality Assyrance program Manyal (March 1992)
preamble states ThIS manual is also designed to meet the requirements of
ANSI/ASME NgA- l." JBEC Qyal itv Assurance program Manyal (April 1992), Number
ii, states . Thi~ manua~ is also designed to meet the requirements of ANSI/ASME
NQA- l to maintaIn consIstency with DOE at NPOSR-CUW."

Discussion

ASM~ NQA-I, Basic Requirement IB, "Audits," states "Planned and scheduled

Finding

The independence and impart i ali ty of qual i ty assurance personnel are essent i a1
and integral parts of an effective QAP. Persons responsible for quality
attainment must have sufficient authority and organizational freedom to
identify problems; to initiate, implement, and verify corrective actions; and
to control deficiencies . The DOE/NPOSR-CUW Qual ity Assurance Officer is
appointed by the Director of NPOSR-CUW. However, the Quality Assurance
Officer is unable to give undivided attention ~o quality assurance issues
because his primary responsibility is civil engineering. Specific
deficiencies pertaining to functional independence that affect environmental
qua 1 i ty assurance are :
The DOE/NPOSR-CUW Qual i ty Assurance Offi cer, under the most recent
DOE/NPOSR-CUW organizational matrix, has primary responsibil ity as
a Civil Engineer reporting to the Director of Engineering and
secondary responsibility as the QA Officer repor ting to the
Director of NPOSR-CUW (QA-IO; I-QA-IO); and
Under the February 25, 1992, organizational matrices, the Civil
Engineer/Qual ity Assurance Officer reported primarily to the
Director of Engineering and secondarily, through the Director of
Engineering, to the Occupational Safety and Health Officer (OS&H
matrix) or the environmental specialist (Environmental matrix)
(QA-36; I-QA-IO).
This finding was not identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment
(April 1992) .
The apparent causal factors for this finding are a lack of I121..kY
implementation, in that OOE/NPOSR-CUW has not implemented an environmental QAP
i n which the Qual ity Assurance Officer has the functional independence
required by OOE Orders; and allocation of resources , in that there is a lack
of personnel available for QA functions.
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audl ts shall be performed to veri fy comp li ance with all aspects of the qual i ty
assurance ~rogram and to determine its effectiveness. These audits shall be
performed In ~ccordance wi~h written procedures or checklists by personnel who
do not have dIrect responsIbility for performing the activities being
audited . " Ba~ic Requirement IB further states "internal or external qual ity
assur~nce . audl~s shall be scheduled in a manner to provide coverage and
ccordlnatlon wIth ongoing quality assurance activities."
Finding
~POSR-CUW has no~ implemented a program for conducting planned and periodic
Indep~ndent quality assessments of its environmental monitoring and

surveIllance operations as required by DOE 5400 . 1, DOE 5700 . 6C, and NPOSR-CUW
qua 1 ity assurance program manuals.
Discussion
Audi~ing is the principal mechanism for monitoring the effectiveness of a
qua~ Ity assurance program. Through the systematic appl ication of internal

audIts conducted . by an independent group, it is possible to not only identify

~ threat to qua 11 t.r, but also to conduct a process of continuous quality

Improvement. Quality defects are not completely identified controlled
corrected at NPOSR-CUW. For example:
"

or

Qua 1 ity assurance audits, appra i sa 1s , or survei 11 ance of
env ironmental operations at NPOSR-CUW are not conducted on a
regular basis t? meet the requirements of DOE Orders .
Environmental fIeld audits are conducted by JBEC Environmental
Department personnel using Environmental Regulatory Inspection
Checklists (ERIC) and, in the past, JBEC has retained outside
cont~actors to provide some appraisal s . However , environmental
qualIty assurance audits that meet the requirements of DOE 5700 . 6C
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are not being conducted by NPOSR-CUW personnel (I-QA-3 and
l-QA-I0) .

FINDING QA/CF-B:

Environllllntal Data Validation

Perfonaance Objective
NPOSR-CUW has not implemented procedures for the conduct of
quality assurance audits (I-QA-3 and l-QA-I0). However, JBEC's
management and operations contractor self-assessment program and
DOE/NPOSR-CUW's self-assessment program were approved by FE-l in
June 1992 (QA-37 and QA-53)
NPOSR-CUW has not implemented a program to train qual ity assurance
auditors (I-QA-3 and l-QA-I0).
The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) fully identified this finding.
The apparent causal factor for this finding is policy implementation, in that
COE policy requiring quality assurance audits has not been implemented by
NPOSR-CUW .

DOE 5400.1, "General Envi ronmental Protection Program," states "a qual i ty
assurance program consistent with DOE 5700.6B [superseded by DOE 5700.6C]
shall be established covering each element of environmental monitoring and
surveillance programs cOllll1ensurate with its nature and complexity." One of
the elements specifically required by this Order is independent data
verification .
DOE 5700. 6C , "Qual i ty Assurance," Cri teri on 10, "Independent Assessment,"
states "Planned periodic independent assessments shall be conducted to measure
item quality and process effectiveness and to promote improvement. The
organization performing independent assessments shall have sufficient
authority and freedom from 1ine organization to carry out its
responsi bil it ies. Persons conduct i ng independent assessments shall be
technically qual ified and knowledgeable in the areas assessed."
DOE 5700.6C also identifies QAMS 004, Guidelines and Specificatjons for
preparing QA program plans, as an EPA guidance document that should be used
for environmental protection programs .
DOE 5700.6C, Attachment 1, Page 2, Paragraph 2, states "Programs developed and
properly implemented using ASME/NQA-l will meet the majority of requirements
of thi s Order."
DOE/NPOSR-CUW Qualjty Assurance program Manual (March 1992) preamble states
"This manual is also designed to meet the requirements of ANSI/ASME NQA-l."
JBEC Oual i ty Assurance Program Manual (April 1992), Number ii, states "Thi s
manual is also designed to meet the requirements of ANSI/ASME NQA-l to
maintain consistency with DOE at NPOSR-CUW."
QAMS-004 defines data val idation as "the process whereby data are accepted or
rejected based on a set of criteri a. " Qual i ty Assurance Project Plans must
indicate the specific criteria that will be used for data validation .
ASME NQA-l, "Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Facilities,"
Basic Requirement IB, "Audits," states "audits shall be performed to verify
compliance with all aspects of the quality assurance program. These audits
sha 11 be performed by personnel who do not have di rect respons i bil ity for
performing the activities being reported."
Finding
NPOSR-CUW has not implemented a program for independent data verification that
meets the requirements of DOE 5400 . 1, DOE 5700.6C, ASME NQA- l, and QAMS-004.
Discussion
Environmental data must be val idated and verified against program-specific
data quality objectives prior to use in reports to any regulatory agency .
Auditing is needed to enSUrl the quality of environmental data. During this
review , the Environmental Subteam identified the following deficiencies:
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The data generated from environmental samp1 ing activities at
NPOSR-CUW undergoes peer review and/or supervisory rev i ew .
However, there is no subsequent audi t of data by persons who are
independent of the activity performed (I-QA-3, I - QA-7 , and
I - QA-IO) .
No independent validation is performed on H2S data generated
during air sampling activities (I-QA-4) .
No val idation is performed on pH and conductivity data generated
during National Pollutant Discharge E1 imination System (NPDES)
samp1 ing activities (I-QA-12).
There are no approved written procedures describing the process(:s
of data val!dation (I-QA-3 and I-QA-IO).
This finding was fully identified in the DOE/NPOSR- CUW self-asses sment (April
1992) and partially identified in the JBEC self-assessment (April 1992) . JBEC
recognized the need to implement a review of data generated by contract
analytical laboratories, but did not recognize the need to verify data
collected by the air and environmental special ists.
The apparent causal ~a~tors for th!s finding are Dol icy imp1ementatjon, in
that DOE policy requlrlng data verlfication has not been implemented by
NPOSR-CUW; and l:llk, in that NPOSR-CUW did not evaluate the risk associated
with unva1 idated data .

FINDING QA/CF -9:

Records Manag_nt

Perfol'Slllce Object i ve
DOE 5400.1 , "General Environmental Protection Program," states "a qual ity
assurance program consistent with DOE 5700 . 6B [superseded by DOE 5700.6C]
shall be established covering each element of environmental monitoring and
survei 11 ance programs commensurate wi th its nature and comp 1exi ty. " The Order
further requires that the Quality Assurance Plan include auditab1e records.
DOE 5700 . 6C, "Qual ity Assurance," Sectie;l 9. b(l) (d), states "records shall be
specified, prepared, reviewed, approved, and maintained ."
DOE 1324.5A , "Records Management Program," Section 5.b(2), requires the
development and app1 ication of standards, procedures, techniques, and
technology designed to ensure maintenance, security, preservation of, and
access to environmental sampling records. Section 6 . b(2) requires that
departmental records be maintained and used in an effective , efficient, and
authori zed manner.
Finding
Records management practices at NPOSR-CUW do not ensure the maintenance,
security, and preservation of environmental records of continuing value as
requi red by DOE 1324. SA, DOE 5400.1, and DOE 5700. 6C .
Discussion
NPOSR-CUW is required to monitor and maintain records of environmental
surveillance . To ensure legal defensibility, records of these activities must
be maintained and be auditab1e . Records of environmental samp1 ing at
NPOSR-CUW are incomplete, not standardized, and stored without due regard for
potential damage or misplacement . During this review, the Environmental
Subteam identified the following defi ciencies :
Vital environmental records are not part of NPOSR-CUW archives.
NPOSR-CUW archives are located at the Federal Building and U.S.
Courthouse, Casper, WY; at the Polymer Building at NPR-3; and at
Building No. 1269, 3886 Schulte, Casper, WY. Env ironmental
records are kept at the ES&H Building at NPR-3 . Records
management procedures for existing environmental documentation are
informal. No environmental monitoring records are stored at the
Polymer Building or at the Federal Building archives (I-QA-l and
I-QA-15: .
At NPR-3, samp1 ing logs containing pH and conductivity
measurements associated with National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) sampling are kept on a bookcase shelf
in an unoccupied office . This office is not always locked when
unattended and the shelf offers no protect i on from damage or loss
(I-QA-12) .
At the NPR-3 Polymer Building, records are stored in boxes stacked
on the floor rather than on pallets. During the Environmental
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Subteam's inspection, a cloudburst occurred and water penetrated
under a door into the record storage area.
At the Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse in Casper, WY, records
are stored on steel shelving in rooms B-6 and B-9A. These rooms
are below grade and records stored there are at risk of water
damage should fire or flooding occur (I-QA-I5).
The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) partially identified this finding. Each of the self-assessments
failed to identify specific deficiencies in this area.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are a lack of I!2li..a
implementation concerning environmental record protection; and J:llk, in that
the risk associated with the potential loss of environmental records was not
evaluated.

FINDING QAlCF-10:

Standards and Calibration

Perfonaance Objective
DOE 5400 . 1, "General Environmental Protection Program," Chapter IV, Section
10.a, states "a quality assurance program consistent with DOE 5700.68
[superseded by DOE 5700.6Cl shall be established covering each element of
environmental monitoring and surveillance programs commensurate with its
nature and complexity."
DOE 5400 . 1 further states that EPA-600/4 -79-019, Handbook for Analytical
Qua1jty Control in Water and Wastewater laboratories, should be used as a
reference for environmental monitoring .
EPA-600/4-79-019, Chapter 12, states that the analyst should pay particular
attention to the stability of standard reagents and that standards should not
be kept longer than recommended by the manufacturer or in the method.
DOE 5700.6C, "Quality Assurance," Criterion 5, "Work Processes," Section d,
states "a process should be establ"ished and implemented to control the
calibration, maintenance, and use of measuring and test equipment used for
monitoring and data collection ." It also states that equipment should "have
calibration certifications traceable to national standards. "
DOE 5700 . 6C, Attachment I , Page 2, Paragraph 2, states "Programs developed and
properly implemented using ASHE/NQA-1 will meet the majority of requirements
of this Order . " DOE/NPOSR-CUW Quality Assurance Program Hanua1 (Harch 1992)
preamble states "This manual is also designed to meet the requirements of
ANSI/ASHE NQA-l." ,LaEC Quality Assurance Program Hanua1 (April 1992) , Number
ii, states "This manual is also designed to meet the requirements of ANSI/ASHE
NQA-1 to ma i ntain consistency with DQE at NPQSR-CUW ."
ASHE NQA-1, "Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Facilities,"
Basic Requirements 12, "Control of Heasuring and Test EqUipment, " states
"tools , gauges, instruments, and other measuring and test equipment used for
activities affecting qual ity shall be controlled and at specified periods
calibrated and adjusted to maintain accuracy within necessary limits . This
requires that measuring and test equipment shall be cal ibrated and adjusted,
and maintained at prescribed intervals or, prior to use, against equipment
having known relationships to nationally recognized standards. " It also
states "if no nationally recognized standards exist, the bases for calibration
shall be documented. Calibrations shall be performed in accordance with
documented instructions. Records shall be maintained and equipment shall be
suitably marked to indicate cal ibration status ."
Finding
NPOSR-CUW does not have a program in place to ensure that sampling and
analytical activ ities meet the requirements for use of standards and
instrument calibrations required by DOE 54QO.1, DOE 5700.6C, ASHE NQA-1 , and
EPA-600/4-79-019 .
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FIIIlING QAlCF-ll:

Discussion
To ensure the defensibi1 ity of data, equipment used to collect environmental
data must be operating properly . Records of calibration and main~enance must
be ma i ntained, and evidence of calibration must be shown on each Ins~rument
that requires calibration . Traceability of a standard 's lot number IS
essential to allow detection of questionable data !n th~ ~vent of a
.
manufacturer's recall. The Environmental Subteam IdentIfIed the followIng
deficiencies related to standards and cal ibration:
NPOSR-CUW has not established a program for tracking equipment
calibration and maintenance. Equipment cal ibration and
maintenance, and documentation of these activities , are dependent
upon the initiative of the field personnel (I -QA-I , I-QA-4, and
I-QA-ll) .
Environmental monitoring instruments are not tagged to identify
calibration status, next recall date, or the identity of the
person responsible for calibration and maintenance (I-QA-4 ,
I-QA-II, and I-QA-12) .
There are no ap~roved wri tten procedures ~esc~i bi ng the . processes
of calibration, maintenance, and standardIzatIon of equIpment
(I-QA-I and I-QA-ll).
The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC se1f-~ssessment
(April 1992) partially identified this finding. DOE/NPOSR-CUW fa~led to
identify specific deficiencies in this area . JBEC did not recognIze that
programs for instrument control; instrument logs; and control of standards,
reagents, and samples are required for air qual i~y monitors ! pH and
conductivity meters, and other environmental monItoring equIpment in use at
NPR-3.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are policy imp1ementat!on, in
that DOE policy has not been imp1emented .by NPOSR-CUW; .a .1ack of wrItten
procedures to implement DOE Orders ; and Inadequate traInIng of personnel who
perform inspections and tests.

Use of Chain-of-Custody

Perforaance Objective
DOE 5400.1, "General Environmental Protection Program," requires that a
qual ity assurance program consistent with DOE 5700.6B [superseded by DOE
5700 . 6C] shall be established covering each element of environmental
monitoring and surveillance programs and that the quality assurance program
shall include chain-of-custody procedures.
DOE 5400 .1 further states that SW-B46, Test Methods for Eva1yating Solid
Waste. physjcal/Chemica1 Methods, and EPA-600/4-79-019, Handbook for
Analytical Oya1 lty Control in Water and Wastewater Laboratories, should be
used as references for environmental monitoring.
EPA-600/4-79-019, Chapter 12 , states that samples must be accompanied by a
chain-of-custody record that includes the name of the study, collectors '
signatures, station number, station location, date, time , type of sample ,
sequence number, number of container, and analyses required.
SW-846 states that an essential part of any sampling/analytical scheme is
ensuring the integrity ~f the sample from the time of collection to data
reporting. The possession and hand1 ing of samples should be traceable from
the time of collection through analysis and final dispos iti on .
DOE 5700.6C, "Quality Assurance," Attachment I, Page 2, Paragraph 2, states
"Programs developed and properly implemented using ASME/NQA-I will meet the
majority of requirements of this Order." OOE/NPOSR-CUW Dual ity Assurance
frog ram Hanya1 (March 1992) preamble states "This manual is also designed to
meet the requirements of ANSI/ASHE-I." JBEC Quality Assurance Program Hanua1
(April 1992), Number ii, states "Thi s manual is also des igned to meet the
requirements of ANSI/ASHE NQA-l to maintain consistency with DOE at
NPOSR-CUW. "
ASHE NQA-l, Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Facilities, "
Basic Requirements 8, "Identification and Control of Items," states "when
specified by codes, standards, or specifications that include specific
identification requirements, the program shall be designed to provide such
identification and control."
Finding
NPOSR-CUW personnel do not conSistently document or implement a
chain-of-custody protocol during field sampling act ivities as required by DOE
Orders, ASHE NQA-I , EPA -600/4-79-019 , and SW-846 .
Discussion
The JBEC Environmental Department is responsible for ensuring compliance with
DOE, EPA, Wyoming Department of Environmental Qual ity, Colorado Department of
Health regulations, and BEC policies by means of site environmental
monitoring and survei l ance . The JBEC Environmental Department monitors spill
prevention and cleanup and conducts National Pollutant Discharge El imination
System (NPDES), air, potable water and groundwater sampling. The
defensibility of data generated in support of effluent monitoring and

3-144
l'l~

3-145

1'14

environmental surveillance programs is compromised by not consistently
adhering to strict chain-of-custody procedures . The Environmental Subteam
identified the following defic i encies during reviews:
Groundwater samples taken at NOSR-3 were not accompanied by a
chain-of-custody record (I-QA- 23) (see Fi nding GW/CF -3).
NPDES effluent samples, and potable water samples taken at NPR-3
were accompanied by chain-of-custody records ; however, record
entries were not made at the time samples were taken. At each
sampl ing s i te, the custody data are recorded on paper. When all
sites have been sampled, t he data are copied onto the
chain-of-custody form and the paper on which the original data was
recorded is discarded (I-QA-Il) .
Receipt and storage of sampl ing containers are not included in the
chain-of-custody records . Sample chain-of-custody properly begin s
at the time a sample is taken. However, JBEC procures sample
containers from the subcontractor analytical laboratory . Good
laboratory practice would include procurement and storage within
the chain-of-custody to ensure that sample containers have not
been contaminated prior to use (I-QA-Il).
There are no approved written procedures descri bi ng the process of
initiating and maintaining a chain-of-custody record (I-QA-l).
This finding was not identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April
1992) and was partially identified in the JBEC self-assessment (April 1992) .
JBEC recognized that chain-of-custody procedures were not val idated or
controlled, but did not recognize that procedures were deficient .
The apparent causal factors for this finding are policy implementation, in
that DOE policy has not been implemented; supervision, in that supervisory
controls are inadequate for implementing policies, procedures, and standards;
inadequate personnel training; and a lack of written procedures to implement
DOE Orders .

FINDING QA/CF-12:

Procuretlent of Analytical Services

Perfonaance Objective
DOE 5400.1, "General Environmental Protection Program ," states "a quality
assurance program consistent with DOE 5700 . 6B [superseded by DOE 5700 . 6C]
shall be established covering each element of environmental monitoring and
surveillance programs commensurate with its nature and complexity . " DOE
5400.1, Section 10.b, further states "Where DOE operations secure the support
of outside contract laboratories, this work shall be conducted by
appropri ate ly cert Hied 1 aboratories. "
DOE 5700 . 6C, "Qual ity Assurance," Section 9.b(2)(c), states "The organization
shall ensure that procured items and services meet established requirements
and perform as specified" and that "prospective suppl iers be evaluated and
selected on the basis of specific criteria."
DOE 5700.6C, Attachment I, Page 2, Paragraph 2, states "Programs developed and
properly implemented using ASHE/NQA-l will meet the majority of requirements
of thi s Order . " DOEINPOSR-CUW Oyal itv Assyrance program Hanyal (Harch 1992)
preamble states "This manual is also designed to meet the requirements of
ANSI/ASHE NQA-I." JBEC Qyal jtv Assyrance program Hanyal (April 1992), Number
ii, states "This manual is also designed to meet the requirements of ANSI/ASHE
NQA-l to maintain consistency with DOE at NPOSR-CUW. "
ASHE NQA-l , Basic Requirement 7, "Control of Purchased Items and Services "
states "The procurement of items and services shall be controlled to assu~e
conformance with specific requirements. Such control shall provide for the
following as appropriate: source evaluation and selection, evaluation of
objective evidence of quality furnished by the supplier , source inspection
audit, and examination of items or services upon del ivery or completion." '
Finding
NPOSR-CUW does not have a program or procedures that ensure the qual i ty of
subcontractor services as required by DOE 5400.1, DOE 5700 . 6C, and NPOSR-CUW
qua 1 i ty assurance program manuals .
Discussion
To ensure that environmental quality assurance requirements are applied to the
procurement of environmental services, and that only certified sources are
used, a quality assurance review must be included in the procurement process.
The Environmental Subteam identified the following deficiencies:
NPOSR-CUW has not developed or implemented procedures for
evaluation and selection of subcontract analytical laboratories
prior to the placement of an order. A list of laboratories
certified for environmental analyses is maintained and updated;
however, no other requirements, such as minimum requirements and
performance standards, are specified. Statements of work
associated with purchase orders typically specify only the number
and types of analyses to be conducted (QA-16; I-QA-l).
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NPOSR-CUW does not conduct periodic audits or reviews of contract
analytical laboratory performance (I-QA-3 and I-QA-I0).
At one subcontractor ana lyt i ca 1 1aboratory, the Envi ronmenta 1
Subteam noted a lack of control of standard operating procedures.
Procedures for analysis of radium had numerous annotations that
could make it difficult to determine how a given sample was
analyzed (I-QA-9).
The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992) and JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) partially identified this finding. Each of these
self-assessments failed to identify specific deficiencies in this area.
The apparent causal factors for thi s fi ndi ng are alack of WID
implementation, in that DOE pol icy requiring oversight of subcontractors has
not been implemented; and I:llk, in that potentially questionable analyses have
not been evaluated.

3.5.7

Rad1ation

3.5.7.1

Overview

The radiation portion of the Environmental Subteam assessment at NPOSR-CUW
evaluated current operational practices and programs to determine the
compliance status with Federal, state, and local regulations, and DOE Orders .
The programs ~ere also reviewed against DOE/EH-0173T, Environmental RegulatorY
Gyide for Radlological Effluent Monitoring and Environmental SuryejJJance and
against commonly accepted industry practices and standards of performance:
The assessment included interviews with the NPOSR-CUW employees; inspection of
NPOSR-CUW facilities and locations; and review of documents, procedures, and
records associated with environmental radiation protection programs.
Table 3-9 lists environmental radiation protection regulations, DOE Orders,
and guidel ines used during this assessment.
As a part of the environmental radiation assessment, reviews were coordinated
with other Environmental Subteam specialists in the areas of soils, sediments,
and biota; groundwater; surface water; and qual ity assurance to ensure that
all potential environmental radiation problems were identified and evaluated .
Environmental radiation protection programs at NPOSR-CUW are limited. The
facil ities are principally involved in the production of oil and gas at NPR- 3
and gas production at NOSR-I and NOSR-3. As such, there are only 1 imited uses
of radioactive materials. However, during the past several years there has
been a heightened awareness within the petroleum industry, DOE, and the State
of Wyoming regarding the presence of naturally occurring radioactive materials
(NORM), which often accompany oil, gas, and produced water streams. Because
there has been no development of the resources at NOSR-2 in Utah, that site
was not included in the environmental radiation assessment.
The Wyoming Department of Environmental Qual ity (WYDEQ) has been examining
NORM issues since early 1989 . At that time, a sample of four produced water
streams at various Wyoming outfalls showed that one of the streams had
elevated radium-226 concentrations. This result and other information , such
as information from the State of Louisiana, prompted WYDEQ to evaluate all
produced water dischargers in the state . During August 1989 , NPOSR-CUW
received a request from the state to test its produced waters at NPR-3 .
Samples were obtained and were assayed for radium-226, with the results being
transmitted to WYDEQ during September 1989. Eight samples were obtained and
analyzed for radium-226. All of the samples were less than the WYDEQ 1 imit of
60 picoCuries per liter (total radium) effluent limit for class 4 waters.
Some produced waters from NPR-3 are discharged to Teapot Creek and Little
Teapot Creek which are both class 4 waters.
Included in the review of NORM was an assessment of the completeness and
re 1evance of records to determi ne whether further radi at i on surveys and
sampl ing are necessary to meet the requirements of NORM regulat i ons and
guidance. In addition to NORM, NPOSR-CUW has some industrial uses for
radioactive materials. These include nondestructive testing of hardware and
fracture testing using sands tagged with radioactive materi als . The use of
these materials was reviewed at all NPOSR-CUW sites (except NOSR-2) to assess
controls and potential impacts on the public and the environment .
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The Environmental and the Safety and Health Departments are responsible for
radiation protection activities at NPOSR-CUW. Managers of these departments
have had radiation safety training as part of their previous job experience,
but their current training and experience are limited. There are no other
personnel at NPOSR-CUW that have had radiation safety training.

TABLE 3-9
LIST OF RADIATION
REGULATIONS/REQUIREMENTS/GUIDELINES

DOE 5400.1

General Environmental Protection
Program

DOE 5400.3

Hazardous and Radioactive Mixed Waste
Program

DOE

DOE 5400.5

Radiation Protection of the Publ ic and
the Envi ronment

DOE

DOE N5400.9

Sealed Radioactive Source
Accountabil ity

DOE

DOE 5480.18

Environment, Safety, and Health
Programs and Department of Energy
Operations

DOE

DOE 5480 . 4

Environmental Protection, Safety and
Health Protection Standards

DOE

DOE 5480.11

Radiation Protection for Occupational
Workers

DOE

DOE 5480.19

Conduct of Operations Requirements for
DOE Facil ities

DOE

DOE 5484.1

Environmental Protection, Safety, and
Health Protection Information
Reporting Requirements

DOE

DOE/EH-0173T

Env ironmental Regulatory Guide for
Radiological Effluent Monitoring and
Environmental Survei 11 ance

DOE

10 CFR 20

Standards for Protection Against
Rad i at ion

NRC

10 CFR 34

Licenses for Radiography and Radiation
Safety Requ irements for Radiographic
Operations

NRC

10 CFR 39

Licenses and Radiation Safety
Requirements for Well Logging

NRC

The present activities at NPR-3 may result in the generation of radioactive
waste. Radioactive waste may be generated as a result of pigging operations
which remove deposited radium-226/228 scale from transfer piping . Systems
that handle produced water may also contain radioactive scale . Typical areas
of concern include ends of tubulars and pipes, all open ings in manifolds, both
ends and the throats of valves, and accumulations in vessels and tanks. Other
sources of waste include piping and the glycol filters at the LTS Gas Plant ,
which may contain radioactive lead-210 and its radioactive progeny.
There were no environmental radiation findings identified during the 1988
Envi ronmenta 1 Survey.
Overall, the radiation environmental protection programs require improvement
to meet DOE requirements. In general, the radiological risks to the public
and the environment from operations at NPOSR-CUW are low. Direct radiation
exposure from radiography represents a possible, but very low potential source
of exposure . For the limited samples of produced waters obtained,
concentrat ions of NORM i n these waters are less than the State of Wyomi ng
effluent limits, and do not appear to be a potential source of radiation dose
to the general public. NPOSR-CUW has not fully evaluated the potential for
radiation doses to the public from release of scrap materials containing NORM.
Although protection of the publ ic and the environment from radioactive
materials has not been an issue, NPOSR-CUW lacks formal programs and
procedures to document proper protect i~ ~ of the public and the environment.
Documentation to demonstrate compl iance with DOE Orders and regulations is not
maintained and formalized into auditable records .
The radiation portion of the Environmental Subteam assessment identified three
compliance findings . The findings pertain to radiation protect i on of the
public and the environment, oversight of subcontractors using radioactive
materials and radiation producing equipment, and managing NORM.
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3.5.7.2

NPOSR-Cu\/ has not implemented the residual radioactive llaterial
requirellll!nts of Chapter IV of OOE 5400 . 5 (see Finding RAD/CF-3).

Cu.pliance Findings

FIIIlING RAD/CF - 1 :

Radiation Protection of the Public and the
Enviro_nt

Perforllilnce Object i ve
OOE 5400 . 5, "Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, '
Section 1, establishes standards and requirements for operations of OOE and
OOE contractors with respect to protection of the members of the publ ic and
the environment against undue risk from radiation.

The OOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992) and JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) fully identified this finding .
The apparent causal factor for this finding is policy imolementation in that
NPOSR-CUW has not implemented OOE poliCies.

OOE 5400.5, Section 4, requires that Heads of Field Operations provide to the
appropriate Program Office, with a copy to the Assistant Secretary for
Environment, Safety and Health (EH-l) by April 8, 1990, a certification for
those areas covered by the Order for which the site is in compliance; and/or a
request for exemption for areas not yet in compliance that includes a plan for
achieving compliance .
OOE 5400 . 5, Section 6.a, states that it is a OOE objective that potential
exposures to members of t he publ ic be as far below the 1 imits as is reasonably
achievable (ALARA), and that OOE facilities have the capabilities , consistent
with the types of operations conducted, to monitor routine and non - routine
releases and to assess dose to members of the public .
OOE 5400.5, Chapter II , Section 2, requ i res Field Elements to develop a
progru, and requires contractors to implement the ALARA process for OOE
activities and facil ities that cause public doses.
Finding
NPOSR-CU\/ does not have a radiation protection program in place for the public
and the environment as required by OOE 5400 . 5.
Di scussi on
NPOSR·CUW has not implemented applicable radiation protection requirements of
OOE 5400 . 5. The scope of the NPOSR-CUW Environmental Protection
Impl ementat i on Plan does not include radiation protection concerns, except for
pr oduced wat er mon itor i ng conducted during 1989 . Examples of failure to
properly impl ement OOE 5400.5 include , but are not limited to , the folloWing :
NPOSR·CUW has not prov i ded the required certification of
compl i ance or
requested an exemption to OOE 5400.5 by April 8,
1990 , as r equ ired by Section 4 of OOE 5400 . 5 (I-R- I0) .
OOE/ NPOSR- CUW has not rev i ewed the Order and has not sent
implementati on correspondence to JBEC. The Order was publ i shed on
February 8 , 1990 , and became effective on flay 8, 1990 (I · R- I0) .
NPOSR-CUW has not developed a graded approach to the ALARA
requirements of OOE 5400 . 5. These r equirements apply to the use
of radi ography cameras by subcontractors, the use of well 1ogg i ng
devic es by s ubcontr actors , and other activities that use
radi onucl i des or r adiation producing devices (I - R- l and I - R- 9).
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FIIIlING RAD/CF-2:

OVersight of Subcontractors

Perforaance Objective
DOE 5400.5, "Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment,"
Section I, establishes standards and requirements for operations of DOE and
DOE contractors with respect to protection of members of the publ ic and the
environment against undue risk frOl1l radiation.
.
DOE 5400.5, Section 6.a, states that it is a DOE objective that potent ial
exposures to members of the public be as far below the limit as is reasonably
achievable (ALARA) and that DOE facilities have the capabilities , consistent
with the types of operations conducted, to monitor routine and nonroutine
releases and to assess dose to members of the publ ic.
DOE 5400.1, "General Environmental Protection Program," states that it is DOE
policy to conduct its operations in an environmentally safe and sound manner.
It further states that it is DOE policy to conduct operations in compliance
with both the letter and the spirit of appl icable environmental statutes,
regulations, and standards.
DOE N5400.9, "Sealed Radioactive Source Accountability," establishes interim
policy and guidance for sealed source accountability. This Order requires
facilities to establish procedures that will address radioactive material
inventory, receipt, labeling, control, storage, transfer, disposal,
recordkeeping, training, surveying, and integrity testing.
10 CFR 39, "licenses and Radiation Safety Requirements for Well Logging,"
prescribes radiation safety requirements for persons using radioactive
materials during well logging.

During radiography operations there is oversight by JBEC .
However, this oversight is not sufficient to ensure that these
operations are conducted in accordance with the requirements of
DOE Orders and 10 CFR 34 (l-R- I).
Subcontractor procedures that provide instruct ions to workers
using radioactive materials were reviewed by the Environmental
Subteam (R-9 and R-ll). These procedures do not incorporate the
requirements of DOE 5400 . 5, N5400.9, 5820.2A, and 5480.11. The
spill procedures do not contain detailed infol'1llation and do not
require notification of JBEC or DOE/NPOSR-CUW personnel in the
event of a spill of radioactive material. There are no
requirements for contamination surveys of equipment or personnel,
which may be required during certain situations. Finally, there
are no posting or contamination protection requirements included
in the procedures .
NPOSR-CUW does not have a program in place to comply with the
requirements of DOE N5400.9 (l-R-I).
NPOSR-CUW does not have a program in place to ensure that the
requirements of 10 CFR 39 are observed during well logging
activities (I-R-I).
This finding was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment
(April 19!12) and was fully identified in the JBEC self-assessment (April
199~). DOE/NPOSR-CUW did not identify the first issue regarding environllM!ntal
revIews.
The apparent causal factor for this finding is appraisals/audits/reviews in
that NPOSR-CUW did not have sufficient oversight of subcontractors .

10 CFR 34, "licenses for Radiography and Radiation Safety Requirements for
Radiographic Operations ," establishes requirements for the use of sealed
radioactive sources containing byproduct material and radiation safety
requirements for persons using these sources for radiography.
Finding
NPOSR-CUW does not have a complete program for oversight of subcontractors
using radioactive materials or radiati ' ' - producing equipment.
Discussion
During the nOl'1llal operati on of oil fields, radioact i ve materials and
radiation-produci ng equipment are used to support various activities. For
example, at NPR-3, radiography is performed on welds for quality assurance.
The Environmental Subteam reviewed working papers and other records of these
projects during the assessllM!nt. The following deficiencies in subcontractor
oversight were noted by the Environmental Subteam:
When subcontracts for services are approved, there is no JBEC
environmental special ist review to ensure that DOE environllM!ntal
standards are incorporated into the subcontract (l-R-4).
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FIIIHIIG RAD/CF-3:

Manag_nt of Naturally Occurring Radioac:tive
Materials

Perfol"llilnc:e Objec:t l ves
DOE 5400 . 5 "Radiation Protection of the Publ ic and the Environment," Chapter
IV Sectio~ 4. a(2), contains the guidelines for residual radium-226
co~taJllination in soil. These are 5 pCi/g averaged over the first 15 cm of
soil below the surface, and 15 pCi/g averaged over 15 cm thick layers of soil
IIIOre than 15 cm below the soil.
DOE 5820 2A

Radioactive Waste Management," Chapter IV, states "DOE waste

containi~g ~aturally occurring and accelerator produced radioactive '!Iaterial

. . . shall be stored, stabil ized in place, and/or disposed of. cons~stent
with the requirements of the residual material guidelines contaIned In 40 CFR
192. "
The American Petroleum Institute (API) has developed guidance for NORM
management in its "Bulletin on Management of Naturally Occurring Radioactive
Materials (NORM) in Oil and Gas Production Draft No.6." Section 1.1 states
"when equipment is opened for inspection or repair, person~el can ~e exposed
to radioactivity by inhaling or ingesting NORM . • . . It IS also Important
th.at NORM waste or equipment containing NORM be managed and disposed by
methods that protect the publ ic from unnecessary exposure."
API Guidance, Section 3.1.3, states that soil may become NORM-contaminated as
a result of various production and maintenance o~erations . .• by s~ch
activities as equipment cleanout, tubular descal1ng, produced water PIts, and
land fanning of tank bottoms. Soil surveys should be conducted over the
subject land area on a del ineated grid.

not been surveyed for NORM, and the scale is exposed to the
environment (I-R-7). API Guidance recOllllM!nds that all
contaminated materials be maintained in a wet state to prevent
dust releases.
Produced waters that enter Teapot Creek and little Teapot Creek
were sampled for radiulll-226 in 19B9. The results of the analyses
showed that these waters cOlllPly with State of Wyoming effluent
lilllits. However, there has been only one followup since 1989,
which was conducted during the Tiger Team visit (R-5) . No
procedures have been developed for Nat i ona 1 Pollutant Di scharge
Elimination System (NPDES) sampling for radium-226, which will be
requ ired in January 1993.
Only one well has been surveyed for NORM scale (R-3), and there
have been no soil surveys after maintenance and other activities.
API Guidance suggests that during well workovers, equipment
maintenance, equipment handl ing and repair, and vessel entry, NORM
be surveyed and controlled to protect workers and the environment.
The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992) and JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) fully identified this finding.
The apparent causal factor for this finding is policy imolementatiQQ in that
NPOSR-CUW has not implemented DOE pol icies and API Guidel ines.

API Guidance, Section 5. 3. I, states that removed scale, sludge, and other
particles should be placed in appropria~e containers for stor~ge • . Par~graph G
also states that all contaminated materJals are preferably maIntaIned In a wet
state to prevent the inhalation of dust by workers and to prevent dust
releases .
Finding
Current practices at NPOSR-CUW for NORM management do not fully comply with
the requirements of DOE Orders and API Guidance.
Discussion
NPOSR-CUW has conducted several surveys for potential NORM contamination of
produced water the low Temperature Gas Plant glycol filters, and some scales .
However, the s~ope of the s urveys was not comprehens i ve. The Envi ronmenta 1
Subteam observed the fo ll owing concerns :
The low Temperature Gas Plant has not been surveyed for lead-210,
bismuth -210, and polonium-210 as suggested by API guidance
(I-R-7 ) .
Dur ing tours of the Scrap Yard and Warehouse Yard, various pieces
of hardware were observed to contain scales. These materials have
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3.5 . 8

Inactiye Waste Sites

3.5.8.1

Overview

The purpose of the inactive waste sites portion of the Environmental Subteam
assessment at NPOSR-CUW was to evaluate the prograJlllllatic and technical status
of the NPOSR-CUW programs for the management and remediation of inactive waste
sites . The programs were evaluated against criteria establ ished in
regulations, permits, industry guidance, and best management practices. The
primary regulations governing progrill1ls for inactive waste sites are those
promulgated under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
liabil ity Act (CERClA) as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986. The regulations, requirements, and
guidance documents reviewed are 1 isted in Table 3-10.
The general approach to the assessment included interviews with OOE/NPOSR-CUW
and JBEC personnel; inspection of facilities and inactive waste sites; and
review of documents including pol icies and procedures, previo'ls environmental
reports, related technical reports, and historic documents relating to the
activities at NPR-3, NOSR-1, and NOSR-3. During the assessment,
groundwater/soil s, sediments, and biota, toxic and chemical material s, waste
management, and surface water Environmental Subteam technical special ists were
consulted regarding the potential for contamination at various locations.

This page intentionally left bhnk.

There has been no development of the resources at NOSR-2 in Utah. However,
since there is pub1 ic access to the property, aerial photos were ordered by
DOE/NPOSR-CUW to be reviewed to identify potential dump sites. These photos
were not received prior to conclusion of the inactive waste sites assessment ;
therefore, NOSR-2 was not included in the inactive waste sites assessment.
NPOSR-CUW has not developed any formal programs to administer CERClA-re1ated
activities. Several studies have been conducted to comply with the provisions
of CERClA and DOE Orders including the NPR-3 Phase I assessment and two
pre1 iminary assessments conducted for the Anvil Points Facil i ty at NOSR -3.
These studies identified several inactive waste sites; however, the studies
were not comprehensive in nature and did not include a review of historic
documentation or interviews with appropri ate personnel to systematically
identify all known inactive waste sites. To date, no remedial or removal
actions have been conducted at any of the identified inactive waste sites.
During the assessment , a number of inactive waste sites were identified that
have not been investigateu . These sites include, but are not limited to,
sol id waste disposal areas and septic systems associated with oil explorat i on
and development activities at NPR -3 during the 1920s, an abandoned septic
system at NPR-3 , an abandoned 1andfil1 along the road to the mi ne bench at
NOSR-3, the potent i al release of friable asbestos to the environment at NOSR- 1
and NOSR -3, and abandoned underground storage tanks at the mine bench at
NOSR- 1. The lack of i dent i f i cat i on and i nvestigation of these sites is a
symptom of the informal programs used to implement CERClA and DOE 5400.4 .
The assessment covered r elease reporting, including the i dent i fication of
substances with reportable quant i t i es, evaluation of releases subject to
notification requ i rements , and r ecordkeep i ng and tra i ni ng act i vities . No
procedures have been developed f or implementation of OOE ' s occurrence
report i ng requi rements .
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TABLE 3-10
LIST OF INACTIVE WASTE SITES
REGULATIONS/REQUIREMENTS/GUIDELINES

TABlE 3-10
LIST OF INACTIVE WASTE SITES
REGULATIONS/REQUIREMENTS/GUIDELINES

OSWER Directive
9230.0.38

COIII1Iunity Relations in Superfund - A
Handbook, Interi. Version

C.R.S. 25-16-102

Colorado Hazardous Waste Clean Up Acts

DOE

DOE

OOE 5500.2A

Ellergency Notification, Reporting and
Response Levels

DOE

DOE Gu i dance

Natural Resource Trusteeship and
Ecological Evaluation for
Environ.nhl Restoration at DOE
facilities

DOE

40 CFR 300

Nat lona1 Oil and Hazardous Subshnces
Cont I ngency Plan

EPA

40 CFR 302

Des i gnat i on, Reportable Quant I ties,
and Notification

EPA

40 CFR 373

Report I ng Hazardous Substance Act Ivl ty
when Sell ing or Transferring Federal
Real Property

EPA

OSVER Directive
9355 . 30-01

Guidance for Conducting Re.edial
Investigations and Feasibility Studies
Under CERCLA

EPA

Doc~nt
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EPA
Colorado
Departlllent of
Health

Compliance with the SARA Title III requirements at NPR-3 was evaluated by the
Environmental Subteam air special ist. Tier II reports have been submitted to
lIyoming and Natrona County Emergency Planning Agencies (the state emergency
planning commission and the local emergency planning committee), but there has
been no formal program developed to identify substances present in threshold
planning quantities (TPQs), nor are there procedures to submit to the
Emergency Management Agencies updated material safety data sheets and to
inform thelll of new chemicals present onsite and chemicals that are no longer
present at the site .
Several of the inactive waste sites identified during the Tiger Team
Assessment were a1 so identified by the Environmental Survey Team in 1988.
NPOSR-CUlI has conducted some followup investigations at NPR-3 on areas
identified in the 1988 Environmental Survey: the mud pits, which may be
contaminated with chromium, and the suspected 2,4-0 disposal area. NPOSR-CUII
has not followed up on other previously identified sites such as the 1920s
NPR-3 disposal sites and the potential releases of asbestos at NOSR-l and
NOSR-3. There are plans to remove the asbestos at NOSR-l and NOSR-3; however,
these areas were not addressed under CERClA.
Overall, NPOSR-CUII needs considerable improvement in the area of inactive
waste site management to meet the requirements of DOE Orders and Federal
regulations. The activities related to inactive waste sites conducted to date
have generally been reactions to specific releases and do not represent a
comprehensive, proactive sitewide effort to discover and assess the overall
environmental condition of the site . The lack of formalized programs to
illlP1ement the requirements of CERCLA and DOE 5400 . 4 is the major stumbling
block in achieving a comprehensive and proactive approach for identifying and
evaluating inactive waste sites .
The assessment of inactive waste sites identified four cOr.1pliance findings,
one best lIIanagement practice finding, and one special issue related to the
management of inactive waste sites and/or to regulatory requirements of
CERCLA. The compliance findings address the following areas: inactive waste
s i te programs, i dentification and evaluation of inactive waste sites,
development of an administrative record file, and spC1 reporting. The best
management pract i ce finding addresses NPR-3's hazardous chelllical reporting
pr ogram under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. The
special issue discusses the potential liability and risks associated with the
Anvil Poi nts Shale Pile at NOSR-3.

3.5.8.2

Compliance Findings

FINDING IlIS/CF-!:

Inactive lIaste Site Prograas

Perfonaance Objective
DOE 5400.4, "Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and liability
Act Requirements," Section 7. a, states "it is the pol icy of DOE to respond to
releases and potentially inainent releases of hazardous substances. . . in
accordance with the provi sions of CERClA, as amended, as well as those of the
NCP and Executive Order 12580 . . . regardless of whether the facility is
listed on the National Priorities list (NPl) . "
DOE 5480.19, "Conduct of Operations," states that it is DOE policy to conduct
its operations with a consistent and auditable set of requirements, standards,
and responsibil ities . Chapter 1 of the Order states "effective implementation
and control of operating activities are primarily achieved by estab1 ishing
written standards in operations, periodically monitoring and assessing
performance, and holding personnel accountable for their performance . "
Finding
NPOSR-CUII has not estab1 ished programs to implement the requirements of DOE
5400.4, DOE 5480.19, CERClA, the National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), and Executive Order 12580.
Discussion
CERClA related activities at NPOSR-CUII have been carried out without the
benefit of established programs that outline the requirements of CERClA and
DOE Orders (1-IIIS-7, 1-IIIS-8, and 1-1115-12). As a result of this informality,
site personnel were generally unaware of many of the provisions of CERClA and
its implementing regulations (1-1115-7 and 1-1115-8). Although the relative
degree of potential contamination at NPOSR-CUII is minimal and many of the
provisions of CERCLA have not been invoked to date, it is important that there
be a complete understanding of the regulations to determine the need for
specific actions. The following are some of the inactive waste site program
components that have not been established:
Implementation plan for DOE 5400 . 4;
Program to systematically identify, characterize, and manage
i nactive waste sites (see Finding IWS/CF-2);
Program to assess natural resource damages and to not i fy Trustees
of Natural Resources (40 CFR 300, Subpart G);
Program for reporting hazardous substance activity when
transferring Federal real property (40 CFR 373);
Program to establish and lIIaintain an administrative record f il e
(40 CFR 300, Subpart I) (see Finding IWS/CF -3) ; and
Program to review and update inventories of inactive waste sites .
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F11IlING IIIS/CF -2:
The DOE/NPOSR-CUII self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) fully identified this finding.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are a lack of ~
imo1ementation of the requirements of DOE 5480.19 and DOE 5400 .4; a lack of
written procedures specifying the requirements of CERClA and implementation
steps; and insufficient 1J:llning of site personnel in the provisions of
CERClA.

Identification and Evaluation of Inactive lIute
Sites

Perforaance Objective
DOE 5400.4, "COIIIjIrehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and liabil ity
Act Requirements," Section 7. a, states "it is the policy of DOE to respond to
releases and potentially illl1linent releases of hazardous substances. . . in
accordance with the provisions of CERCLA, as amended , as well as those of the
National Contingency Plan (NCP) and Executive Order 12580 . . • regardless of
whether the facility Is listed on the National Priorities list (NPl)."
DOE 5480.14 , "Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
li abil I ty Act PrograJII," (superseded by DOE 5400.4 on October 6, 1989), Sect I on
8.c, required all DOE facil Itles to prepare a Phase I installation assessment
to "identify all past landfill and burial sites, as well as any other possible
sites contaminated from spills or releases of hazardous substances."
40 CFR 300 . 410, "Removal Site Evaluation," and 40 CFR 300 . 420, "Remedial Site
Evaluation," out1 ine the methods, procedures, and criteria for conducting
preliminary assessments (PAs) that DOE, as the lead agency, shall use to
evaluate releases of hazardous substances.
Finding
NPOSR-CUII has not completely identified or evaluated inactive waste sites in
accordance with the provisions of 40 CFR 300.410, 40 CFR 300.420, and DOE
Orders.
Discussion
The Phase I i nstallation assessment formerly required by DOE 5480 .14 and the
remedia 1 PA requi red by 40 CFR 300.420 are essent i a lly analogous . NPOSR-CUII
has prepared a Phase I assessment for NPR-3 and two PAs for NOSR-3 to comply
with DOE Orders and CERClA. No documentation was found indicating that any
reports were prepared for NOSR-I to comply with the provisions of CERClA.
Interviews with site personnel (1-IIIS-6, I - IIIS-9, and I-IIIS-I0), site
inspect ions, and a review of historic documents (lIIS-7) identified a number of
inactive waste sites that were not identified in either the Phase I assessment
of NPR-3 or the PAs prepared for NOSR-3. The following are examples of
inactive waste sites that were not identified or evaluated by NPOSR-CUII under
CERClA:

All waste disposal areas from activities at NPR-3 during the
1920s. These areas Include: solid waste disposal areas;
abandoned sept i c systems from hous i ng complexes; 1aboratori es; the
hospital; and potential sites where wastes from industrial
facilities, such as the cracking plant in which gasoline was
refined, were disposed.
The free water pit at the Bad Oil Facil ity that had been used to
collect waste acid.
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The recently abandoned septic system near the truck shop that
disposed of wastewater from the Warehouse, truck shop, and
administrative buildings.

The abandoned underground storage tanks loca,ted at the mine bench.
Potential releases of friable asbestos from the buildings at the
mine bench (see Finding A/BMPF - 1).

The solid waste disposal area for the housing complex and the
industrial facilities at the Anvil Points Facility located along
the road leading to the .ine bench (I-IWS-6).
Waste disposal areas associated with the Rulison Facility.
The asbestos disposal site located in the draw to the west of the
Quonset Hut Warehouse.
The DOE/NPOSR-CUII self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) did not identify this finding. Although not identified in either
self-assessment, site personnel were aware of most of the above-mentioned
inactive waste sites prior to the Tigel' Team Assessment.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are Dolicy implementation of the
requirements of 40 CFR 300.420 and DOE Orders, and a lack of procedures also
to fulfill the requirements of these regulations and Orders. A secondary
contributing factor is insufficient appraisals/ayd1ts/reyiews to identify
historic documents and interview knowledgeable site personnel that could
provide insight into the past waste disposal practices at NPOSR-CUW.

FINDING IVS/CF-3:

Administrative Record File

PerfDrmance Objective
DOE 5400 . 4, "Comprehensive EnvironllM!ntal Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act Requirements," Section 7.a, requires that DOE respond to hazardous
substance releases in accordance with CERCLA and the National Contingency Plan
(NCP) regardless of whether the site is included on the National Priorities
List.
DOE 5400.4, Section 8.e, states that DOE facilities shall "gather information
with respect to releases and potentially imminent releases of hazardous
substances and maintain a field organization-wide record of all actions taken
under this Order, CERCLA, as amended, the NCP, and applicable DOE policies,
requirements, and procedures related to such releases."
40 CFR 300, "National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan," Subpart I, "Administ,'ative Record for Selection of Response Action"
outl ines the requirements for establishing and maintaining the adlAinistraiive
record file for response actions under CERCLA, including special requirements
for Federal facilities, the location of the administrative record file, and
the contents of the record .
OSWER Directive No. 9833.3A-1, "Final Guidance on Administrative Records for
Selecting CERCLA Response Actions," states that "the record should be compiled
as documents relating to the selection of the response action are generated or
received by the lead agency . " The directive further states that "the
. administrative record file ' should be distinguished from the . administrative
record'. The administrative record file refers to the documents as they are
being compiled. Until a response action decision has been selected, there is
no complete administrative record for that decision. Thus, to avoid creating
the impression that the record is complete at any time prior to the final
selection decision, the set of documents is referred to as the administrative
record fil e rather than the admi ni strat i ve record."
Finding
NPOSR-CUW has not establ ished an adlllini strative record fi le as required by 40
CFR 300, Subpart I, DOE Orders, and OSWER Directive No . 9833 . 3A-I.
Discussion
40 CFR 300 , Subpart I , and OSWER Directive No . 9833 . 3A-1 requires DOE, as the
lead agency, to establ ish an administrative record file that contains the
documents that form the basis for the select i on of a response action. These
documents include such items as preliminary assessments and s1te evaluation
reports , verified sampling data, chain -of-custody forms, and technical and
engineeri ng evaluations (40 CFR 300 . 810) . The documents that form the
administrative record file are to be kept at a central location of the lead
agency and at a locat ion at or near the s i te (40 CFR 300 .805) .
NPOSR-CUW has generated several documents to assess potential releases of
hazardous mat er i als under CERCLA. These include: the "CERCLA Phase I
Assessment for Naval Petroleum Reserves No.3, May 1987" (IWS -2); the
"Preliminary Assessment Report , Anvil Points Facility , Ri fle, Colorado , April
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1988" (IllS-I); and the "Preliminary Assessment, Spent Shale Pile and Drum
Disposal Area, lIest Sharrard Gulch, Anvil Points Facility, June 1992" (IIIS-3).
Other documents that do not specifically address the provisions of CERCLA have
been prepared which present sampling and analysis results of identified
1ocat ions of potent i a1 releases of hazardous materials at NPR-3 and NOSR-3
(IIIS-4; I-IIIS-S, and I-IIIS-6). These documents and other doc uments that form
the basis for selection of a response action have not been incorporated into
an adllinistrative record file in accordance with 40 CFR 300, Subpart I, OSIIER
Directive No. 9833 . 3A.I, and DOE Orders (I-IIIS-7, I-IIIS-8, and I-IIIS-12).
Although NPOSR-CUII has not selected response actions under CERCLA, both
DOE 5400.4 and OSIIER 9833.3A-I require DOE, as the lead agency, to compile the
docu.ents that will be used to select a response action in an administrative
record file. This is further demonstrated in the "Administrative Records for
Federal Facilities" fact sheet that states "the lead agency (as del ineated in
[,0. 12580) IlUst compile and maintain the administrative record file (i .e.,
the incomplete record as it is being compiled)."

FINDING IIIS/CF-4:

Spill Reporting

Perfonaance Objective
DOE SOOO.3A , ' Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Infonaation,'
Section 8.g, requires DOE to direct contractors to "prepare and prOGlUlgate
procedures for notification and reporting that are compatible with and serve
the poliCies of this Order .'
DOE SOOO . 3A, Section 7, further states "Attachment 1 to this Order
Categorization of Reportable Occurrences, shall be used to establi;h facility
specific reporting requirements, and their categorizations.'
The Spill/Leak Incident Report that is part of JBEC Policy and Procedure
1.5-04, 'Spill and Leak Reporting," requires that all chemical and oil/fluid
spi 11 s, 1eaks or unauthori zed di scharges be reported.
Finding

This finding was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUII self-assessment
(April 1992) in that it was noted that there is no policy to establish an
administrative record. This finding was not identified in the JBEC
self-assessment (April 1992).
The apparent causal factors for this finding are a lack of R2lill
implementation of the requirements of 40 CFR 300, Subpart I, DOE Orders, and
OSIIER 9833.3A-l; a lack of procedures to formally establish the contents,
location, and roles and responsibil ities involved in generating an
administrative record; and a lack of 1n.1.n.in9. of the site personnel who were
generally not aware of the administrative record requirements of CERCLA. A
secondary contributing factor for this finding is inadequate
appraisals/aydits/reviews in that the need for establishing an administrative
record flle had not been previously identified by JBEC.

NPOSR-CUII has not developed formal procedures for implementing the
requirements of DOE SOOO.3A, and the spill reporting practices presently in
use do not ensure that spills are correctly categorized and reported in
accordance with DOE SOOO.3A and JBEC Policy and Procedure 1.5-04.
Discussion
Spills of oil and hazardous materials at NPOSR-CUII are reported by two
methods . The first method uses the Spill/Leak Incident Report (IIIS-8)
prepared by JBEC personnel and the second is through the DOE SOOO.3A reporting
process. The Spill/Leak Incident Report is deSigned to track all spills while
the DOE SOOO.3A reporting process is designed to report only those spills that
have been categorized and require reporting under DOE SOOO.3A. Interviews
with NPOSR-CUII personnel and inspection of spill reporting records revealed
that the established procedure for reporting spills (IIIS-9) is out-of-date
with respect to such elements as emergency phone numbers and does not
incorporate the reqUirements of DOE SOOO.3A. NPOSR-CUII has not developed
formal reporting procedures for DOE SOOO . 3A nor have facility-specific
categorization or reporting requirements been established .
NPOSR-CUII has been reporting spills through the DOE SOOO.3A process since the
inception of the Order. This reporting, however, has not been conducted with
the benefit of a written procedure as required by DOE SOOO . 3A . The lack of
procedures relating to occurrence categorization and clear definitions of
roles and responsibilities has led to instances of incorrect categorization of
spills and late submittals of occurrence reports (I - IIIS-16) . Although these
instances have been few, they are indicative of the breakdowns that can occur
without forma l i zed procedures. A draft procedure has been prepared to
implement the requirements of DOE SOOO.3A (IIIS-I0) and is presently under
review by NPOSR-CUII.
The JBEC pol i cy and procedure , ' Sp i ll and Leak Reporting ," dated
March 16, 1990 (IIIS-9) , outl ines the report i ng requirements for field
personnel and for management . In addition, the JBEC Spill/Leak Incident
Report (IIIS-8) indicates that all chemi cal and oil/fluid spills, leaks, or
unauthorized discharges are to be reported. In actual field practice, oil
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spills of less than 2 gallons are generally not reported (I-IWS-16). The
discrepancies between the established procedures and the informal field
practices do not ensure that spills are being reported in a consistent manner
throughout NPOSR-CUW. Additionally, training of field personnel is generally
infonAl, which does not ensure a full understanding of NPOSR-CUW pol icy
regarding spill reporting requirements .

J.5.8.3

Best Managa.ent Practice Findings

FIIIlING IIIS/BMPF-I:

~rgency Planning and Ca..unity
Right-to-Know Act Hazardous Chelical
Reporting Progr_

PerfonAnce Objective
This finding was partially identified in the OOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment
(April 1992) in that it was identified that NPOSR-CUW does not have procedures
in place to conSistently assess oil spills and to perform appropriate
reporting and followup. This finding was fully identified in the JBEC
self-assessllll!nt (April 1992) .
The apparent causal factors for this finding are a lack of Will
implementation of the OOE 5000.3A requirements for preparing facility-specific
procedures and reporting requirements; inadequate syperyisjon frOll!
OOE/NPOSR-CUW to JBEC on the preparation of OOE 5000.3A procedures until
June 5, 1992 (IWS-11); and a lack of formal lri1n1n!I of field personnel
concerning procedures for spill reporting and response.

Best management practices suggest that sites have a prograJI to collect, track,
and manage material safety data sheets (MSDSs) and other inforllation related
to hazardous materials and waste in use or present onsite. This inforllation
is critical for proper reporting to state ellll!rgency planning conaissions and
local emergency planning committees under the Emergency Planning and Conaunity
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), "Hazardous Chemical Reporting: COIIIIUnity
Right-to-Know" prograJII.
Finding
NPOSR-CUW has not developed a fOnAl prograJII to manage chemical and MSDS
i nformat i on report i ng and updates.
Discussion
There are no formal programs or procedures to detemi ne quant i ties of
hazardous and extremely hazardous chemicals present onsite or to submit
updated MSDSs for NPR-3 to the local emergency planning coanittee, the Natrona
County Emergency Management Agency (EHA), and the Wyoming Emergency Management
Agency for hazardous chemicals present in amounts above regulatory thresholds.
JBEC has provided t~e EHAs with Tier 11 reports and a map of the locations
where MSDSs and materials are present at the site (A-79 and A-SO). However,
there are no formal procedures to prepare updates (I-A-13 and I-A-14) that
would inform the EHAs of new chemicals or chemicals that are no longer present
at the site. There are several known hazardous chemicals for which MSDSs are
not available (I-A-12, I·A-14, and I-A-27) (see Finding TCH/CF-l), and there
is no doculIII!ntation to show that a list of these substances has been provided
to the EHAs.
POSR-CUW does not have an integrated chemical tracking system
that would assist in detemining if hazardous or extremely hazardous chemicals
are present in threshold planning quantities.
The OOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) partially identified this finding. Neither self-assessment
mentioned the need for procedures to track chemicals for EPCRA reporting.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are inadequate Will and
procedyres to ensure compliance with hazardous chemical reporting
requirements; ~ in site organization and operations involved in
collecting data and reporting; and an inadequate level of personnel knowledge
and experience in EPCRA reporting.
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3.5.8.4

Any potential discharge of oil from the shale pile WOUld, therefore, be in
violation of the Clean Water Act.

Special Issue

SPECIAL ISSUE IIIS/SI-I:

Status of Shale Pile at NOSR-3

Concern has been expressed by Environmental Subteam members who visited NOSR-3
that the Anvil Points shale pile may collapse due to the natural force of
erosion in West Sharrard Gulch. This concern was previously expressed by the
1988 Envirollllental Survey teaJII. The possible raJllifications of such a collapse
include violations of Section 311 and/or Section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
The shale pile consists of both raw oil shale fines generated in the crushing
.
process and spent shale from the retorting process at the Anvil Poin!s .
Facility. In January 1979, it was discovered that combustion had in1tlated 1n
the raw fines pile and a small i\IIIOunt of shale oil was observed flowing from
the base of the pile. To prevent the release of this material to West
Sharrard Creek, a ditch and evaporation pond were constructed at the base of
the pile to collect this leachat·a and to collect storm water runoff from the
shale pile. Recent observations indicate that the combustion in the shale
pile has greatly dimillished since 1983. During site inspections by the
Environmental SubteaJII, heat was felt at the vent holes in the shale pile
indicating that cOlDbustion may still be occurring in the shale pile.

Any discharge of material from the shale pile into West Sharrard Creek would
be a violation of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. Section 404 require s
that permits be obtained for the discharge of fill material into the navigable
waters of the United States .
The potential liability associated with the condition of the shale pile
appears to warrant further study and action to stabilize and/or remove the
portions of the shale pile that are in danger of collapsing. Site personnel
are aware that an effort needs to be made to stabilize the shale pile. A job
order issued Hay 27, 1992, includes a line item for construction "required to
stabilize the creek bank below the shale pile;" and the budget for this work
was approved June 10, 1992 (IWS - l4).

A ,number of studies have been conducted on the shale pile to estimate the
potential migration of contaminants to surface water and to groundwater.
These studies generally cOllcluded that the constituents in the shale pile are
relatively innobile in the environment and for the most part would r€main in
the pile . Analysis of the surface water and groundwater in the area of the
shale pile is ongoing. The validity of these data is in question because of
the lack of sampling procedures, preservation techniques, and the general lack
of quality assurance and quality control (see Findings QA/CF -4, 5, II, and
GW/CF-3) .
40 CFR 300 . 420, "Remedial site evaluation," states that a remedial preliminary
assessment (PA) "shall consist of a review of existing information about a
release such as information on the pathways of exposure, exposure targets , and
source and nature of t ht release." The PA of the shale pile, prepared in June
1992 (IWS -3) indicated that "41 feet of the berm had eroded to a point where
spent shale had been exposed to the stream side of the berm" and that "West
Sharrard Creek has eroded into the benn at the toe of the pile and exposed an
area of waste shale, which, if left alone, could possibly slump into the
stream bed itself. Such an occurrence would pose both surface water and
soil/s('diment contamination problems i n the area ." Although the potential for
contaJllination was clearly defined in the PA, there was no recommendation for
further act i on .
The first portion of the shale pile that would fall into the stream bed is the
ber. created to divert leachate and runoff from the pile into the lined pond .
Dur i ng the Environmental Subteam s i te inspections, a sheen of oil was observed
i n the lined pond that apparently originated from leachate or storm water
runoff. Without the benefit of the berm, oil of any kind generated from the
shal e pile could flow directly to West Sharrard Creek. Should portions of the
raw fines pile (where combustion lIIay still be occurring) discharge into West
Shar nrd Creek, the potential for oi l contamination would be greater . Section
311 of the Clean Water Act states "there should be no discharges of oil or
hazardous substances into or upon the navigable waters of the United States. "
3- 172
~I

3-173
~~
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"ation~l EnyironleOt~1

3.5.9. 1

OVerview

Policy Act

The purpose of the National Envirollllenhl Policy Act (NEPA) portion of the
Envi ronmenta I Subtealll assesslll!nt at NPOSR-CUII was to: (1) eva I uate the NEPA
management structure and NEPA review processes; (2) identify inappropriate
procedures and inadequate NEPA doculII!ntation; (3) evaluate cOAlpliance with
NEPA, Council on Environlll!ntal Quality (CEQ) regulations, and DOE NEPA
Regulations, Orders, guidance, and IIeIIOranda; and (4) evaluate the adequacy of
guidance and oversight frotl the Assistant Secrehry, Office of Fossil Energy
(FE-I) and the Assistant Secretary for Environllllnt, Safety, and Health (EH-I).
Table 3-11 lists the regulations and requirellllnts used to evaluate NEPA
compliance. The new DOE NEPA regulations are cited in the perfonaance
objectives; however, the findings would be the sa.e whether the old NEPA
guidelines or the new NEPA regulations are used.
The primary focus of the NEPA assesslll!nt was activities at NPR-3 . There was a
review in Casper of NOSR-I and NOSR-3 doculII!nts related to NEPA activities,
and there was onsite verification by one of the NEPA specialists during his
field work at NOSR-l and NOSR-3. Because there has been no develoPllllnt of the
resources at NOSR-2 in Utah, that site was not included in the NEPA
assessment .

This

p~ge intention~l1y

left

bl~k.

The NEPA assessment included interviews, docullllnt reviews, and onsite
verification . Interviews were conducted with the DOE/NPCSR-CUII and JBEC
personnel responsible for NEPA cOllPliance, finance, facilities, projects,
production, maintenance, progrillll lIIanagelll!nt, and project leadership.
Documents were reviewed for adequacy in the following areas : (1) cOlipliance
with environmental laws, regulations, and guidelines; (2) technical content;
and (3) suitability for reference or tiering. Onsite verification of
NPOSR-CUII activities was used to detenaine whether projects (e.g., oil field
operations, maintenance, and construction) Lave been hlplellllnted with
approved NEPA documents, and whether NPOSR-CUII activities and resultant
impacts are consistent with those described in the NEPA docullllnts.
DOE/NPOSR-CUII NEPA documents provided to the Tiger Teillll for review included:
(I) the August 1990 Environllllntal Assesslll!nt (DOE/EA-0442), "Continued
Development of Naval PetroleulII Reserve No.3"; (2) the May 1991 Environllllntal
Assessment (DOE/EA-053I), "Proposed Natural Gas Protection Progralll for Naval
Oil Shale Reserves Nos. I and 3"; and (3) 25 categorical exclusions, 20 of
which are still in the approval process and 5 of which have unauthorized
signatures and thus are not valid NEPA detenainations. An additional nine
proje .. ts were determined by DOE/NPOSR-CUII to be covered in their existing
Environmental Assessments (EAs).
FE-I has oversight responsibility for the DOE/NPOSR-CUII NEPA progralll.
Currently, the authority for determining and docullllnting the level of NEPA
documentation required for those proposed actions that are listed in Subpart D
of DOE NEPA Regulations (and reconnend ing the level of review for non-Subpart
D actions) lies with FE-I. The DOE/NPOSR-CUII Environmental SpeCialist acts as
the central point for NEPA revie~ , document preparation, and recordkeeping .
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TABLE 3-11
LIST Of NATIONAL ENVIROfIIOOAL POliCY ACT
REGULATIONS/REQUIREMENTS/GUIDELINES

42 U.S .C. 4321,
lllL.

n

National Envlronllenhl Poltcy Act
(NEPA)

U.S. Congress

DOE 4700.1

Project Managellent Systell

DOE

DOE 5100.3

Field Budget Process

DOE

DOE 5400.1

General Environmental Protection
Progra. Requlrellents

DOE

DOE 5400.4

COIIPrehenslve Environmental
Restorat lon, COIIPensat I on, and
ltability Act

DOE

NEPA

DOE

46 FR 18026

Forty Most Asked Questions
Concerning CEQ's NEPA Regulations

CEQ

10 CFR 1021

National Environllll!ntal Pol Icy Act
1l1li1ellll!nt I ng Procedures

DOE

10 CFR 1022

COIIpltance With floodplain/Wetlands
Envlronllental Review Requlrellents

DOE

40 CFR 1500-1508

Regu 1at Ions for Ilip1ement I ng the
Procedural Requirellll!nts of NEPA

CEQ

N/A

Draft NEPA Compliance GUide
(October 1988)

DOE

N/A

GUidance Related to Analysis of
Impacts to Workers In NEPA
Documentation
(June 10, 1988)

DOE

5440.1D
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DOE/NPOSR-CUW procedures for NEPA review and doculIII!ntat l on are currently In
draft fOnll. Formal NEPA review of DOE actions has only been required since
March I, 1992 (N-25 and N-26). These actions generally consist of development
drilltng, construction of production facil Itles, and operations and
maintenance (0&14) activities. 0&14 activities account for approxlaately 75
percent of NPOSR-CUII expenditures. Development activities are conducted under
Job Orders, which are prepared by JBEC and approved by DOE/NPOSR-CUII. 0&14
activities are conducted under Inforaal work orders. Neither Job Orders nor
work orders receive NEPA review by the DOE/NPOSR-CUII Envlronllental Speclaltst
or the JBEC Environllll!ntal Manager . Moreover, the DOE/NPOSR-CUII Envlronllental
Specialist has only recently been Included In planning lleetlngs. Currently,
the JBEC Environllll!ntal Manager Is a lleillber of the Planning, Evaluation, and
Control COIIIIIlttee. However, the JBEC Envlronllental Manager did not
participant In the April Strategic Planning Heetlng or In the drafting of the
long-Range Plan .
The site Is not In compliance with, and has a min imal understanding of, NEPA .
It was assumed that actions were documented In a 1976 Environmental Impact
Statement (ElS) prepared by the Department of the Navy, or In the 1990 and
1991 DOE EAs . However, the 1976 EIS cannot be used to document ongoing or
proposed actions because It was never formally adopted by DOE. Moreover, it
Is out-of-date and does not address current activities. Where appropriate, It
can be used as a reference doculIII!nt. The 1990 and 1991 DOE EAs can be used to
document proposed actions, as long as the proposed action Is Included In the
EA and the Impacts are adequately described.
National Environmental Poltcy Act requirements were not within the scope of
the 1988 Env I ronmenta 1 Survey.
While DOE/NPOSR-CUII and JBEC are not currently In compliance with NEPA
requirements, most of the personnel recognize that their activities require
DOE NEPA review and determination, probably as a result of the recent
self-assessments . However, there Is Incomplete understanding and confusion
about the Implementation of, and responsibilities for, the NEPA requirements .
The DOE/NPOSR-CUII Environmental Speclaltst Is developing NEPA procedures and
plans to provide guidance and training to DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC personnel .
But, unless NPOSR-CUW management makes a commitment to compliance with NEPA
and provides leadership and support, acceptance and Integration of NEPA early
Into the planning process will be slow.
The NEPA assessment resulted In five compliance findings. These findings
concern completion of NEPA review , determination, and documentation prior to
Initiation of actions; NEPA poltcles and procedures; adequacy of NEPA
documents; Integration of NEPA In the project planning and budgeting
processes; and recordkeeplng and tracking .
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FINDING

should be coordinated with the conceptual design stages of project planning
(see Finding NEPA/CF-4).

Cu.pliance Findings
NEP~CF-I:

National Enviro_ntal Pollcy Act (NEPA) Review,
Detenlination, and Docu.entation

PerfonllllCe Object he
DOE 5440.ID, "NEPA," Section 7.a(l2) and (14), states that the responsibil ity
for detenlining the appropriate level of NEPA review 1 ies with the Secretarial
Offi cers or EH-1.
Finding
Most DOE actions reviewed by the Tiger Teu at NPOSR-CUII were illlPlemented
without a NEPA review or detel'llination by FE-I/EH-I of the level of NEPA
docu.entation required.
Discussion

Currently, management and operating (MlO) activities lack NEPA docu.entation,
as required by the DOE NEPA Regulations (10 CFR 1021.102), but the
DOE/NPOSR-CUII Environmental Specialist is developing consolidated categorical
exclusions (I -N-I) which, once approved, will provide NEPA coverage for
routine activities with no potential for environmental effects.
The DOE/NPOSR-CUII self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) fully identified the lack of NEPA review, detel'1llination, and
documentation for proposed actions.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are inadequate site ~ for
NEPA review and docullentation; incOlljllete pol icy illPlementatlon of DOE
regulations and Orders; and inadequate 1l:lin1n9 by the FE NEPA COIIjIliance
Officer (NCO) of site personnel to fillliliarize them with the requirellents of
NEPA and related laws; a secondary contributing factor for this finding is
inadequate appraisals/audits/reviews by FE.

At NPOSR-CUII, failures to uke appropriate NEPA determinations have occurred
in the following ways: (I) actions do not receive NEPA review because they
are incorrectly assUlled to be covered by the existing Environmental
Assessllents (EAs) (N - IO and N-27); and (2) actions proceed with unauthorized
detenlination. Actions also have proceeded without any NEPA determination .
Incorrect NEPA Determinations
letters were found in the fil es that gave approval to perfol'lll proposed actions
based on DOE/EA-0442 (N-27) and DOE/EA-0531 (N-IO) . This is an acceptable
procedure to follow. However, in the following cases, the activities were :
(I) not described in the EA (e.g., Run Cement Bond logs to Comply with lIyoming
Oil l Gas Conservat i on COIIIIIIission (IIOSCe) Rules and Regulations) or (2) the
effects of the proposed activity are not adequately described in the EAs
(e.g., Installation of Steall Generator No.5; Drilling and :nstalling four
Infill lIells for Steam Generator No . 4; and Installation of lIasat ch
Dehydration Units, lIell Nos. 1-11-20, 2-11-21, and 3-11-29 at the NOSRs)
(see Finding NEPA/CF-3).
Unaythorized Peterminations
NEPA categorical exclusion detel'lllinations were signed by NPOSR·CUII for seven
proposed actions. Only FE-I has the authority to make NEPA determinations and
at present , this authority cannot be delegated to the site .
Actions withoyt NEPA Determinations
A number of activities are near completion or have progressed through detailed
design without NEPA detel'llinations fro. FE-I. For example , the lIater Source
lIell project is 9B percent ca.plete and the lIorkover Prograll is ongoing
(I · N-15). In addition, for about 50 percent of the facilit i es projects,
detailed design is in progress or has been cOlljlleted (N -8; I-N-5). At
present, additional work on these projects is awaiting NEPA approval (requests
for categorical exclusions have been subllitted to FE-I). To avoid such
delays, NEPA review and submittal of categorical exclusions requests to FE·I
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FINDING NEPA/CF-2:

National EnvirollEnhl Policy Act (NEPA)
Policies and Procedures

FINDING NEPA/CF-3:
(NEPA)

Adequacy of National Environlental Policy Act
Doc.-ents

Perforunce Objective

Perforunce Objective

DOE 5440 . 10 'NEPA,' 7. a(2), 7. c(3), and 7.d(4), and DOE 4700 . 1, ' Project
Management System,' Part F, establl sh requirements and guidance for written
procedures to ensure consistency In the agency-wide applicat i on of NEPA and
cOllPliance with the Council on Environmental Quality regulations. DOE
5480.19, ' Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilit i es,' Sect i on 4.b,
requ i res operators of DOE facilities to have procedures in place to control
the conduct of their operations .
Finding

Council on EnvironllM!nta1 Quality (CEQ) regulations require an Environmental
Assessment (EA) to identify environmental effects and values in adequate
detail (40 CFR 1501.2(b» and provide sufficient evidence and analysis for
detel'1llining whether to prepare a finding of no significant illlPact (FONSI) or
an Env i ronmental IlIjIact Statement (EIS) (40 CFR 1508.9(a)(I» . DOE guidance
states that radiological and nonradio10gical impacts to workers should be
considered in NEPA documents (Office of NEPA Oversight melAOrandu. 'Guidance
Related to Analysis of Impacts to Workers in NEPA Documentation, ' June 10,
1988) .

There are no formal procedures for Implementation of NEPA at NPOSR-CUW.

Finding

Discussion

The 1990 EA , 'Continued Development of Petroleum Reserve No.3' (DOE/EA- 0442),
and the 1991 EA, 'Proposed Natural Gas Protection Program for Naval 011 Shale
Reserves Nos. 1 and 3' (DOE/EA-0531), are inadequate when judged against the
requirements of 40 CFR 1501 . 2(b), 40 CFR 1508 . 9, and DOE guidance dated June
10, 1988, regarding impacts to workers .

There are no formal procedures for the i mplementation of NEPA at NPOSR-CUW ,
but the si te personnel are currently attempting to comply with NEPA i n the
absence of written NEPA procedures . The DOE/NPOSR-CUW Environmental
Silec i al i st i s currently preparing guidance defining the roles and
respons i bll i ties and lines of authority for the conduct, management, review,
and oversi ght of NEPA compl iance activities for the site. Subsequently , JBEC
will develop formal procedures for implementation of a NEPA compliance program
(N - 2). A memorandum (N-25) and a letter (N - 26) out1 ining the DOE policy for
NEPA compl i ance was sent to the site on February 20, 1992. On June IS, 1992 ,
DOE/NPOSR-CUW rece i ved 'Procedures for Preparing/Submitting Categorical
Excl us i ons ' (N-28) from Offi ce of Fossil Energy (FE) . Apparently, this latter
document is t he only guidance that DOE/NPOSR-CUW has received from FE.
The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self- assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992 ) ful l y ident i fied the lack of procedures to manage, review ,
conduct, and oversee NEPA compl i ance act i vities.
The apparent causal factor s for this finding are inadequate Mlill
implementation of DOE NEPA r egulat i ons and orders and inadequate !nin1ng by
DOE/NPOSR-CUW and t he FE NEPA Comp1 lance Offi cer of the site personnel . A
secondary contributing fac t or for th i s f i nding i s i nadequate FE
apprai sal s/aydi ts/ reyi ews.

Discussion
Both EAs r eferenced in this f i nding (N-I0 and N-27) ar e defic i ent i n thei r
descript i on of the proposed action, the existing environment , and impacts ;
thus reducing their usefulness for tiering and referencing in accordance wi th
40 CFR 1502 . 20 and 1502 . 21. These include the following def i cienc i es :
The proposed action i s not described in suffic i ent detail to
determine which future actions are covered. Neither EA descr ibes
routine maintenance, operation, decommi ssioning and
decontamination of the facll ities . The descr i ption of the
proposed act i on is not clear in some instances, such as whether
the proposed act i on in DOE/EA-0442 (N - 27) is for i nstallation of
Steam Generators 3, 4 , 5 and 6, or just for the i r ' plann i ng .'
There i s no descr i pt i on of wetlands (such as t he wetland
vegetat i on i n t he stream bottom along the Teapot and Li ttle Teapot
Creeks) i n DOE/EA-0442 (N -27) . The descr i pt i on of wet lands i n
DOE/EA-0531 (N - I0) is i ncomplete, since it does not i dentify the
wet l ands i n water retention ponds , beaver pond s, and streams.
There is no discuss i on of worker impact s i n e ither of t he EAs.
There is no descr i pti on of t he i mpacts on t he environment and
health due to the change i n hydr ogen s ulfi de emissi ons r e sulting
from the proposed action .
There is no description of no ise i mpacts i n DOE/ EA- OS31 (N-1 0) .
The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (Apr il 1992) di d not eval uate the NEPA
documents . The JBEC self- assessment (Apri l 1992) part i al ly i dentified t his
finding, in that the inadequate wetlands descr i pti on was not ed .
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The apparent causal factors for this finding are the lack of IlQJ.ill
IIPlementatlon of DOE NEPA policies by NPOSR-CUII and Inadequate 1ni1liD.g on
docullent preparation by DOE/NPOSR-CUII and the FE NEPA Compliance Officer .

FINDING NEPAlCF-4:

Project Planning and Budget Review

Perfonaance Objective
The Council on Environlllental Quality regulations (40 CFR 1501.2), DOE NEPA
Regulat Ions (57 FR 15122, Sections 1021.101 and 1021. 200(a) and (b»; DOE
5440.10, 'NEPA,' Section 7.a(1), 'National Environlllental Policy Act COIIIPliance
Program'; and DOE 4700.1, 'Project Management System,' Part F, require the
integration of the NEPA process with project planning at the earliest possible
time to ensure that decisions reflect environlllental values and to avoid
delays. Moreover, DOE 5440.10, Section 7.a(5); DOE 5700.7B, 'llork
Authorization System'; and DOE Notice 5100.3, 'Field Budget Notice,' require
the incorporation of NEPA lIilestones and financial planning into project
planning docullents, and the inclusion of NEPA cOlllpllance activities and status
reports in internal budget reviews.
Finding
NPOSR-CUII does not apply NEPA early in the planning process for proposed DOE
actions as required by 40 CFR 1501.2, DOE NEPA Regulations, DOE 5440.10, DOE
4700.1, DOE 5700.7B, and DOE Notice 5100.3. NEPA milestones and financial
planning are not included in project planning documents and Job Orders as
required. Thus, these documents do not ensure valid, early consideration of
environmental issues.
Discussion
The primary early project planning and budgeting documents used at NPOSR-CUII
are the Long Range Plan (N-3) and the Annual Operating Plan (N-4) .
Consideration of the NEPA process early in planning is inadequate because NEPA
is not explicitly considered in these documents. The 1988 Environment, Safety
and Health Long-Range Plan (N-29) noted that three Environmental Assessments
may be required, one for each new steam generator planned for FY 1990, 1991,
and 1992. These steam generators were subsequently included in the 1990
DOE/EA-0442 (N-27). However, the description of the generators in the 1990
Environmental Assessment was not adequate (see Finding NEPAlCF-3).
Development activities have not received environmental review at the
conceptual design stage as required by DOE 4700.1. It was clear from almost
all of the interviews and from various project planning schedules (N-4, 5, 6,
and 7) that neither DOE/NPOSR-CUII nor JBEC personnel understand the
relationship of the NEPA process (i.e., review, determination , and
documentation) and project planning as described in DOE 4700.1. NEPA
requi rements have been dealt wi th as issues ari se.
Successful integration of NEPA depends on cOlll11unication between the person(s)
responsible for NEPA and the project managers . The DOE/NPOSR-CUII
Environmental Specialist was not included in the April 1992 Strategic Planning
Meeting, nor was he included in the weekly staff meetings held by
DOE/NPOSR-CUII or JBEC (I-N-1 and I-N-8) until June 1992. Input from the
NPOSR-CUW NEPA specialists early in the planning stages of projects is
necessary to ensure compliance and to avoid future needless delays .
Generally, NEPA has either not been considered at all or Is considered late in
project development (see Finding NEPAlCF-1).
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The DOE/NPOSR-CUII sel f-assesslll!nt (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) fully Identified the lack of early planning for NEPA and the lack
of .ilestones and financial planning for NEPA In project planning documents.
The apparent causal factors for this finding are a lack of ~
I.,lwntatlon for integrating NEPA with project lIIanagement; a lack of
NPOSR-CUII procedures for cOllPlIance with NEPA; Inadequate 1J:i.ini.ng by the FE
NEPA COIIPlIance Officer (NCO) of site personnel. A secondary contributing
factor for this finding Is inadequate DOE-HQlFE appralsals/aydlts/revlews .

FINDING

NEP~CF-5:

Recordkeeping for National EnviroMe11tal Policy
Act (NEPA) Doc..entation

Perforaaoce Objective
DOE 5440.10, "NEPA," Sections 7.a(2) and 7 .c(3), requires procedures and
recordkeeplng to ensure consistency In the agency-wide application of NEPA.
DOE 4700.1, "Project Managelll!nt Systl!ll,' requires a disciplined, systellatlc,
and coordinated approach to project llanagellent that results In efficient
planning, organization, coordination, budgeting, aanagwnt, review, and
control of DOE actions . DOE 1324 . 5, 'Records Managwnt Progrill,' Section
6.b(2), requires that departmental records be aalntalned In an effective,
efficient, and authorized aanner. Best llanageillent practices suggest that
integrated tracking procedures be in place for NPOSR-CUII to follow the status
of NEPA review.
Finding
There is no recordkeeping such that the status of NEPA cOlllPllance in the
planning, funding, approval, design, and construction phases of all NPOSR-CUII
actions can be determined . There is also no integrated tracking systell at
NPOSR-CUII in accordance with best lIIanagellMmt practices (I-N-1).
Discussion
NPOSR- CUII NEPA files are incomplete, scattered, and poorly cross-referenced.
For Instance, NPOSR-CUII did not provide a copy of the Finding of No
Si gnificant Impact for either DOE/EA-0442 (N-I0) or DOE/EA-0531 (N-27), or the
two primary NEPA documents for future proposed actions at NPR-3, NOSR-l, and
NOSR-3. Therefore, the documents were provided by the Tiger Team.
Best management practices for an integrated tracking systelll do not exist at
NPOSR-CUII (I-N-l and I-N-4). There is no systelll evaluating the progress of
actions In relation to NEPA lIIilestones. Additionally, the site does not track
the status of individual NEPA documents submitted for review and approval
(i.e., a system that tracks the NEPA document from JBEC, to DOE/NPOSR- CUII,
FE -64, FE-I, and EH-l, then back to the originator , as appropriate). Thus,
NPOSR-CUII and JBEC managers cannot readily ascertain when NEPA determinations
or NEPA documents have been approved and, therefore, when actions may be
implemented . As a result, the potential exists for actions to proceed to the
detailed design (I.e ., after conceptual design) stage prior to authorized
approval by FE-lor EH - l (see Finding NEPA/CF-l) .
The DOE/NPOSR- CUII self-assessment (April 1992) and the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) fully identified the lack of recordkeeping and tracking .
The apparent causal factor for this finding Is a lack of oolicy Implementati on
for recordkeeping and tracking NEPA review of projects .
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4.1

PURPOSE

All)

HEALTH ASSESSIIEHT

The purpose of the Safety and Health (SlH) Subteam assessment was to determine
the effect i veness of site safety and health programs at the Naval Petroleum
and Oil Shale Reserves in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming (NPOSR-CUW) . A
Technical Safety Appraisal (TSA) team (also referred to as the Safety and
Health [S&H] SubteaJII) was assembled for this purpose by the Department of
Energy (DOE) Deputy Assistant Secretary for Safety and Quality Assurance
Offi ce of Perfonllance Assessment. The S&H Subteam assessment was perfo";'ed
concurrently wit~ assessments conducted by the Environmental and Management
Subtealls.
4.2

SCOPE

~ithin the sa~ety and ~ealth programs of NPOSR-CUW,
In ~h~ fo~lowlng tec~nlcal ~reas: Organization and

performance was appraised
Administration, Quality
VerifIcatIon, OperatIons, Slte/Facil ity Safety Review, Maintenance Technical
Support, Training and Certification, Packaging and Transportation (including
pipel ine safety), Occ~p~tiona~ Safety , Worker Safety and Health (Occupational
~afety ~nd Hea~th Admlnls~ratlon [OSHA]) Compliance (including a compliance
InspectIon), FIre ProtectIon, Emergency Preparedness, and Medical Services.
Three of the four locations which comprise NPOSR-CUW were visited during the
assess~nt .
Naval Petroleum Reserve Number 3 (NPR-3) near Casper, Wyoming and
Naval 011 Shale Reserve Numbers 1 and 3 (NOSR- I and NOSR-3) near Rifle
Colorado were examined . Naval Oil Shale Reserve Number 2 (NOSR-2) nea~
Vernal, Utah was not visited as it is an inactive DOE property .

4.3

APPROACH

The TSA team was composed of DOE Headquarters experts employees of DOE
contractors, and outside consultants . The TSA was co~ducted according to the
" Procedu~es for Conducting Technical Safety Apprai sal s , " dated February 1991,
and the Protocol for the Conduct of Concurrent Tiger Team Assessments and
Technical Safety Appraisals," dated January 16, 1990 .
Th~

SlH Subtea~ ass~ssment was conducted from June 22 through July 15, 1992.
GUIdance and directIon were provided by the Director Office of Performance
Assessment. A list of the Subteam members together ~ith their areas of
responsibility is provided in Section 4.9; biographical sketches of the
Subteam members are provided in Appendix A-3.
The . T~A . focuses . on safety o~ operations and the condition of equipment and
~aclll t ~ es.
Thl s approach 1 s based on the assumpt i on that the facil i ty and

Its equIpment have been appropriately designed and constructed . Each
appraisal addresses whether current operations are being conducted within the
scope of operational sa fety procedures and programs establ ished for specific
facil ities and activities.
The activities of the SlH Subteam were guided by the performance objectives
an~ su~porting cri~eria contained in DOE/EH -OI35 "Performance Objectives and
C r lte~la f~r TechnIcal Safety Appraisals at Department of Energy Facilities
and SItes, dated June 1990. A Performance Objective and Criteria for
"Aviation Trans portat i on" was added to the Packaging and Transportation
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Section based on the existi ng Performance Objectives and Criteria for Aviation
Safety.
The findings and resulting concerns identified by the S&H Subteam were
developed using establ ished performance objectives for each of the technical
areas evaluated. Although nearly all of the performance objectives were
addressed, this report cites only those objectives for which a concern was
identified. Those performance objectives that are not applicable are
identified in the Overviews. Therefore, the reader is cautioned against
forming an opinion of the safety and operational performance within an area
without f irst reading the Overview concerning that area. When an appl icabl e
performance objective is not listed, the omission impl i es that the Subteam
judged all significant criteria to be met.
The findings and concerns identified by the S&H Subteam were obtained in three
ways:
(1) observing routine operations, emergency exercises, and the physical
condition of the site and facilities; (2) interviewing management, staff,
operators, and craft personnel; and (3) reviewing policy statements, records ,
procedures, and other relevant documents. In addition, the DOE/NPOSR-CUW Site
Office Self-Assessment Report and the JOh.l Brown Engineers and Constructllrs
Inc. (JBEC) Self-Assessment Report were reviewed.
A concern addresses a situation that in the judgment of the SlH Subteam either
(I) refl ected 1ess than full comp1 lance wi th a DOE safety and health
requirement or mandatory safety standard; (2) threatened to compromise safe
operation; or (3) if properly addressed, would substantially en~ance the
excellence of a particular situation, even though that part of the operation
was judged to have a currently acceptable margin of safety . B'~cause this last
category addresses the excellence of operation, more concerns are reported
than would result from a strictly compl iance-oriented appra i sal.
The findings that support each cencern immediately precede the concern . The
category rating, potential hazard level, and level of compliance for each
concern were determined by using the criteria presented in Section 4 . 7.
A comprehensive OSHA-type compliance appraisal covering general industr y and
construction work sites was performed. The scope of this appraisal involved
major process , service, production and maintenance facilities. This part of
the appraisal effort focused on "serious" noncompliance issues rather than on
thos~ deSignated as "other than serious ." Furthermore , de minimis issues
noted during the appraisal are not included in the inspection form s.
The Subteam also evaluated NPOSR-CUW in terms of the presence of any
Noteworthy Practices . Noteworthy Practices are exceptional ways of
accomplishing a Performance Objective. Other DOE facilities are encouraged to
adopt such practices when they are applicable to their operation .
Drawing upon the extensive experience of it s appraisers, the SlH Subteam has
made an effort to identify some of the responsible factors i n each statement
of concern. However , the Subteam recognizes that this effort has limitations.
because Subteam members are not fully famil iar with the detail s of the day-today operations of NPOSR -CUW. Therefore, the SlH Subteam believes that the
findings, and even the statements of concern, should be considered as possibly
symptomatic of some set of deeper root causes. Therefore, the Office of
4-2
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Fossil Energy (FE), DOE/NPOSR-CUW, and JBEC management should search out and
correct those root causes to ensure that improvements in the safety of the
operation will be sustained .
4.4

SAFm
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There is a heightened awareness of safety throughout the JBEC organization.
However, JBEC has not fully communicated its expectations for safety
improvement and has not provided sufficient leadership, strategy, and training
to assist employees in achieving an overall improved safety culture . JBEC
management has not developed the necessary tools such as S&H plans, goals,
performance standards, and an institutional ized Qual ity Assurance (QA) program
to communicate and implement the NPR-3 S&'H program. Both JBEC and DOE/NPOSRCUW management have failed to require the implementation of the S&'H and QA
provisions of the DOE operating contract with JBEC. DOE Orders and
requirements have not been transmitted to JBEC in a timely manner . DOE/NPOSRCUW lacks a formal directives system to transmit Orders and lacks an
understanding of the need to do so. In addition, the DOE/NPOSR-CUW Site
Office has not provided sufficient oversight of JBEC safety and health
programs and associated activities. These deficiencies have resulted in the
failure to develop an S&'H program appropriate to the site's needs .
A total of 110 concerns is identified in this Safety and Health Section; 90
concern s pertain to JBEC , and 20 concerns to DOE/NPOSR-CUW. There are 11
Category II Concerns : 3 relate to meeting the safety and quality provisions
of the operating contract and DOE/NPOSR-CUW oversight i ssues in Organization
and Administration ; 3 relate to Maintenance problems with work practices,
oversight , and support; 4 relate to Occupational Safety and Worker Safety and
Health non - compliances and deficiencies in confined space entry, workplace
hazards evaluat i on and control, electrical safety , and control of hazardous
energy ; and 1 relates to Fi re Protection involving potential excessive
property losses. A Tabulation of Concerns from this appraisal is contained in
Secti on 4 . B. 2 .
Tabl e 4-1 provi des a comparison between findings resulting from the combined
DOE/NPOSR-CUW and J BEC Self -Assessments and those concerns identified during
the TSA. A compari son of the t otal concerns identified during the TSA to
those ide ntified in t he comb ined Self-Assessments indicates that B2 percent of
the TSA Category II Concerns and BB percent of the Category III Concerns were
either fully or parti all y i dentifi ed by the combined Self-Assessments.
Neither DOE/NPOSR-CUW nor JBEC have i mplemented QA programs as required by
DOE 5700.6C and the provisi ons of the DOE operating contract with JBEC . Draft
QA Manuals have been prepared and submi tted to the Office of Fossil Energy for
review and approva l. The Site Off i ce has not prepared a plan describing how
it will implement it s own QA Program or how it will provide oversight of the
evolving contractor QA Pr ogram . The general plan is to use Total Quality
Managment (TQM) as the QA i mplementing tool ; however, the specific details for
the implementation proce ss have yet to be defined . Successful implementation
of a JBEC QA Program will be dependent on management's ability to apply a
graded approach to the site ' s qual i ty - related activities utilizing eXisting
resources.
JBEC lacks the necessary t r ai ni ng , aud i t , and appraisal programs to ensure
silfety awarenes s within Operati ons. JBEC Operat i ons does not effectively
interhce with Engineeri ng t o en sure sound safety principles in the selection ,
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implementation, and operation of equipment. Operators do not have approved
Operation Procedures to guide performance of their duti~s and do not
effectively monitor the operating condition of their equ1pment. As a result,
certain facilities and drilling equipment are not being operated in a safe and
reI iable manner ; the lock, Tag, Try Procedure is incomplete and not
effectively implemented; and requirements regarding the use of blowout
preventers duri ng well workovers are not followed.
Observations of maintenance activities indicated personnel were qualified to
perform ma i ntenance work. The site was ma i nta i ned ina neat, orderly
condition and had high on-stream equipment availability. However, the
Maintenance organization has not ensured implementation and control of
maintenance activities and has not ensured that sufficient safety and
engineering support is provided for maintenance operations. The Maintenance
organization has not maintained the material condition of components and
equipment in a manner sufficient to prevent hazardous conditions caused by
non-code installations, i mproper operation of equipment, and equipment
deterioration. Other significant deficiencies noted were a backlog of
electrical parts , use of outdated drawings , lack ~f written procedures, and
lax enforcement of informal procedures resulting 1n hazardous conditions and
unsafe practices .
Safety and health training for NPR-3 operations, although good by oil field
standards, does not meet DOE requirements . JBEC is in a reactive, catch - up
training mode caused to a great extent by lack of direction from DOE/NPOSRCUW . Training has been informal with little attention paid to controlling the
quality of planning and scheduling, training materials, instructor
credentials, and recordkeeping. There is neither a needs analysis based on
specific jobs and tasks nor a comprehensive training plan. There is no
assurance that operations, maintenance, and technical staff have appropriate
safety, health, and qualification training. First:line supervisors do not
keep training records on hand for the persons work1ng under them. Training
for first-line supervisors and reanagers has not been provided on a regular
basis . Subcontractors often have not had the necessary ES&'H training, and
neither JBEC nor DOE/NPOSR-CUW have been effective in mon i toring their
activities on site . Nevertheless, JBEC recognizes their deficiencies and has
been making efforts to improve all aspects of their training program. In
add i t i on, a significant number of ES&'H training activities have occurred i n
the past 6 months .
The existing JBEC and DOE/NPOSR-CUW Emergency Preparedness Program is in the
early stages of development , and lacks a well written emergency management
plan , a set of implement i ng procedures, an exerc i se/drill schedule , and a
documented training program. Despite these deficiencie s , JBEC developed a
challeng i ng exercise scenar i o and performed their emergency management and
respon se activ i ties in a satisfactory manner. To date the DOE Offi ce of
Fossil Energy has not prov i ded formal oversight and adequate guidance for
emergency pr eparedness program act i vit i es at NPR-3.
Techn i cal support t o field operat i ons at NPR -3 is provided for reservoir and
new constr uct i on eng i neer i ng . However , engineering support for de si gn and
i nstallat ion of facil ity mod ific at i ons and for mechanical and electr i cal
problems in fi eld ma i ntenance and operat ion s is not effective . DOE/ NPOSR-CUW
surveillance has not ensured eng i neered s afety for operati ons at NPR -3.
Eng i neer i ng personnel locat ed i n Casper do not spend enough ti me i n the field

to provide appropriate support for day to day operations . JBEC does not have
an effective configuration control system to ensure that drawings are
maintained current as-built. Field work often is carried out without
involvi ng engineering personnel to update the drawings. Follow-on work must
then be performed without accurate piping and electrical diagrams , creating
potential safety problems . NPR-3 facilities are not covered by a Safety
Analysis Report (SAR) to serve as the top-level safety document specifying
operational limits, physical and administrative controls, safety systems, and
surveillance requirements. Further , no formal hazards assessment has been
performed, and the full range of accident conditions has not been determined.
The good hazardous materi al s transportation accident record at NPR-3 can be
attributed to few shipments, the low volume of crude oil moved by pipeline,
and the constructive attitude of the JBEC staff . A packaging and
transportation program for implementing DOE Orders does not exist. Policy and
Procedure documents have not been implemented; design standards have not been
establ ished; qual ity control and qual ity assurance systems have not been
instituted; t he knowledge of Federal and state laws and regulations is very
low; industry standards and practices are followed only in part ; internal
audits are not accomplished on a scheduled basis; packaging and storage
procedures are i ncomplete; and no training program is in place. A publ ic road
t ransverses the site, necessitating compliance with Department of
Transportation (DOT) 49 CFR, but few are met. The Pipeline Corrosion
Protect i on Program is inadequate and not under the supervi s i on of aqua 1ifi ed
individual . The technical staff of DOE/NPOSR-CUW rel ies excessively on the
competency of the JBEC staff; however JBEC demonstrates little knowledge with
respect to DOE Orders. The result is that the degree of risk is unknown, and
the current safety record is in jeopardy.
JBEC is required by DOE Orders to have an internal safety review system that
ensures comprehensive and indepth appraisals of facil ity safety . It was noted
that JBEC does not perform periodic safety and health appraisals of the
overall operation of each facility and has not conducted independent triennial
appraisals of its safety and health internal review system. Furthermore,
DOE/ NPOSR-CUW has not provided oversight to ensure that JBEC has fully
impl ement ed the requirements for internal safety reviews and appraisals.
JBEC management i s not fully complying with DOE and OSHA worker safety and
he al t h requi rements . This is evident by the lack of an effective, proactive
compli ance-oriented safety and health program . JBEC safety policies and
procedures are i nformal, lack specificity, and are not uniformly distributed
or enforced for all employees and subcontractors . The lack of an aggressive
trai ning program and specifi c safety reviews of worksites has hindered the
achievement of full compliance with DOE Orders and OSHA regulations. Serious
concerns were specifically identified in electrical systems , lockout/tagout
pract ices, and equ i pment guardi ng.

is common to the petroleum industry . However, the new ERT group at NPR-3 has
not received sufficient training to respond to site emergencies and is not
provided with the required personal protective equipment. The Low Temperature
Separation (LTS) Gas Compressor Building and 1iquid storage tanks are not
protected by deluge type sprinkler systems as required by DOE 5480.7 . JBEC
does not have a program to conduct fire protection engineering surveys.
JBEC does not have a comprehensive medical services program for its employees
as required by DOE 5480.8. Major deficiencies include the elements of
administration, physical examination, recordkeeping, and employee assistance
and well ness programs. The existing limited program is administered by a
local physician who is neither trained in current occupational medicine
practices nor totally familiar with the JBEC work environment . The physician
performs pre-employment exams, 1ung function tests for the respi ratory
protection program, and care for job incurred injuries on a fee for services
basis. Neither JBEC, the medical provider, nor DOE site management were aware
of the requirements of DOE 5480.8 or all pertinent OSHA regulations requiring
medical surveillance.
An occupational safety and health program is in place at NPR-3 which applies a
line management safety approach. Systems such as facility inspections,
deficiency tracking and reporting, safety meetings, permit process, and others
have been implemented to apply the program . The line organization demonstrates
interest in safety; however, the program has had only partial success in
controlling hazards and achieving compliance with safety and health
requirements of DOE Orders and OSHA standards . Hazard identification,
evaluation, and control is a particular deficiency in the JBEC program .
Specific deficiencies in confined space entry, 1ockout/tagout , hydrogen
sulfide hazard control, eyewash stations, and practices regarding working
alone are exacerbated by the lack of effective hazard evaluation.
Causes for the limited effectiveness in the JBEC Safety and Health Program
begin with DOE/NPOSR-CUW, which has failed to direct JBEC to implement safety
and health requirements. DOE/NPOSR-CUW al so has not provided oversight and
guidance for the Safety and Health Program. Likewise, JBEC management has
failed to understand its Safety and Health Program obligations, plan for the ir
implementation, and establish proportionate organizational systems and
resources to communicate and apply an effective program . To achieve
improvement in the Safety and Health Program , DOE/NPOSR-CUW must clearly
communicate its expectations and requirements to the operat i ng contractor and
follow through with the necessary guidance , support , and oversight to ensure
proper implementation . In addition, the operating contractor must establi sh
the organi zat i on, allocate resources, and develop systems to fulfi 11 the
expectat i ons and requi rements del ineated by DOE/ NPOSR -CUW.

Neither DOE/N"'OSR-CUW nor JBEC has developed a Fi re Protection Policy .
Responsi biliti es, aut horit ies, and accountab i l i ties are not well -established
and clearl y unders t ood by personnel for credi ble fi re scenarios. The method
of inte rfaci ng wit h offsite emergency agencies also is not well defined.
There is no fo rmal program or implementing procedures to comply with National
Fire Protection Associ at i on (NFPA) Standard 101, "Life Safety Code." No Fire
Hazard Analysis or SAR addresses the potential of offsite releases of
hazardous material s. The newly created Emergency Response Team (ERT) concept
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TABLE 4-1
COMPARISON OF SELF-ASSESSMENT PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
IIITH TSA CONCERNS
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF TSA CONCERNS IDENTIFIED IN
SELF-ASSESSMENTS/TSA DISCIPLINE AND SERIOUS CATEGORY'
TSA DISCIPLINE
SELF
Organization l
Administration
Oua 1i tv Veri fi cat i en
Operations
Maintenance
TraininQ & Certification
Packaaina & Transportation
EmerQency Preparedness
Technical Support
Site/Facil ity Safety Review
OccuDationa1 Safety
1I0rker Safety l Health
Fire Protection
Medical Services
Total Concerns
cateQDry)

(by

CATEGORY II
TSA
"TSA

1

3

33 .3

3

3

100 .0

2

2

2

2

1

1

100.0
100.0
100.0

9

11

81.8

CATEGORY III
SELF
TSA "TSA
8

10

80.0

2

2

6
6
6
10
8
6
8
7
7
7
6

8
6
6
13
9
6
8
7
10
7
7

100.0
75.0
100.0
100.0
76 . 9
88 . 9
100 .0
100.0
100.0
70 .0
100.0
85 .7

87

99

87.9

'Concerns partially or fully identified in the self-assessments were counted as
identifi ed in this table .
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4.5.1

Organization and Ad.inistration

4.5.1.1

Overview

The technical area of Organization and Administration was assessed by
revi ewing various management documents, making tours of work areas, and
conducting interviews with non-supervisory and management personnel at all
levels of the DOE/NPOSR-CUII and JBEC organization. All eight of the
Organization and Administration performance objectives were reviewed as part
of this assessment . These objectives were analyzed based on the nature of
operations at NPR-3 and applicable DOE Orders and requirements.
One-on-one discussions with randomly selected JBEC non-supervisory and
management personnel indicated a heightened awareness of safety and the desire
to work safely. However, most felt that management has not fully communicated
its expectations for safety and has not provided sufficient information and
training to ass ist employees in achieving an overall improved safety culture.
OOE/NPOSR-CUII has failed to ensure that JBEC meets the SlH and Quality
Assurance (QA) provisions of the DOE operating contract with JBEC . This was
the subject of a Category II Concern. DOE Orders and requirements have not
been formally transmitted to JBEC in a timely manner due to the lack of a
formal directives system and the lack of understanding of the need to convey
such information. In addition, DOE/NPOSR-CUII has not estab1 ished a QA Program
for the Site Office as well as ensuring that JBEC has an operating QA Program .
The S&H Subteam noted many deficiencies resulting from the lack of DOE/NPOSRCUll oversight of JBEC safety and health programs and related activities . The
specific deficiencies have been documented within the var ious technical areas
of the S&H Subteam report. Insufficient DOE/NPOSR-CUII oversight of JBEC
safety and health related activities has been a significant contributing
factor to the lack of properly developed and implemented safety and health
initiatives at NPR -3 and thus was cited as a Category 11 Concern. In
addition, it was noted that OOE/NPOSR-CUII has not allocated sufficient
resources t o support an effective program of oversight of JBEC .
JBEC similarly has failed to adhere to the S&H and QA provisions of its
operating contract with DOE and has no mechanism in place to ensure that
regular reviews are made to determine compliance with the provisions of the
operating contract . This was the subject of a third Category II Concern.
JBEC management has not developed the necessary tools such as SlH goals and
plans , performance standards, and an institutionalized QA Program to
effectively communicate and implement the S&H program at NPR-3 .
Annual S&H goals have not been established by management. Safety and health
plans describing program requirements and implementation schedules have not
been developed . Position descriptions do not provide the individual with a
clear definition of his/her SlH responsibilities . Clearly defined performance
expectations have not been established as part of the employee performance
appraisal process . Management has not developed staffing plans to antic i pate
and manage impacts resulting from potential funding reductions, attrition, and
response to special needs that may arise ; for example, the self-assessment
findings and concerns .
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JBEC has implemented an occurrence reporting system based on DOE 5000 .3A .
However, reporting requirements for the Notification and 10-Day Reports have
not been implemented in accordance with this Order. In addition, DOE/NPOSRCUW has not consistently met the 3-Day sign-off requirements for Final
Reports.
JBEC has established an independent Safety Review Committee that meets monthly
to review and discuss current S&H issues . The Committee consists of top level
JBEC management and a representative from DOE/NPOSR-CUW . Included on the
Committee is the Field Operations Manager, which dimin is hes the actual
independence of the Committee from operations areas reviewed. In addition,
the S&H Section conducts quarterly inspections of work areas . Also, various
assessme~ts have been conducted by or through JBEC Houston over the past 2
years WhlCh included the areas of electrical grounding, fire protection
environmental inspections, emergency preparedness , and safety and health .
Supplemental personnel in the areas of environment and safety are currently
being pro~ided to .JBEC through the Houston office . Corporate support, in
general , lS supplled to NPR-3 on an as-needed basis within the constraints of
budget allocations approved by DOE/NPOSR-CUW.

programs, the need to develop and apply management tools in carrying out these
programs, and a lack of understanding of DOE Orders and requirements.
Corrective actions reflected management commitment to correct problems, but in
some cases did not indicate a total understanding of the deficiencies
identified .
The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment reflected a lack of understanding of DOE
Orders and requirements . In general, the self-assessment consisted of
repetitious phrases stating criteria had not been met, followed by a statement
indicating these would be met. The proposed corrective actions indicated that
the nature of the deficiencies was not well understood by DOE/NPOSR-CUW .

JBEC has nearly completed its initiative to review and update 373 Policy and
Procedure documents . The effort is approximately 85 percent complete and has
resulted in the deletion of 44 documents no longer applicable . JBEC has
implemented a Policy and Procedure Index that appears effective for tracking
these documents thr~ugh th~ ~eview and ~pproval process. JBEC has developed a
system for controlllng reV1Slons to POllCY and Procedures that incorporates
the return of the outdated sheets to the Policies and Procedures Analyst and
an annual independent verification to assure manuals are kept current . JBEC
presently uses an informal system for its Operation Procedures (OPs) .
Activities are just underway to develop OPs as part of the Conduct of
Operations initiative at NPR-3 . This effort will be more complex than that
associ~ted with the review of Policy and Procedures.
JBEC, however, has not
establlshed a plan for managing and implementing the OP development process .
Presently, no Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) have been developed for NPR -3.
DOE/NPOSR-CUW ~re se ntly is planning to obtain assistance in developing SARs
for NPR-3. ThlS is further discussed under Section 4. 5. 7 Technical Support of
this report .
JBEC has estab 1i shed a drug and a1coho 1 abuse po Hcy. That pol icy does not
require formal training of supervisors in the detection and referral of
employees suspected of substance abuse . There is no education program for
employees regarding substance abuse . In addition, JBEC does not have an
Employee Assistance Program in place for employee referral.
JBEC initiated a Performance Indicators and Trending Program in FY 1991.
Information Is provided quarterly to DOE/NPOSR-CUW in accordance with the
reporting categories defined in SEN-29-91 . However, this data i s neither
analyzed for trends nor used to improve the overall margin of safety for
NPR -3.
The JBEC self-assessment appeared thorough in scope and quite candid . The
self-assessment process was conducted by a relatively few key individuals
wi th i n JBEC , thus, it did not allow input from all levels of the organizat ion.
Defi ci enc i es i dentif i ed related to the need to develop safety and health
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4.5.1.2

Findings and Concerns

OA.l

SITE/FACILITY ORGANIZATION

• A review of the recent transmittal letters from DOE/NPOSR-CUW
indicated the lack of clear guidance to JBEC . This was
substantiated by JBEC personnel who had asked for clarifying
information from DOE/NPOSR-CUW on several occasions, but did
not receive it. DOE/NPOSR-CUW management indicated this is due
to the lack of expertise within the Site Office to provide
guidance and interpretation of DOE Orders .

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Management should organize and manage the
~ite/facility ' s work, programs, and resources so that safety and health are an
lntegral part of the personnel duties and requirements are consistently
implemented.
FlIIlIII&S:

• DOE/NPOSR-CUW recently final ized a qual ity assurance procedure
(QAP) describing a directives system for the Site Office, QAP
6.3, "Directive System," dated June 5, 1992. The completed
procedure was transmitted to DOE/NPOSR-CUW via the letter,
Lynette Soehn to Cecil Foote, Subject: 'Completed Directive
System Quality Assurance Procedure, ' dated June 25, 1992 .
However, at the time of this assessment, the directives system
had not been implemented.

• Discussions with the JBEC Safety and Health Manager revealed
there is no safety and health plan published by JBEC.
• DOE 5480.1B, paragraph 8.d.(6) requires the establishment of
implementation plans for ES&.H activities.
• The DOE operating contract with JBEC (DE -ACOI-86FE60896)
requires that a safety and health plan be prepared within 90
days after the effective date of the contract . Such a plan is
to be updated by JBEC annually, thereafter for the remainder
of the contract. This contractual requirement has not been
meet . (See Concern OA . I-4.)
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).

CONCERN:
(OA.l-1)
(Kl/Cl)

The operating contractor has not prepared safety and health plans
as required by DOE 5480.18, paragraph 8.d.(6) and by its operating
contract wi th the Departllent of Energy.

FINDIII&S:

• A review of gu idance letters from DOE/NPOSR-CUW to JBEC was
made . These letters formally requested the contractor to
implement specific DOE Orders . It was noted in several
in;tances that JBEC was only recently requested to implement
these Orders which have been in effect for considerable periods
of time. For example, the lett er C. Ray Williams to Mi chael R.
Fosdick, Subject: ' Gu i dance for DOE Order 5480.19 , Conduct of
Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities ," dated February 13
1992, directed JBEC t o implement all 18 chapters of the Order . '
DOE 5480.19 has been in effect since July 1990 . Similar
exam;>les were noted with DOE 5480 . 1B , DOE 5481.1B, DOE 5482 . 1B ,
and the DOE 5500-series of Orders.
• DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not establ i shed a formal di rectives system to
ensure DOE urders and requ irements are conveyed to JBEC i n a
tiill8ly manner .
• Discussions with DOE/NPOSR-CUW management i ndicated that until
their visit to the Naval Petroleum Reserves i n California in
1991, they were not aware of t he need to formally transmit
appl i cable DOE Orders t o JBEC .

• The following concern was fully identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW
self-assessment (April 1992) .
CONCERN:
(OA.l-2)
(H2/C2)

DOE/NPOSR-CUII Site Office has not i.pl_nted a directives syste.
and has not provided clear and tillMlly guidance to the operating
contractor.

FINDINGS:

• The DOE operating contract with JBEC (DE -ACOI -86FE60896)
contains specific requirements within the Statement of Work for
Safety and Health and Qual ity Assurance .
• Some of the safety and health requirements imposed by the
contract include:
"The Contractor shall submi t for approval, in writing, a
Health and Safety Plan to the Director, NPOSR -CUW wit hin
ninety (90) days after the effective date of the Cont ract."
(The effect ive date of the contract was Oc t ober 1, 1986 . )
- "The plan shall be updated by the Contractor and reviewed and
approved by DOE when necessary, but no less than once each
year, corres pond ing with the preparati on of t he Annual
Operating Plan for the next fiscal year."
These contractual requirements were not met by JBEC and not
enforced by DOE/ NPOSR -CUW.
• Some of the quality assurance requirements imposed "y the
contract include :
"The Contractor is responsible for establishing, maintaining
and operating an approved Quality Assurance (QA) Program in
accordance with the direction given in NPOSR Order 5700.6A . "
"The Contractor's QA Program shall be integrated into daily
ope rat ions ... . "

4- 11

,). 1/7

These contractual requirement s were not met by JBEC and not
enforced by DOE/ NPOSR- CUW .
•

Di scussions with both DOE/ NPOSR- CUW and JBEC management
indicated there has been no mechanism established to en s ure
t hat a regular review of the contract is perfor med and that i ts
Safety and Health and Qual ity As surance provision s are being
met .

•

The following concern was not identified in the DOE/ NPOSR - CUW
self- as 3essment (April 1992).

CONCERN:
(OA.1-3)
(H2/Cl)
CAT. II

DOE/NPOSR-CUW Site Office has not enforced the safety and health
and qual i ty assurance provi s ions of the Department of Energy
operating contract with the operat i ng contractor.

F1I1lINGS :

•

CONCERN:
(OA.1-4)
(H2/Cl)
CAT . II

The operati ng contractor does not have a !lechani s. in place to
ensure that the safety and health. and quality assurance
prov i s i ons of i ts operati ng contract with the Department of Energy
are !let.

FINDINGS :

•

•

•

The following concern was not i dentified i n the JBEC
self- as sessment (April 1992) .

The po siti on descr i pt i on fo r the Di rector, Contract
Surve ill ance and Adm i ni strati on s tates the incumbent i s
res pon si bl e for s afety and health . These responsibil iti es
include devel op i ng , i mplement i ng , and evaluating safety and
hea lt h pr ogram; and conduct i ng surveys and i nspect ions . Th e
Unit Ch arter f or t he DOE/NPOSR - CUW Contract Surveillance and
Administrati on or gan i zati on pr ov i de s fo r t he use of engineer s
in the Site Of f ice t o pe r fo r m over s i ght of occupat i onal safety
and health act i vit i es and t o r eport t he '; r f i nd i ng s to the
Director. It is not cl ea r how t hes e r es pon s ibilities and
authorities are assigned and managed withi n t he framewo r k of
the matrix organization being us ed .
The Director, Contract Surveil lance and Admin is t rat ion performs
his safety and health res ponsi bilities on l y as a coll atera l
duty, responding to issues only as t hey ar is e. Thu s, he
devotes little time , if any, t o devel op i ng , impl ementing , and
evaluating safety and health pr og r ams f or the Site Off i ce and
JBEC as required by his pqsiti on des cr i pti on.
The respons i bil ity for safety and he alt h is s hown di fferent l y
on the various DOE/NPOSR - CUW or ganiza t i on cha r t s re viewed by
the S&H Subteam . In some cases, the fu nction al res ponsi bil ity
for safe ty and health is not shown at all .

•

The lack of clearly assigned respons i bilities for s~fety and
health has contr i buted to deficiencies assoc i ated with
implementing the safety and health and QA prov i s i ons of the DOE
operating contract with JBEC as well as a directives . ystem
needed to ensure DOE Orders and requirements are properly
i mplemented . This lack of clearly assigned responsibilitie s is
not in accordance with DOE 5480 . IB , paragraph 8.d . (6)(a)! .

•

See Concerns OA . I-2. OA . I-3 , MA.I-I . EP . I-I , EP . I-2, PT.I - I ,
OS . I - 2 . FP . I - I, and FP . I-2.

•

The following concern was fully identified i n the DOE/NPOSR- CUW
self-assessment (April 1992).

CONCERN:
(OA.1-5)
(H2/Cl)

The organizational structure. responsibilities. and authorities
for safety and health have not been clearly established by
DOE/NPOSR-CUW Site Office in accordance with DOE 5480.18.
paragraph 8.d. (6)(aH .

FI NDINGS:

•

Dur ing the course of thi s Tiger Team Asse s sment , the S&H
Subteam identified numerous serious defi c i encies a ss o c iate~
wi th t he lack of effect i ve DOE/NPOSR- CUW overs i ght of JBEC
safety - and health - related activities . In s ufficien t oversi ght
of JBEC ha s s igni fi cantly contributed to the lack of full y
developed and implemented safety - and health - r elated
initiatives at NPR- 3 . The following are some of those
defi ci encie s i dent i fied by the S&H Subteam.
DOE/ NPOSR - CUW has not provided clear and timely gu i dance t o
JBEC i n r egar ds to DOE Order s and requi r ement s. (S ee Concern
OA . I - 2 . )
DOE/NPOSR- CUW does no t ensur e that JBEC and i t s
s ubcontractor s are meeti ng t he t ra i ni ng requirements of DOE
Or ders and 29 CF R reg ula ti on s. (See Concern TC.I- 4.;
- DOE/NPOSR -CUW does not have an Emergency Pr eparednes s Program
and ha s not ens ured JBEC has an Emerge ncy Pre paredr ' S
Program in compIi ar.ce wi t h DOE Orders . (SEe Concer. ; EP . 1-1
and EP.I - 2)
Appraisals of JBEC packaging and t ra ns portation activities
have not been conducted by DOE/N POSR - CUW. (See Section
PT.I!.)
DOE/NPOSR - CUW has not ensured t hat aviation charter pilots
and aircraft comply with DOE 5480.13 . (See Concern PT . 13 - !.)
Functional appraisals of JBEC safety and healt h activities
have not been conducted by DOE/N POSR -CUW . (See Concerns
FR . 4- 2 and FR.5 - 2.)
Support , gUidance, and direction to JBEC regarding their
Occupational Safety and Health Program has not been provided
by DOE/ NPOSR- CUW. (See Concern OS . 1- 2.)
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GUidance on resources, organi zati on , and administrative
systems for implementing a Fire Protection Program in
compl iance with DOE Orders has not been provided to JBEC by
DOE/NPOSR - CUW . (See Concern FP . 1- 2 . )
DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not required JBEC to implement the
requirements of DOE S4BO.B i n regard to its Med ical Program.
(See Concern MS . I-3 . )
•
CONCERN:
(OA.I-6)
(HI/C1)
CAT II

OA.2

ADMINISTRATION

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Administration programs and controls should be in
pI ace to ensure pol icies concerning health and safety are admini stered
throughout the faci~ity.
FINDINGS:

•

JBEC Policy and Procedure 1.1-17, · Occurrence Reporting, · dated
June I, 1992, describes the methods JBEC uses to comply with
DOE SOOO.3A . However , this document does not include a
specific procedure on how occurrence reports are entered into
the Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS) .

•

A revi ew of recent occu r rence reports revealed that the
reporting requirements of DOE SOOO.3A are not being met in that
many Notification and 10-Day Reports have not been filed within
the time specified by DOE SOOO . 3A, paragraph 7.

•

JBEC has not established a formal lessons learned program to
utilize information from occurrence reports, other JBEC audits
and inspections, and other DOE f acilities as required by DOE
SOOO . 3A, paragraph B. c. (2) .

•

The following concern was partially identified in the JBEC
self-assessment (April 1992) .

The following concern was partially identified in the
DOE/NPOSR -CUW self-assessment (April 1992) .

DOE/NPOSR-CUV Site Office has not provided sufficient oversight of
the operating contractor safety and health prograJIs and related
activities.

CONCERN:
(OA.2-1)
(H3/Cl)

The operat i ng contractor occurrence report i ng systllll does not
comply with the reporting, procedural, and lessons learned
provisions of DOE SOOO.3A.

FINDINGS:

•

DOE/ NPOSR-CUW has designated a Facility Representative a s part
of the NPR- 3 occurrence report i ng system and has on-line access
to the O~PS . However, there are no procedures defining the
reporting requirements, sign-off authorities, and data entry
i nto ORPS.

•

A review of recent Final Reports indicated they had not been
reviewed and signed - off by the Facil ity Representative within
the required 3-working day period as required by DOE SOOO . 3A,
paragraph B. b. (S).

•

The following concern was not identified in the DOE/NPOSR - CUW
self- ass essment (April 1992) .

CONCERN:
(OA. 2-2)
(H3/Cl)

4- IS
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DOE/NPOSR-CUV Site Office does not meet the reporting and
procedural provi s ions of DOE SOOO.3A.
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OA.3

OA.G

MAHAGENENT OBJECTIVES

PERSOIIIEL PLANNING AND QUALIFICATION

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Site/facility management objectives s hould ensure
commitment to safe operation , including enforcement of approved work practice s
and procedures .

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Personnel programs should ensure that appropriate job
qualification requirements or position descriptions are established for all
po siti ons that affect safe and reliable operation.

FINDINGS:

FINDINGS:

COIICERN:
(OA.3-1)
(H2/CI)

•

The JBEC Safety and Health Manager present. a broad summary of
safety act i vit i es at the NPR-3 to management at thei r semiannual reviews . However , this information does not contain
specific management safety and health goals .

•

The annual Long Range Plan document discusses the status of
ES&H activities, but no reference is made to any management
safety and health goals.

•

Discussions with the JBEC Safety and Health Manager indicated
there is no process in place whereby management establishes
annual safety and health goal s and communicates them throughout
the organization as a tool for improving overall safety as
required by DOE 54BO.19, Chapter I, paragraph C. 3.

•

The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).

•

JBEC position descriptions are prepared in accordance with
Policy and Procedure 1.6-01, · Position Description
Preparation,· dated Hay 19, 1992. This document instructs the
employee preparing his/her position description to list the
ES&H responsibilities of that position . However, management
does not provide the incumbent with specific information on the
safety responsibilities applicable to his/her position.

•

A review of some older as well as recently revised position
descriptions for both management and non-supervisory positions
revealed that general izations were used to describe safety
responsibilities. During interviews it was found that some
personnel had not seen their most recently revised position
description, even though Pol icy and Procedure 1.6-01 requires
the incumbent to participate in the document preparation.

•

JBEC Policy and Procedure 1.6-04, ·Processing Employee
Performance ReView,· dated April 20, 1992, describes the method
for conduct~ng annual employee performance evaluations . This
procedure instructs the supervisor to compare the work
performed with applicable yardsticks, such as ~osition
descriptions. However, position descriptions do not provide
the employee with specific and clearly defined safety
responsibilities.

•

Discussions with the Personnel Manager indicated there are no
other formal mechanisms in place where safety performance
standards are established for the employee that are used as
part of the employee performance appraisal process.

•

Although the JBEC Personnel Section is in the process of
evaluating a new performance appraisal form (i .e., 1.6-F01
Employee Performance Review-A Total Qual ity Management
Approach , Rev. 3/92), this ~ew approach does not establish
specific safety standards for individual's performance in
accordance with DOE 5480.19 , Chapter I, paragraph B.

•

The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).

The operating contractor .anag_nt has neither developed annual
safety and health goals nor developed a process to cOllllUnicate
thl!ll to the organization as required by DOE 5480.19, Chapter I,
paragraph C.3.

CONCERN:
(OA.G-I)
(H3/CI)
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Position descriptions do not provide clear documentation of safety
responsibilities and chlarly defined safety performance standards
are not established as part of the operat ing contractor employee
perforllance appraisal process as required by DOE 5480.19, Chapter
I, paragraph B.
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F1I1lINGS:

• Discussions with the JBEC Planning and Coordination Supervisor
indicated that headcount and Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) are
identified within the long Range Plan . However , that
information is not used to develop long range staffing plans
for JBEC.

OA.1

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Document control systems should provide correc t,
readily accessible information to support site/facility operations .
FINDINGS:

• No formal management plans have been prepared by JBEC,
ident ifyi ng staffi ng needs or impacts result i ng from potent i a1
reductions in operating funds, attrition, and the JBEC se1fassessment.
• DOE 5480 . 19, Chapter I, paragraph C. 2. stipulates that a long
range staffing plan, anticipating personnel losses, should be
developed and implemented. Such a plan has not been developed
by JBEC .

• JBEC presently relies on an informal system for its present
operating procedures. Policy and Procedures 5.4-08 "Operation
Procedure Preparation and Distribution," dated June 1, 1992,
and 5.4-09, "Reviewing, Revising, and Deleting Published
Operation Procedures," dated June 8, 1992, have been approved
to describe the general requirements for the development of
OPs. These OPs are being developed as part of a Conduct of
Operations initiative that JBEC is presently implementing.
However, there is no process in place to determine what OPs
must be developed or their order of development .
• Discussions with the JBEC person responsible for OP development
indicated the total number of procedures, now estimated to be
in excess of 300, has not yet been precisely determined. For
example, the Safety and Health Section, due to the Tiger Team
visit, has been unable to define the total number of OPs to be
developed by that organization.

• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992) .
CONCERN:
(OA.&-2)
(H3/Cl)

DOCUMENT CONTROL

The operating contractor management has not developed a long range
staffing plan as required by DOE 5480.19, Chapter I, paragraph
C.2.

• JBEC has not developed and communicated to those writing
procedures its approach to and the criteria for developing OPs .
• JBEC has not developed an implementation plan along with
schedules showing how the development of OPs will be managed
and prioritized.
• The following concern was not identified in the JBEC
self-assessment (April 1992).
CONCERN:
(OA.1-1)
(H2/C2)
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The operating contractor has not established a plan for developing
and implementing its Operation Procedures.

4-20

J5lp

OA.S

FITNESS FOR DUTY

~ERFO~CE OBJECTIVE:

The Fit~ess for Duty Program should be capable of
ldent 1 fYl ng persons who are unfl t for thei r ass i gned dut i es as a result of
drug or alcohol use or other physical or psycholog ical conditions and should
prov ide proced~res to remo~e them from such duty and from acces s to vital
areas of the slte or faCll lty pending rehabilitation or remedial actions.
FINDINGS: • JBEC Pol icy and Procedure, 1. 6· 22, "Drug and Al co ho 1 Pol icy, "
dated June I, 1992, states the company's policy concerning the
use of drugs and alcohol by its employees. This document doe s
not , however, stipulate any requirements for training JBEC
supervisors in the detection and referral of employees
suspected of substance abuse .
• The. P~rsonnel Manager was not aware of any planned formal
tralnlng of JBEC supervlsors in the detection and referral of
employees suspected of sUbstance abuse.
• ~ i scuss ions with the Per sonne 1 Manager i ndi cated the previ ous
lnc~mben~ in that posit!on discu ssed the drug and alcohol
POllCY wlth JBEC supervlsors and employees periodically .
However, there was no structured or formalized approach used in
those sess ions.
• See Concern TC . IO-I .
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992) .
CONCERN:
(OA.S-I)
(H2/C2)

The operating contractor supervisors do not receive formal
training in the detection and referral of employees suspected of
substance abuse.

4.5 . 2

Quality Verification

4.5.2.1

Overview

The technical area of Qual ity Verification (QV) was assessed by reviewing
draft Quality Assurance (QA) Manuals and related management documents, touring
work areas , and conducting interviews with DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC personnel .
Performance Objective Q~ . I served as the basis for the QV assessment as
neither DOE/NPOSR-CUW nor JBEC has a functioning QA Program in place at NPR -3.
For this reason, the other QV performance objectives were not used .
DOE/NPOSR-CUW does not have a QA Program in place as required by DOE 5700 .6C .
A draft QA Manual has been prepared and submitted to the Office of Fossil
Energy for review and approval . The manual is comprehensive in scope,
following the 18 elements of Nuclear Quality Assurance Standard One (NQA-I) .
However , it is not clear how the QA Program will be implemented within the
Site Office and how oversight of the evolving JBEC QA Program will be
accompl ished by DOE/NPOSR-CUW. The individual presently assigned QA
responsibility for the Site Office performs it as a collateral duty chiefly as
a member of the Performance Evaluation Board for the Cost Plus Award Fee
(C PAF) process . He currently reports to the Director of Engineering, thus,
presenting an organizational conflict of interest should he continue to assume
responsibil ity for the Site Office QA Program. In addition, DOE/NPOSR-CUW has
not enforced the requirement for implementation of a QA Program by JBEC as
required by the DOE operating contract with JBEC .
JBEC does not have a QA Program in place as required by DOE 5700.6C and the QA
provis i ons of its operating contract with DOE. JBEC has prepared a QA Manual
based on the DOE/NPOSR-CUW QA Manual that is also under review at the Office
of Fossil Energy . JBEC has recently fi 11 ed the pos i t i on of Quality Management
Coordinator with an individual with Total Quality Management (TQM) and
QA/Quality Control (QC) experience who will be responsible for implementing
the JBEC QA Program. JBEC management plans to use TQM as the QA implementing
tool. However, management has not defined the details for the implementation
process. Successful implementation of the JBEC QA Program will be largely
dependent on management's ability to apply a graded approach to the site 's
qual ity-related activities utilizing existi ng resources.
The JBEC self-assessment confirms that a QA Program has not been implemented
at NPR -3. The proposed corrective actions, however, do not appear realistic
in that an overall QA Program is planned to be implemented by September 3D,
1992.
The DOE/N POSR-CUW self-assessment similarly confirms the lack of a QA Program
at NPR -3. However , it appears t he Site Office does not understand what will
be required to implement such a QA Program within its own organizat ion . The
responses in the self-assessment were a repetition of the criteria used,
stating that the contractor will be required to carry out all the provisions
of a QA Program. The self-assessment did not address any corrective actions
that must be implemented by the Site Office, except that they will review and
audit the contractor plans . This indicates a lack of understanding of the
total QA Program requirements as they apply to DOE/ NPOSR -CUW .
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4.5.2.2

Fi ndi ngs and Concerns

QV.I

QUALITY PROGRAMS

• JBEC is responsible for establishing , maintaining, and
operating an approved QA Program under the Statement of Work
provisions of its operating contract with DOE (DE-ACOI B6FE60B96), but has not fulfi 11 ed th i s requirement. (See
Cor.cern OA . I-4 . )

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Admi ni strati ve programs and con t rol s should be i n
place to ensure pol i cies concerning quality are admin istered for each fa cility
t hroughout t he site.
FINDINGS:

• JBEC recently submitted its draft QA Program Manual , John Brown
E&C Quality Assurance Program, dated April 30, 1992 , to
DOE/NPOSR-CUW (letter M. R. Fosdick to C. R. Williams , dated
June 16 , 1992) for review and approval by the Assi stant
Secretary for Fossil Energy . The draft QA Program manual i s
comprehensive, follows the IB elements of NQA-I , and makes
provision for Quality Improvement as an additional element.
The proposed QA Program, as defined in the draft Manual, i s
aggressive ; however, it is lacking in some aspects which
include :

• JBEC has not implemented a QA Prografll for NPR- 3 as required by
DOE 5700 .6C, paragraph 9. a.( I) .
Import ant QA Program elements have not been implemen t ed by JBEC
at NPR -3. Examples of elements that need to be considered
include :
QA requirements and procedures that cover procurement of
equipment, mat erials , and services having safety
implicat i ons ;

It does not completely address all of the QA criteria set
forth in DOE 5700.6C, paragraph 9.b. (I)(a) with respect to
assess i ng adequacy of work and management systems .

documented evidence that equipment, materials, and services
meet procurement quality requ irements;

It does not yet integrate JBEC self-assessment activities and
the TQM concept i nto the QA Program .

QC inspection program ;

Implementing procedures for the QA Standards (QASs) have not
been developed .

QC inspector training ;
procedures that assure identifi cation and traceability of
procured items;

• Although JBEC has proposed a comprehensive QA Program, a
detailed implementation plan describing how thi s program will
be implemented within a limited resource environment has not
been prepared .

- process cont rol systems and practices ;
product shi pment systems ;
- identi f icat ion of regulatory matter s that may impact
operati ons;
cali brati on of equipment having safety implications performed
accordi ng to establ i shed procedures ;
procedures and systems t o as sure t he segregat i on and con trol
of procured equi pment and mater i als to preclude the use of
nonconforming items;
description of Operati on Procedu res and t hei r impl ement ati on ;
identificati on and control of special proces ses;
defi nit i on of record retent i on pract i ces; and
an independent audit system t o verify compl iance wit h t he
various aspects of the QA Program.

• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC sel f assessment (Apr i l i 992) .
CONCERN:
(QV.I-I)
(H2/CI)

FINDINGS:

The operating contractor has not implemented a quali t y assurance
program at Naval Petroleum Reserve Number 3 i n accordance with DOE
5700.6C and the provisions of its operating contract with t he
Department of Energy.
• DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not implemen t ed an effect ive QA f uncti on or
prog r am with i n the Site Office, as required by DOE 5700 .6C,
paragraph 10.e. The indiv i dual presently assig ned QA
responsi bility for t he Site Offic e handles it as a collateral
duty . As suc h, t he indiv idual spends only a minimal amount of
his t ime on QA . His role for QA consists essential ly as a
Performance EvaI uat i on COl11l1it tee member for t he CPAF process .
• The DOE/NPOSR-CUW Site Office has not enforced the requirement
for implementation of a QA Progr am by JBEC, as required by DOE
5700 .6C, paragraph IO. e. (I) and the QA provisi ons of t he DOE
operating contract with JBEC . (See Concern OA.I -3.)
• The Site Office person assigned the Site Office QA
responsibility has not recei ved sufficient training i n QA to
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und~r~tand t~e requirements of an effective QA Prog ram.
In
addltl0n, thlS person reports to the Director of Engineering
and, thus, would be in an organizational conflict of interest
posit i on if permitted to continue in this reporting
relationship as the QA Officer .

• Recently, DOE/NPOSR-CUW contracted the services of NUS Haliburton to prepare a draft QA Manual (draft Naval Petroleum
and Oil Shale Reserves Colorado, Utah and Wyomi n9 Qual i ty
Assurance Manual, dated April 1992) for the Site Office, based
on ~E 5700 .6C . This Manual has been transmitted to the Deputy
Asslstant Secretary , Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Re serves
(letter .C. Ray Williams to Captain Meeks, dated June 16, 1992)
fo r reVlew and approval. However, this Manual does not
completely address all of the QA criteria set forth in DOE
5700.6C , paragraph 9.b(I)(a) with respect to assessing adequacy
of work and management systems . In addition, QA Program
implementing procedures have not been developed.
• The following concern was fully identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW
self-assessment (April 1992) .
CONCERN:
(QV.l-Z)
(HZ/Cl)

DOE/HPOSR-CUW Site Office has not implemented a qual ity assurance
program in accordance with DOE S700.6C, paragraph lO.e.

4.5.3

Operations

4.5.3.1

Overview

The eight performance objectives in the Operations technical area were
addressed in this appraisal. The appraisal was conducted by means of
interviews with safety, production , engineering, and management personnel .
Policies and procedures , records, and forms were reviewed. All major
facilities in the field were visited at least once . DOE Drilling Rigs No .
and No . 3, and three workover rigs were appraised. A random selection of
steam injection we11sites and test satellite facilities were also visited .
Observations were made during an evening shift to evaluate the activities of
the night pumper and the water treatment facility operator .
Field operations personnel knew their jobs, showed a keen interest in
improving their knowledge, and communicated effectively within the operations
group. The oil field facilities did not appear to need housekeeping
attention. The LTS Gas Plant, steam generator buildings, and Water Treatment
Facility were especially well organized, neat, and clean . However, the two
DOE drill ing rigs were found to be in poor condition, and the Madison
Waterf100d supply well, produced water disposal facility, and three Crow
Mountain water disposal wells had serious safety deficiencies.
An ineffective interface between JBEC engineering and operations personnel was
revealed while assessing the physical arrangement of the steam generators and
their associated piping , and the specifications and manufacturer 's drawing for
Steam Generator No . 5. Decisions have been contradictory and suggest
administrative control problems regarding design and installation .
Manv deficiencies were noted on the two DOE drilling rigs. No procedures had
been developed or implemented to mothball drill i ng rigs when not in use . In
addition, much of the wire rope and chain rigging on both drilling rigs was
substandard, and installation of the climbing device and safety belt on one of
t he rigs was found t o be su bstandard. Considerable time would be required to
correct the deficiencies prior to using the drill ing equipment.
Approximately 85 percent of Pol icy and Procedure documents were republished
during the past 6 months . However, the distribution of these documents is
1imited and does not reach all of the affected personnel. Curre;lt1y, an
effort is being made to publish official Operation Procedures. Of the first
group of 18, only I sustained the complete internal review process and was
pub1 ished. Therefore , operations personnel do not have guidance afforded by
official procedures .
Although most operations were conducted in a safe and reliable manner some
conditions cause concern as to safety awareness . Four such condition~ were:
(I) oper ating 4 reciprocating pumps at the water dis posal fa ci lity for more
t han 3 weeks without press ure re lief valves protecting the pumr ~ , (2) the
abil ity to di sc ha rge 1iquid s from t he Steam Generator No.3 gas scru bber
inside the building, (3) a pressure relief valve whi ch could rel ieve 160° F
water at 1,300 psi insi de the Steam Generator No . I building, and (4) the
deficiencies noted on DOE Drilling Rigs , No . 2 and No.3 .
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Shift turnover between the day pumpers and the lone night pumper effectively
provided an accurate picture of the overall site status . A routine which
proved adequate , although undocumented had developed without the need for a
formal turnover as required by the Conduct of Operations, Order XII. Day
pumpers verbally briefed the night pumper who recorded in a stenographi c pad
the status of those items to whi ch he had been alerted .
The Conduct of Operations training program given thi s spring during several
safety meetings is commendable . local personnel were assigned chapters to
teach, based on tho se subjects with which they were famil i ar .

4.5.3.2

Fl ndl ngs and Concerns

OP.I

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Operations, organization and administration should
ensure effective implementation and control of operations activities .
FINDINGS:

Six of the ei ght concerns were covered by the JBEC self-assessment. JBEC
provided effective corrective action , and de~dlines in their assessment .
DOE/NPOSR-CUW covered most of the concerns also , but the concerns were
actually the responsibil ity of JBEC. DOE/ NPOSR-CUW stated that t heir
corrective action plans would be fully developed after the Tiger Team' s vi si t
so that the ES&H fi ndi ng s ann concerns coul d be integrated wi th these plans.
JBEC and DOE/ HPOSR-CUW analYled the findings for causal factors and determined
appropriate root causes of deficiencies in the operations area .

• The JBEC night pumpers, unlike their daylight counterparts ,
periodically miss some weekly safety meetings due to scheduling
of these safety meetings . The night pumpers are consequently
not updated with the latest safety information .
• Systematic distribution of Policy and Procedure documents does
not occur. Rather, operators are required to be aware of the
existence of a procedure which may impact on them , and then ask
for a copy from one of the custodians of controlled copies.
Consequently , operators fail to be aware of and follow
established procedures and practices .
• Seventeen Operation Procedure (OP) documents are being
r ewrit ten. Copies of OPs were not found at the work site .
Many OPs do not exist, but have been identified as desirable .
• Administrative controls for JBEC Policy and Procedures were
found to be confusing; managers provided different answers as
to what was available to field personnel and what should be
available to field personnel. Thi s illustrates confusion
inhouse as to t.he JBEC management position regarding
di stribution of Policy and Procedures.

CONCERN:

See Concern OP.3-1.

FINDINGS :

• Eight persons reviewed and agreed on the de sign specifications
for Steam Generator No . 5 and its as sociated pi ping . However,
t he Daniel Company design drawing for t he pu rchase was not in
full agreement with the approved specifi cations , but was
accepted. The specifications cal l ed for a block valve, but a
globe valve was shown on the Daniel Company drawing and was
installed . No float drai n for the gas scrubber wa s specified,
but the Daniel Company had one on their drawing, and 'it was
installed on the scrubber .
• A gauge glass was spec ified on the Steam Generator No . 5 gas
scrubber de spi te the fact that it doe s not. exist on all other
scrubbers. The gauge is of questionable value because of
infrequent vi s its to the generator and because of the
scrubber 's small size. No high lev"l alarm and automatic fuel
gas shutdown are connected to alert operators and to protect
t he generator .
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• Connections on the gas scrubber were not specified on the JBEC
design specifications . Steam Generator No.3 has a leak at a
2-inch threaded connection at the top of the scrubber . The
fact that some gas 1i nes in the buil di ng have threaded
connections does not justify having them on the scrubber .

OP.2

FINDINGS:

• The float dra in valve on the gas scrubber at Steam Gene rator
No . 3 relieves hydrocarbon condensate or water inside the
generator building . The float drain has been removeu from the
inlet gas scrubber for Steam Generator No . 4 by operations
personnel. The design specifications did not call for a float
drain at Steam Generator No . 5, but such was provided.

•

Pressure relief valve piping on fuel gas i nlet receiver on
Steam Generator No . I was labeled incorrectly by JBEC
operations personnel .

• Softener train B primary softener, rinse drain valve AV-BII Lo Matic valve, i; leaking hot water (160'F) around the valve
body leading to an unsafe operating condition .
• Refractory in the throat of the convection section in Steam
Generator
No.3 is loose . Mild steel refractory straps were incorrectly
used and have parted . This allowed the refractory material to
separate from the steam generator's outershell, exposing the
outer shell to 2,300'F temperatures, resulting in an unsafe
operating condition.

• See Concerns TS .3-I, TS .3-2, and MA.5-1.
• The following concern was partially identified in the JBEC
self-assessment (April 1992).
CONCERN:
(OP.I-I)
(H2/C2)

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Operational activities should be conducted in a manner
that achieves safe and rel iable operation .

The operating contractor operations group does not effectively
interface with engineering to ensure sound safety principles in
the selection, installation, and operation of components and
equipment at Naval Petroleum Reserve Number 3.

• JBEC operations personnel removed pressure relief valves from
the 4 water disposal reciprocating pumps thereby removing
.
protection for the system which normally operates at 1,020 pSI.
Pressure shutdown switched did exist but they do not serve as a
device to relieve pressure .
• JBEC operations personnel did not use certified slings to move
the mist pump skid and the substructure ramp at DOE Drilling
Rig No . 3.
• Suction stabilizers on Pumps No.3 and 4 at the North
Waterflood Plant are operating unsafely in excess of specified
worki ng pressures .
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992) .
CONCERN:
(OP.2-1)
(H2/CI)
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The operating contractor l acks the necessary training, audit. and
appraisal programs to ensure safety awareness as required by DOE
5480.19. Conduct of Operations.
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OP.3

Pumpers do not keep a log of locked out/tagged out locks .

OPERATIONS PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTATION

The l TS Gas PI ant is not keepi ng a log of locked out/tagged
out locks.

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Approved writ ten procedures, procedure po Ii ci es and
data sheets should provide effective guidance for normal and abnormal '
operation of each facility on a site.
FINDINGS:

• JBEC Policy and Procedure 1.3-27, is deficient with respect to
recordkeeping requirements.

• There ~re no ~Ps at the lTS Gas Plant. An industry book for
operat1ng var10US types of gas plant equipment is available.

• Electrician's locks are not always placed on lTS Gas Plant
switchgear.

• No ~P~ or checklists are in final form for the water treating
fac1l1ty or for the well service units.
•

• JBEC Pol icy and Procedure 1.3-27 does not discuss the use of
hasps to hold several locks as defi ned in DOE 5480.19, Conduct
of Operations.

Procedures are not readily available and clearly identified on
each steam ~enerator control panel for starting up and for
shutting down the steam generator.

• JBEC Policy and Procedure 1.3-27 mentions group lockouts only
once and does not define them as to what group it applies to,
or the circumstances under which they are used.

• No Pol icy and Procedures have been developed or implemented to
mothball DOE drilling equipment.

• See Concern WS.4-6 and Section 05.2.

• Operators do not have Policy and Procedures which apply to
their job and assigned facil ity.
• Many OPs in the master fil e are 1i sted as "Ident i fi ed - Not
Drafted" which means they do not really exist.
•

lTS Gas Plant personnel were not fully aware of a revision to
JBEC Policy and Procedures 1.3-27, "lock, Tag and Try"
procedure, dated June 8, 1992, 19 days after it had received
DOE/NPOSR-CUWapproval.

• The following concern was partially identified in the JBEC
self-assessment (April 1992).
CONCERN:
(OP.3-2)
(H2/C1)

The operating contractor Policy and Procedure 1.3-27. lock. Tag.
and Try Procedure is i ncomp1ete and. consequently. not effect ive
in ensuri ng safety of operations as required by DOE .5480.19.

FINDINGS:

• The contract between DOi/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC states that the
Bureau of land Management (BlM) Onshore Oil and Gas Orders and
the State of Wyoming Oil and Gas Rules and Regulations must be
followed with respect to oil and gas producing operations at
NPR-3 .

• See Concerns OA.7-1 and MA.2-2 .
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).
CONCERN:
(OP.3-1)
(H2/C1)

The operating contractor operators do not have approved Operation
Procedures to aid them in performing their duties as required by
DOE 5480.19, Conduct of Operations.

FINDINGS:

• JBEC Pol icy and Procedures 1.3-27 requires a record of all
Caution tags. Danger tags used for equipment isolation for
personnel protection do not require a record of where they have
been installed . This does not agree with DOE 5480.19 , Conduct
of Operations, Chapter IX , which requires records of the
placement of Danger tags and Caution tags .

• DOE/NPOSR-CUW workover procedures speci fy that blowout
preventers are to be used on Shannon oil wells capable of
flowing during workover operations .
• Blowout preventers are not employed uniformly on Shannon oil
wells, which have the capability of flowing during workover
operations, as required by the State of Wyoming and the BlM.
• JBEC does not have formal correspondence from the State of
Wyoming or the BlM waiving the use of blowout preventers on
wells capable of flowing during workover operations .
• The following concern was not identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992) .

• The following deficiencies in lockout/tagout recordkeeping were
i dent ified:
Water treatment facil ity and the North Waterflood Plant have
no log of lockout/tagout locks , and these locks are not
numbered.
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CONCERN:
(OP.3-3)
(H2/C1)

The operating contractor field operations do not meet the intent
of both the State of Nyomi ng and Federal Bureau of Land Management
regulations regarding the use of blowout preventers on wells
capable of flowing during well workover operations.

OP.4

FACILITY STATUS CONTROLS
4-32
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PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Operations personnel should know the status of the
systems and equipment under the i r control and should know the effect of nonoperat 1 ona 1 systems and equi pment on cont i nued operat ions. They shou1 d ensure
t hat systems an~ equlpment are controlled in a manner that supports safe and
re1lab1e operatlon .
Defective o~ out of tolerance instrumentation is identified , properly labeled ,
and correctlve measures are to be taken in a timely manner .
FINDINGS:

• A bypass v~lve at Ste~m . Generator No . 3 which was tagged "valve
to remaln ln open posltlOn" was in fact in the closed position .
No procedure was employed to release the tagout as required by
DOE 5480 . 19 .
• Orifice meters at the individual steam injection wells are not
calibrated or checked for accuracy on a regularly scheduled
basis . Most steam injection meters have not been calibrated
since they were installed .
• The old filter room had two locks from electricians on 480 volt
boxes, but there was no "Do Not Operate" tag, and the boxes
were not counter locked by the operator.
• The following concern was partially identified in the JBEC
se1 f -assessment (April 1992) .

CONCERN:
(OP.4-l)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor operations personnel do not effectively
monitor the operating condition of equipment as required by
DOE 5480.19.

OP.S

OPERATIONS STATIONS AND EQUIPMENT

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Operation stations and facil ity equipment should
'!ffective1y support facility operation .
FINDINGS:

• The two DOE drilling rigs, mud mixing skid, waterf100d
facilities, steam injection wells, and produced water disposal
facilities were found to have serious safety deficiencies .
• The steam pressure gauge on steam injection Well 73-3SX-IO, and
the temperature gauges on steam injection Wells 64-2SX - IO and
67-62SX-3 are broken.
• Wire armor on the IO-inch suction hose on the mud mixing skid
from DOE Drilling Rig No . 3 has separated from the rubber
jacket , compromising safety. This self-contained mud mixing
skid is used to mix kill mud for Shannon oil well workovers .
• Short bolting is evident and bolts are missing at Crow Mountain
water disposal Wells 34 -CMX-IO, 51-CMX-IO, and 74-CMX-IO , and
at the North Waterf100d Plant.
• Madison water supply Well 17-WX-21 is capable of naturally
flowing 20,000 BWPD of 185' F water. The 8-inch discharge 1ine
from the well has a bolt missing from an elevated companion
flange, compromising safety.
• A temporary discharge-to -suction bypass at the North Waterf100d
Plant is constructed of unrated and unlabeled hose. The safe
working pressure of the ho se is unknown.
• Oil is not visible in the lubricator bulb at the T-I -3 test
satellite pump, and the ground cable is not attached to the
pump base at test satellite T-I-34 .
Much of the wire rope and chain rigging on DOE Drill ing Rigs
No. 2 and No . 3 was found to be substandard and is not in
agreement with the DOE Hoisting and Rigging Manual .
• The cable attached to the climbing device on DOE Dr i lling Rig
NO . 3 is badly frayed and improperly clamped .
• On DOE Dr ill i ng Rig No . 2, the climbing device and safety belt
for the derr ic kman have less than adequate lanyards. The bel t
has no locking clips to attach the belt to the lanyard . A
sheave on the traveling counterweight on the derrickman's
escape line has seized; the cable support bracket for the
counterweight contains only two U c1amps (3 required); and t he
crown sheave pin suppor ting the climbing device counterweight
is severely bent compromising safety and rel i able operation .
• See Concerns WS.5 -2 and MA.2 -2.
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• The following concern was not i dentified in the JBEC selfassessment (Apri l 1992).
CONCERN:
(OP.5-1)
(HI/CI)

Certai n operating contractor facilities and drilling equipment are
not operated in a safe and reliable manner as required by DOE
5480 . 19.

OP.6

OPERATOR KNOWLEDGE AND PERFORMANCE

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Operator knowledge and performance should support safe
and reliable operation of the equipment and systems for which they are
res ponsible.
FINDINGS:

•

Formal training in operations is not conducted.

• The period of apprenticeship varies widely .
A new employee with oilfield experi ence was accompanied on
the job for 1 week before working unsupervised.
- Another new employee was accompanied for 4 weeks before
working unsupervi sed at night.
•

Employees are not formally tested as to their knowledge and
capabil it i es .

• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992) .
CONCERN:
(OP.6-1)
(H2/C2)

The operating contractor operators do not complete formal
qualifications before operating alone as required by DOE 5480.19.

4-35

4-36

J-7/

J?d-.

4.5.4

Ma i ntenance

4.5.4.1

Overview

procedures . JBEC written work procedures were in the draft stage of
deve 1opment.

All eight performance objectives in the Maintenance technical area were
addressed in this appraisal. The appraisal was conducted through interviews
with operations personnel that perform maintenance work, onsite surveys of
site maintenance activities , and a review of DOE Orders. Facilities surveyed
included workover and drilling rigs, water disposal facilities , steam
injecti on facilities, water flood facilities, the LTS Gas Plant , product ion
tank battery and test-satellite facilities , and production wells.
The ma i ntenance organi zat i on is well defi ned and understood . The mai ntenance ,
field support, LTS Gas Plant , and Water Facilities groups perform all level s
of maintenance work whereas production , workover, and drilling groups
primarily conduct preventive and minor maintenance work on surface equipment .
However, except for new construction, field maintenance does not provide
routine onsite coordination to , or receive daily input from, engineering and
safety .

Recordkeeping differs somewhat between the groups, because each operating
group has maintenance responsibilities with varying degrees of mobility and
scope. Standardi zed central moni tori ng and storage of records does not occur .
In some areas, such as safety and work completion control, the records are not
sufficient to support implementation of a graded maintenance program to meet
the i ntent of DOE 4330 .4A .
No Predictive Maintenance Program has been implemented. A history of
maintenance was maintained on most equipment through the use of permanent log
bo?ks . No other data were collected which would support a Predictive
Malntenance Program . There were no indications that any individual piece of
equipment was sufficiently critical to facility performance to require a
Predictive Maintenance Program.
The JBEC self-assessment was comprehensive and critical . Four maintenance
concerns were partially recognized and five were fully recognized out of the
ni ne maintenance concerns identified in this report .

The JBEC graded approach to implementation of maintenance activities does not
inc 1 ude formal document at i on of a comparat i ve ana lys is of ma i ntenance
activities at NPR-3 with DOE 4330.4A . Enginee ri ng and safety support at the
work activity level have not been sufficient to alleviate the untimely
identification and correction of deficiencies by maintenance. These
deficiencies include non-code installations, improper operation of equipment ,
equipment deterioration, and unsafe practices, and have led to three
Category II Concerns. Once identified during this appraisal, these concerns
have been either physically corrected or mitigating administrative procedures
are being implemented.
The NPR-3 facility had a high level of operational readiness and a neat ,
orderly appearance . Preventive Maintenance and corrective maintenance are
mi ni mi zed through wi despread use of bui 1di ngs and shelters; these provi de
environmental protection of components and equipment .
Observations of work activities showed that maintenance personnel were
qualified , except in the areas of industry codes and standards . Safe work
practices were generally being used duri ng observed JBEC work activities;
however, numerous latent safety hazards were noted in the work areas. These
were due to a lack of safety awareness. Lax enforcement of safety procedures
was observed during a wireline subcontractor work activity.
The operating and maintenance groups perform maintenance design work for most
small projects . Engineering and safety expertise has not been util ized to
ensure complia nce with applicable laws, regulations, industry codes, and
s~andards, exce~t duri ng new . construct i on . Typi ca 1 drawi ngs of rout i ne type
fleld lnstallatl?nS and repalrs, that show acceptable connections , fittings,
valves, and weldlng requirements, were not provided by engineering to the
f i eld.
Except for safe work permitting procedures , there were virtually no JBEC
written procedures in use by maintenance personnel. Experience,
manufacturer's data books , and checklists were the source of maintenance work
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4.5.4.2
IIA.I

1IA.2

Findings and Concerns
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Maintenance organization and administration should
ensure effective implpmentation and control of maintenance activities .
FINDINGS:

FINDINGS:

• Although the maintenance organization was well defined and
understood, it did not ensure qualified engineering and safety
input was provided .
•

• Except for safe work permitting procedures, there were
vi rtua 11 y no wri tten work procedures used by rna i ntenance.
• Authorization and control of maintenance work procedures did
not provide sufficient documentation in the areas of safety and
work completion .

• The first-line supervisor was not provided ~e~hnical gu~dance,
training, or procedures for properl~ authorlzlng.b~p~sslng of
safety devi ces for ope rat i ng and rna lOtenance act 1 Vl t 1 es .

• The work order tracking system form used by the production
group was not completely filled out prior to destruction of a
completed work order. There was a very limited record of
maintenance done.

• See Concerns TS .3-1 and 05.1 - 1.
• The following concern was partially identified in the JBEC
self-assessment (April 1992) .
(IIA.I-I)
(H2/C2)

The operating contractor maintenance organization does not ensure
effective implementation and control of maintenance activities and
does not ensure that safety and engineering support are provided
for work activities .

FINDINGS:

•

Procurement of electrical parts did not keep up with job needs .
Some electrical parts for maintaining hazardous area
classifications have been on order for a year . Management has
not taken action to rectify this situation . This resulted in
continued operation with an existing poten t ial ignition source
in a Class I, Group 0, Division I hazardous area. Examples
are :
The LTS Gas Plant main compressor building .
- The LTS Gas Plant PAMCO Compressor bu i 1di ng .
- The B- IIO tank battery test manifold building.

• See Concern WS.4 -5.
• The following concern was partially identified in the JBEC
self-assessment (April 1992).
CONCERN:
(1IA.1-2)
(HI/CI)

CAT. II

The operating contractor has permitted hazardous conditions to
exist during continued operations, because of a backlog of
electrical parts, which is not in accordance with DOE 4330.4A.
paragraph 3.4.8.

• A Maintenance Management Plan has not been developed that
forma lly documents the exi st i ng graded rna i ntenance program,
including a comparative analysis of the maintenance activities
at NPR-3 with DOE 4330 . 4A. (See Concern OA.I -2. )
Instructions and specialty job training were informal, on-thejob, and not documented.

First-line supervisors used substitute parts and materials
without engineering approval .

• Maintenance work was generally not coordinated with engineering
which resulted in non-code installations .

CONCERN:

CONDUCT OF IlAINTENANCE

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES: Maintenance should be conducted in a safe and
effective manner to support each facility condition and operation on the site.

• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).
CONCERN:
(1IA.2-1)
(H2/CI)

FINDINGS:

The operating contractor Maintenance Program does not meet the
systematic documentation requirements of DOE 4330.4A, paragraphs
3.3 and 3.4.
• There was no uniform implementation of industry standards and
codes applicable to electrical, pip i ng, and pressure vessel
mainten an ce.
• The maintenance group has routinely fabricated non -standard
pipe fittings to permit completion of work on schedule. For
example, a field fabricated non -code pipe fitting type weld
cap, cut from flat plate, was used to close the end of a
pressurized production flow line pipe which could result in an
early piping failure at Well No . 16-5-35.
• Maintenance and operating groups design small projects without
engineering input. This has resulted in some non -code
installat i ons such as the wooden vent/sump boxes at battery
locations.
•

Facility Engineering did not attend operat i ons morning meetings
where daily and future maintenance work was discussed and
resolved .

• Typi cal engineering drawings for repetitive type installations
were available i n the Casper office but not in the field .
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CONCERN:

See Concern MA.l-l.

FINDINGS:

•

Entry through the main gate to the LTS Gas Plant was not
controlled to minimize exposure when passing through Class 1,
Group D, Division 1 and 2 hazardous areas.

• The gate to the fenced 480/2,080 volt electrical equipment at
Well
No. 55-TP-10 was not locked to prevent unauthorized personnel
from entering.
•

Except for piping drawings, the LTS Gas Plant drawings were not
updated for changes.

•

Workover rig operations were not always conducted with the rig
personnel properly instructed and equipment correctly set-up.
- Rig P-6, while located at Well No. 41-11-SX-11, had 2 snug
guy wires and two loose ones.
- Numerous downhole well maintenance operations were conducted
without written procedures onsite.
- Gas engine vehicles were not controlled with respect to the
distance from a well bore.
- Wireline subcontractor personnel were not briefed on
important si te safety requirements, such as posting of proper
signs at entrances to a well site while arming/disarming
explosives.

• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).
CONCERN:

(MA.2-2)

(Hl/Cl)
CAT. II

Use of outdated drawings. lack of written procedures. and lax
enforcement of informal procedures by the operating contractor has
resulted in unsafe practices in the field and does not meet the
requirements of DOE 4330.4A.
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MA.3

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Facilities, equipment, and material should effectively
support the performance of maintenance activities .
FINDINGS:

• The fo1lowing concern was partia1ly identified in the JBEC
self-assessment (April 1992).

MAINTENANCE FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, AND MATERIAL

• A lID-barrel capacity fiberglass maintenance solvent tank
located at the maintenance group's Chemical Dock did not have
an internal ground wire system for conducting electrical
charges to ground.

CONCERN:
(MA.3-1)
(HI/CI)

The operating contractor has not provided personal protective
equipment for all maintenance activities as required by
DOE 4330.4A.

• An outside-type fuel gas regulator, which vents locally, was
located inside the Welding Shop Building.
• The Welding Shop fuel gas regul ator had a maximum pressure
rating of 150 psig, which is we1l below the maximum possible
source pressure of 375 psig.
• A field fabricated 1,440 psig working pressure pig launcher was
found in the welding shop. One end was fabricated out of noncode pipe ~ ittings, which could result in failure at that
pressure.
• The LTS Gas Plant had several field fabricated electrical
adapters that were used for maintenance to connect unclassified
electrical equipment to classified electrical outlets in
hazardous areas. This practice could ignite flammable
atmospheres.
CONCERN:

See Concern MA.5-1.

FINDINGS:

• Operating instructions were·not posted on the following
maintenance facility equipment:
- DOE Unit No.3 Forklift, which also had no capacity tag;
- DOE Uni t No. 69 Case Backhoe;
- DOE paint trailer; and
DOE Hot Water Pressure Washer.
• None of the pressure hoses used by maintenance for handl ing
chemicals had been pressure tested since purchase.

CONCERN:

See Concern MA. 2-2.

FINDINGS:

• No electrical flash protection suits, aprons, or face shields
were provided for electricians.
• One pair of insulated gloves was onsite for the use of six
electricians.
• See Concern OS. 3-1.
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MA.4

PLANNING, SCHEDULING, AND WORK CONTROL

MA.S

CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: The planning, schedul ing, and control of work should
ensure that identified maintenance actions are properly completed in a safe,
timely, and effective manner.

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: The material condition of components and equipment
should be maintained to support safe and effective operation of all facilities
on the site.

FINDINGS:

FINDINGS:

• Pumping jack polish rod liner damage and excessive bearing wear
were noted on Well No. 67-42-SX-3. This resulted from lack of
early identification of maintenance deficiencies , such as worn
components and/or al ignment problems.
• Fifteen to 20 percent of all pumping jacks needed repair or
al ignment .
• Some equipment has been left improperly installed . Well No .
57-WX-3 had a new production tl'ee with a significant water
leak .
• Procedures for post maintenance testing and operator acceptance
of completed maintenance work were not developed .
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).

CONCERN:
(MA.4-1)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor personnel have not been instructed on
proper inspection and post-maintenance control procedures as
required by DOE 4330.4A, Section 3.

• Relief valves had been removed from the discharge of three
large tri-plex positive displacement pumps since June 3, 1992 .
The pumps were in service and were only protected by high
pressure shut down operating switches.
• The Steam Generator No. 1 fuel gas scrubber had an apparent
under designed relief valve system . The scrubber was rated for
200 psig and the closest upstream relief valve was set at 1,200
psig.
•

Flame arresters on bul k treaters at · Battery No. 1-3 were not
effective, because they were dirty and/or structurally damaged.

• A below ground level, vent/bottom, sludge, and water (BS&W)
concrete box with wood cover was located at each tank battery .
These boxes were improperly vented for receiving pressure
vessel over pressure reI ief gas and were not .provided with a
safe means to remove liquids with a vacuum truck.
• The Production Lease Automatic Custody Transfer (LACT) Building
and the AMOCO building at the South Terminal, did not meet area
electrical requirements because they were located within a more
hazardous area .
• A large number of tanks, skids, buildings, and electrical gear
were either not grounded, did not have a separate ground, or
did not have a properly sized ground.
• Heater treater pilot lights did not automatically shut off fuel
when the flame went out. The gas came back on through the main
burner when it was called for by the thermostat.
• A I-inch valve to the heater treater was not locked open to
prevent over pressure of the 150 psig rated fuel gas scrubber
(there was no separate relief valve) at Tank Battery No. 1-3.
Maximum source pressure was
375 psig at the LTS Gas Plant.
• Several lease production buildings, such as buildings attached
to heater treaters, were not properly vented resulting in a
potentially explosive atmosphere.
• Several other lease production buildings , such as the South
Terminal Production LACT building, did not meet hazardous area
electrical requirements.
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- LT1S Ga~ Plant Control Monitoring Building had an unclassified
e ectrlcal outlet in the lab room.

The 125 psig fuel gas scrubber located at B-II0 tank battery
had no rel ief valve and could be blocked in and subjected to a
source pressure of 375 psig .
•

- The bypass valve on inlet Emergency Shutdown (ESD) valve to
the LTS Gas Pl ant was closed, but not sealed.

The hot produced water tank (180 - 200 degrees Fahrenheit) at
the Ten Sleep tank battery had a serious leak at the bottom
because of deteri orat i on from corros i on.

•

Several code vessels (i . e., vertical heater treater at T-3-28)
were continued in operation after field repairs were made
without following vessel repair code procedure.

•

A field fabricated non -code pressure vessel , without upstream
pressure relief protection, was used to inject ethyl mercaptan
into the LTS Gas Plant liquid products .

•

The hot, produced water tank, at the North Waterflood facility ,
had heavy corrosion and was leaking at a previous repair
located inside the filter building . The tank has a potential
for a severe failure unless promptly repaired or drained.

•

The following concern was partially identified in the JBEC
self-assessment (April 1992).

CONCERN:
(MA.S-l)
(Hl/Cll
CAT. II

The operating contractor engineering and safety assistance
provi ded to the ma i ntenance organi zat i on in the fi e 1d has not been
sufficient. and the maintenance organization has not maintained
the material condition of components and equipment in a manner to
prevent hazardous conditions caused by non-code installations.
improper operation of equipalent. and equipment deterioration to
meet the requirements of DOE 4330.4A.

FINDINGS:

•

- DO~ Drilling Rigs No . 2 and No.3 require significant
malntenance prior to use .
CONCERN:

See Concerns MA.2-2, NS.S-2. and OP.S-I.

Several other corrective maintenance (CM) deficiencies were
noted as follows:
A few small hydraulic and engine oil leaks were noted on
workover rigs.
Workover rigs were operating without a written prognosis
(procedure) on the rig for the work.
Numerous, open ended, quarter -turn valves were noted on
hydrogen sulfide contaminated gas streams on producing wells.
Numerous wells were noted where the pumping jack skid was
loose on the pad and/or out of alignment with the well bore .
The South Terminal sump pump had a loose conduit connection
at the motor .
Small pump packing and piping connection leaks were noted at
several locations.
Area electrical classification requirements were not met in
some locations because seals were not installed.
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MA.8
MA.6

PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE

PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTATION

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Preventive maintenance should contribute to optimum
performance and reliabil i ty of systems and equipment important to operations .

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Maintenance procedures and rel ated documents should
provide appropriate directions and guidance for work and should be used to
ensure that maintenance is performed safely and effectively.

FINDINGS:

FINDINGS:

CONCERN :
(MA.6-1)

•

Stored facility maintenance equipment and equipment on standby
were not on a prevent i ve ma i ntenance (PM) 1i st i ng .

•

The . computerized P~ program did not include all field oper ating
equIpment and duplIcated separate PM programs maintained by
most of the various groups that performed their own preventive
maintenance .

•

The pre~ent~ve main!enance backlog was minimal, except for PM
of pumpIng Jacks whIch was about 2 months behind schedule
because of the PM computer program shutdown for rev i sion.

•

PM procedure for pumping jacks did not require a check of
al i gnment with the well.

•

DOE Drilling Rigs No . 2 and No.3 were stacked without PM and CM
be i ng performed .

•

PM was not performed on out-of-service equipment.

For example,
the I6-inch manway on out of service heater treater at Test
Satell ite
No . BI-14 was open , and the vessel wa s unprotected from the
environment or unauthorized entry.

•

Vi brat i on swi tches on the cool i ng fans at the l TS Gas Pl ant
were not tested as part of the PM program .

•

The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (Apr i l 1992) .

•

There was no central or otherwise su i table place to store
maintenance records for most of the groups that perform
ma i ntenance .

•

There were virtually no existing written maintenance procedures
in use , except on safe work permitting .

• Maintenance records are not kept on some equipment .
example , there are none for pumping jacks .

CONCERN:
(MA.8-1)
(H2/CI)

•

See Concern MA.2-2.

•

The following was furly identified in the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) .

The operating contractor does not provide sufficient documentation
and records storage in support of the Ma i ntenance PrograJII as
required by DOE 4330.4A, Section 3.

The operating contractor Preventive Maintenance Program does not
always meet the intent of DOE 4330.4A, paragraph 3.6.1.

(H2/CI)
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4.5.5

Training and Certification

4.5.5.1

Overview

Five of the 11 performance objectives in the Training and Certification
techn i cal area were addressed in this appraisal . The following performance
objectives , not applicable to NPOSR-CUW , were not addressed : TC.2 Reactor
Operations, TC .3 Nuclear Facility Operations, TC.6 Criticality Safety , TC.9
Radiological Protection Personnel , TC.ll Simulator Training/Facil ity
Exercises . TC .8 Quality Control Inspection, also not addressed , was covered
in Section 4. 5.2 Quality Verification. Interviews were held with Managers in
Safety and Health and Personnel , the Training Special ist, facil ity
Supervisors, and the DOE/NPOSR-CUW Director of Contract Surveill ance and
Administration . Documentation was reviewed and evaluated for adequacy of
policies and procedures, training materials, and tra i ning record s. The
effectiveness of training in operations , maintenance, and occupational safety
was evaluated by members of the Safety and Health (S&H) Subteam during visits
to the NPR-3 facilities . Self-Assessments for NPOSR-CUW, dated April 1992 ,
prepared by both JBEC and DOE/NPOSR-CUW, were also reviewed and evaluated .
Safety and health training for NPR-3 operations has probably been as good or
better than most oil field activities, but has not met DOE standards. As a
result, JBEC is in a reactive and catch up training effort , caused to a great
extent by lack of direction from DOE/NPOSR-CUW. JBEC training has been
informal with little attention paid to controlling the quality of planning and
scheduling, training materials , instructor credentials , qualification
requirements , and recordkeeping . JBEC does not have a formal training program
to ensure that operations, maintenance, and technical staff have safety,
health, and qualification training required by DOE Orders. Nevertheless, JBEC
recognizes the se deficiencies and has been making efforts to improve all
aspects of training . In addition , a number of ~pecific training activities
have occurred in the past 6 months . During February and March of 1992 , each
cha ~ ter in the DOE Conduct of Operations Order was reviewed with supervisors
and staff . In addit i on , the follow i ng safety training has been provided :
annual ES&H refresher training , OSHA safety review , 40-hour HAZMAT training,
hydrogen sulfide (H,S) monitoring , respirator training , Cardiopulmonary
Resuscitation (CPR) training, and emergency preparedness and management.

The Training SpeCialist, reporting to the Safety and Training Manager, is
responsible for the onsite ES&H and technical skills tra i ning program . He has
a relevant background and experience for this responsibil ity and the knowledge
of what activities need to be conducted (i .e . needs analysis based on specific
jobs and tasks, a comprehensive training plan, updated training materials,
instructor training , and evaluation of tra i ning effectiveness). Operations
and maintenance worker training has occurred as on-the-job instruction, but
qualification requirements have not been well documented. Training for firstline supervisors and managers has not been provided to prepare individuals for
personnel and administrative responsibilities . A tra i ning room in the Safety
Bldg . is equipped to meet the needs of onsite safety training. Safety meeting
training is given either in the training room or in available conference rooms
and lunch rooms .
Within the past year, much more attention has been given to general employee
and occupational safety training. Site-specific safety orientation training
is given to new employees, visitors, and subcontractors. The outline of the
annual safety and health refresher course, given to essenUally all employees
in 1991 and 1992, is comprehensive. Nevertheless , JBEC does not provide
appropriate ES&H training to all employees according to their job needs .
Deficiencies in performance of activities were noted by the S&H Subteam in
areas such as confined space entry, hazard communication, competent persons,
and spill prevention and control . There is no formal training for
environmental monitoring and sampling, and certification of ES&H training has
not been consistent . Safety training topics presented by first-1 ine
supervisors at weekly safety meetings have been an important part of ES&H
train i ng, but its effectiveness can be improved by greater coordination and
documentation of content by the Training Specialist. Subcontractors coming on
to the site pose a particular problem in that many have not had the necessary
ES&H training . Requirements for ES&H training have generally been included in
subcontracts , but JBEC has not been effective in monitoring and enforcement .
New procedures require that subcontractors must present safety training
documentation. The Contracting Officer's Technical Representatives (COTRs) ,
re sponsible for monitoring subcontractor performance, require additional
training in hazard recognition and OSHA requirements . DOE/NPOSR-CUW does not
conduct surveillance and oversight of either JBEC training programs or
subcontractor training compliance. This has been expressed as a concern.

Educati on and tra i ning for JBEC i s administered by the Personnel Section ,
whi ch is responsible for facil i tating offsite education and training and
mai nta i ni ng computer -based train i ng records , and the Safety ~nd Health
Secti on , wh i ch i s responsible for providing ES&H and technical ski lls
traini ng , i nc l ud i ng administration of qualification and certification
requirements. The budget ava i lable for offsite education and training for
JBEC personnel was found to be far too small to provide a meaningful program.
For offs ite courses, training records have for some time been stored in
computer-based f i les , but for onsite tra i ning, records have generally been
maintai ned only as train i ng session attendance sheets . Therefore, first -line
super vi sors do not have complete tra i ning records to ensure that their staff
members have recei ved the necessary ES&H and qualification training required
by DOE Orders. JBEC recogn i zes this deficiency and is working to get all
training records int o the computer database .

Both the JBEC and DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessments were comprehensive , critical
appraisals of training and certification activities at NPOSR-CUW . All of the
concerns expressed in this appraisal , as well as many other critical finding s,
were i dentified in both self-assessments . Casual factor s , root causes, and
corrective action schedules were presented, but resource allocations were not
included . Analysis of findings in t he JBEC self-assessment demonstrated a
good understanding of the problems and applicable requ i rements. Analysi s of
finding s by DOE/NPOSR-CUW was minimal .
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4.5.5.2

Findings and Concerns

TC.l

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

CONCERN:
(TC.I-I)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor has not ilDpletllented a formal training
program to ensure that operations. maintenance. and technical
staff have required safety and health training and qual ification
training in accordance with DOE 5480.19. DOE 4330.4A. and DOE
5480.3.

FINDINGS:

•

Training records for in - house courses have generally been kept
on course attendance sheets. In that form, individual training
based on ES&H and work qualification requirements for assigned
job tasks is not readily verifiable.

•

The Personnel Section has the responsibil ity to maintain
training records in a computer database. Offsite training
records for all employees have been regularly put into this
database , but all onsite training records have not been
incorporated.

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: The training organization and admini stration should
ensure effective implementation and control of training activities .
FINDINGS:

•

•

JBEC Pol icy and Procedure 1.6-08, "Employee Training Courses,"
dated June 1, 1992, states the JBEC policy is to provide
continuing training for all employees. Each department manager
is responsible for presenting an annual training plan . The
Personnel Section is responsible for budgets and schedules of
offsite training sessions . For the past few years the budget
to support offsite training activities for JBEC employees has
been $10,000 or less.
JBEC Policy and Procedure 1.3-35, "In-House Training," dated
June 9, 1992, states the JBEC policy is to provide in-house
training on safety, environmental, and work rel ated issues and
procedures . Supervisors are responsible for ensuring that
their employees attend scheduled training meetings and for
requesting special training as needed. The first-l ine
supervisors do not have the specific responsibil ity to ensure
that personnel under them have the safety and health train~ng
required by DOE Orders and by 29 CFR 1910 and 1926 regulatlons.

•

JBEC Pol icies and Procedures do not require a periodic
assessment of the effectiveness of the traini.ng program.

•

The Training Specialist, who reports to the Safety and Health
Manager, is responsible for developing an in-house training
plan. The plan has not yet been developed. He is also
responsible for conducting a training needs analysis based on
job and task requirements, and this has not yet been done .

•

Formal on-the-job training has not been developed for field
operations and maintenance personnel as required by DOE 5480.19
and DOE 4330.4A.

•

LTS Gas Plant and the Water Treatment Facil ity have no formal
training program for operations .

•

No JBEC fi e 1d dri 11 i ng and workover personnel have current
Minerals Management Service certification in well control
operat ions.

•

JBEC internal appraisals do not regularly review the overall
operation of each facility to ensure that operator and
supervisor qual ification and certification programs meet DOE
requirements.

•

See Concerns PT . 2-1, EP . 3-1, and EP . 3-2.

•

The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992) .

In general, individual training files do not contain written
and oral examination results or on-the-job demonstration
requirements and checklists .
•

First - line supervisors do not keep training records on hand to
ensure that persons working under them have safety and health
and qualification training required by DOE Orders and 29 CFR
regulations .

•

The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfasse ssment (April 1992) .

CONCERN:
(TC.I-2)
(H2/C2)

The operating contractor training records are not maintained to
enable verification of safety and health training requirements and
job qualification requirements .

FINDINGS:

•

JBEC Policy and Procedure 1. 3-32, "Subcontractor Safety
Monitoring,' dated May 22, 1992, states that subcontractors
performing work at NPOSR-CUW are required to comply with all
DOE Order requirements and safety and health regulations.
However, not all subcontractors have had the neces s ary training
to meet those requirements .

•

JBEC plans to include appropriate SlH requirements in all
future contracts, such that subcontractors must provide proof
of safety documentation including training records. This
Policy and Procedure has not been fully implemented .

•

On a limited basis , JBEC has provided some S&H train i ng for
subcontractors who do not meet the training requirement s,
rather than delay the necessary work by requiring the
subcontractor obtain the training from other sources .

•

The S&H Subteam members noted examples of subcontractors
lacking training in occupational safety requirements including:
- At injection Well No. 72-5-SX 3, Oyna Jet , Inc . personnel
said they had not received a safety briefing by JBEC .
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Electrical maintenance workers who service the substation at
the LTS Gas Plant had not received training in electrical
safe work practices as required by 29 CFR 1910 .331 -335.
- On the road leading to the pond, the backhoe operator, wh?
was cleaning up an oil spill, had not had hazardous materIal
training .

CONCERN:
(TC.1-3)
(Hl/Cl)

FINDINGS:

o

COTRs have recently been given the responsibility for
monitoring the safety training provisions of the subcontract,
but that effort has not yet been implemented. Most COTRs have
not received training to serve as a technical representative
and are not skilled in hazard recognition or OSHA standards.

o

See Concerns WS.4-5, WS . 4-9, WS.5-1, WS.5-2, OS .4-2 , TC.I-3,
and FP . 2-1.

o

The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).

The operat i ng contractor does not ensure that all subcontractors
working onsite satisfy safety and health training and job
qualification requirements specified in 29 CFR 1910 and 1926
regulations.
o DOE/NPOSR-CUW does not conduct regu1 ar surv~il1 ance and
oversight of JBEC training programs as requIred by DOE 5482.IB.
o DOE/NPOSR-CUW does not monitor to ensure that subcontractors
are meeting the health and safety training requirements for the
NPOSR-CUW sites.
o See Concerns WS.5 -1 and WS.5-2 .
o

CONCERN:
(TC.1-4)
(Hl/Cl)

The following concern was fully identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW
self-assessment (April 1992).

TC.4

GENERAL EMPLOYEE/PERSONNEL PROTECTION TRAINING

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: General employee and personnel protection training
programs should ensure that site/facil ity personnel, subcontractors, and
Vi sitors have an understanding of their responsibilities and expected safe
work practices and have the knowledge and practical abil ities necessary to
effectively implement personnel protection practices associated with their
work .
FINDINGS:

o During April 1991 and April 1992, annual refresher tra i ning on
general employee safety was given to all employees, and sitespecific occupational safety training was provided to all field
employees . Each training session was 3 to 4 hours in length.
In some cases, Casper office personnel did not have the sitespecific safety training before going to the field.
o Weekly safety meetings in operations and maintenance are used
to augment the annual fresher training for the presentation of
site-specific occupational safety training topics . Generally ,
these training sessions have not been coordinated with the
Training Specialist and are not always well documented.
o Components of safety training provided in either the weekly
safety meeting or annual refresher training did not meet the
specific training requirements of 29 CFR regulations (e.g . ,
confined space entry, hazard communications, electrical
safety), because either the content was not well defined , the
extent of the coverage was brief, the instructor was not
approved, or examinations were not given and documented.
o Although all field employees were said to have had 20 minutes
of training on the use of H,S monitors, S&H Subteam members
observed that the monitors were not used appropriately as
employees entered hazardous areas.
o

DOE/NPOSR-CUII Site Office does not ensure that the op~rating
contractor and its subcontractors are meeting the traIning
requirements of DOE Orders and 29 CFR regulations.

Competent person training has not been provided to workers
conducting or supervising activities with mandatory OSHA
training requirements. Examples observed by S&H Subteam
members include:
At Well No . 16-S-35, the Supervisor, who had oversight had
not been trained as a competent person for inspection of
excavat i on activities.
- At DOE Drilling Rig NO.2 , no one had been trained as a
competent person for oversight of machinery activities .

o

See Concerns FP . 2-1, EP .3-1, EP .3-2 , WS .4-5 , WS.4-6, WS .4-B ,
WS .4-9, WS . 5-1 , WS . 5-2, WS .6-1 , and Section OS . 5.

o

The following concern was fully identifi ed in the JBEC se1fassessment . (April 1992)
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CONCERN:
(TC.4-1)
(HI/Cll

Not all operating contractor employees at the Naval Petrole'!'J1.
Reserve Number 3 receive occupational safety and health tralmng
appropriate to their needs as specified in 29 CFR 1910 and 1926.

TC.S

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: The maintenance personnel training qual ification
programs should develop and improve the knowledge and skills necessary to
perform assigned job functions.
FINDINGS:

CONCERN:

•

A formal training and qualification program for maintenance
personnel at NPR-3 has not been developed and implemented as
required by DOE 4330.4A.

•

Maintenance worker qualification training is generally on-thejob training which has not been documented.

•

Safety meetings are
training. Training
provide a record of
topic, are not well

•

Training records do not provide evidence that maintenance
workers have the safety and health and technical skills
training for their assigned tasks.

used to provide occupational safety
record sheets , which are designed to
attendance by the individual training
documented.

See Concern TC.I-I.
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TC.IO

TRAINING FOR SUPERVISORS. MANAGERS. AND TECHNICAL STAFF

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Training programs for supervisors, managers, and the
technical staff should broaden overall knowledge of processes and equipment
and develop supervisory and management skills.
FINDINGS:

•

First-1 ine supervi sors do not receive formal supervi sory and
management training in accordance with DOE 5480.19 .

•

Training for supervisors and managers has not been generally
provided to prepare individuals for personnel and
administrative responsibilities.

•

In September 1990. topics from the National Safety Council
supervi sory training were presented to first-1 ine supervi sors.

•

A 24-hour course entitled "The Foundation of Good Supervision"
was given in 1985.

•

See Concerns WS.4-6, WS . 4-9, WS.5-I, WS.5-2. OA .8-I, and
Sect i on EP. 1.

• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment. (Apl'il 1992)
CONCERN:
(TC.IO-I)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor does not generally provide training for
supervisors and managers to prepare individuals for assigned
responsibilities in accordance with DOE 5480.19.

4.5.6

Emergency Preparedness

4.5.6.1

Overview

The Emergency Preparedness appraisal addressed all seven performance
objectives in the Emergency Preparedness technical area for NPOSR-CUW. In
addition, two other areas were addressed: the Emergency Public Information
Program and Hazardous Materials Response Program. The appraisal was
accomp 1i shed through interviews , document revi ews, equi pment assessments, and
an emergency drill . Interviews with managers, supervisors, specialists, JBEC
Emergency Management personnel, senior JBEC and DOE/NPOSR-CUW management, and
various members of the emergency response organization were used to ascertain
how emergency response activities and the Emergency Preparedness Programs were
conducted, managed, and controlled . Documents reviewed and examined included
records, the emergency plan, procedures, training program records, training
programs, and supporting documents. These were compared for comp 1i ance wi th
DOE 5000 .3A, the DOE 5500-series of Orders, the DOE 5480-series of Orders,
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standards, and good industry
practices.
The JBEC Emerge.
Preparedness Program is in the early stages of development
and has a 1imitea ~ apabillty to respond to natural and man-made emergencies
and to provide guidance and protection to onsite employees and offsite
population. DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not developed an emergency management plan and
has not provided emergency preparedness or personal protection training .
JBEC personnel have recently been appointed as members of their emergency
management organization and emergency response teams (ERTs). These personnel
have participated in one JBEC emergency drill and have been given 1imited
training. The JBEC ERTs consist of medical/first aid, fire fighting, and
hazardous materials (HAZMAT). There is no emergency pub1 ic information
procedure developed by DOE/NPOSR-CUW for use during exercises, drills, and
emergencies as required by DOE 5500 . 4A. All agreements for providing
emergency services (e.g., fire department, law enforcement, ambulance
services, hospital s, and airborne he1 icopter services) are verbal agreements.
There are no formal agreements or letters of understanding with these support
agencies. The other DOE/NPOSR-CUW facilities located in Utah and Colorado
generally have only verbal agreements exist for emergency r.esponse from local
emergency response agencies.
The format of the JBEC Emergency Management Plan does not comply with the
DOE 5500-series and the DOE 5480-series of Orders. However, since there is no
Safety Analysis Report (SAR) , the site cannot ensure that all credible
emergencies have been identified and used for decision-making and guidance for
an emergency or exerci se. The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), DOE 5500 .1
and DOE 5500.2, are not in compliance with DOE 5000.3A and DOE 5500.2B with
respect to reporting of emergencies . JBEC has developed three emergency
procedures including Medical, Security , and Spill Control .
JBEC does not have emergency procedures which address all credible emergency
actions (e.g., emergency notifications and reporting , activation of emergency
response organization and faci1 ities, security , fire and natural phenomena
events, protective actions for onsite and offsi te populations) .
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The JBEC Emergency Preparedness Training Program i s i n the early stage s of
deve 1opment, and there is no draft procedure wh i ch descri bes the functions and
requirements of activities as specified in DOE 5500 . 3A . Some le sson plans or
speaking outlines , training visuals , and job task analyses have not been
developed .
JBEC has designated the ES&H Training Room at the Upper Office Building . at
NPR-3 as its emergency operating center (EOC) . Thi s fac i l ity can easily be
rearranged and has sufficient space for the emergency management team . Within
this EOC , there are two telephones, but offi ces wi th i n this building have
three additional telephones that could be used . Radio communication is
avai lable to support onsite emergenc i es. Another radio i s available for
communications with offsite response agencies . The first aid treatment
center , with a large supply of medical supplies and res ources , is also located
i n this building . Radio and telephones are relied upon to disseminate
emergency instructions , since t here is no public address system available at
the NPR-3 site . The EOC does not have an emergency back up power supply .

4.5.6.2

FI ndl ngs and Concerns

EP.I

ORGANIZATION AND ADNINISTRATION

PERFORIIAHCE OBJECTIVE: Emergency preparedness organization and admini strati on
should ensure effective planning for , and i mplementation and control of,
site/facility emergency response.
FINDINGS :

JBEC developed a very realistic, challenging, and aggressive emergency
preparedness exercise scenario for the TSA Team. JBEC has conducted only one
previous drill approximately one month prior to the commencement of the Tiger
Team Assessment . The enthusiastic response and job knowledge of the JBEC
emergency management and response organizations combined with their desire to
perform during t he exerc i se were favorable aspects identified by the TSA Team .
The JBEC cr i tique and videotape of that exercise identified weaknesses in
emergency preparedness . The TSA exercise was also videotaped both at the onscene control point and at the EOC operation . The TSA Team evaluators rated
the exerc i se as satisfactory . This rating was achieved in spite of the fact
that there has been 1ittle or no emergency response training given to the JBEC
emergency re sponse organization, there was a lack of emergency procedures ,
t her e was an i nadequate emergency plan , and the emergency response
or ganization was informally appointed .
JBEC has not developed procedures t o address site-specific emergency action
l evel s (EAl s) for the hazar dous chemicals stored or used at the s i te , and the
emergency clas sification system is not in compliance wi th DOE 5500 . 2B . The
JBEC emergency management plan and EAls have not been formally transmi tted to
l ocal and state emergency management agencies for review . The emergency
not i fi cat i on and report i ng procedures developed by DOE/NPOSR-CUW are not in
compli ance wi th DOE Or ders . DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not developed a SAR , but plan s
t o compl ete t his document i n 1993 . JBEC does not have a procedure to asses s
the haz ards i nvo1ved at NPR-3 and to provi de protective act ions to both ons i te
and offs i te personnel.
JBEC has limited med i cal as s i st ance capability . The medical staff consi sts of
emergency medical t echnicians ; these ind i vi duals are not certifi ed by the
Stite of Wyoming . No nurse or doctor is in attendance on a routine basis at
NPR -3. The first ai d treat ment facil ity has adequate medical suppl i es for
mi nor accidents, but not for maj or ones . Evacuation routes and assembly areas
are not posted i n al l bu i ld i ng s throughout NPR-3 . JBEC does not have a
procedure to address s i t e evacuati on , shel t eri ng , or personnel accountabi l i ty.

CONCERN :
(EP . I - I)
(H2/CI)

•

The JBEC and DOE/NPOSR-CUW personnel responsible for develop i ng
the NPR -3 emergency preparedness program are not performing
this function as a full-time act i vity , but as collateral duty .
(See Section OS . I . )

•

The JBEC Emergency Preparedness Program is not in compliance
with the DOE 5500- series of Orders and the DOE 54BO - series of
Orders (e .g ., it lacks emergency response train i ng) . The
exi st i ng Emergency Management Plan and emergency procedures do
not address all emergency response organizat i on
respons i bilit i es . (See Concerns EP.2 - I , EP . 3-I, and EP . 4-1.)

•

The JBEC technical support, EOC support , and on-scene ERTs are
identified as having a role in emergency response activities ,
but have not been assigned specific responsibilit i es in
implementing procedures or in t he Emergency Management Pl an .

•

The JBEC emergency management organizat i on performed
satisfactory during the TSA emergency exercise, but their
respon s ibil ities are not fully defined in an existing emergency
management plan or emergency procedures .

•

JBEC personnel and alternates are designated as part of the
emergency management organizat i on; however , the i ndividuals
have not been formally appo i nted , clear l i nes of succession
have not been established, and all responsibilit i es have not
been formally documented or assigned .

•

JBEC has not established an auxil i ary security force that could
assist the EOC Director and on - scene Commander in executing a
build i ng evacuat i on , in escorting the fire department and other
offs ite med i cal responders, in preparing for receiving the
offsite hel icopter , in providing directions to any res pond i ng
local news med i a , and in performing crowd and traffic control
during emergenci es or exercises .

•

See Concer ns FP. 3- 1 and EP . 7- 1.

•

The f ollowi ng concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992) .

The operating contractor Ellergency Preparedness PrograJII I s not In
compliance wi th the DOE 5500-ser l es of Orders and with
DOE 5480.IB .

The J BEC self- assessment was thor ough and addr essed all seven Emergency
Preparedness concer ns. The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment partially i dentified
two of the three Emergency Preparednes s concerns addressed to them .
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FINDINGS:

CONCERN:
(EP.I-2)
(H2/CI)

•

DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not documented arrangements, agreements, or
understandings for obtaining emergency response assistance from
offsite local response agencies (e.g., hospitals, ambulance
service, 1 i fe fl ight, fire department, and 1 aw enforcement
agencies) .

•

DOE/NPOSR-CUW does not provide sufficient oversight to JBEC on
emergency preparedness matters and does not maintain a
documented Emergency Preparedness Program for all NPR-3
facil ities.

•

DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not developed a SAR.

•

See Concerns FP . 3-1 and FP.7-1, and Section EP.2 .

•

The following concern was partially identified in the
DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April 1992).

EP.2

EMERGENCY PLAN AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: The emergency plan, the emergency plan implementing
procedures, and their supporting documentation should provide for effective
response to operational emergencies.
FINDINGS:

•

The current JBEC Emergency Management Plan was not developed in
accordance with DOE 5500.3A (e.g, it does not address all the
responsibilities, credible emergencies, protective actions and
emergency classifications, and it is not of prescribed format
and content).

•

JBEC Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) do not
address protective actions for onsite and offsite personnel;
appropriate notifications and reporting of emergencies;
emergency management and emergency response teams dut i es and
responsibilities; emergency classification system and emergency
action levels; personnel evacuations, assembly areas, and
accountability; re-entry and recovery operations; and
capabil ity to obtain offsite emergency response from local
agencies.

•

Exi st i ng JBEC emergency procedures do not include emergency
planning checklists for use during emergencies for all members
of the emergency management and ERTs .

•

JBEC has not developed Emergency Plan Administrative Procedures
(EPAPs) to address routine emergency preparedness act i vi ties
and functions (e . g., conduct of drills/exercises, emergency
action item tracking system, maintenance, and reviews and
appra i sa 1s of the Emergency Preparedness Program).

•

See Concern FP.2-1.

•

The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).

DOE/NPOSR-CUII Site Office does not have an Elllergency Preparedness
Progru that is in cOllpl iance with the DOE 5500-series of Orders
and with DOE 5480.1B.

CONCERN:
(EP.2-1)
(HI/Cl)

The operating contractor Elllergency Managl!lllent Plan and Emergency
Plan Implementing Procedures do not address all facets of the
emergency response funct ions and do not include Emergency PI an
Administrative Procedures for conducting routine activities as
specified in DOE 5500.1B and DOE 5500.3A.

FINDINGS:

•

DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not formally transmitted a controlled copy of
the JBEC Emergency Management PI an to FE -13, to I oca1, and to
state emergency management agencies for their review and
coordination.

•

DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not developed a site-specific SAR, but plans
to complete one in 1993. (See Concern TS . 2 - 1. )

•

DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not prepared an emergency public information
plan or developed any pre-formatted messages as required by DOE
5500 . 4A.
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•

DOE/NPOSR-CUW Emergency Notification Standard Operating
Procedures SOPs 00.5500 . 1 and 00 .5500.2 are not in compliance
wi th DOE 5500. 2B and DOE 5000 . 3A and have not been revi sed to
address all verbal notifications and reports to be made to the
DOE Headquarters EOC.

EP.3

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Emergency response training should develop and
maintain the knowledge and skills for emergency personnel to respond to and
control an emergency effectively.
FINDINGS:

CONCERN:

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING

•

The JBEC Emergency Preparedness Training Program is not
described in any document and is not in compliance with the OOE
5500- seri es of Orders.

•

JBEC has not trained all members of the ERT in personnel
protection, HAZMAT response operations, and Self-Contained
Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) .

•

JBEC has not developed lesson plans, speaking outlines, and
schedules for either employee orientation or training for their
emergency management and response teams .

•

JBEC has not provided orientations and site tours to offsite
emergency response assistance groups (e . g., fire, medical , law
enforcement, local hospital) .

•

Training records are not kept as required by OOE 5500 .3A or
OOE 1342 . 2, Records Oi spos i t i on .

•

See Concern WS . 4-9.

•

This concern was fully identified in the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992).

See Concern EP.1-2.

CONCERN:
(EP.3-1)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor has not fully conducted _rgency
preparedness training. hazardous materials _rgency response
training. and personnel protective equiJ)lN!nt training as required
by DOE 5500.3A and 29 CFR 1910.120.

FINDINGS:

•

OOE/NPOSR-CUW has not provided emergency respon se or SCBA
training to all OOE/NPOSR-CUW employees who have not received
HAZMAT and emergency response functions .

•

See Concern WS.4-9 .

•

The following concern was not i dentified in DOE/NPOSR-CUW selfassessment (April 1992).

CONCERN:
(EP.3-2)
(Hl/Cl)
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DOE/NPOSR-CUW Site Office has not provided hazardous materials
emergency response and personnel protective equiJ)lN!nt training to
their staff as required by DOE 5500.3A and 29 CFR 1910.120.
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EP.4

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DRILLS AND EXERCISES

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Emergency preparedness programs should include
provisions for simulated emergency drills and exercises to develop and
maintain the knowledge and skills for emergency personnel to respond to and
control an emergency effectively .
NOTE:

The drills and exercises referred to in this section are related
to tests of and training on the emergency preparedness program .
In many cases , these drills and exercises are best initiated using
an operational situation. If accomplished that way, an add i t i onal
benefit is gained by exercising the operations personnel and the
interface between operations and emergency preparedness.
Therefore, for maximum benefit, an operational drill or exercise
can be used to lead into the emergency preparedness event,
providing a drill or exercise to each program .

FlIllIN6S:

•

JBEC had not developed an emergency preparedness annual
drill/exercise schedule and has not documented procedures on
development, conduct, control, and post-exercise activit i es .

•

JBEC has provided limited emergency exercise/drill tra i ning to
the controllers and evaluators .

•

Weakness in the drill/exercise program are indicated by the
following findings which were identified by the TSA Team in the
exercise evaluation; these findings were not identified by the
OOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC critiques of the exercise :

CONCERN:
(EP.4- 1)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor has not established an etlergency
preparedness drill/exercise progrilll as required by DOE 5500.lA.

JBEC did not have medical/first aid forms to identify the
injured person name , medical condit i on, degree of injury,
type of contaminat i on and what treatment was rendered at the
s ite .
- JBEC on-scene response team leaders were not identified .
- JBEC did not perform any monitoring or environmental
sampling .
Hot, warm , and cold zones were not established .
All r equired notifications were not performed.
Effective i nterfaces with OOE/NPOSR-CUW and the contract
physi c i an were not established .
The on - scene Commander did not establ ish a first aid triage
area.
•

Emergency communicat i on drills have not been conducted on a
qu?rterly basi s by JBEC .

•

The follow i ng concern was fully i dentified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).
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EP.5

EMERGENCY FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, AND RESOURCES

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Emergency facil ities, equipment, and resources should
adequate 1y support s i te/facil i ty emergency operat ions.
FIIIlINGS:

•

JBEC EOC does not have emergency power back up resource,
(i .e ., emergency generator or emergency battery power) .

EP.6

EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT AND NOTIFICATION

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Emergency assessment and not ifi cat i on procedures
should enable the emergency response organization to correctly classify
emergencies, assess the consequences, notify emergency re sponse personnel , and
recommend appropriate actions.
FINDINGS:

•

JBEC has not developed a system of emergency action levels to
aid in the classification of emergency events, which assist in
development of emergency protective measures (shelters or
evacuation) for both onsite and offsite personnel .

•

JBEC has not developed a report format for emergency
medical/first aid treatment which addresses the name of the
injured, degree or type of injury , type of contamination (if
any) , treatment provided , and any other emergency data
required .

•

JBEC does not have any EPIPs to address assessment of a
chemical or HAZMAT release.

•

Periodic messages were not issued by JBEC to update site
personnel when emergency classifications were escalated or deescalated and to provide special instructions and protective
actions throughout the exercise .

•

JBEC has not deSignated sufficient personnel to support the EOC
Director i n ei ther expediting communications or in performing
dut ies as runners and qualified status board keepers.

•

The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (Apri 1 1992).

• Adequate status boards to depict emergency data and i nformat ion
were not available during the exercise .

CONCERN:
(EP.5-l)
(H2/Cl)

•

JBEC has not developed EPAPs for performing testing ; inventory
control; and service on emergency equipment, resources , and
facil ities.

•

JBEC emergency management, support staff, and emergency
Response personnel do not have emergency checklists to ensure
they assume and perform all their emergency response
activities.

•

JBEC does not have pri nted report forms and message s for use
(e.g., initial notification and Follow-up Report , Emergency
News Releases) as required by the OOE 5500-series of Orders.

•

The following concern was fully identified in the JREC selfassessment (April 1992).

The operat I ng contractor Ellergency Operations Center does not have
all equl PIIIlnt and the resources necessary to respond to an
_rgency as required by DOE 55oo.2B, DOE 55oo.3A, and
DOE SOOO.3A.
CONCERN:
(EP.6-l)
(H2/Cl)

The operat I ng contractor Ellergency ManagetDent PI an and the
Emergency PI an I.p l_nt I ng Procedures do not address all
etDergency assessillent actions as required by DOE 5500.3A and
DOE 5480.lB.
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EP.7

PERSONNEL PROTECTION

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Personnel protection procedures should control and
minimize personnel exposure to any hazardous materials during abnormalities,
ensure that exposures are accurately determined and recorded, and ensure
proper medical support.
FINDINGS:

• JBEC has not posted evacuation routes and special instructions
in each building at the NPR-3 site.
• First aid kits are available in JBEC vehicles and other
locations on NPR-3; however, their locations are not identified
in any medical procedure, and such procedures do not identify
an inspection requirement.
• JBEC does not have sufficient SCBA equipment and spare
cyl inders for emergency purposes, and their locations are not
identified.
• Many SCBA cyl inders del ivered during the exercise and stored
onsite were not fully charged . (See Appendix) .
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (Apri I 1992).

CONCERN:
(EP.7-1)
(Hl/Cl)

The operating contractor has neither developed all personnel
protection instructions nor obtained necessary equiplent for
etlergency purposes as required by DOE 5500.3A and DOE 5480.1B.

4.5.7

Technical Support

4.5.7.1

Overview

Four of the eight performance objectives in the Technical Support technical
area were addressed in this appraisal. Performance objective TS.6 Packaging
and Transportation of Hazardous Materials was appraised as .a separate
functional area in Section 4.5.8 Packaging and Transportation and performance
objective TS . 5 Environmental Impact was addressed in detail by the
Environmental Subteam and is described in Chapter 3. Other areas not
addressed were TS.7 Reactor Engineering and TS .8 Criticality Safety, both of
which apply specifically to nuclear facilities. Interviews were held with
Managers for Technical Service, Safety and Health, Facilities Engineering, and
Maintenance; engineers, supervisors, and field support personnel; the Policies
and Procedures Analyst ; and the DOE/NPOSR-CUW Director of Engineering.
Documentation was reviewed and evaluated for project design and construction,
facilities drawings, policies and procedures, and equipment performance
monitoring and trendings . ES&H Self-Assessments for NPOSR-CUW, dated April
1992, prepared by both JBEC and DOE/NPOSR-CUW, were also reviewed and
evaluated .
The technical support fu nction at NPR-3 has a well defined organizational
structure and responsibil ities, but implementation of a fully effective
program is yet to be realized. The S&H Subteam has identified deficiencies in
technical support, which can usually be related to not following the
principles of formal quality found in conduct of operations. JBEC design and
construction engineers, limited in number and in formal engineering training,
have not always incorporated safety in the design and installation of
facilities onsite . This has been expressed as a concern by the S&H Subteam.
Personnel located in Casper often do not spend enough time at the NPR-3 site
to ensure effective technical support is provided to field operations. On the
other hand, individuals working in the field believe that they run an
effective operation without much assistance from the Technical Services
Department . Engineering support for production to ensure operation at the
maximum efficient rate appears to be going well; however, many other
activities are conducted at NPR-3 that bypass engineering. Field work is
often carried out without the benefit of accurate drawings, creating potential
safety problems associated with lack of configuration control . The
preparation, review, approval, and revi sion of Pol icy and Procedure documents
are controlled very well and are performed in a timely manner. However, a
concern of the S&H Subteam is that independent safety and health review is not
a formal requirement. Another concern is that there is no formal testing and
surveillance program used to improve equipment safety and reliability.
Technical support to field operations at NPR-3 comes primarily from the
Technical Services Department, which has the responsibility for facilities
modifications, including deSign, construction, and inspection of all surface
facilities, and for production engineering to ensure production of the
reservoirs at the maximum efficient rate . Technical support is also provided
by the Safety and Health Section, which reviews the safety of engineered
projects and continuously supports the safety of operations . Organizational
charts define the lines of communication and responsibility . Within each
organization, position descriptions are used to list major accountabilities of
personnel.
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The Facilities Engineering Section, which is responsible for design and
const ruction management, uses standard engineering practices with procedures
for safety review and approval of design packages. DOE/NPOSR-CUW engineers
monitor these projects closely and appear to have a good working relationship
with JBEC engineers. Engineering support for mechanical and electrical
problems in field maintenance and operations is not always effective. The S&H
Subteam detected an attitude of "them versus us" among the JBEC engineers in
Casper and the field maintenance and operations personnel. Engineers are not
very visible in the field , and their presence is sometimes not welcome. The
S&H Subteam also observed numerous deficienci es in equipment and systems that
signal insufficient mechanical and electrical engineering support in the
field. This has been expressed as a concern .

4.5.7.2

Fi ndi ngs and Concerns

T5.2

PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Technical support procedures and documents should
provide appropriate direction, allow for adequate record generation and
maintenance for important activities, and be properly and effectively used to
support safe operation of all facilities on the site.
FINDINGS:

JBEC does not have an effective configuration control system to ensure that
all drawings are maintained current as-built. Generally, drawings for
facilities construction projects are kept up to date by Facilities
Engineering, although subsequent field work may be performed over which they
have no control of the drawings. As a result, follow-on field work is then
conducted according to the memory of experienced personnel, because accurate
piping drawings and electrical diagrams are not available. JBEC and
DOE/NPOSR-CUW have both acknowledged this to be a seriolJs safety concern and
are working on corrective actions.

• Safety analysis information is not incorporated in JBEC Policy
and Procedure documents or in operation and maintenance
procedures in accordance with DOE 5480.19 and DOE 4330.4A.
• No formal hazards assessment has been performed for NPOSR-CUW.
• No hazards analysis has been performed for NPR-3 which meets
the requirements of 29 CFR 1910.119 for a Process Hazards
Management Program.

NPR-3 facilities are not covered by a Safety Analysis Report (SAR) which
serves as the top-level safety document specifying operational limits ,
physical and administrative controls, safety systems , and surveillance
requirements . Notes , cautions, and warnings appear in operation procedures
without the basis of a full understanding of the hazards and risks involved.
No formal hazards assessment has been preformed for NPOSR-CUW. The more
obvious hazards are well understood by the site personnel; however, the full
range of accident conditions has not been addressed. DOE/NPOSR-CUW is taking
the necessary steps to have a SAR in place in FY 1993.

• The range of credible emergencies that could affect NPR-3,
based on site-specific safety analyses of potential abnormal
conditions, has not been addressed as required by DOE 5500.3A .
(See Section EP.2)
• A memorandum from Ken Roberts, DOE/NPOSR-CUW, to K. Brown ,
J8EC, dated June 19, 1992, states that implementation of a
Strategic Plan for Safety Analysis at NPR-3 will include the
preparation of a SAR, meeting or exceeding the requirements of
DOE 5481.1B, to be completed sometime in FY 1993 .

Both the JBEC and the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessments were comprehensive,
critical appraisals of technical support for operations at NPOSR-CUW . All of
the concerns expressed in this appraisal, as well as many other critical
findings, were identified in both self-assessments. Causal factors, root
causes, and corrective action schedules were presented, but resource
allocations were not included. Analyses of findings in the JBEC selfassessment demonstrated a good understanding of the problems and applicable
requirements. Analysis of findings by DOE/NPOSR-CUW was minimal.

4- 72

?J)'6

• Facilities at NPR-3 are not covered by a SAR, which serves as
the top-l eve 1 safety document to descri be the safety envelope
of operational limits, engineered and administrative controls,
safety systems, and surveil 1ance requi rements, in accordance
with DOE 5481.1B.

• See Concerns PT.6-4, FP .3-1, and FP . 7-1.
• The following concern was fully identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW
self-assessment (April 1992).
CONCERN:
(TS.2-1)
(H2/Cl)

DOE/NPOSR-CUW Site Office has not ensured that facilities at the
Naval Petroleua Reserve Nuaber 3 are covered by a Safety Analysis
Report as required by DOE 5481.IB.

FINDINGS:

• Operations for technical support are generally governed by
Policy and Procedure documents, although some will be covered
by operational procedures, which are now in draft only.
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•

•
CONCERN:
(TS.2-2)
(H2/C2)

Pol icy and Procedure 5.4-08, 'Operation Procedure Preparation
and Distribution," dated June 1, 1992, states that the Safety
and Health Manager is respons i b1e for revi ewi ng, revi sing, and
approving operation procedures, to comply with safety and
health standards rules, and regulations. Policy and Procedure
5 4-01 "Pol icy ~nd Procedure Preparation and Distribution,"
d~ted june 1, 1992, does not state that same responsibility for
safety and health review and approval.

TS.3

FACILITIES MODIFICATIONS

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Technical support services required by each facil ity
on the site to execute modifications should be carried out in accordance with
sound engineering principles that assure proper design, review, control,
implementation, and documentation in a timely manner.
FINDINGS:

•

Field operations receive engineering technical support for
facil ities modifications and production services, but S&H
Subteam members were frequently informed that engineering
technical support for mechanical and electrical problems in the
field was inadequate.

•

The S&H Subteam found no evidence that engineers in the
Technical Services Department are involved in tracking and
trending equipment failures to improve reliability and safety.

•

The S&H Subteam found that engineers in the Technical Services
Department are not involved in the maintenance/operations
planning meetings held each morning at the site.

•

Policies and procedures do not effectively control maintenance
work that should receive engineering input. The S&H" Subteam
was informed by field personnel that maintenance work is
performed with the viewpoint that, "We don't get daily support
from engineering - - - if we think we can do it, we do it."

•

Examples of deficiencies in equipment and systems that can be
attributed to insufficient engineering technical support were
identified by S&H Subteam members in the field as follows:

The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (Apri 1 1992) .

The operatlng contractor does not formally requlre an lndependent
safety and health revlew ln the preparatlon and revlslon of Polley
and Procedure documents.

- improper steam generator discharge lines,
- removal of relief valves from pump discharge,
- undersized relief valve on fuel gas scrubber,
improper design of a vent/Basic Sediment and Water (BS&W)
concrete box,
- improper grounding of equipment,
- failure to meet hazardous area electrical requirements , and
- field fabricated non-code pressure vessel .
•

Additional examples include :
- A pressure relief valve on the quintiplex charge pump on
Steam Generator No.1 can discharge water at 1,300 psi and
160' F into the buildings, because the relief valve is not
properly connected to the suction piping,
- At the LTS truck loading rack, there is no automatic pump
shut down, if the electrical ground is deficient .

•

4- 74

?JO

See Concerns OP . I-2, MA . I-I, MA . 5- 1, and WS . 4- 5.
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• The following concern was fully identified i n the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).
CONCERN:
(TS.3-l)
(H2/C2)

The operating contractor does not provide effective electrical and
llechanleal engineering support to field operations at Naval
Petroleu. Reserve Number 3.

FINDINGS:

• The LTS Gas Plant engineering design did not provide for an
Emergency Shutdown (ESD) station at the main eXit/entrance
gate .
• Design review did not prevent the LTS Gas Plant control room
building from being improperly orientated on location to
provide for best protection from site hazards . For example,
the two egress doors opened on the process side of the building
and there were no oth2r outside doors . Air i.ntake vents and
building air conditioning equipment are also located on the
process side of the building, which could provide an ignition
source for natural gas releases .

• Audit Report No. ADC-90-00B, Construction and Quality
Assurance, dated September 19, 1990, recommended that JBEC
revi~w its polic ies and procedures for preparing as -built
draWIngs and ensure that the drawings are accurate . As a
result of the review, a letter from C. Ray Williams
DOE/NPOSR-CUW Director, to Michael. R. Fosdick, JBEC ' General
Manager, date~ October ~O, 1991 , stated that a management
re~iew det~rmlned a serious safety concern existed because asbUIlt dra~lngs were not being adequately revised, and onsite
workmen dId not have current prints with which to work.
• See Concern HA . 2-2.
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).
CONCERN:
(TS.3-3)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor does not have an effecti ve progra. to
ensure that piping and instrUlentation diagrallS and other drawings
are maintained current as-built in accordance with DOE 4330.4A.

• Design review did not prevent the LTS Gas Plant office building
and main entrance road from being located in a hazardous (i.e.,
electrically classified) area .
• Site/facility fire protection standards have not been
established and incorporated in the plans and specifications
for all new buildings and major modifications of existing
buildings as required by DOE 6430.lA.
• See Concerns WS.4-7 , FP.5-1 , HA . l-l , and HA.5-1.
• The following concern was partially identified in the JBEC
self-assessment (April 1992) .
CONCERN:
(TS.3-2)
(Hl/Cl)

The operating contractor does not effactively incorporate safety
in the engineering design and installation of facilities at Naval
Petroleu. Reserve NUiber 3 in accordance with DOE 6430.IA.

FIIIIIII6S: • The S&H Subteam found that Facilities Engineering has effective
control of as-built drawings for inhouse and subcontractor
facilities mod i fications, but considerable field work is
performed over whi ch they have no control . There has been no
determination as to which or how many as-built drawings are
inaccurate .
• Often field work is performed according to the memory of
experienced personnel , because as-built drawings of piping and
i nstrumentation diagrams are not available.
• Technically accurate and up to date drawings are not always
used to provide appropriate work directi o.1 and 0 ensure t hat
field work is performed safely and effic iently in accordance
with DOE 4330.4A .

4-76

4-77

""{;}..

3l~

TS.4

EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE TESTING AND MONITORING

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Effective equipment performance testing an~ monitor~ng
should be performed by technical support groups to ensure tha~ ~9u~~ment an
system performance is within established safety parameters an 1m1 s.
FIIIlINGS:

• JBEC does not have a formal perform~nc~ ~esting and
survei 11 ance program to improve ~el1ab111ty and safety of
equipment and systems for operat10ns .
• There is no sitewide preventive maintenance and qu~lity
controlled calibration program that meets the requ1rements ~f
DOE 4330.3A. For example, at the water plan~, pressure rel1ef
valves had recently been sent offsite for ma1ntenan:e and
calibration . This was corrective mainte~ance! but 1t was not
part of a preventive maintenance and cal1brat10n program.
• The maintenance organization does not have a fOr1!lal program of
tracking and trending equipment failures as requlred by DOE
4330.3A.
• ".n internal effort in Field Support to extend the 1ife of
downhole pumps was identified by the Sl~ Subteam as a good
example of equipment improvements, but 1t was not part of a
documented JBEC program.
• The position description for the JBEC Q~a~i~y . Management
Coordinator lists the following respons1b111t1es:
_ investigates material and equipment failures in a timely
manner, and initiates accurate and appropriat~ ~eports to
management for correction of substandard cond1t10ns; and
analyzes failure incidents to predict potential failure
frequency and project impact.
The SlH Subteam found no evidence that these activities have
yet been implemented .
• See Concern MA.6-1 .
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992) .

CONCERN:
(TS.4-1)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor does not have a for.al progra. to
collect, trend, and analyze perfor.ance data for equiplent and
systeas i.portant to operations and safety at Naval Petroleu.
Reserve Nu.ber 3 as required in DOE 4330.3A.

4.5.8

Paclcaging and Transportation

4.5.8.1

Overview

The 13 performance objectives of the Packaging and Transportation technical
area were addressed during this appraisal. Interviews were held with
personnel responsible for the safe packaging, storage, and movement of
hazardous materials and hazardous wastes, and for aviation transportation .
Facilities for the receipt, storage, and onsite and offsite transportation of
hazardous materials were visited. Transportation policy statements and
procedures were examined, and operations for vehicles, equipment , and
pipelines observed. Shipping, receiving and storage, and maintenance records
were reviewed, and the results of classification, packaging, marking,
labeling , and placarding activities were examined.
Hazardous materials transportation movements by vehicle have been conducted
without incident, and there have been no pipeline accidents in the past 12
years. This excellent record is due, in part, to the close attention given to
such movements by the staff of JBEC, and to the small number of movements
(e.g ., about 100, 55-gallon drums containing materials such as vehicle
maintenance lubricants or solvents are received each year). Hazardous wastes
are .shipped in compliance with DOE Orders, and Federal and state regulations.
Other shipments, however, are not in compliance with these requirements.
Although the DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC staff are competent in 'their jobs insofar
as they have been trained, there is a general unawareness of the requirements
for the safe transportation of hazardous materials. In some cases, adequate
knowledge of and skill in job performance is lacking. The appraisal team
found a universally positive attitude toward th~ safe transportation of
hazardous materials and aviation safety, however. The DOE/NPOSR-CUW staff
provides few instructions and guidance regarding packaging and transportation
operations to JBEC and relies excessively on the decisions of the contractor
to ensure safe packaging ~nd transportation operations. The cognizance of the
DOE/NPOSR-CVW staff in some packaging and transportation technical areas is
greater than that of JBEC employees, but less in other areas. As a result ,
compliance with packaging and transportation requirements for different types
of hazardous materials is inconsistent.
The genesis of the weakness in the packaging and transportation program
conducted by DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC is the lack of policies and procedures for
complying with DOE requirements . The lack of adherence to DOE Orders is the
re.son for most of the findings of this appraisal. In addition, authority and
responsibil ity assignments are not clear, ilnd the result has been confusion
and lack of coordination among those carrying out hazardous materials
operation . A large degree of unawareness of the specific requirements
applicable to the site has exacerbated compliance with the requirements .
Unfortunately, a training program has not been developed and implemented to
help employees gain the knowledge and skills necessary to perform their jobs
satisfactorily . The absence of efforts to develop a quality assurance program
and to conduct safety appraisals, until very recently, has permitted these
weaknesses to remain.
The location of a public road, and the concomitant need to comply with
Department of Transportation (DOT) packaging, marking, labeling , placarding,
and shipping paper regulations, has added complexity to the packaging and
transportation program. Also, the delivery of methanol and glycol to the LTS
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Gas Plant by cargo trucks regulated by DDT has increased the scope of
mandatory knowledge of ODE and DOT requirements, as has the movement of
propane, butane-gasoline mix, and crude oil from the site by cargo truck . The
relatively small number of movements onto, on, and off the site, has probably
contributed to the lack of accidents. Even so, required analyses have not
been accomplished to evaluate the potential for risks associated with
hazardous materials transportation. The corrosion protection program follows
National Association of Corrosion Engineers (NACE) recommended practices, but
not all locations meet the minus 850 millivolt protection level . Nor has
sufficient training been given to those in the program to allow them to have
the insight of a qualified practitioner, as required by DOE.

4.5.8.2

Findings and Concerns

PT.l

ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Management should develop and implement a system of
pol icies and directives that will provide for effective implementation of
Department of Energy Orders, particularly DOE 5480.3, ODE 1540.1, ODE 1540.2 ,
Federal and State regulations, and good industrial practices, in operations
involving packaging and transportation of hazardous materials.
FINDINGS:

The appraisal team found that the attitude of both DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC
employees toward safe packaging and transportation of hazardous materials was
positive and constructive, and particularly in the recent past, very
proactive . There is a desire to know the DOE requirements, and ways to
comply .

• ODE/NPOSR-CUW has issued a policy statement on ODE 5480 . 3 and
on ODE 1540 . 1, but not on ODE 1540.2 or on Federal and state
regulations or industrial practices. The existing statements
are too brief and unspecific to provide adequate instructions
and guidance to JBEC.

The JBEC self-assessment addressed 6 of the 10 JBEC concerns identified by the
S&H Subteam, partially addressed 2, and did not address 2. This assessment
covered each criterion in the packaging and transportation discipline in a
clear, albeit limited, discussion. The criteria which JBEC considered not
applicable to NPR-3 were so noted. Causal factors and root causes were
presented, but not resource allocations . The schedules for implementationwere very optimistic.
The ODE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment addressed two of the three ODE/NPOSR-CUW
concerns and di d not address one. This assessment covered only the OA
performance objective , although some of the criteria from the other objectives
were included . Altogether, 26 percent of the criteria were discussed very
superficially . Root causes were presented for all Safety and Health Findings;
none included specific cOllllll!nts of the packaging and transportation technical
area. Causal factors were not presented . The Corrective Action Plan was
brief and did not include estimates of resource allocations or a detailed
schedule. As such, implementation efforts will be difficult to monitor and
control .

• ODE/NPOSR-CUW does not have a formal system for implementing
ODE Orders on packaging and transportation. There are no
requirements for format, content, and schedule for issuance.

• ODE/NPOSR-CUW has not assigned the authority and responsibility
for all packaging and transportation activities according to a
formal procedure as required by ODE 54BO.19. Assignments which
have been made are included in position descriptions in some
cases, and in instructions to prepare policy directives in
other cases . The lack of a formal procedure has resulted in
inconsistent and incomplete coverage of the requirements.
• No ODE/NPOSR-CUW individual is assigned overall responsibility
for packaging and transportation activities . This
fragmentation has resulted in confusion and different
interpretations in the implementation of ODE Orders and ODT
regulations.
• The following concern was fully identified in the ODE/NPOSR-CUW
self-assessment (April 1992).
CONCERN:
(PT.l-l)
(H2/Cl)

DOE/NPOSR-CUN Site Office has not established a policy for
i.p1eaentation of DOE 5480.3, DOE 1540.1, and DOE 1540.2. or the
responsibility and authority for the shi~nt of hazardous
materials as required by DOE 5480.19.

FINDIN6S:

• JBEC does not have a formal system for implementing ODE Orders
on packaging and transportation. Partial compliance with some
Orders is accomplished informally, but neither effectively nor
efficiently .
• JBEC does not have a system to ensure that employees
responsible for packaging and transportation operations are
prov ided accurate operating documents.
• JBEC has not i ssued implementation procedures for ODE 5480 .3,
ODE 1540 . 1, and DOE 1540 . 2, or for Federal and state
regulations or industry practices . Policy and procedures
documents are be i ng prepared , but none is completed. The
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drafts which the SlH subteam reviewed are not specific and 1ack
several items with respect to DOE Orders and DOT regulations .
• JBEC .has not established a packaging and transportation safety
commlttee to coordinate effective implementation of DOE Orders
for the storage and movement of hazardous materials . The lack
of a committee has exacerbated effective management
communi cat ions.

PT.2

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Personnel should be trained, qual ified, and certified
in handling hazardous materials as required by DOE 5480.3 and 49 CFR.
FINDINGS:

• JBEC h~s not assigned the authority and responsibil ity for
packaglng and transportation activities to a JBEC employee.
J~EC staff, in general, are not aware of thei.r responsibilities
wlth respect to DOE Orders and DOT regulations .

• JBEC does not have a training program in hazardous materials
packaging and transportation operations . An effort to develop
a training program is under way, but was not finished as of the
date of this appraisal.
• JBEC staff members have not received hazardous materials
transportation training as required by 49 CFR 173 . I(b),
althuugh several individuals conduct operations involving
hazardous materials .

• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992) .
CONCERN:
(PT .1-2)
(H2/Cl)

TRAINING

• JBEC has not performed job task analyses of packaging and
transportation related positions .

The operating contractor has not established a policy for
illpl_tation of DOE 5480.3, DOE 1540.1, and DOE 1540.2, or the
responsibility and authority for the ship.ent of hazardous
aaterials as required by DOE 5480.19.

• JBEC personnel have not received training in recelvlng and
storage, onsite, or offsite movements of hazardous materials.
They have not received training in vehicle maintenance and
certification and in emergency response requirements (i .e.,
49 CFR 396, 49 CFR 600-604). JBEC personnel have not received
training in the safe transportation of gases and petroleum
liquids by pipeline as required by 49 CFR 192 and 49 CFR 195.
• JBEC does not have a continuing training program for operating
and maintenance personnel such as those working on corrosion
protection as required by 49 CFR 195.403(a). Except for
welders who are certified per API 1104, Standards for Welding
Pipe lines and Related Facilities, pipeline maintenance
personnel are not included in a documented training program.
• See Concerns TC . I-I, EP.3-1, EP.3-2, WS.4-9, and FP.3-1.
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).
CONCERN:
(PT .2-1)
(H2/Cl)
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The operating contractor does not have a training program for
personnel involved in hazardous .aterials packaging and
transportation operations as required by DOE 5480.3, DOE 5480.1B,
and 49 CFR.
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PT.3

PT.4

QUALITY ASSURANCE

REGULATORY COMPLIANCE

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: A system of checks and balances should exist that
ensures the quality assurance requirements of the applicable Department of
Energy Orders , especially DOE 5700 .6C, and ASHE NQA-I-1989 are met.

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: All packaging and transportation operations involving
hazardous materials should be conducted in cotnp1iance with the applicable
Federal and State regulations, including those of the Department of
Transportation, the Nuclear Regulatory COlllllission , the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency.

FINDINGS: • DOE/NPOSR-CUW does not ·~ave a quality assurance (QA) program in
accordance with DOE 5700 .6C for packaging and transportation
operations.

FINDINGS: • A public road transverses NPR-3. JBEC transports hazardous
materi a1s on the road in motor veh i c1es. Because of the
transportation of the hazardous materials on the public road,
vehicles and drivers must comply with 4~ · CFR. DOE/NPOSR-CUW
staff does not understand all the requirements, and have not
acted to comply with 49 CFR requirements.

• DOE/NPOSR-CUW management has not periodically assessed
packaging and transportation operations at NPR-3, NOSR-l, and
NOSR-3.

• DOE/NPOSR-CUW owns two vacuum trucks used at NPR-3 to transport
hazardous materials . Neither truck has a cargo tank
specification plate as required by 49 CFR.

• DOE/NPOSP.-CUW does not have personnel trained and qualified to
ensure implementation of DOE 5700 .6C. DOE/NPOSR-CUW has
assigned the responsibility for QA to the civil engineer who
has not had QA train ing.
• DOE/NPOSR-CUW has implemented DOE 6430.1A, General Design
Criteria, as the standard for packaging and transportation
technical designs, particularly pipeline designs, but has not
implemented the design standards of 49 CFR 192 and 49 CFR 195,
or industry standards such as ANSI B31.4, Liquid Petroleum
Transportat i on Pi pi ng Standards. Thi slack of comp 1i ance wi th
Perfol"llance Criterion 6 of DOE 5700.6C has placed JBEC in an
area of uncertainty in designing piping items .
CONCERN:

• The following concern was fully identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW
self-assessment (April 1992) .
CONCERN:
(PT .4-1)
(H2/Cl)

DOE/NPOSR-CUW Site Office is not in ca.p1iance with 49 CFR 392,
49 CFR 396, and 49 CFR 172 with regard to shi~nts of hazardous
materials.

FINDINGS:

• The trucks operated by JBEC which are transporting hazardous
materials have 49 CFR placard holders installed, but the proper
placards are not conSistently displayed.

See Concern QV.I-2.

• JBEC is aware of the requirement that JBEC must meet 49 CFR ,
but does not comply with all of the requirements of 49 CFR.
For example, proper shipping papers are not prepared.

FINDINGS: • JBEC does not have a QA program, but has initiated
developmental efforts.

• JBEC does not have a program to ensure compliance with
regulatory requirements . Some regulations (e .g. , those for the
transportation of hazardous wastes) are complied with, but this
resu1 tis not because of a comp1 iance program .

• JBEC has not conducted QA audits of their packaging and
transportation activities.
• JBEC does not have personnel trained and qualified to perform
QA audits . This deficiency is recognized by JBEC management.
JBEC intends to train existing personnel for QA work, keeping
in mind the principle of independence of appraisers.

CONCERN:

• JBEC has recognized the lack of a QA program regarding NPR-3,
but not the lack of a program regarding NOSR-l and NOSR-3.

• JBEC has a plan for the implementation of future hazardous
materials regulatory changes . Documents which contain such
changes will be reviewed . No specific assignment(s) has been
made for analyzing regulatory changes , and implementation of
the plan has not been accomplished .

See Concern QV.l-l.

• The following concern was partially identified in the JBEC
self-assessment (April 1992) .
CONCERN:
(PT .4-2)
(H2/Cl)
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The operating contractor IOve.ents of hazardous .ateria1s do not
ca.p 1y wi th the safety requi re.ents of DOE 5480.3 and 49 CFR.
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PT.6

• JBEC does not inspect vehicles delivering hazardous material s
shipments to NPR-3 at the site entrance for compliance with
safety requirements as they did before such inspections were
discontinued in the early 1980s. The inspections helped ensure
the safety of the shi pments on the site.

OPERATIONS

PERFORIWICE OBJECTIVE: Sitewide operations i nvolv ing packag ing and
t r ansportation of hazardous materials should be conducted in a safe,
cons istent , and accountable manner, following approved procedures t hat ensure
conformance with applicable standards and accepted practices .

• JBEC does not inspect all crude oil trucks loading crude oi l at
the B-TP-I0 Battery for offsite shipment. There i s no
procedure for such inspections . Trucks can be driven t o the
loading Battery, be loaded, and depart without the presence of
a JBEC employee. A JBEC employee does not sign the shipping
paper for a shipment, as required by DOE 5480.3 and 49 CFR.

FINDINIS: • JBEC warahouse personnel do not inspect incoming hazardous
materials shipments for compliance with 49 C~R. They have
little knowledge of the requirements.
• JBEC warehouse personnel do not inspect vehicles delivering
hazardous materials for compliance with DOE Orders and 49 CFR .

• During a loading sequence witnessed by the S&H subteam, the
truck driver properly attached the grounding cable to the truck
and the loading skid. However, a proper grounding of the truck
was not obtained because the skid was not connected to a
grounding rod. The tank had a DOT Me 306-Al specification
plate attached and a current DOT test date.

• The containment area at the warehouse is of insufficient volume
to contain the 55-gallon drums of hazardous materials stored in
the area.
• The documentation of the shipments of hazardous materials from
the warehouse is incomplete . There is no documentation of the
storage areas of hazardous materials on NPR-3. There i s
general knowledge of the location of hazardous materials on
site, but , there is no tracking of the movements of hazardous
materials.
• Gas cylinders stored in the warehouse are not inspected by JBEC
for test dates, or for other requirements in 49 CFR .

• When the truck noted above departed , neither the Pumper nor the
truck driver had signed the shipping paper certifying that the
shipment of oil met DOT requirements.
• The following concern was partially identified i n the JBEC
self-assessment (April 1992) .

• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).

CONCERN:
(PT .6-2)
(Hl/Cl)

CONCERN:
(PT .6-1)
(Hl/Cl)

The operating contractor does not conduct hazardous .aterlals
activities at the warehouse In cOlPllance with DOE 5480.3 and
49 CFIt.

FINDINGS: • JBEC does not have a program for analyzing the risks associated
with the packaging and transportation of hazardous materials .

FJNDIN6S:

• JBEC does not have a policy and procedure for the receipt of
methanol or glycol at the lTS Gas Plant. A procedure is being
developed . The draft of the procedure does not reference DOE
5480 .3 or 49 CFR, and does not contain Instructions for the
operator to follow when refusing a shipment .
• The SlH subteam reviewed the shipping paper for a shipment of
methanol to the lTS Gas Plant. The shipment was not In
compliance with the requirements of 49 CFR, because the shipper
had not signed the shipping paper certifying that the shipment
was safe . The shi pment was accepted by the operator .
• JBEC does not have a procedure for loading trucks at the l TS
Gas Plant . The operator uses a checklist which does not
reference 49 CFR, and is incomplete is other respects. In
part icular, the checklist dops not include the signature of the
oper ator as the shipper , certifying that the shipment is
properly packaged, marked, and labeled and in all respects in
proper condition for transport by highway according to 49 CFR .

The operating contractor does not .eat the transportation
requlra.ents of DOE 5480 .3 and 49 CFR with respect to deliveries
of ..thanol and glycol to. and the shlPl8nt of propane and
butane/gasoline .Ixture fro.. the Low TalpBrature Separation Gas
Pl ant and the shl Pl8nt of crude 011 fro. the B-TP-I0 Battery.

• JBEC Production operations staff has analyzed pi peline leaks
for the purpose of determining when to replace a pipel i ne as
opposed to repairing It , but there is no procedure to impl ement
the results of the analysis or to evaluate the results .
CONCERN:

See Concerns OS.3-1. TS.2-1. FP.3-1. and FP.7-1.

FJlIIJN6S: • JBEC annually takes cathodic protection pipe to soil voltage
potential readings at NPR-3. Some of the voltages recorded
during the September/October 1991 inspection did not meet the
minus 850 millivolt requ i rement of NACE standard RP-69-01 as
referenced in DOE 5480.3 and 49 CFR . No formal action was
taken to correct the defic iency .
• JBEC only annual ly inspects cat hod ic protect ion rect ifi ers at
NPR-3, not at i nt ervals not exceeding 2.5 months, but at l east
6 t imes each calendar year as required by 49 CFR .
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• JBEC subcontracted for the cathodic protection system at NOSR-3
to be inspected in February 1990; the results met 49 CFR
standards. An inspection was not conducted in either 1991 or
in 1992 as required by 49 CFR .
• JBEC has not inspected the cathodic protection system at NOSR-l
at intervals not exceeding 15 months ; 49 CFR requires
inspection at least once each calendar year .

PT .8

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Onsite transfers of hazardous materials should be
conducted in a safe, consistent, and accountable manner , following approved
procedures that ensure conformance with applicable standards and accepted
safety practices.
FINDINGS:

• Some of the coatings and wrappings at the pipe to ground
surface interface on pipelines at NPR-3 have deteriorated to
the point where the pipe is not being protected from external
corrosion (e .g. , the B-TP-I0 Battery and the South Terminal) .
The lack of protection is a violation of 49 CFR.
• JBEC has no procedure to measure and record the extent of
piping internal wall corrosion when an internal wall is
exposed, as required by 49 CFR.

ONSITE TRANSFERS

• JBEC does not have procedures for the safe onsite transfer of
hazardous materials at NPR-3.
• JBEC does not conduct movements of hazardous materials at NPR-3
in accordance with DOE Orders and 49 CFR. For example, records
of movements are not complete and consistent with these
requirements , correct placards are not always used, and
specification tanks are not used.

CONCERN:

See Concern PT .4-2.

• JBEC maintenance employees visually examine pipe internal walls
for corrosion when possible, but do not measure the extent of
corrosion nor record the results as required by 49 CFR .
• The following concern was not identified in the JBEC se1fassessment (April 1992) .
CONCERN:
(PT .6-3)

(HZ/CI)

The operating contractor Is not In cOlp11ance with the pipe
internal and external wall corrosion control requlra.ents of 49
CFR.

FlIIIIII6S: • An Amoco petroleum pipeline is located on NPR-3 along the
Eastern border of the site from the North-South midpoint to the
South Terminal. The pipeline is marked with warning signs
which comply with 49 CFR. JBEC has not analyzed the potential
risks associated with thi s pipeline.
• The Amoco pipeline crossing NPR-3 is not in proximity to the
NPR-3 facilities other than the Bad Oil Facility in Section 2,
Township 3B North , Range 7B West . JBEC has not investigated
the consequences of this pipeline on the Bad Oil Facility .
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992) .
CONCERN:
(PT.6-4)

(HZ/C2)

The operating contractor has not ensured that the condition of the
third party pipeline crossing Naval Petro1eu. Reserve Nu.ber 3
will not adversely affect safety at the site.
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PT.9

PT.IO

OFFSITE SHIPMENTS

RECORDS

PERFORIIANCE OBJECTIVE: Offsite shipments of hazardous materials should be
conducted in a safe , cons i stent , and accountable manner, following approved
procedures that ensure conformance with applicable regulations, standards and
accepted practices.
'

PERFORIIANCE OBJECTIVE: Records of hazardous materials movements, transfers,
and shipments should be prepared and maintained to ensure compliance with
Department of Energy and other regulatory requirements, and to provide an
aud i table trail of actions .

FINDINGS:

FINDINGS:

• JBEC does not have procedures for the safe offsite transfer of
hazardous materi a1s at NPR-3 .
• JBEC does not conduct offsite shipments of hazardous material s
at NPR-3 in accordance with DOE Orders and 49 CFR . For
example, records of movements are not complete and consistent
with these requirements , and inspections are not conducted.

CONCERN:

See Concern PT .4-2.

• JBEC does not have a procedure for implementing the record keep i ng requirements of DOE 5480.3 .
• Except for hazardous waste shipment records, JBEC records of
hazardous materials shipments are not complete and maintained
as required by DOE 5480.3. For example , shipping papers are
not prepared which contain a provision for a signature of a
JBEC employee certifying that a shipment meets 49 CFR .
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992) .

CONCERN: The operating contractor does not prepare and maintain records of
(PT.IO-I) hazardous materials movements as required by DOE 5480.3.
(H2/CIl
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PT. 11

APPRAISALS AND INTERNAL AUDITS

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE : Periodic Packaging and Transportation safety
appraisals of contractors by the Field Office, and independent internal
Packaging and Transportation safety audits by each contractor are required by
DOE 5480.3 are conducted in accordance with DOE 5482 . 1B .
FINDINGS:

• DOE/NPOSR-CUW does not have a documented program for conducting
safety appraisals of JBEC packaging and transportation
operations.
• O!lE/NPOSR-CUW has not co.nducted an appraisal of JBEC in
accordance with DOE 5482.1B and 49 CFR.
• DOE/NPOSR-CUW employees have had little training in ES&H
appraisal activities.
• DOE/NPOSR-CUW conducts informal appraisals of JBEC hazardous
materials operations, but it neither documents the results nor
requires corrective action plans of JBEC.
• See Concern OS.I -2.

PT.12

PACKAGING AND STORAGE PROCEDURES

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: All packaging and storage procedures for hazardous
material are in conformance with DOE 5480 . 3, 49 CFR, and 40 CFR .
FINDINGS:

• Real time master inventories of the hazardous .aterials stored
in Flalll!lable Storage Units are not available for i..ediate use
by JBEC personnel in the event of a nearby fi re or other
emergency .
• Except for the procedures for' the packaging of hazardous
wastes, JBEC does not have procedures for the packagi ng of
hazardous materials , as required by DOE 5480.3.
• Radioactive materials have been stored i.properly with other
chemicals in the warehouse; the requirements of 49 CFR have not
been met .
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).

CONCERN: The operating contractor hazardous .aterials packaging and storage
(PT.12-1) procedures are not in confor.ance with DOE 5480.3.
(H2/Cl)

CONCERN:

See Concern FR.4-2.

FINDINGS:

• JBEC does not have a program for conducting independent
internal packag i ng and transportation safety audits .
• JBEC has not conducted an internal safety audit in accordance
with DOE 5482 . 1B and 49 CFR.
• JBEC employees have not been trained in ES&H independent
appraisals .

CONCERN:

See Concern FR.4-J.
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PT. 13

AVIATION TRANSPORTATION

PERFORIWICE OBJECTIVE: Organization, administration, and safety programs
should ensure the provision of proper personnel , aircraft and facil ities and
the effective illP1I!IIf!ntation and control of aviation activities as required by
OOE 5480 . 13 "Aviation Safety" and applicable OOE and FAA regulations .
FIII)III6S:

• Contracts have been written by OOE/NPOSR-CUW for avi at ion
services that did not address the requirements of OOE 5480 . 13.
• OOE/NPOSR-CUW personnel were unaware of the aviation safety
requi relll!nts of OOE 5480 . 13. The requi rements were not bei ng
considered when contracting for aircraft services. For
exuple , itells such as pilot experience and certification,
aircraft configuration, and operator Federal Aviation
AdIIinlstration (FAA) certification were not included in the
contracts.
• The following concern was not identified in the OOE/NPOSR-CUW
self-assessment (April 1992) .

CONCERN:

DOE/NPOSR-CUW Site Office has not assured that aviation charter

(PT.13-1) pilots and aircraft cu.ply with DOE 5480.13.
(H2/C1)

FIII)III6S:

• Contracts have been written by JBEC for aviation services that
did not address the requirements of OOE 5480 . 13.
• JBEC personnel were unaware of the aviation safety requirements
of OOE 5480.13. The requirements were not being considered
when contracting for aircraft services . ·For example, items
such as pilot experience and certification, ai rcraft
configuration, and operator FAA certification were not included
i n the contracts.
• The following concern was not identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).

CONCERN: The operating contractor has not assured that aviation charter
(PT . 13-2) pilots and aircraft cOllPly with DOE 5480.13.
(H2/C1)

4.5.9

Site/Facility Safety Review

4.5.9.1

OVerview

All six performance objectives relating to the Technical area of Site/Facility
Safety Review were addressed . Interviews were conducted with members of the
Safety Review Connittee, operations and safety personnel, and JBEC Pol icies
and ~rocedures and OOE Orders were reviewed. Minutes of eight Safety Review
Comm1ttee (SRC) meetings and two General Manager/Field Employee Safety
Meetings were reviewed . A meeting of eight hourly employees who attend the
General Manager/Field Employee Safety Meetings as representaiives of field
personnel, was attended on June 29, 1992 .
A JBEC Safety Review Committee does exist. Minutes of Committee meetings
revealed that members provide information of a safety nature and that the
members are at times the individuals who take action on a particular subject.
OOE 54~2.1B, Environmental , Safety, and Health Appraisal Program, states that
the pr1mary function of members is as advisers to management. Because of the
small number of employees at NPR-3 creating the necessity that the Committee
be composed of some management per sonne 1 rather than ent i rely of techni cal
non-management personnel, the existing Safety Review Committee is acceptable
in terms of representation of management level personnel .
SRC is provid!ng some .good results to improve safety at NPR-3 but, many
1mportant areas w1th poss1ble safety questions are not being addressed . Among
them are organization and staffing, operational procedures, and hazards
assessment. A review of Committee minutes revealed discussions of accidents
but there was no apparent rigorous investigation of root causes and monitori~g
of safe/unsafe industry operation experience . The failure to include such
topics as part of their scope is considered to be a major failing of the
Committee. OOE 5482.1B, Environment, Safety , and Health Appraisal Program,
presents areas for objective review.
.

~he

Technical safety reviews are performed at NPR-3 project planning meetings.
Agenda items include new equipment and modifications to old equipment. The
~a~e~y and Heal~h Manager must approve such projects before they can be
1n1t1ated . He 1S aware of these projects during their initial planning as a
member of the Plann i ng and Control Committee .
Of concern is the failure to have Safety Review Committee meetings when
scheduled , the absence of a periodic operating review of the fac i lity and the
absence of a trienn i al appraisal of the Safety Review System. JBEC did
conduct an i nternal review i n 1991 , identified as the 1991 Safety and Health
Department Aud i t. However , it did not satisfy the requ i rements of rev i ewing
the overall operation to ensure adequate ES&H coverage as required by DOE
5482.1B .
DOE/NPOSR-CUW has neither prov ided surveillance and overs ight of JBEC ' s
internal safety rev i ew system nor have they conducted funct i onal appraisal s of
JBEC acti vities to ensure an effecti ve ES&H program as outlined in DOE
5482 . 1B . By t he i r i nact ion , DOE/NPOSR-CUW has played a maj or role in the
fa il ure to fully implement t he ES&H program at NPOSR.
Both JB EC and DOE/NPOSR-CUW self· assessments addressed concerns found by the
S&H Subteam . DOE/NPOSR-CUW frequently used the same re sponse for different
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subjects and stated that the corrective action plans would ·be implemented
after the Tiger Team visit . JBEC's corrective action plans appeared to
provide more immediate and focused responses . Concerns were analyzed for root
causes by both organizations.

4.5.9.2

Findings and Concerns

FR.l

SAFm REVIEW COIIIlnEE

PERFORIWICE OBJECTIVE: A Safety Review Committee should be available to
review safety questions and the safety impacts of experiments . This committee
is part of th~ ' "Contractor Independent Review and Appraisal System" specified
in DOE 548Z . 1B., Section 9.d .
FIt.IINGS:

• The JBEC Safety Review Committee is charged in Pol icy and
Procedure 1.3-0Z, "Organizational Safety Responsibility , " to
ensure maintenance and establishment of new safety and health
programs to protect JBEC employees and subcontractors. The
Committee has no formal charter.
• Committee meeting minutes usually designate action items and
the name of the person taking action with the expected
completion date, but that information is not provided for all
action items.
• No procedure exists for handling situations in which a member
should abstain from voting because of a conflict of interest .
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 199Z).

CONCERN:
(FR. 1-1)
(HZ/C2)
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The operating contractor Safety Review Co.Iittee does not have a
charter specifying responsibility, authority, quoru., reporting
requirements, and docUMntation in accordance with DOE 5482.1B.
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FR.2

FR.3

SAFETY REVIEW TOPICS

OPERATION OF SAFETY REVIEW COIIIITTEE

PERFORNAHCE OBJECTIVE: Items that require review by the Safety Review
Committee should be well defined and understood by facility management.

PERFORIIANCE OBJECTIVE: Review of site/facility activities by the Safety
Review Committee should ensure achievement of a high degree of safety.

F1I1lII16S:

FINDINGS:

• The responsibilities of the Safety Review Committee in Policy
and Procedure 1.3-02, ·Organizational Safety Responsibility,·
are narrow in scope when compared to those 1isted in DOE
5482.1B, Section 9d.

• Monthly Safety Review Committee meetings are rescheduled to
assure attendance of members, thereby delaying prompt action
towards identification and resolution of safety issues.

• No mechanism exists to gather items for review at Safety Review
Committee meetings.
• The Safety Review Committee minutes did not provide evidence
that safety matters are addressed in depth to resolve questions
about proposed modifications to plant and equipment,
organization and staffing, operational procedures and
significant changes, hazards assessment, and emergency
preparedness.

• The Safety Review Committee meetings are to convene monthly per
JBEC Policy and Procedure 1.3-02, ·Organizational Safety
Responsibility.· A review of the meeting minutes reveals 2
months out of the past 11 when there was no meeting.

• The following concern was partially identified in the JBEC
self-assessment (April 1992) .
COHCERN:
(FR.3-1)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor Safety Review Ca..ittee irregularly holds
.eetings which contradicts their Policy and Procedure 1.3-02.

• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).
CONCERN:

(FR.2-1)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor Safety Review Coamittee does not ensure
ca.prehensive and indepth reviews of all .ajor itelS i.portant to
the safety of operations in accordance with DOE 5482.18.
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FR.4

FR.5

FACILITY SAFETY REVIEW

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: A periodic operating review of the facility should be
performed by a cOllll1ittee appointed by top contractor management as specified
i n DOE 5482.IB .
FINDINGS:

•

TRIENNIAL APPRAISAL OF SITE/FACILITY SAFETY REVIEW SYSTEM

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: A triennial appraisal of the safety review system
should be performed by contractor management.
FINDINGS:

There is no JBEC policy and procedure for a facility safety
review to ensure ES&H coverage as requi red by DOE 5482.IB ,
which calls for an overall periodic rev i ew of the operation at
each facil i ty .

•

DOE 5482 . IB requires an independent appraisal of the safety
review system every 3 years, but there has been none at NPR-3 .

•

JBEC Pol i cy and Procedures do not requ i re a tr i enn i al appra i sal
of the safety review system.

•

The following concern was fully ident ' fied in JBEC selfassessment (April 1992) .

•

Packaging and t r ansportation operations were not appra i sed
periodically by JBEC as requ i red by DOE 5482 . IB .

•

The 1991 Safety and Health Department Aud i t did not address all
items spec i fied i n DOE 5482 . IB , Sect i on 9.d.

CONCERN:
(FR.5-1)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor has not conducted independent triennial
appraisals of its safety and health internal review systa. as
required by DOE 5482.18.

•

The following concern was fully i dentified in the JBEC
self-assessment (Apr i l 1992) .

FINDINGS:

•

DOE/NPOSR- CUW did not enforce the implementation of DOE
5482.1B.

CONCERN:
(FR . 4-1)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor does not perfonl periodic appraisals of
the overall operation of each facility to ensure safety and health
coverage as required by DOE 5482 . 18.

•

DOE/NPOSR-CUW did not review ot provide oversight of a
trienn i al facil i ty appraisal .

FINDINGS:

•

DOE/NPOSR-CUW did not enforce the i mplementation of DOE
5482.IB.

•

DOE/NPOSR-CUW has no aud i t or appraisal system in place to
ensure JBEC compliance wi th DOE 5482.1B.

•

DOE/NPOSR-CUW did not review or provide oversight for a
periodic safety review system.

•

The following concern was fully identified i n DOE/NPOSR- CUW
self- assessment (April 1992).

•

DOE/NPOSR- CUW has no aud i t or appraisal system in place to
ensure JBEC compl i ance with DOE 5482.IB .

•

The following concern was fully i dentifi ed in the DOE/NPOSR- CUW
sel f - assessment (April 1992 ).

CONCERN:
(FR.4-2)
(H2/CI)

CONCERN:
(FR.5-2)
(H2/CI)

DOE/IIPOSR-CUW Site Office has not pr ovided surveillance and
oversight of the operating contractor ' s internal safety review
systa. to ensure illpl_ntation according to the requir_nts of
DOE 5482 . 18 .

DOE/IIPOSR- CIN Site Office has not conducted functional appraisals
to ensure safety and health coverage as required by DOE 5482.18.
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FR.6

OPERATING OPERIEHCE REVIEW

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Operating experiences should be evaluated, and
appropriate actions should be undertaken to improve safety and reliability .
FIIIIINGS:

• Rigorous investigations of root causes of accidents and nearmisses at NPR-3 are not performed; (See Concerns TS.4.1 and
OS . 4-1. )
• JBEC has not evaluated industry operating practices for safety
and reliability implications.
• JBEC has not evaluated other DOE operating contractor
experiences applicable to operations at NPR-3.
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).

CONCERN:
(FR.6-1)
(HZ/C2)

There is no operating contractor progra. to gather, evaluate, and
trend either their inhouse or industry-wide operating experience
data to i.prove safety and reliability.

4.5.10

Worker Safety and Health (OSHA) COIQJiance

4.5.10.1

Overview

A comprehensive, Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)-type safety and
health appraisal covering general industry and construction standards was
conducted at NPR-3 to determine compliance with existing OSHA regulations as
adopted by DOE. Evaluation criteria were based, in part, on OSHA general
industry and construction standards, 29 CFR 1910 and 29 CFR 1926,
respectively. Noncompliance and hazards were documented and discussed with
management at the end of each day. Repeated noncompliance of the same
standard in a facility were only noted once on the inspection report form (see
Appendix F). Figure 4-1 is a percentage break down of the identified
noncompliances. All Performance Objectives for the worker safety technical
area were evaluated except for liS. 1 Management of Health and Safety Concerns,
IIS . 2 Surveillance of Health and Safety Concerns, and IIS.3 Compliance with
Occupational Health Standards for General Industry. These sections are
incorporated into Section 4.5.11 Occupational Safety.
The appraisal was directed at specific areas according to the number of
employees working in the area, the presence of hazardous materials, the type
and size of the activity in the area, and the size of the facility.
Facilities satisfying these criteria include, but are not limited to, the
maintenance shops, materials storage areas, process areas, drill sites, steam
generators, and compressor stations. A less comprehensive sample of office
buildings and other low-hazard areas was also inspected.
A total of 167 noncompliance issues were identified all of which were
considered serious. The serious noncompliance issues may be misleading
because the appraisal team expended most of its effort in identifying these
types of hazards. Table 4-1 provides a summary of the areas that were
inspected, the number of noncompliance issues noted, and the OSHA
noncompliance classification of each. Figure 4-1 is a graphic portrayal of
the noncompliance by major categories. Appendix F is a tabulation , by
operational areas, of all identified noncompliance of OSHA standards and the
classification of each . It should be noted that many of the noncompliances
were corrected immediately after they were identified .
Collectively, the findings indicate serious noncompliance with electrical
standards, the hazard communication program, machine guarding, labeling of
hazardous chemicals, lockout/tagout procedures, confined space identification,
confined space entry procedures, and emergency evacuation. Consequently, 2 of
the 12 concerns noted during the appraisal involving electrical system
deficiencies and lockout/tagout procedures were designated as Category II
Concerns.
JBEC management is not fully complying with DOE regulations and Orders
regardin~ safety and health requirements.
This is ev ident by the lack of an
effective, proactive compliance-oriented safety and health program . JBEC
safety and health policies and procedures are informal, lack specificity , and
are not uniformly distributed or enforced for all employees and
subcontractors.
Numerous incipient policies and procedures were put in place to comply with
safety and health standards; but, the programs were not carried out to satisfy
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the intent, direction, and oversight required by the Secretary of Energy's
"IO-Point Initiative" in pursuit of excellence .

Figure 4-1

JBEC has fully identified B of the 12 concerns noted in this assessment and
partially identified I concern (Excavations). The three concerns not
identified involve storage of oxygen and acetylene, the storage of liquified
petroleum gases, and improper eyewash facilities.
Line management and hourly empi oyees should be knowledgeable in all safety and
health programs and be able to recognize workplace hazards . Consequently,
OOE/NPOSR-CUW, and JBEC should develop and initiate an aggressive training
program for all worksites in order to achieve compliance with DOE Orders and
OSHA regulations.

4-104

4-105

.5tfO

341

4.5.10.2

Findings and Concerns

WS.4

COMPLIANCE WITH OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY STANDARDS FOR GENERAL INDUSTRY

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Workplaces should be free of uncontrolled physical
hazards and should be in compliance with Department of Energy prescribed
occupational safety standards.
NOTE :

FINDINGS:

Noncompliance with this performance abjective is documented
ut i lizi ng the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OS~A) Form IB
format. A compilation of these completed forms are lncluded as
Appendix F to the Tiger Team Assessment report.
o

o

o

CONCERN:
(WS.4-2)
(H1/C!)

o

Anti -restart dev ices were not provided on machines where injury
to the operator might result i f the motors were to restart
after a power failure .

o

The following concern was fully ident i fied in the JBEC se1fasses sment (April 1992).

Guarding is not In place for equipment operated by the operating
contractor as requl{'ed by 29 CFR 1910, Subpart 0, Machinery and
Machine Guarding.

FINDINGS:

Emergency action plans for all facilities , except for the
Maintenance Shop , do not meet the provisions requ i red by the
standards. Examples include :

On B- I- I0 , Gas Separator Bldg ., standard railings and toeboards
were not provided around a pressure relief valve , located 8
feet above the ground . The smooth , metal roof of the building
was the working surface personnel used for the maintenance
dut ies .

- The written emergency action plan does not contain the
min imum requi rements outlining key operational employee
dut ies .
Accounting procedures for employees affected by an evacuat ion
are not outlined .

Rungs on fixed ladders are not uniformly spaced to provide
cont inuous assent or descent . For example , the rungs of the
f i xed ladders in the Water Treatment Plant and B-I-3 were not
un i formly spaced.

- Emergency escape route assignments are not clearly def i ned
wi th adequat e maps , building locations , and as sembly areas .

The follow i ng concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfas sessment (April 1992) .

COMCERN:
(WS.4-1)
(H1/C1)

The operating contractor guarding of walkways and maintenance of
ladders is not in accordance with 29 CFR 1910, Subpart D, Walking
and Working Surfaces.

FINDINGS:

o

Procedures do not identify employees to rema i n and perfo rm
critical plant operat ions before they evacuate .
Personnel are not trained to assist in the safe and order ly
evacuation of other employees. In addition , the plan was not
reviewed with each employee prior to ass ignment of du t ies in
the areas affected by the action plan .

Machine guardi ng i s missi ng and/or deficient i n several areas
at NPR-3. Examples i nclude :
There is i ncomplet e guardi ng of power transmiss ion dev ices
such as bel ts and pull eys. For instance, the hor i zontal
belts and pul l eys on Pump 37 AX 10 and Well No . 16 S-35 and
the vertical bel ts and pulleys on DOE Dri lling Rig No . 2
diesel were not proper ly guarded .
Rotating drill press chucks on t he Wilton dr i ll press in t he
Maintenance Shop and the Mi lwaukee drill press in the LTS Gas
Plant Shop were not guarded .

o

CONCERN:
(WS.4-3)
(H1/C 1)
FINDINGS:

The operating contractor does not comply wi th 29 CFR 1910 . 38,
Emp loyee Emergency Plans and Fire Preventi on Plans .
o

Fan guardi ng was not provided on the Pamco No . 2 air
exchanger i n the LTS Gas Plant.
In the Maintenance Shop , t he hor izontal shaf t for the
ci rculati on pump and the compressor i n the work bay were not
completely guarded.

See Concer n FP. 2-\ and Secti on EP. 2.
The fo ll ow ing concer n was full y iden ti fi ed in t he JBEC se1fas sessment (April 1992) .

o

Oxygen and acetyl ene cylinders were not stored at least 20 feet
apart or with a fire barrier of 30 mi nu tes fire resistance
rating at the Wareho use outside sto rage rack and i n th e LTS Gas
Plant Shop .
See Concern TC .4-1.
The follow i ng concern was not ide nt i fied i n the JBEC se1f assessment (Apr i l 1992) .

In the Maintenance Shop , t he Rigid portable band saw did not
have the unused porti on of t he bl ade guarded .
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CONCERN:
(IIS.4-4)
(H1/C1)

Compressed gas cylinders are not stored by the operating
contractor in accordance with 29 CFR 1910, Subpart Q, lIelding,
Cutting, and Brazing.

FJlI)JN6S:

• Electrical cords and battery jumper cables have cuts, broken
insulation, and are frayed allowing for potential contact with
energized wires.

Lockout devices were not standardized within the facil ity in
at least one of the following criteria: color, shape, or
size.
- J8EC does not conduct, at least annually, inspections of the
energy control program.
- The lockout device keys were not under the exclusive control
of the employee performing the servicing and/or maintenance.

• Testing instrumentation indicated that some electrical circuits
had the ground and neutral leads shorted. Examples include:
the 8-1-3 Operator Shack circuit No. 2 and the Steam Generator
No.4 circuit No . II.

•

• The 8-1-3 Operator Shack circuit No. I had an open neutral.

• The following concern was fully identified in the J8EC selfassessment (April 1992).

• At the Warehouse Quonset copy room, an electrical circuit
receptacle box cover was broken exposing the live parts inside .
• Electrical equipment not approved for Class I, Division I and
locations include wiring in the LTS Gas Plant Office Trailer,
the LTS Cold Storage 8uilding catalytic heater, the 8-1-10
operator doghouse light switch, the 8-1-3 operator doghouse
lighting, and the Hazard Waste Accumulation Area shack lights
and junctions boxes .

• See Concerns OS . 2- I, OP.3-2, TC.4-I, and TC.IO-I .

CONCERN:
(IIS.4-6)
(Hl/C1)
CAT. II

The operating contractor does not ca.ply with 29 CFR 1910.147. The
Contl'ol of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout) in that .ini_
perfoJ'llance requi r_nts for the control of hazardous energy have
not been established.

FINDINGS:

•

• Numerous conduit fittings are not wrench tight in the following
l ocations defined as Class I, Division I or 2: 8-1 -3 Water
Shipping pump station and the South Terminal LACT shack light
and power on/off switch conduit.

•

FIIIlIN6S:

• J8EC does not ensu re their employees are ~. rained in and
uniformly comply with lockout/tagout procedures . Examples
include:
Some tagout attachment means did not have a minimum unlocking
strength of at least 50 pounds .
The tagout devices did not identify the employee applying the
dev ice .
Lockout devices intended for controlling energy were used for
other purposes.
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In the LTS Gas Plant, no fusible link was provided at the
discharge of the propane tanks for emergency shutdown.

• See Concerns FP.3-1 and FP.S-I.

• The following concern was fully identified in the J8EC selfassessment (April 1992).
The operating contractor does not cOllply with 29 CFR 1910, Subpart
S, Electrical for the control of explosion and electrocution
hazards .

In the LTS Gas Plant, the propane and butane/gasoline storage
tanks are not separated by a minimum distance of 20 feet.
In the LTS Gas Plant, the propane and butane/gasoline storage
tanks are diked together .

• See Concerns MA.I -2, and MA.5 - I, TS .3-I, TC . I-3, and TC . I-4.

CONCERN:
(IIS.4-5)
(H1/C1)
CAT. II

In 1992, an accident report indicated an electrician was
shocked due to an improper lockout/tagout procedure.

The following concern was not identified in the J8EC selfassessment (April 1992).
CONCERN:
(IIS.4-7)
(H1/C!)

The operating contractor does not comply with 29 CFR 1910.110.
Storage and Handling of liquified Petroleum Gases.

FINDINGS : • J8EC has not conducted a risk analysis to determine confined
spaces.
• J8EC has not identified all confined spaces . Examples include:
the basement of the LTS Compressor 8uilding, the entrances to
the radiant areas of the steam generators, the 8-1-10 box , and
the inspection portals to all aboveground tanks such as the
fire water and product water tanks at the North Waterflood
area.
• J8EC has not properly labeled all confined spaces.
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115.5

CONCERN:

See Concern 05.2-2.

FlIIIIN6S:

• JBEC does not provide adequate (i.e ., at least a 15 .minute
continuous flush) eyewashes at all areas where requlred.
Examples include: the North lIaterflood area where Nalco 3919
is handled, the LTS Compressor Building, B-1-10 where N~lco
4818 and 4449 is used, and the Chemical Dock where multlple
hazardous chemicals are handled.

PERF?RNANCE OBJECTIVE: Construction activities should be free of uncontrolled
physlcal and health hazards and should be in compliance with Department of
Energy prescribed occupational safety and health standards relating to
construction.
NOTE:

Noncompliance with this performance objective is documented
utilizing the O~cup~tional Safety and Health Act (OSHA) Form IB
format. A compllatlon of these completed forms is included as
Appendix F to the Tiger Team Assessment report.

FINDINGS:

• At the Well No. 16-S-35 excavation, adequate barrier physical
protection was not provided .

• JBEC does not provide a first-aid trained employee at the NOSR1 and NOSR-3 sites.
• See Concern TC.4-1.

COMPLIANCE IIITH OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH STAIIIARDS FOR
CONSTRUCTION

• The following concern was not identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).
CONCERN :
(115.4-8)
(H1/C1)

The operating contractor does not ca.ply with 29 CFR 1910.151,
Medical Services and First-Aid.

• JBEC has not ensured that excavations are properly sloped or
benched to prevent cave in including the excavation at Well No .
16-S-35 where work was being performed.

FlIIIIN6S:

• JBEC has not developed or implemented a hazardous waste
operations safety and health spill response procedure.

• JBEC has not provided a competent person, as defined by OSHA
to inspect excavations prior to the start of work and as needed
throughout the shift.
• See Concerns TC .1 -3 , TC.1-4, TC.4-1 , TC.I0-l and OP .S-l.

• JBEC has not provided training for all employees working onsite
who may respond to hazardous substance spills , and for their
supervisors and managers responsible for the site.
• See Section EP.3 and Concerns TC.1-3, TC .4-1, and TC.10-1.
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992) .
CONCERN:
(115.4-9)
(H1/C1)

The operating contractor does not ca.ply with the hazardous
aaterial spill response require.ents of 29 CFR 1910.120, Hazardous
lIaste Operations and ~rgency Response.

• The following concern was not identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992) .
CONCERN:
(115.5-1)
(H1/C1)

The operating contractor does not comply with 29 CFR 1926, Subpart
P, Excavations.

FINDINGS:

•

JBE~

has not deSignated a competent person , as defined by OSHA,
to lnspect all mach ,nery and equipment prior to and during each
use.

• DOE Drilling Rig No . 2 has many deficiencies including the
following :
- Many wire ropes and cables are "bird-caged" and have kinks ,
broken strands, splits, and flattened strands .
Hor izontal shafts on the right angle rotary and the drop box
are not guarded.
Derrick climber counterbalanced pulleys were worn and not
replaced .
- The muffler on the diesel was not insulated or guarded to
protect employees from possible contact .
- The belts and pulleys on the diesel were not guarded .
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- Cable clevises on the derrick are improperly sized for their
intended use .
• See Concerns OP.5-1, TC.I-3, TC . I-4, TC .4-1, lC.IO- I , and MA . 22.

PERFORNANCE OBJECTIVE: Site/facility personnel should be adequately informed
of chemical. physical, and biological stresses that may be encountered in
their work environment .
NOTE:

Noncompliance with this performance objective is documented
utilizing the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) Form IB
format. A compilation of these completed forms is included as
Appendix F to the Tiger Team Assessment report .

FINDINGS:

• Hazardous chemical containers were incorrectly labeled in many
areas . Examples and locations include: the butane/gas storage
tanks at the LTS Gas Plant and Solvent 140 in the B-TP-IO
operator doghouse .

• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).
CONCERN:
(115.5-2)
(HI/CI)

The operating contractor does not comply with 29 CFR 1926.550,
Cranes and Derricks.

PERSONNEL COMMUNICATION PROGRAM

• Material Safety Data Sheets were not available in a reasonable
time at Steam Generator No . I, the Hazard Waste Accumulation
Area , and the Chemical Dock .
• There is no written Hazard Communication Program specific for
each worksite at NPR-3, NOSR - I , AND NOSR-3 .
• The JBEC Chemical Hazard Communication Program Procedure does
not address the following major prog ram elements :
- Labels and other forms of warning; such as the designation
of person(s) responsible for ensuring label i ng of in-plant
containers , description of labeling systems in use at NPOSR CUW, description of written alte rnat ives to labeling of inplant containers, and procedures to review and update label
information when necessary .
Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSlj such as the designation
of person(s) responsible for obtaining/maintaining the MSDS,
how such sheets are to be mai ntained , and procedures to
follow when the MSDS is not received at the time of the
shipment.
Trainingj such as the designation of person(s) responsible
for conducting t r aining , format of the program to be used ,
elements of the training program, procedures to train new
employees at the time of their initial assignment and t o
train employees wh en a new hazard is introduced into the
workplace , and procedures t o train employees for new hazards
they may be exposed to when wor king on or near another
employer's worksite (such a~ NOSR-I and NOSR -3) .
• See Secti on OS . 5 and Concern

T~ . 1 - 4 .

• The foll?wing cor.cern was fully ide nti fied in the JBEC selfassessme nt (Apr il 1992) .
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CONCERN:
(VS.6-1)
(H1/C1)

The operating contractor does not comply wi th the requl rements of
29 CfR 1910.1200. Hazard COIIIIIunlcatlon.

4.5.11

Occupational Safeh

4.5.11.1

Overview

All five Occupational Safety performance objectives were addressed in this
appraisal. The appraisal was conducted through a combination of NPR-3 site
walkthroughs, equipment and facility assessments, work practice evaluations,
personnel interviews, policy and procedure reviews, and records and
documentation reviews. Walkthroughs were conducted of most NPR-3 facilities
including the tank batteries, test stations, production areas, steamf100d
fa~i1ities, waterf100d facilities, shops, warehouse, safety and health
facility, chemical dock, and the LTS Gas Plant. Various operations were
either observed or discussed with workers . Policies, procedures, programs,
records, work permits, and other documentation were reviewed at the site and
in JBEC offices. Discussions and interviews were conducted with JBEC
representatives from the various line organizations, Safety and Health
Section, Environmental Section, subcontracts organization, and other groups.
Interviews were also conducted with DOE/NPOSR-CUW personnel responsible for
environment, safety, and health .
A line management safety program is in place at NPR-3. Systems have been
implemented to apply a safety and health program, including inspections,
deficiency reporting and tracking, safety meetings, permit processes, and
others. In general, the JBEC line organization demonstrates interest and
emphasis on safety and has been successful in identifying and correcting many
safety deficiencies. Nevertheless, safety deficiencies remain which have not
been identified and corrected, particularly in the area of electrical safety.
In many respects, JBEC takes an informal approach to the implementation and
application of safety and health requirements . Although informal, the
approach often demonstrates some degree of effectiveness . One example is
safety and health training. Much of the training provided takes the form of
informal briefings in the field or during safety meetings. Yet, in many
cases, workers demonstrated knowledge in the application of safe work
practices and were aware of hazards associated with their activities . But
notable exceptions existed where it was apparent that workers required
additional information and training to avoid unsafe practices and conditions .
A second example is the lack of operating procedures with safety requirements.
Despite the lack of many formal procedures, safety issues are generally
considered and applied by the workers .
In some instances the informal approach has failed to achieve the desired
result, and workers are placed at risk. As examples, JBEC has been
ineffective in assessing and properly controlling the hydrogen sulfide hazard,
in controlling confined space entries, and in controlling hazardous energy
through a lockout/tagout program . The confined space deficiency is a Category
II Concern .
The Safety and Health Section is staffed with three well qualified
individuals; the Section Manager, a Safety and Health Professional , and a
Training Specialist . In addition to occupational safety and health
responsibility, the Section also has responsibility for the Emergen=y
Preparedness Program , the Fire Protection Program , and Medical Program .
Supplemental resources are not available through a subcontract mechanism to
assist in addressing all areas of responsibility. The Section has not
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formally set its priorities, and it has not determined which operations and
associated hazards require its specific involvement, oversight, and support.
Hazard identification, evaluation, and control is a significant deficiency at
NPR-3. The evaluation and response to the hydrogen sulfide hazard is one
example . A hazard evaluation has not been conducted despite hydrogen sulfide
in tanks and vessel s. well in excess of that iRl11ediately dangerous to 1ife and
health. Control criteria have not been established. JBEC policies and
procedures concerning restricted areas and personal protection are
inconsistent. All areas with potential sources of high hydrogen sulfide have
~ot been identified.
Despite the formation of a project team to address this
Issue~ the effort lacks coordination, planning and approaches, objectives, and
a basIs for decisions. Other hazardous conditions which lack thorough
evaluation and/or proper controls include electrical safety, control of
hazardous energy sources, confined space entry, chemical handling, benzene
exposures, and lead exposures. The lack of hazard identification, evaluation
and control is a Category II Concern .
'

4.5.11

Findings and Concerns

OS.1

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE : Site and facility organization and administration
should ensure effective implementation and control of the occupational safety
program.
FINDINGS:

• The JBEC Safety· and Health Section has one Safety and Health
Profe~sional supporting field activities, one Training
CoordInator, and a Section Manager . One additional Safety
Professional is on temporary assignment through September 1992 .
This staff not only conducts safety and health oversight,
support, and training, but is also responsible for fire
protection, emergency preparedness, ' and medlcal services.
The Section ' s functions are limited by personnel resources.
• No contractual mechanism is in place to obtain safety and
health subcontractor support as needed.

Although OSHA-type inspections are performed, the DOE/NPOSR-CUW Site Office
does not provide support, guidance, direction, and oversight to JBEC for its
safety and health program. The Site Office has not delineated its safety and
health expectations and has not provided JBEC with direction or assistance
concerning DOE Orders applicable to safety and health.

• The Safety and Health Section has not established a staffing
plan around goals, objectives, roles, and responsibilities .
(See Concern OA.6-2)
• The Safety and Health Section has not prioritized its
functions. It has not conducted sufficient hazard analyses or
job safety analyses to determine which types of activities
require more intense support or oversight . It is not
necessarily involved in higher hazard operations, such as
confined space entry .

The JBEC self-assessment was thorough. JBEC at least partially identified all
occupational safety concerns. DOE/NPOSR-CUW identified the one occupational
safety concern directed toward the Site Office.

• The Safety and Health Section does not periodically conduct
audits or appraisals of safety and health program elements ,
such as 1ockout/tagout , chemical handling, confined space
entry, and others.
• The following concern was partially identified in the JBEC
self-assessment (April 1992) .
CONCERN:
(05.1-1)

(Hl/Cl)
FINDINGS:
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The operating contractor Safety and Health Section does not
provide all necessary support and oversight to the line
organization for the implementation of the Occupational Safety and
Health Program as required by DOE 5480.18 and DOE 5480.10.
• The DOE/ NPOSR -CUW Director of Contracts Surveillance and
Administration has safety and health as a collateral duty . The
Director ' s safety and health role and function are ill-def i ned.
Guidance, direction, and oversight is not provided to any
significant extent for the JBEC safety and health prog ram.
(See Concerns OA . I -2, OA . I -5, and ~A . 1-6. )
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• The DOE/NPOSR-CUW Environmental Speci alist conducts safety and
health OSHA-type inspections and provi des information t o the
Director of Contracts Surve i llance and Administration fo r awc' d
fee evaluation purposes . However , the organizational
interfaces, reporting mechanisms, and responsibilities between
the Environmental Spec i alist and Director are not clearly
establ ished.
• DOE/NPOSR-CUW does not provide regular safety and health
oversight of NOSR -1 and NOSR-3 sites .
• DOE/NPOSR-CUW does not provide any safety and health program
appra i sal s or assessments .
• DOE/NPOSR-CUW does not provide constructive and supportive
guidance to JBEC for the improvement of the safety and health
program or for the i mplementation of the safety and health
requirements of DOE Orders. (See Concern OA.1 -2.)
• DOE/NPOSR-CUW does not provide JBEC wi th clear safety and
health expect~tions to guide JBEC in the establishment of
priorities, objectives, and goal s.
• The following concern was identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW selfassessment (Apr i l 1992) .
CONCERN:
(OS.I-2)
(H2/Cl)

DOE/NPOSR-CUIf Site Office does not provide support, guidance, and
direction to the operating contractor regarding the Occupational
Safety and Health Prograll as required by DOE 5480.1B.

OS.2

PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTATION

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE : Procedures and documentation should prov i de
appropriate direction , record generation , and support for the occupational
safety program .
FINDINGS:

•

Few JBEC Operation Procedures are in place to define operating
requirements and specify associated safe work practices . (See
Concern OP . 3-1. )

• Section 1.3 of the JBEC Policy and Procedure Manual provides
safety and health policies, procedures, and programs . Many of
these Pol i cy and Procedure documents have been recently
prepared or revised and have not yet been fully implemented .
Examples include: Lock, Tag, and Try Procedure ; Hearing
Conservation Program ; In-House Training; Subcontractor Safety
Monitoring ; and Industrial Hygiene; and Safety Awards , among
others .
• JBEC Pol icy and Procedure Number 1.3-27 , "Lock, Tag , and Try
Procedure ," defines the JBEC lockout/tagout program . The
procedure does not address all aspects of 29 CFR 1910 . 147 . For
instance, the procedure does not specify lock/ key control,
means to verify isolation, and annual audits to evaluate
program effectiveness . (See Concern WS .4-6.)
• JBEC Pol icy and Procedure 1.3-27 specifies that locks shall be
standard ized . This requirement is not yet in ' place .
•

Locks and keys are not well controlled . They are not alwa~s
kept in the possess i on of the employee performing the serVl ce
and maintenance . Often , locks and keys are kept unsecured on a
wall mounted station.

•

Logs of lockouts are not maintained as requi red by DOE 5480 . 19
to ensure operat ional status control. (See Concern OP .3 -2 . )

•

Verificati on t hat energy sources have been isolated by the
lockout/tagout process is not always performed . A standard
procedure for verification is not i n place .

• JBEC Policy and Procedure Number 1.3-36, "Hearing Conservation
Program, " requires that each fi eld job classification be
monitored for 8-hour time weighted average exposure to noise .
Noi~e monitoring ,was performed in 1990 , and some follow -up
monltorlng has Slnce been conducted. The monitoring approach
and data analysis , however, were not conducted i n a manner to
identify which workers or job classificat ions shoul d be
enrolled into a hearing co nservation program.
• Audiograms have been provided as part of the Hearing
Conservation Program to approximately 40 workers. However the
determination as to who receives audiograms was not fully based
on measured or predicted exposures to noise at or above the 85
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decibel (dBA) standard. Workers wi th comparable dut ies may or
may not be given aud i ograms .

• The Safety and Health Section is not required to parti~ipate in
the process of hazard identification and ~ontrol, perm1t
issuance, verification that controls are 1n place, or any other
aspect of confined space entries.

The Hearing Conservation Program and JBEC practices are not in
full compliance with 29 CFR 1910 .95 . (See Concern MS.l-1 . )

• JBEC personnel authorizing entry are not necessarily fam i liar
with the activ i ties , facilities, or operat i ons where the entry
will occur . This is particularly true when the person
author i zi ng entry does not work in the operation or facility
where entry is to be conducted. Persons authorizing entry are
not comfortable with this situation .

• See Concerns OS . 2-2, WS .4-6 , WS .6-1 and OA .I- 2.
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC sel fassessment (April 1992).
CONCERN:
(05.2-1)
(HI/CI)

The operating contractor occupational safety and health program as
defined in the Policy and Procedure Manual is not fully
implemented, and various program elements are not in compl lance
with DOE 5480.4 and Occupational Safety and Health Administration
standards.

FINDINGS:

• JBEC Policy and Procedure Number 1.3-26, "Hot and Cold Work
Permi ts, " dated 1988, includes requ i rements for confi ned space
entry . This procedure is not consistent with many aspects of
Draft 29 CFR 1910.146 and ANSI ZI17 . 1-1989 . Examples include:
hazard defi niti ons , rescue provisions , and training
requirements , among others .

• Confined space entry permits are comple~ed for entries . . All
required i nformation is not always prov1ded on the perm1t, such
as the names of all authorized entrants and attendants, rescue
provisions , and monitoring requirements .
• Confined spaces are not always labelled. In addition, those
that are labelled are not properly labelled with a red and
black danger sign indicating, confined space, enter by permit
only .
• Hazards associated with various types of confined spaces and
entri es have not been identified .

• A revised Work Permit Policy and Procedure was adopted dur ing
this assessment on June 26, 1992. It contains l i ttle
i nformation on confined space entry , but references a
"Procedure for Safe Work Permitting ," dated April 1990 . This
1990 procedure i s a training aide . It also does not address
all necessary aspects of the standards cited above.
• Rescue provisions are not clear in Policy and Procedure 1.3-26
and in the "Procedures for Safe Work Permitting ." The
procedures correctly state that the attendant is to perform
rescue functi ons from ou tsi de the space , but also discuss
rescuers entering the space, without ident i fying who the
rescuers will be. The procedure doe s not state whether an inhouse rescue team or outside rescue team wil l be used.
Training in confined space rescue has not been provided to i nhouse personnel, as required by the standard.
Attendants and entrants receive only 2 hours of i n-house
~ nfined space entry training. There is no di st inct i on between
he training provided t o attendants and entrants .

• All confined spaces have not been identified and are not always
recognized as confined spaces. As an example , the lower level
of the LTS Gas Plant Compressor Building i s under a grating and
has limited access points. Gas pipelines are located i n t he
space and the potential for gas accumulation, explosion , and
f i re exists . The space was not considered a confined space .
Workers enter to turn valves to drain liquid hydrocarbons from
l ines.
• The following concern was partially identified in the JBEC
self-assessment (April 1992).
CONCERN:
(05 . 2-2)
(HI/tl)
tAT. II

The operating contractor has not identified all confined space
hazards and does not control entries in accordance with Draft 29
CFR 1910.146 and ANSI ZI17 .1-1989.

• Persons authorizing entry who are re sponsible for identifying
and controlling haza rds, specifying permi t conditions, and
issuing the permit are provided only a mi nimal 2-4-hour i nhouse training course. JBEC consi ders that the attendance of
this course qual i fies t he individual to authorize entry ;
however , this degree of training cannot ensure that the persons
authorizing entry are qualif i ed in hazard identification and
control .
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05.3

•

MAHAGElIEHT OF SAFETY CONCERNS

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Physical and/or other environmental stresses arising
in the workplace should be identified, evaluated , and controlled.
FINDINGS:

• Mandatory audits, such as for 10ckout/tagout to assess program
effectiveness and proper hazard controls, are not conducted .

• A documented program has not been established to identify,
evaluate, and control occupational safety and health concerns .

• See Concerns TS.2-1 and FP .3- 1.

• Job safety analyses have not been conducted for many
operations.
• Al t hough an industrial hygiene consultant conducted a st udy in
1990, fo110wup industrial hygiene surveys and monitoring
programs have not been conducted to effectively evaluate and
control hazards assoc i ated with many operations, such as
chemical hazards during well treating, benzene exposures from
produced crude oil and gas, and others . (See Concern OS . 4-2. )

Electrical safety hazards have not been evaluated and personal
protective equipment has not been specified and provided . (See
Concerns HA.3-1 and WS .4-S.)

•

The following concern was fully identified in the J8EC se1fassessment (April 1992) .

CONCERN:
(05.3-1)
(HI/CI)
CAT JJ

The operating contractor has not identified, evaluated, and
controlled .any occupational safety and health hazards as required
by DOE 5480.4, DOE 5480.10, and Occupational Safety and Health
Administration standards.

FINDINGS:

• The Safety and Health Section has not identified and
prioritized activities and !!peratlons that have associated
hazards requiring its involvement. oversight, or support. (See
Concern OS . 1-1. )

• Hydrogen sulfide is produced as a result of the steamf100d and ,
to a lesser extent, waterf100d operations . J8EC recently
formed a project planning team to evaluate and control the
hydrogen sulfide production and emissions. However , the
project team has not effectively planned and conducted the
hazard assessment and control process .

• The hydrogen sulfide hazard has not been evaluated, and
controls are not established based on a hazard analysis . A
plan for a hazard analysis has not been developed . (See
Concern OS . 3-2.)

• Although environment, safety and health, engineering , and
production are represented on the project planning team, a
coordinated approach to the hydrogen sulfide hazard has not
been estab 1i shed .

• Confined space hazards have not been identified.
OS.2-2.)

• A hazard analysis for hydrogen sulfide has n9t been performed .
A monitoring plan on which to base a hazard analysis has not
been established .

(See Concern

• Many operations and activities posing electrical, chemical, and
physical hazards are conducted by employees working alone in
remote areas. An evaluation has not been conducted of
operations and activities where employees work alone to
determine the degree of risk. A working alone policy, location
tracking system, and formal communication requirements have not
been developed based on risk.
•

Eye and skin hazards from chemical splashes are present during
various operations and activities at NPR-3, including the
preparation and handling of significant quantities of organic
solvents, phenols, acids, spontaneously ignitable
hydrosu1fites, and others. There is a general lack of eyewash
stations and showers located where these materials are handled
and with sufficient capacity to effectively flush the eye or
skin . The chemical dock area and well treatment activit ies in
the field pose particular hazards, although other areas and
activities suffer from a similar deficiency. J8EC has failed
to implement a solution to address the eyewash and shower
deficiency and to ensure the ab ility to treat an acute eye or
ski n inj ury (See Concern WS.4-8 . )
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• Restricted zones have been established at 200-foot perimeters
surrounding 3 facilities (i.e ., 2 test stati9ns and 1 tank
bdttery) associated with the steamf100d project . The 200 -foot
distance was arbitrarily established . The adequacy of this
zone has not been evaluated based on a hazard analysis
supported by monitoring data .
• An evaluation has not been conducted to determine whether other
areas should also be restricted . Other areas impacted by the
steamflood project, such as the production areas which receive
produced oil and water from steamflood wells , show simi,ar
levels of hydrogen sulfide in tanks and skim boxes as the ar&as
whic h are considered to be restricted zones. However , these
areas are not under the same requirements as the restricted
zones.
Production area 8- 1-10 had been considered free from hydrogen
sulfide even though it receives oil and water produced from
steamflood wells and even though another production area (i.e.,
8-1-3) was known to have high levels of hydrogen sulfide in the
tanks . Sampling prompted by t he S&H Subteam revealed hydrogen
4-123

::69

• The following concern was partially identified in the JBEC
self-assessment (April 1992) .

sulfide levels over 1,000 parts per million (ppm) in the oil
tank .
• Sampling for environmental purposes is conducted monthly at the
200-foot perimeter sU ~Tounding the three test/tank battery
areas where hydrogen sulfide emissions are suspected . These
data have not been used to evaluate the positioning of the
restricted zone or to make judgements concerning worker
protection and hazard controls.
•

CONCERN:
(OS.3-2)
(Hl/Cl)

The operating contractor has not evaluated and controlled the
hydrogen sulfide hazard associated with the steaJIflood project as
required by DOE 5480.10.

Little, if any, exposure monitoring for workers is conducted
within the 200-foot boundary where exposures would be expected
to be higher than at the perimeter . Monitoring has not been
conducted to evaluate exposures relative to the OSHA
permissible exposure limit or to the concentration immediately
dangerous to life or health (IDLH).

• Occupi ed areas within the restricted zones have the potential
to accumulate hydrogen sulfide due to adjacent emissions and
restricted airflow . These areas include, among others,
fabricated buildings housing pumps near heaters and tanks, pits
collecting tank runoff, diked areas, depressions, and other
buildi ngs. These areas have not been evaluated for their
potential to accumulate hydrogen sulfide .
• Contrary to JBEC policy and procedure, workers do not place
monitors at arms length to determine whether hazardous levels
of hydrogen sulfide are present before entering these areas.
In the 3 restricted areas, workers are req' Ii red to wear
hydrogen sulfide alarm monitors to alert them if they have
entered an are i above 10 ppm, in which case they would retreat .
However , due to the response time of these alarms, sufficient
warning would not be provided to prevent them from entering an
IDLH area, and t o· ensure their ability to escape in time.
• JBEC has not established hydrogen sulfide ·triteria (e.g .,
concentrati on in tanks , i n ambient ai r, in ai r around tanks and
other emission sources) on which to base dec i sions regarding
exposure controls or area restr i ctions .
•

Requirements for respiratory protection to access the tops of
oil and water tanks are inconsistent. For instance , at
production area B-1-3, hydrogen sulfide concentrations in water
and oil tanks are approximately the same, wi th both regularly
exceeding 1,000 ppm. The use of a supplied air respirator is
required t o access the top of the water tank, but is not
required for the oi l tank.

• Warning sign requirements for access to the tops of tanks are
arbitrary and are not based or. a hazard analysis. Some tanks
have no warning signs; others are posted as requiring an alarm
monitor; others require both a monitor and supplied air
respirator.
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OS.4

• An asbestos abatement project is planned to be subcontracted at
NOSR- l and NOSR-3. The procurement contains appropriate safety
information and requirements. However, JBEC has not
established the process or responsible party within its
organization to conduct oversight to ensure and document that
the asbestos hazard will be properly abated and controlled.

SURVEILLANCE OF SAFETY CONCERNS

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Appropriate surveillance of activities should be
conducted to measure safety performance and ensure the continued effectiveness
of controls .
FINDINGS:

• Accidents and injuries are recorded and investigated, but are
not evaluated for root cause.

• See Concern MA . 2-2.
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC se1fassessment (April 1992).

• NPR-3 has not implemented and maintained a hazard prevention
program which addresses physical hazards identifiable from the
current OSHA 200-10gs and JBEC Report of Injury/Illness/Near
Miss . There is no evidence that exists that recurrent hazards
have been addressed with a sitewide accident prevention
program .

CONCERN:
(OS.4-2)
(HI/Cl)

Proc.ises and responsibilities for subcontractor safety
surveillance have not been established by the operating contractor
as requi red by DOE 5480.9.

• Accidents and injuries are not trended.

FINDINGS

• The line organizations apply a series of safety checklists to
conduct monthly or periodic workplace inspections to identify
safety deficiencies. These inspections focus on facility and
equipment condition. Comparable reviews are not conducted to
evaluate the effectiveness of safety and health program
elements .

• See Concerns TS .4-1 and FR .6-1 .
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC se1fassessment (April 1992) .
CONCERN:
(OS.4-1)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor does not record, trend, or evaluate
accidents and injuries for root cause as required by DOE 5483.IA,
DOE 5484.1, and 29 CFR 1904.

FINDINGS:

• Oversight responsibility for subcontractors is not clearly
defined .
• Contracting Officer's Technical Representatives (COTRs) are
assigned from within the line organization to perform technical
oversight function s ; however, " the COTRs do not conduct safety
oversight. The JBEC Policy and Procedure for subcontractor
monitoring requires that the COTR perform a safety overs i ght
function ; however , this procedure was only recently adopted and
has not yet been implemented .
• COTRs prepare a quarterly technical performance evaluation for
submittal to the subcontracts administrator, but safety
performance is not considered in this evaluation.
• Subcontract administrators neither request nor formally receive
any information regarding safety performance .
• The Safety and Health Section and others within the line
organizations perform occasional safety oversight of
subcontractors, but such oversight is not a programmatic
function.
• Some procurements and subcontracts contain importan t safety and
health related information and requirements, as wel l as require
submittals by the subcontractor regarding safety issues.
However, the responsibility for review and approval of such
submittals is not clearly established and is not always conducted .
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• An industrial hygiene survey of selected activities was
conducted by a subcontractor in 1990, and some fo110wup
monitoring is performed by the JBEC Safety and Health Section.
However, hazard analyses and exposure monitoring have not been
conducted in a manner to fully determine the degree of hazard
and necessity for controls for many items, including the
following as examples:
naturall y occurring radioactive materials deposited in
pipelines, valves, and other equipment;
benzene from crude oil and gas production and proces sing;
chemicals used in well treatment such as isobutano1 ,
ethyl benzene , xylene, dimethy1formamide, and meronidazone
(a suspect carcinogen);
- noise (some mon i tor i ng is performed , but not i n a manner to
determine workers with exposures above 85 dBA for en rollment
in the hearing conservation program) ;
- hydrogen sulfide (see Concern OS.3 -2) ; and
l ead during spray painting operations .
• The Safety and Health Section does not identify and rout i nely
perform safety and health surveillance for activities that are
deemed to pose higher levels of r i sk to employees, such as
confined space entries , chemical handling, and use of
spontaneously ignitable mater i als (e.g ., hydrosu1fites and iron
sponges) .
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CONCERN:
(05.4-3)
(H1/C1)

• See Concerns 05.1 -1 and 05.3-1.

05.5

PERSONNEL COMMUNICATION PROGRAM

• The following concern was partially identified in the JBEC
self-assessment (Apr i l 1992) .

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Site/facility personnel should be adequately informed
of physical stresses that may be encountered in their work environment .

The operating contractor does not conduct an effective
surveillance and exposure monitoring program to ensure effective
control of safety and health hazards as required by DOE 5480.10
and DOE 5480.1B.

FINDINGS:

• Safety meetings are held on a weekly basis by line
organizations . The Safety and Health Sect i on does not provide
any significant input to these meetings to ensure that
appropriate topics are addressed .
• The safety meetings are considered by the line organizations to
co~stitute OSHA compliance-oriented training in certain safety
topics . However , any training conducted in these meetings is
generally informal, of short duration, and not conducted in a
manner to fulfill training requirements of OSHA standards.
• Confined space entry training is of short duration and cannot
ensure that trainees are qualified to perform their function.
(See Concerns 05 . 2-2 and TC.4-1.)
• Hazard communication training is of short duration and is
generic . Well treatment personnel handling si gnificant
quantities of a wide variety of chemicals have been informally
briefed on Material Safety Data Sheets, but have not received
hazard communication training specific to their operations.
(See Concern WS .6-1.)
•

Competent person training has not been provided as required by
various OSHA standards.

• Qualifications of operators are not verified, and certification
training is not provided for heavy equipment and crane
operators .
CONCERN:
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See Concerns TC.1-1 and TC.4-1.
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4.5.12

Fire Protection

4.5.12.1

Overview

Na~rona County Fire Department, which is located near Casper.
Respons~ tIme for the Midwest and Edgerton Fire Departments to the site is
15-20 m~nutes, an~ for.the . Natron~ County Fire Department, the response time
40 -50 m~nutes. F~re f~ght~ng equ~p~e~t used by the three fire departments
responsIble for fIre fIghtIng actIvItIes at NPR-3 meets minimum NFPA Standards
for fighting fires involving petroleum and petroleum products.

and the

The fire protection appraisal addressed six of the seven performance
objectives as outlined in DOE/EH-0135 "Performance Objectives and Criteria for
Technical Safety Appraisals at Department of Energy Facilities and Sites,"
dated June 1990. Performance Objective FP.4 Impairment of Operations was not
appraised as the site would not be vulnerable to being shut down for an
unacceptable period as the result of a credible fire. The S&H Subteam
appraisal addressed the technical adequacy and overall effectiveness of the
site Fire Protection Program in meeting the six performance objectives. The
appraisal was performed by conducting inspections of selected buildings ,
maintenance shops, tank storage facilities, the LTS Gas Plant, steam generator
buildings, test treaters, and Crude Tank Battery installations. It also
included interviews with site personnel responsible for the fire protection
program, Supervisors, technicians, craft personnel, members of the newly
formed Emergency Response Team (ERT), and managers throughout the site .
A review of training records and fire equipment inspection checklist was also
conducted.
The i nformation developed from these interviews, inspections, and of document
reviews was evaluated against provisions of DOE 5480 . 4, DOE 5480 .7, DOE
6430.IA , and the DOE Fire Resource Manual; the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) Standards, specifically NFPA 101 "Life Safety Code," NFPA
Standard 1500 Fire Department Occupational Safety & Health, and NFPA 30
Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code; Standards of the Highly Protected Risk
Insurance Industry; and fire protection standards associated with the
petroleum industry.
Overall responsibility for the NPOSR-CUWFire Protection Program is assigned
to the Director of DOE/NPOSR-CUW in accordance with DOE 5480.7.
Organizat i onal responsibility is assigned to the DOE Director of Contract
Surveillance and Administration. Operational responsibility for the Fire
Protection Program is assigned to the JBEC S&H Manager .
The Improved Risk/Highly Protected Risk levels of fire protection as defined
by the major insurance underwriters and requirements as defined in DOE Orders
and the DOE Fire Resource Manual have not been established at the
DOE/NPOSR -CUW facilities .
The scope of the NPOSR-CUW Fire Protection Program only covers maintenance,
annual testing and inspection of portable fire extinguishers . JBEC uses a
certified Wyoming subcontractor to perform the required maintenance and
testing of the port able fire extinguishers on an annual basis. Limited
training of JBEC employees on the use of fire extinguishers is performed by a
training specialist assigned to the Safety and Health Section and is conducted
on a yearly basis .
There is no fire department organization or fire brigade at NPR-3, NOSR-I, or
NOSR -3. Fire fighting protection for NOSR - I is furnished by the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM). Fire fighting protection for NOSR-3 is furnished by
the Rifle and Parachute Volunteer Fire Departments. Fire fighting protection
for NPR-3 is furnished by the Midwest and Edgerton Volunteer Fire Departments

The newly created Emergency Response Team (ERT) has not been formalized' has
not been ~utfitted properly with Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) su~h as
bunker SUItS, SCBAs, and fire helmets; and has not received sufficient
t rai~i~g in the many di~cip1i~es needed to make a group such as this
profIcIent. The enthusIasm dIsplayed by the members of this team and
witnessed during this appraisal would indicate this group could provide a high
level of emergency related services to the site until further assistance is
available, provided they are well equipped and trained .
fixe~ ~r . automatic fire extinguishing systems installed at any
~he NPOSR-~UW fa~11Itl~s. There are no dedicated fire water systems which
Includes f~re ~alns, fIre hydrants, fire pumps, or sufficient water storage

There are no

of

for fIre fIghtIng at any of the NPOSR-CUW facilities. At NPR-3 there is a
warehouse in operation that contains highly flammable insu1atio~ ' within the
warehouse, a Mezzaine Office was installed over the Supervisor's'office
c~nstructed of wood ~ateria1. This situation results in a higher than ~orma1
fIre hazard . Also, In the NPR-3 Maintenance Shop a hot oil truck is
occasionally stored that contains 75 barrels of hot crude oil and two, 500
gallon propane tanks. There are no fixed fire extinguishing systems in either
of these buildings. The propane and butane/gasoline tanks located at the LTS
Gas Plant have no fixed deluge sprinkler systems or fixed fire monitor
protection . This failure to protect facilities against high value property
losses was identified as a Category II Concern.
DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC personnel do not clearly understand their authorities
accountabilities, or interfaces with supporting groups in relation to fire '
protection activities.
Responsibilities for implementation and execution of the Fire Protection
Program have not been effectively communicated to responsible managers,
supervisors and hourly employees , and they do not understand their fire
protection responsibilities.
No Safety Analysis Re~orts (SARs), Fire Hazard Analysis, or similar documents
have been prepared whIch evaluate the potential release of hazardous materials
bey~nd the site/facility boundaries as a result of a fire at NPR -3. Although
rev~e~s.are made .of any new construction or modification to existing
facIlItIes for fIre protection features, there is no formal program in place
to assure compliance with the standards of the NFPA 101, "Life Safety Code."
There is no Fire Barrier Program in place to
result of spills or fire fighting activity.
surveys are n~t conducted as required by DOE
personnel medIcal records storage facilities
protection standards .
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control liquid run-off as a
Fire protection engineering
5480.7. Vi tal record storage and
do not meet current fire

The JBEC self-assessment was considered to be thorough and candid . JBEC
addressed all of the concerns in their self-assessment. The DOE/NPOSR
self-assessment noted all of the performance objectives in their selfassessment. However, the self-assessment did not address all of the concerns
in depth.
In order for DOE/NPOSR-CUW to meet and to achieve DOE requirements for fire
protection, a strong management culture that clearly defines the Fire
Protection Program, organization, responsibilities, accountabilities,
training, resource allocations, and interfaces with supporting groups needs to
be establ ished.

4.5 . 12.2

Findings and Concerns

FP.l

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Fire protection organization and administration should
ensure the effective implementation and control of the fire protection
equipment and activities .
FINDINGS:

• There is no policy established for the overall Fire Protection
Program by either DOE/NPOSR-CUW or JBEC .
• Sufficient resources have not been allocated to accomplish a
Fire Protection Program as required by DOE 5480 . 7.
• The fire protection organizational structure is not well
defined or understood.
• There are no Fire Protection Program implementation procedures
in place .
•

Responsibilities and authority of each management, supervisor,
and professional position within the fire protection
organizat i on are not defined.

•

Personnel do not clearly understand their authority,
responsibilities, accountabilities and interfaces with
supporting groups.

• Site/facility fire protection standards have not been
established and incorporated in the plans and specifications
for all new buildings and major modifications of existing
buildings as required by DOE 6430 . 1A .
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992) .
CONCERN:
(FP.l-l)
(HI/CI)

The operating contractor has not developed a Fire Protection
Program as required by DOE 5480.7, DOE 6430.1A, and the DOE Fire
Resource Manual.

FINDINGS:

• DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not established organizational responsibility
to provide guidance or oversight for a Fi re Protect i on Program .
• See Concern OA . I -2.
• The following concern was fully ident i fied in the DOE/NPOSR -CUW
self-assessment (April 1992) .

CONCERN:
(FP.I-2)
(HI/CI)

DOE/NPOSR-CUW Site Office has not provided guidance to the
operat i ng contractor on resources , organi zat ion, and
administrative systems necessary for the effective implementation
and control of the Fire Protection Program as required by DOE
5480.7, DOE 6430.1A, and DOE Fire Resource Manual.
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FP.2

The Energy 1 Building does not have an automatic sprinkler
system and only has fire detectors installed in the large ,
first floor, Assembly Room .

LIFE PROTECTION

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: All facilities onsite should provide adequate life
safety provisions against the effects of fire .
FINDINGS:

• There is no program in place to ensure that facilitie s comply
with NFPA 101 , "Life Safety Code" requi rements . Exampl es
include:
There is breaching of the ceiling in Mechanical Room of the
Operations Office Building .

• The following concern was fully identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW
self-assessment (April 1992) .
CONCERN:
(FP.2-2)
(H2/Cl)

DOE/NPOSR-CUW Site Office is not in full compliance with the
National Fire Protection Association Standard 101, "Life Safety
Code.
U

- Some exi t doors at the Safety Building do not open in way of
exit travel .
- There is no emergency exit for the upstairs office of the
warehouse .
• The newly created ERT has not received sufficient training in
their emergency duties , do not have personal protective
equipment available , and are not formally organized as a fire
fighting unit. Examples include:
Prefi re plans have not been developed .
ERT members have not been fully trained in search and rescue
operations. (See Concerns EP .3-1 and EP .4-1.)
There are no formal training or drill schedules developed.
A documented program does not exist requiring ERT members to
tour their respective facility or site a minimum of once each
quarter .
• The follow i ng concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992) .
CONCERN :
(FP . 2- 1)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor is not in full compliance with the
National Fire Protection Association Standard 101, "Life Safety
Code ."

FINDINGS : • DOE/ NPOSR-CUW has no program in place to ensure that facilities
comply with NFPA 101 , "Life Safety Code" requirements .
Exampl es include :
JBEC offices located at the Cottonwood Office Building has a
partial Fire Detect i on System and is not protected by an
automatic sprinkler system ; personnel in some offices can not
hear the evacuat i on alarm signal when it is activated ; and
not all areas have f i re extinguishers available.
DOE occupied offices at the Cottonwood Office Building has no
fire detect i on system or an automatic sprinkler system; not
all areas have f i re extinguishers.
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FP.3

PUBLIC PROTECTION

FP.5

PERFORIIANCE OBJECTIVE: All facilities onsite should provide adequate
protection to prevent any added threat to the public as the result of an
onsite fire causing the release of hazardous mater ials beyond the site or
facil ity boundary.
FINDINGS:

PERFORIIANCE OBJECTIVE: A maximum credible fire , as defined in DOE 5480.7 ,
Section 6.f., should not result in an unacceptable property loss.
FINDINGS:

• SARs which contain fire hazard analysi s information for
evaluating the potential release of hazardous materials beyond
the site or facility boundary have not been developed.

• The improved Risk/Highly Protected Risk levels of Fire
Protection as defined by the major insurance underwriters and
requirements as defined in DOE Orders and the DOE Fire Resource
Manual have not been established by DOE/NPOSR-CUW.
• There are no fixed or automatic fire extinguishing systems in
service at NPR-3.

• A fire or explosion in one of the bullet tanks located near the
lTS Gas Plant would place the publ ic at risk due to the
proximity of the tanks to a public access road . (See NPR -3
loss Prevent i on Report dated April 10, 1992 , prepared by JBEC
Houston . )

• There is a warehouse at NPR-3 that is insulated with a highly
flammable insulation, has a wooden constructed office with two
floors, and has no fixed fire protection system in place . (See
NPR-3 Loss Prevention Report, dated April 10, 1992 , prepared by
JBEC Houston . )

• There are no automatic or fixed fire protection systems
i nstalled at NPR-3.

• There is no dedicated fire water system in service at NPR-3.
For example there are no fire mains , no fire hydr ants , and no
fire hose reels ; only a limited amount of water is stored at a
remate location· from most of the buildings ; and there are no
fire pumps .

• There i s no documented Fire Barrier Program in place to control
release of liquid and hazardous materials to the public during
a fire .
• This concern was fully identified in the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992) .
CONCERN:
(FP.3-1)
(HZ/CI)

PROPERTY PROTECTION

• OOE/NPOSR-CUW operates a South Terminal/LACT facility at NPR-3
without fire fighting foam protection for either the crude oil
tank or bad oil tank .

The operating contractor has not established a Fire Barrier
Program for controlling hazardous materials releases to the public
from a credi ble fire according to the requirements of DOE 5480.7.

• OOE/NPOSR-CUW operates crude oil tank batteries at NPR-3
without fire fighting foam protection for the crude oil tanks.
• The Maintenance Shop at NPR-3 occas ionally stores a Hot Oil
truck that may contain 75 barrels of hot crude oil and two 500
gallon propane tanks and is not protected by a f i xed fire
prot ection system. (See NPR -3 Loss Prevention Report , dated
April 10, 1992 , prepared by JBEC Houston . )
• The Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) and butane/gasoline tanks
located at the LTS Gas Plant have no fixed deluge sprinkler
systems or fixed fire monitor protection installed . Spacing
and diking of these tanks do not meet the requirements of
29 CFR 1910 . 110 . (See Concern WS .4-7 and NPR-3 Loss Prevention
Report, dated April 10 , 1992, prepared by JBEC Houston . )
• JBEC has not provided ass urance th at fire losses will not
exceed t he guidelines of DOE 5480.7 .
• This concern was fully ide ntified in the JBEC self-assessment
(April 1992).
CONCERN:
(FP.5-1)
(HI/el)
CAT. II

4-136

37d.-

The operating contractor does not protect Naval Petroleum Reserve
Number 3 facilities against property losses in excess of
gUidelines of DOE 5480 .7 for a maximum credible fire.
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FP.6

FIRE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: The Fire Department should have the capacity to
promptly terminate and mitigate the effects of a fire in a safe and effective
manner.
FINDINGS:

• There is no Organized full-time fire department or fire brigade
on any of the NPOSR-CUW si tes. A corrective action plan has
not been developed to achieve compliance with NFPA Standard
1500 for fire department operations.
• Fire fighting protection for NPR-3 is furnished by the Midwest
and Edgerton Volunteer Fire Departments and the Natrona County
Fire Department , which are 20 and 50 minutes away,
respectively .
•

Fire Protection for NOSR-l is furnished by the BLM which is 30
miles away from the site and for NOSR-3 by the Rifle and
Parachute Volunteer Fire Departments, each of which are 10
miles away from these sites.

• Quarterly visits and orientation to the sites by local fire
department members as required by DOE 5480.7 and NFPA 1500 are
not being conducted.
• There are no signed formal agreements with any outside agencies
for fire protection activities, with the exception of NOSR- l
which has a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) wi t h the Bureau
of Land Management.
• See Concerns EP.I-2 and FP . I -2.
• This concern was fully ident i f i ed in the DOE/ NPOSR -CUW selfassessment (April 1992).
CONCERN:
(FP.6-1)
(H2/Cl)

DOE/NPOSR-CUW Site Office has not established formal agreements
with local fire departments to respond to emergencies, participate
in drills and exercises, and to conduct quarterly visits to the
sites as required by DOE 5480 . 7.
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FP.7

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: A fire protect i on eng i neering program should be i n
place to effedively provide and maintain an " improved ri s k" level of f i re
protection .
FINDINGS:

CONCERN:
(FP.7-1)
(H2/Cl)

•

There is no documented Fire Barrier Maintenance pr ograms in
place as required by NFPA Standard 80 and DOE 5480 . 7.

•

There have been no SARs, Fire Hazard Analysis, or other s imilar
documents prepared to asses s the potential impact of credible
fires .

•

An annual documented revi ew of the Fi re Protection Program is
not be i ng done .

•

Procedures are not in place for the safe use of welding and
cutting operations and the use of flammable and hazardou s
materi al s .

•

~ire protection engineering surveys are not conducted as
requ i red by DOE 54BO . 7 .

•

Vital records storage and personal medical records storage do
not meet current fi re protect i on standards.

•

This concern was fully identified in the JBEC self-asses sment
(April 1992).

The operating contractor does not meet the requirements relating
to the Fire Protection Engineering Program as required by DOE
5480.7.

4.5.13

Medical Services

4.5 . 13.1

Overview

The Medical Services apprai s al was conducted using all five performance
objective s and the requirements of DOE 5480 .8. Interviews and discu s sions
were held with JBEC managers having resppnsibil ity for or interaction with
medi ca I programs . DOE/NPOSR - CUW managers wi th oversight respon s i bil i ty for
health and safety activities were interviewed. Pol icy and Procedure documents
were reviewed . Medical records (patient charts) were examined. Providers of
medical services were interviewed. Medical equipment was evaluated . The
NPR -3 site was visited. Orientat i on and familiarity with numerous facilities
were obtained. Managers, foremen, and employees encountered at random ~ere
irterviewed . An emergency exercise was observed and comments were submltted
for i ncorporat ion inSect i on 4 . 5.6 Emergency Preparedness _.
Providing medical programs in compliance wit h DOE 5480 . 8 for a small work
force di spersed at a remote site is a di fficult task . There is a lack of
understanding of most of the medical requirements of OSHA and DOE 5480 . 8, both
by DOE/NPOSR- CUW and JBEC . This has impeded implementation of the
comprehensive Occupational Medical Program mandated by DOE 5480.8. The
program lacks the leadership that needs to be exerted by a con sultant
physician trained and experienced in occupational medicine and knowledgeable
of DOE 5480.8. Planning and prioritization of medical programs is driven and
I imited by allocation of resources rather than on an as required basis.
The medical program i s not documented by a comprehensive wr.itten plan .
Multiple policies and programs are present . Professional medical services ar e
provided by contractors. Perso~n~l, safe~y and health, and co~t~actor and
procurement managers interact mlnlmally wlth the contract physlcnn . The
contract physician does not participate in pol icy or program development and
is not knowledgeable of them. Attempts to meet OSHA and DOE 5480 . 8 medical
requi rement s fall s hort because of lack . of profe~si o~a I i nvo I veme~t. The
scope of existing programs, s uch as medlcal examlnatlons for resplrator use
and audiograms, is limited by the ar bitrary allocation of funds .
Examinations are performed on some new hires. Before assignment to respirator
use , employees receive medical clearance . Audiograms are performed on
employees exposed to noise . Other per iodic examinations are not conducted .
Health evaluation on terminat i on of employment is not performed . Employees
returning to work after an illness or injury absence are requ i red to . h~ve a
relea se from their personal phys ician but not from the contract physlcnn .
JBEC has a comprehensive drug free work place policy , although it i s
infrequently and poorly communicated. New employees receive informa~ion as
part of orientation and s ign off that they have knowledge of the POllCY . Drug
testing is done on all new hi r es and is required by pol ic~ to be performed for
cause but is not being implemented . It may also be requlred on a random
basi s ' after completion of a r ecovery program . There is no formal Employee
Assistance Program (EAP). Employees seeking help for substance abuse are
referred by the Personnel Sect i on and are directed into programs covered ~y
the company medical in surance plan . Although no formal wellness program lS
conducted , health educat i on l i terature is avai I abl eons i te and is di stri buted
in mailings; articles on health appear i n the JBEC newsletter.
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Medical emergency care has been arranged. The first aid room is equipped for
minor accident and illness response. Multiple first aid kits and disaster
"jump packs" are distributed throughout the site . A defibrillator has not
been obtained, because of the legal requirements restricting use of such
equipment. First responders are emergency response team members, all of whom
are first aid trained and many are emergency medical technician (EMT) trained.
Community health care resources have been identified and informal arrangements
have been made for support. The emergency response capability was
demonstrated by an emergency exercise which was observed by the Tiger Team.
The identification of victims was a secondary priority to other emergency
activities .

4.5.13.2

Findings and Concerns

MS.l

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Site and facility organization and administration
should ensure effective implementation and control of the medical services
program .
FINDINGS : • JBEC does not require the contract physician to participate in
policy making or program development relative to the
Occupational Medical Program as required by DOE 5480 .8.
• The audiograms conducted as part of the .Medic?l Program ?n JBEC
personnel are performed without professlonal lnterpretatlon .

Findings supported concerns about education and training, leadership, written
pl an, medical records, examination programs, and counsel ing and education .
The DOE/NPOSR-CUW sel~-assessment identified some of the concerns. The JBEC
self-assessment identified most of the concerns fully and others partially.

• JBEC occupational medical programs are based on funds allotted
rather than compliance requirements of DOE Orders or
regulations.
The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (Apri 1 1992).
CONCERN:
{MS.l-i}
{H2/Cl}

The operating contractor does not have a plan for implementation
of the Occupational Medical Program as required by DOE 5480.8.

FINDINGS:

• JBEC lacks an understanding of the requirements of DOE 5480 .8.
• The contract physician provider lacks knowledge of OSHA and of
DOE 5480.8 requirements .
• JBEC management has not required implementation of the medical
requirements of DOE 5480 .8 by the provider.
• See Concern OA.I-2 .
• The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).

CONCERN:
{MS.I-2}
{H2/Cl}

The operating contractor does not require the providers of medical
services to implement the provisions of DOE 5480.8 .

FINDINGS:

• DOE/NPOSR-CUW lacks an understanding of the requirements of
DOE 5480 .8.
• See Concern OA . I -2.
• The follow i ng concern was fully identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW
self-asses sment (April 1992) .

CONCERN:
{MS.I-3}
{H2/Cl}

DOE/NPOSR-CUW Site Office does not require the operating
contractor to implement the provisions of DOE 5480. 8.
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FINDINGS:

•

•

•
CONCERN:
(MS.I-4)
(H2/CI)

Administration of the Workman's Compensation Program is
fragmented and decentralized . Admini strative responsibility is
delegated between the Personnel and Safety and Health Sections .
There is a procedure for following lost time job incurred
injuries, but it is not implemented. Currently physicians
reports are obtained only after a 60 - day absence interval.
Total costs of the program including medical care , lost time
payments , and permanent di sabil ity awards are not avail abl e.

MS.2

FINDINGS:

The following concern was not identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).

The operat i ng contractor does not have a central i zed
administrative program for the control of lost time costs,
disability benefit payments, medical costs, and disability
prevention as required by DOE 5480.8.

3'f')

AND DOCUMENTATION

•

JBEC policies and conduct of the Occupational Medical Program
are delegated among the Personnel , Safety and Health , and
Procurement Sections. There is no centralized direction .

•

There is no cohesive comprehensive plan for the JBEC
Occupational Medical Program .

CONCERN:

See Concerns MS.1-1, MS.1-2, and MS.1-3.

FINDINGS:

•

JBEC medical records do not contain comprehensive past medical
hi story, work hi story, or exposure hi story.

•

JBEC medical records do not contain a list of job requirements
or hazards in the workplace.

•

JBEC medical records do not chronicle the medical history after
emp 1oyment.

•

Complete blood counts of JBEC personnel are not performed .

•

JBEC medical records are retained by the contract physician
with copies in the Personnel Section .

•

JBEC audiograms are stored in the Safety and Health Section .

•

Results of pulmonary function testing for the respiratory
protect i on program on JBEC per sonne 1 are stored in the Safety
and Health Section .

•

See Concern 05.4 -3 .

•

The following concern was partially identified in the JBEC
self- assessment (April 1992).

CONCERN:
(MS.2-I)
(H2/C1)
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~ROCEDURES

PERFORNANCE OBJECTIVE: Procedures and documentation should provide
appropriate direction, record generation , and support of the medical services
for the facility and site .

The operating contractor does not collect or maintain complete
medical records, and existing records are not protected to assure
confidential ity as required by DOE 5480.8 .
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"EDICAl TREAT"ENT

PERSONNEL

CO~NICATION

PROGRAII

PERFORIIANCE OBJECTIVE: Medical treatment should be avail able and provided by
qualified, competent staff, and adequate facilities should be available.

PERFORIIANCE OBJECTIVE: Site/facil ity personnel should be adequately informed
of the medical hazards that may be encountered in their work environment and
of the medical services that are available .

FINDINGS:

FINDINGS:

•

Medical examinations are not performed on all JBEC new hires .

•

Voluntary periodic examinations are not offered to the majority
of the JBEC employees .

•

JBEC employees returning to work after illness/injury absence
of seven or more days do not receive a medical evaluation by
the company physician before being allowed to return to work.

•

The health of JBEC employees is not evaluated at termination of
employment.

•

COIICERN:
(~.3-1)

(H2/el)

JBEC personnel who have physical, chemical, or biological
hazards in their workplace are not receiving periodic medical
evaluations.

•

Preplacement examinations include x-rays of the back for JBEC
employees who will work in the field. This is not considered a
good medical practice and is not in agreement with Federal
directives for use of x-ray examinations .

•

Urine samples for drug testing of JBEC personnel are not
collected in a manner to assure rel iabil ity and to meet DOT
standards.

•

Audiograms performed for the JBEC Hearing Conservation Program
are not interpreted by a certified audiologist . (See Concerns
MS . I-3 and OS.2-1) .

•

The contract physician is not informed about the hazards or
physical job analys is when asked to evaluate JBEC employees for
res pi rator use . (See Concern MS . 2-1).

•

The following concern was partially identified in the JBEC
self - assessment (April 1992) .

CONCERN:
("S.5-1)
(H2/Cl)

•

There is a JBEC substance abuse policy, but it is infrequently
communicated and is not commonly known by JBEC employees .

•

There is no formal JBEC Employee Assistance Program.

•

There is no structured or formal wellness-health education
program for JBEC personnel .

•

See Concern OA.8-1.

•

The following concern was fully identified in the JBEC selfassessment (April 1992).

The operating contractor does not have progrilllS of counsel ing and
health education as required by DOE 5 BO.B.

The operating contractor INIdical eXilllination progrus do not INlet
the requirelMlnts of DOE 54BO.B and other Federal requirelMlnts.
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4.6

4.7

NOTEWORTHY PRACTICES

There were no noteworthy practices identified by the Safety and Health
Subteam.

SYSTEM FOR CATEGORIZING CONCERNS

Each concern contained in this report has been characterized using the
fo 11 owi ng three sets of criteri a .
A.

Catagory I: Addresses a situation for which a "clear and present"
danger ex i sts to workers or members of the pub1 i c . A concern in
this category is to be immediately conveyed to the managers of the
facil i ty for action . If a clear and present danger exists , the
Assistant Secretary for Environment , Safety and Health , or his/her
designee , is to be informed immediately so that consideration may
be given to exerc i sing the Secretary's facility shutdown authority
or directing other immediate mitigation measures .
Catagory II: Addresses a significilnt risk or substantial
noncompliance with DOE Orders but does not involve a situation for
which a clear and present danger ex i sts to workers or members of
the publ i c. A concern in this category i s to be conveyed to the
manager of the facility no later than the appraisal closeout
meeting for immediate attention. Category II concerns have a
significance and urgency such that the necessary field response
should not be delayed until the preparation of a final report or
the routine development of an act i on plan . Aga i n, considerat i on
should be given to whether compensatory measures, mitigation, or
facility shutdown are warranted under the circumstances.
Catagorv III: Addresses significant noncompliance with DOE
Orders, or the need for improvement in the margin of safety, but
is not of sufficient urgency to require immed i ate attention.

B.

C.

Hazard Levell:

Has the potent i al for causing a severe
occupational injury, illness , or fatality , or
the loss of the facility .

Hazard Level 2:

Has the potential for causing minor occupat ional
injury or illness or major property damage , or
as the potent i a1 for result i ng in , or
contri but i ng to , unnecessary expos ure to
radiation or toxic substances .

Hazard Level 3:

Has 1 ittle potential for threaten i ng safety,
hea lth, or property.

Compliance Level I:
Does not comply with DOE Order s , prescribed pol i cies or
standards , or documented accepted practices. The latter i s a
profe ssional judgment based on the acceptance and appl icabil ity
of nati onal con sensus st andards not prescribed by DOE
r equ i rements .
Compliance Level 2:
Does not comply with DOE references, standards or guidance , or
wi t h good pr act i ce (as der i ved from industry experi ence , but
not ba sed on nat i ona 1 consensus standar ds ) .
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Ca.pliance Level 3 :
Has little or no compl i ance cons i derat i ons . These concerns are
based on professional judgment in pursuit of excellence in
design or practice, i. e . , these are i mprovement s for thei r own
sake and are not deficiency driven .

4.8

CATEGORIZATION AlII TABULATION OF CONCERNS

4.8.1

Categorization of Concerns

Concerns
Number

Potent i al

Hazar(~l)

Level
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Compliance
Level (C)

Concerns
Number

H

Potenti al
Hazard
Level (H)

COIIPliance
Level (e)

OA . I - I

3

I

MA.I-I

2

2

OA . I - 2

2

2

MA.I-2*

I

I

OA . I-3*

2

I

MA . 2- 1

2

I

OA . I-4*

2

I

MA . 2- 2*

I

I

OA . I - 5

2

I

MA . 3- 1

I

I

OA . I - 6*

I

I

MA.4-1

2

I

OA . 2-1

3

I

MA . 5- 1*

I

I

OA . 2-2

3

I

MA . 6- 1

2

I

OA.3 - 1

2

I

MA . 8- 1

2

I

OA . 6-1

3

I

TC . I-I

2

I

OA . 6- 2

3

I

TC . I - 2

2

2

OA . 7- 1

2

2

TC . I-3

I

I

OA.8-1

2

2

TC . I - 4

I

I

QV.1-1

2

I

TC . 4-1

I

I

QV.I - 2

2

I

TC . IO-I

2

I

OP . 1-1

2

2

EP . 1-1

2

I

OP . 2-1

2

I

EP . I - 2

2

I

OP . 3- 1

2

I

EP . 2- 1

I

I

OP . 3- 2

2

I

EP.3 - 1

2

I

OP . 3-3

2

I

EP .3 - 2

I

I

OP . 4- 1

2

I

EP .4 - 1

2

I

OP.5-1

I

I

EP . 5- 1

2

I

OP .6 - 1

2

2

EP . 6- 1

2

I
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Concerns
Number

Compl lance
Leve'j (C)

OS.4 -3

1

1

FP. 7-1

2

1

1

FP.l - l

1

1

MS.l-l

2

1
1

Co:npliance
level (C)

FR . 4- 2

2

1

1

FR.5-1

2

Compliance
Level (C)

[P.7-1

1

1

TS.2-1

2

Concerns
Number

Concerns
Number

Potential
Hazar(d
Level H
Hl

Potential
Hazard
level (H)

Potential
Hanni
Level (H)

Concerns
Number

Potential

Hazart~)
Level
H

COlIIpl iance
Level (C)

TS . 2-2

2

2

FR.5-2

2

1

FP .1- 2

1

1

MS.I-2

2

TS . 3-1

2

2

FR . 6-1

2

2

FP . 2-1

2

1

MS.I-3

2

1

2

1

MS.I-4

2

1
1

TS.3-2

1

1

WS . 4-l

1

1

FP.2-2

TS.3-3

2

1

WS . 4-2

1

1

FP.3-1

2

1

MS.2-1

2

1

FP.5-1*

1

1

MS.3-1

2

1

FP.6-1

2

1

MS . 5-1

2

1

TS . 4-1

2

WS . 4-3

1

1

PT.l-l

2

1

WS.4-4

1

1

PT . I-2

2

1

WS . 4- 5*

1

1

PT . 2-1

2

1

WS . 4-6*

1

1

PT .4-1

2

1

WS . 4-7

1

1

PT. 4-2

2

1

WS . 4-8

1

1

PT . 6- 1

1

1

WS . 4- 9

1

1

PT . 6- 2

1

1

WS . 5-1

1

1

PT . 6-3

2

1

WS.5-2

1

1

PT . 6-4

2

2

WS.6-1

1

1
1

PT.I0-l

2

1

OS.I - 1

1

PT . 12 - 1

2

1

OS.I - 2

2

1

PT.13 - 1

2

1

OS.2-1

1

1

PT .13- 2

2

1

OS.2-2*

1

1

FR.l-l

2

2

OS.3 - 1*

1

1

FR . 2-1

2

1

OS . 3- 2

1

1

FR.3 - 1

2

1

OS.4-1

2

1

FR . 4-1

2

1

OS.4-2

1

1

.-
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4.8.2

Tabulations of Concerns

4.5.1

Organization and Administration

CONCERN:
(OA.l-l)
(H3/Cl)

The operating contractor has not prepared safety and health plans
as required by DOE 5480.18, paragraph 8.d.(6) and by its operating
contract wi th the Department of Energy.

CONCERN:
(OA.1-2)
(H2/C2)

DOE/NPOSR-CUW Site Office has not implemented a directives system
and has not provided clear and timely guidance to the operating
contractor.

CONCERN:
(OA.1-3)
(H2/Cl)
CAT. II

DOE/NPOSR-CUW Site Office has not enforced the safety and health
and quality assurance provisions of the Department of Energy
operating contract with the operating contractor.

CONCERN:
(OA.1-4)
(H2/Cl)
CAT. II

The operating contractor does not have a mechanism in place to
ensure that the safety and health and quality assurance provisions
of its operating contract with the Department of Energy are met.

CONCERN:
(OA.1-5)
(H2/Cl)

The organizational structure, responsibilities, and authorities
for safety and health have not been clearly established by
DOE/NPOllR-CUW Site Office in accordance with DOE 5480.18,
paragraph 8.d.(6)(a)!.

CONCERN:
(OA.l-6)
(Hl/Cl)
CAT II

DOE/NPOSR-CUW Site Office has not provided sufficient oversight of
the operating contractor safety and health programs and related
activities.

CONCERN:
(OA.2-1)
(H3/Cl)

The operat i ng contractor occurrence reporting system does not
comply with the reporting, procedural, and lessons learned
provisions of DOE 5000.3A.

CONCERN:
(OA.2-2)
(H3/Cl)

DOE/NPOSR-CUW Site Office does not meet the reporting and
procedural provisions of DOE 5000.3A.

CONCERN:
(OA.3-1)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor management has neither developed annual
safety and health goals nor developed a process to communicate
them to the organization as required by DOE 5480.19, Chapter I,
paragraph C. 3.

CONCERN:
(OA.6-1)
(H3/Cl)

Position descriptions do not provide clear documentation of safety
responsibilities and clearly defined safety performance standards
are not established as part of the operating contractor employee
performance appra i sal process as requi red by DOE 5480.19, Chapter
I, paragraph 8.

CONCERN:
(OA. 6-2)
(H3/Cl)

The operating contractor management has not developed a long range
staffing plan as required by DOE 5480.19, Chapter I, paragraph
C.2 .
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CONCERN:
(OA.7-1)
(H2/C2)

The operating contractor has not established a plan for developing
and implementing its Operation Procedures.

CONCERN:
(OA.8-1)
(H2/C2)

The operating contractor supervisors do not receive formal
training in the detection and referral of employees suspected of
substance abuse.

CONCERN:
(QV.l-l)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor has not implemented a quality assurance
program at Naval Petroleum Reserve Number 3 in accordance with DOE
5700.6C and the prOVisions of its operating contract with the
Department of Energy.

CONCERN:
(QV.1-2)
(H2/CI)

DOE/NPOSR-CUW Site Office has not implemented a quality assurance
program in accordance with DOE 5700.6C, paragraph 10.e.

4.5.2

Quality Verification

4.5.3 Operations
CONCERN:
(OP.l-l)
(H2/C2)

The operating contractor operations group does not effectively
interface with engineering to ensure sound safety principles in
the selection, installation, and operation of components and
equipment at Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserve Number 3.

CONCERN:
(OP.2-1)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor lacks the necessary training, audit, and
appraisal programs to ensure safety awareness as required by DOE
5480.19, Conduct of Operations.

CONCERN:
(OP.3-1)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor operators do not have approved Operation
Procedures to aid them in performing their duties, as required by
DOE 5480.19, Conduct of Operations.

CONCERN:
(OP.3-2)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor Policy and Procedure 1.3-27, Lock, Tag,
and Try Procedure is incomplete and, consequently, not effective
in ensuring safety of operations as required by DOE 5480.19.

CONCERN:
(OP.3-3)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor field operations do not !leet the intent
of both the State of lIyomi ng and Federal 8ureau of Land Management
regulations regarding the use of blowout preventers on wells
capable of fl owi ng duri ng well workover operat ions.

CONCERN:
(OP.4-1)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor operations personnel do not effectively
monitor the operating condition of equipment as required by
DOE 5480.19.

CONCERN:
(OP.5-1)
(Hl/Cl)

Certain operating contractor facilities and drilling equipment are
not operated in a safe and reliable manner as required by DOE
5480.19.

CONCERN:
(OP.6-1)
(H2/C2)

The operating contractor operators do not complete formal
qualifications before operating alone as required by DOE 5480.19.
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4.5.4

Maintenance

CONCERN:
(TC.I-2)
(H2/C2)

The operating contractor training records are not maintained to
enable verification of safety and health training requirements and
job qualification requirements.

CONCERN:
(MA.I-I)
(H2/C2)

The operating contractor maintenance organization does not ensure
effective implementation and control of maintenance activities and
does not ensure that safety and engineering support are provided
for work activities.

CONCERN:
(TC.I-3)
(HI/CI)

CONCERN:
(MA.I-2)
(HI/CI)
CAT. 11

The operating contractor has permitted hazardous conditions to
exist during continued operations, because of a backlog of
electrical parts, which is not in accordance with DOE 4330.4A,
paragraph 3.4.8.

The operat i ng contractor does not ensure that all subcontractors
working onsite satisfy safety and health training and job
qualification requirements specified in 29 CFR 1910 and 1926
regulations.

CONCERN:
(TC.I-4)
(HI/Cl)

DOEjNPOSR-CUII Site Office does not ensure that the operating
contl'"actor and its subcontractors are meeting the training
requirements of DOE Orders and 29 CFR regulations.

CONCERN:
(MA.2-1)
(H2/CI)

The operat i ng contractor Maintenance Program does not meet the
systematic documentation requirements of DOE 4330.4A, paragraphs
3.3 and 3.4.

CONCERN:
(TC.4-1)
(HI/CI)

Not all operating contractor employees at the Naval Petrolellll
Reserve Number 3 receive occupational safety and health training
appropriate to their needs as specified in 29 CFR 1910 and 1926.

CONCERN:
(MA.2-2)
(HI/CI)
CAT. 11

Use of outdated drawi ngs, 1ack of wri tten procedures, and 1ax
enforcement of informal procedures by the operating contractor has
resulted in unsafe practices in the field and does not meet the
requirements of DOE 4330.4A.

CONCERN:
(TC.IO-I)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor does not generally provide training for
supervisors .and managers to prepare individuals for assigned
responsibilities in accordance with DOE 5480.19.

CONCERN:
(MA.3-1)
(HI/CI)

The operating contractor has not provided personal protective
equipment for all maintenance activities as required by
DOE 4330.4A.

CONCERN:
(MA.4-1)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor personnel have not been instructed on
proper inspection and post-maintenance control procedures as
required by DOE 4330.4A, Section 3.

CONCERN:
(EP.l-l)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor Emergency Preparedness Program is not in
compliance with the DOE 5500-series of Orders and with
DOE 5480.lB.

CONCERN:
(MA . 5-1)
(HI/CI)
CAT. 11

The operating contractor engineering and safety assistance
provided to the maintenance organization in the field has not been
sufficient, and the maintenance organization has not maintained
the material condition of components and equipment in a manner to
prevent hazardous conditions caused by non-code installations,
improper operation of equipment, and equipment deterioration to
meet the requirements of DOE 4330.4A.

CONCERN:
(EP.1-2)
(H2/Cl)

DOEjNPOSR-CUII Site Office does not have an Emergency Preparedness
Program that Is In compliance with the DOE 5500-series of Orders
and with DOE 5480.lB.

CONCERN:
(EP.2-l)
(Hl/Cl)

The operati ng contractor Emergency Managetll8nt Pl an and Emergency
Plan Implementing Procedures do not address all facets of the
emergency response functions and do not Incl ude Emergency Pl an
Administrative Procedures for conducting routine activities as
specified in DOE 5500.lB and DOE 5500.3A.

CONCERN:
(MA.6-1)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor Preventive Maintenance Program does not
always meet the intent of DOE 4330.4A, paragraph 3.6.1.

CONCERN:
(EP.3-l)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor does not conduct emergency preparedness
training, hazardous materials etII8rgency response training, and
personnel protective equipment training as required by DOE 5500.3A
and 29 CFR 1910.120.

CONCERN:
(MA . 8-1)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor does not provide sufficient documentation
and records storage in support of the ma i ntenance program as
required by DOE 4330.4A, Section 3.

CONCERN:
(EP.3-2)
(Hl/Cl)

DOE/NPOSR-CUII Site Office has not provided hazardous materials
emergency response and personnel protective equipment training to
their staff as required by DOE 5500.3A and 29 CFR 1910.120.

CONCERN:
(TC.I-I)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor has not implemented a formal training
program to ensure that operations, maintenance, and technical
staff have required safety and health trainir.g and qualification
training i n accordance with DOE 5480.19, DOE 4330 . 4A, and DOE
5480.3.

CONCERN:
(EP.4-l)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor has not established an 'emergency
preparedness drill/exercise program as required by DOE 5500.3A.

CONCERN:
(EP.5-l)
(H2/Cl)

The operat i ng contractor Emergency Operat Ions Center does not have
all equipment and the resources necessary to respond to an
emergency as requi red by DOE 5500. 2B, DOE 5500. 3A, and
DOE 5000.3A.

4.5.4

Training and Certification

4.5.6

Emergency Preparedness
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CONCERN:
(EP.6-1)
(H2/CI)

The operati ng contractor Elllergency Management PI an and the
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures do not address all
emergency assessment act ions as requi red by ODE 5500. 3A and
DOE 5480.IB.

CONCERN:
(EP.7-1)
(HI/CI)

The operating contractor has neither developed all personnel
protection instructions nor obtained necessary equipment for
emergency purposes as required by DOE 5500.3A and DOE 5480.IB.
4.5.7 Technical Support

CONCERN:
(TS . 2-1)
(H2/CI)

DOE/NPOSR-CUII Site Office has not ensured that facilities at the
Naval Petroleum Reserve Number 3 are covered by a Safety Analysis
Report as requi red by DOE 5481. lB.

CONCERN:
(TS.2-2)
(H2/C2)

The operating contractor does not formally require an independent
safety and health review in the preparation and revision of Policy
and Procedure documents.

CONCERN:
(TS.3-1)
(H2/C2)

The operating contractor does not provide effective electrical and
IIIlchanical engineering support to field operations at Naval
Petroleum Reserve Number 3.

CONCERN:
(TS.3-2)
(HI/Cl)

The operating contractor does not effectively incorporate safety
in the engineering design and installation of facilities at Naval
Petroleum Reserve Number 3 In accordance with DOE 6430.IA.

CONCERN:
(TS.3-3)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor does not have an effective program to
ensure that pi pi ng and I nstrUllllntat ion di agrams and other drawl ngs
are maintained current as-built In accordance with DOE 4330.4A.

CONCERN:
(TS.4-1)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor does not have a formal program to
collect, trend, and analyze performance data for equi pment and
systems Important to operations and safety at Naval Petroleum
Reserve Number 3 as required In DOE 4330.3A.
4.5.8

Packaging and Transportation

CONCERN:
(PT.I-I)
(H2/CI)

DOE/NPOSR-CUII Site Office h~s not established a policy for
Implementation of DOE 5480.3, DOE 1540.I, ' and DOE 1540.2, or the
r es pons I bill ty and author I ty for the shl PIIIlnt of hazardous
luterials as required by DOE 5480.19.

CONCERN:
(PT .1-2)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor has not estab Ii shed a po Ii cy for
Implementation of DOE 5480.3, DOE 1540.1, and DOE 1540.2, or the
responsibility and authority for the shipment of hazardous
lIaterlals as required by DOE 5480.19.

CONCERN:
(PT .2-1)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor does not have a training program for
personnel I nvo 1ved I n hazardous materials packagl ng and
transportation operations as required by DOE 5480.3, DOE 5480.18,
and 49 CFR.
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CONCERN:
(PT .4- 1)
(H2/CI)

DOE/NPOSR-CUII Site Office Is not In compliance with 49 CFR 392,
49 CFR 396, and 49 CFR 172 wi th regard to shi pments of hazardous
materials.

CONCERN:
(PT .4-2)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor movements of hazardous materials do not
comply with the safety requirements of DOE 5480.3 and 49 CFR.

CONCERN:
(PT .6-1)
(HI/Cl)

The operating contractor does not conduct hazardous llateri a 1s
activities at the warehouse In compliance with DOE 5480.3 and
49 CFR.

CONCERN:
(PT .6-2)
(HI/Cl)

The operating contractor does not meet the transportat I on
requi rements of DOE 5480.3 and 49 CFR wi th respect to de llveri es
of methanol and glycol to, and the shipment of propane and
butane/gasoline mixture from, the low Telllperature Separation Gas
PI ant and the shi pment of crude oil from the B-TP-IO Battery.

CONCERN:
(PT.6-3)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor is not in compliance wi th the pi pe
Internal and external wall corrosion control requirements of 49
CFR.

CONCERN:
(PT .6-4)
(H2/C2)

The operating contractor has not ensured that the condition of the
third party pipeline crossing Naval Petroleum Reserve Number 3
will not adversely affect safety at the site.

CONCERN:
(PT .10-1)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor does not prepare and maintain records of
hazardous materials movements as required by DOE 5480.3.

CONCERN:
(PT.12-1)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor hazardous materials packaging and storage
procedures are not in conformance wi th DOE 5480.3.

CONCERN:
(PT.13-1)
(H2/CI)

DOE/NPOSR-CUII Site Office has not assured that aviation charter
pilots and aircraft comply with DOE 5480.13.
.

CONCERN :
(PT .13-2)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor has not assured that aviation charter
pilots and aircraft comply with DOE 5480.13.

CONCERN:
(FR. I-I)
(H2/C2)

The operating contractor Safety Review Committee does not have a
charter specifying responsibility, authority, quorum, reporting
requi rements, and document at i on I n accordance wi th DOE 5482 .IB.

CONCERN:
(FR.2-1)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor Safety Review Committee does not ensure
comprehensive and Indepth reviews of all major Items Important to
the safety of operations In accordance with DOE 5482.IB.

CONCERN:
(FR.3-1)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor Safety Review Committee irregularly holds
meetings which contradicts their Policy and Procedure 1.3-02.

4.5.9

Site/Facility Safety Review
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CONCERN:
(FR.4-1)
(H2/C1)

The operating contractor does not perform periodic appraisals of
the overall operation of each facility to ensure safety and health
coverage as required by DOE 5482.1B.

CONCERN:
(FR.4-2)
(H2/C1)

DOE/NP05R-CUN 5ite Office has not conducted functional appraisals
to ensure safety and health coverage as required by DOE 5482.1B.

CONCERN:
(FR.5-1)
(H2/C1)

The operating contractor has not conducted independent triennial
appraisals of its safety and health internal review system as
required by DOE 5482.1B.

CONCERN:
(FR.5-2)
(H2/C1)

DOE/NP05R-CUN 5ite Office has not provided surveillance and
oversight of the operating contractor's internal safety review
systl!lll to ensure implementation according to the requirements of
DOE 5482.1B.

CONCERN:
(FR.6-1)
(H2/C2)

There is no operating contractor program to gather, evaluate, and
trend either their inhouse or industry-wide operating experience
data to improve safety and reliability.
4.5.11

lIorker 5afeh and Health (OSHA) Compliance

CONCERN:
(115.4-1)
(H1/C1)

The operating contractor guarding of walkways and maintenance of
ladders is not in accordance with 29 CFR 1910, Subpart 0, lIalking
and lIorki ng Surfaces.

CONCERN:
(115.4-2)
(H1/C1)

Guarding is not in place for equipment operated by the operating
contractor as required by 29 CFR 1910, Subpart 0, Machinery and
Machine Guarding.

CONCERN:
(115.4-3)
(H1/C1)

The operating contractor does not comply with 29 CFR 1910.38,
Emp I oyee Emergency PI ans and Fi re Prevent i on PI ans.

CONCERN:
(115.4-4)
(H1/C1)

Compressed gas cyl inders are not stored by the operating
contractor in accordance with 29 CFR 1910, Subpart Q, lIelding,
Cutting, and Brazing.

CONCERN:
(115.4-5)
(H1/C1)
CAT. Jl

The operating contractor does not comply with 29 CFR 1910, Subpart
5, Electrical for the control of explosion and electrocution
hazards.

CONCERN:
(115.4- 6)
(H1/C1)
CAT. Jl

The operating contractor does not comply with 29 CFR 1910.147, The
Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout) in that minimum
performance requirements for the control of hazardous energy have
not been established .

CONCERN:
(115.4-7)
(H1/C1)

The operating contractor dOls not cOllply with 29 CFR 1910.110,
Storage and Handling of Liquified Petroleum Gases.
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CONCERN:
(115.4-8)
(H1/C1)

The operating contractor does not cOllply with 29 CFR 1910.151,
Medical Services and First-Aid.
.

CONCERN:
(115.4-9)
(H1/C1)

The operating contractor does not cOllply with the hazardous
material spill response requirellents of 29 CFR 1910.120, Hazardous
lIaste Operations and Emergency Response.

CONCERN:
(115.5-1)
(H1/C1)

The operating contractor does not cOllply with 29 CFR 1926 5ubpart
P, Excavations.

CONCERN:
(115.5-2)
(H1/C1)

The operating contractor does not cOllply with 29 CFR 1926.550,
Cranes and Derricks.

CONCERN:
(115.6-1)
(H1/C1)

The operating contractor does not cOllply with the requirellents of
29 CFR 1910.1200, Hazard C~nication.

CONCERN:
(05.1-1)
(H1/C1)

The operating contractor Safety and Health Section does not
provide all necessary support and oversight to the line
organization for the i.plementation of the Occupational 5afety and
Health Program as required by DOE 5480.18 and DOE 5480.10.

CONCERN:
(05.1-2)
(H2/C1)

DOE/NPOSR-CUN Site Office does not provide support, guidance, and
direction to the operating contractor regarding the Occupational
Safety and Health Program as required by DOE 5480.18.

CONCERN:
(05.2-1)
(H1/C1)

The operating contr.actor occupational safety and health program as
defined in the Policy and Procedure Manual is not fully
implemented, and various program eleftl8nts are not in compliance
with DOE 5480.4 and Occupational Safety and Health Administration
standards.

CONCERN:
(05.2-2)
(H1/C1)
CAT. Jl

The operating contractor has not identified all confined space
hazards and does not control entries in accordance with Draft 29
CFR 1910.146 and AN51 Z117.1-1989.

CONCERN :
(05.3-1)
(H1/C1)
CAT Jl

The operating contractor has not identified, evaluated, and
controlled many occupational safety and health hazards as required
by DOE 5480.4, DOE 5480.10, and Occupational 5afety and Health
Administration standards.

CONCERN:
(05.3-2)
(H1/C1)

The operating contractor has not evaluated and controlled the
hydrogen sulfide hazard associated with the steamflood project as
requi red by DOE 5480.10.

CONCERN:
(05.4-1)
(H2/C1)

The operating contractor does not record, trend, or evaluate
accidents and injuries for root cause as required by DOE 5483 . 1A,
DOE 5484.1, and 29 CFR 1904.

4.5.13

Occupational 5afeh

CONCERN:
(05.4-2)
(Hl/Cl)

Processes and responsibilities for subcontractor safety
surveil 1ance have not been estab Ii shed by the operat i ng contractor
as required by DOE 5480.9.

CONCERN:
(05.4-3)
(Hl/Cl)

The operating contractor does not conduct an effective
surveil 1 ance and exposure .,ni tori ng prograJI to ensure effect i ve
control of safety and health hazards as required by DOE 5480.10
and DOE 548O.IB.
4.5.14 Fire Protection

CONCERN:
(FP.l-l)
(HI/CI)

The operating contractor has not developed a Fire Protection
ProgrUl as required by DOE 5480.7, DOE 6430.IA,and the DOE Fire
Resource Manual.

CONCERN:
(FP.1-2)
(Hl/Cl)

DOE/NPOSR-CUII 5ite Office has not provided guidance to the
operating contractor on resources, organization, and
a~inistrative systeas necessary for the effective illplementation
and ,<;ontrol of the Fire Protection PrograJII as required by DOE
5480.7, DOE 6430.lA, and DOE Fire Resource Manual.

CONCERN:
(FP.2-l)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor is not in full compliance with the
National Fire Protection Association Standard 101, "LHe Safety
Code."

CONCERN:
(FP.2-2)
(H2/Cl)

DOE/NPOSR-CUII Site Office is not in full cOllpl1ance with the
National Fire Protection Association Standard 101, "LHe Safety
Code."

CONCERN:
(FP.3-l)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor has not established a Fire Barrier
PrograJI for contro lli ng hazardous lIateri a1s releases to the public
fro. a credible fire according to the requirHents of DOE 5480.7.

CONCERN:
(FP.5-1)
(Hl/CI)
CAT. II

The operat i ng contractor does not protect Naval Petro 181. Reserve
Nu.ber 3 facilities against property losses in excess of
guidelines of DOE 5480.7 for a lIaxi_ credible fire.

CONCERN:
(FP.6-1)
(H2/CI )

DOE/NPOSR-CUII Site Office has not established f'lrllal agreHents
with local fire departllents to respond to Herg,, 'cies, participate
in drills and exercises, and to conduct quarterly visits to the
sites as required by DOE 5480.7,

CONCERN:
(FP.7-1)
(H2/CI)

The operating contractor does not .et the requir_nts relating
to the Fire Protection Engineering ProgrUl as required by
DOE 5480.7.

CONCERN:
(lIS. I-I)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor does not have a plan for illpl_ntation
of the Occupational Medical ProgrUl IS required by DOE 5480.8,

CONCERN:
(M5.1-2)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor does not require the providers of 118dical
services to illpl_nt the provisions of DOE 5480.8,

CONCERN:
(MS.1-3)
(H2/Cl)

DOE/NPOSR-CUII Site Office does not require the operating
contractor to illplHent the provisions of DOE 5480.8.

CONCERN:
(M5.1-4)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor does not have a centralized
administrative progrUl for the control of lost t i . costs,
disability benefit payMnts, lledical costs, and disability
prevent i on as requi red by DOE 5480.8.

CONCERN:
(M$.2-l)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor does not collect or lIaintain cOllplete
medical records, and existing records are not protected to assure
confidentiality as required by DOE 5480.8.

CONCERN:
(M5.3-1)
(H2/Cl)

The operating contractor .dical eXUlination prograJIS do not 118et
the requirements of DOE 5480.8 and other Federal requirHents.

CONCERN:
(M5.5-1)
(H2/Cl)

The operat i ng contractor does not have progralls of counse Ii ng and
health education as required by DOE 5480.8.

4.5.15 Medical Services
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4.9

SUBTEAM COMPOSITION AND AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

Area of Responsibility

N_/Organization
James B. Murphy (OSHA IB Technician)
Murphy & Associates

Area of Responsibility

Nalle/Organi zat ion

EH Senior Manager

Oliver O. T. Lynch , Jr .
Department of Energy
Offi ce of Performance Assessment

Team Leader

Leonard M. Lojek
Department of Energy
Office of Performance

Asse~sment

Fire Protection

JilllllY E. Biggs
Biggs Associates

Emergency Preparedness

George P. Bailey
Advanced Sytems Technology, Inc.

Medical Services

OE-IO Representative

James S. Gill iam
Department of Energy

Donald E. Lentzen
Department of Energy
Office of Occupational Medicine

Organization and
Administration/Quality
Verification

Bernard R. Kokenge
BRK and Associates , Inc .

Dr . Paul Mossman, M.D.
Pri vate Consul tant

Operations/Site Facility
Safety Rev i ew

Robert J. Cordes
Private Consultant

Report Support . Observers. and Li a ison

F. Richard Myal (Drill ing)
CER Corporation

Lead Appraisal Coordinator

Maintenance

Carl II. Mangus
Private Consultant

Mary Meadows
Department of Energy
Offi ce of Performance Assessment

Coordi nators

Technical Support/
Training and Cert i fication

Gl enn A. IIhan
Private Consultant

Janice E. Hill
EG&G Idaho, Inc .

Packaging and Transportation/
Pipel ine Safety

Robert D. Jones
Office of Risk Analysis and Technology,
Headquarters, Department of Energy

Dr . Bernard S. Zager, M.D.
Private Consultant

Lydia G. Guerra
M.H . Chew and Associates
Technical Editor

Robert F. McCallum
MCMS, Inc .

Robert L. Paull in
Paull in Consulting Services
Occupational Safety

Gary J . Gottfried
Apex Environmental , Inc .

lIorker Safety

IIi 11 iam R. Murphy
Murphy & Associates
David M. Drury
Safety Enhancement
Pamel a A. Claps (OSHA IB Techn i ci an)
Mur phy & Associates
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5.0

MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT

5.1

PURPOSE

The Management Subtealll conducted a llanagellll!nt and organization assessment of
environment, safety, and health (ES&H) activities performed by U. S.
Department of Energy (DOE) and John Brown Engineers and Constructors Inc.
(JBEC) personnel at Naval PetroleUM Reserve Nulllber 3 (NPR-3), Naval Oil Shale
Reserve Number I (NOSR-I) and Naval Petroleuill Reserve Number 3 (NOSR-3), which
are part of the Naval Petroleuill and Oil Shale Reserves in Colorado, Utah, and
Wyoming (NPOSR-CUW). The objectives of the assessment were as follows :
(I) to evaluate the effectiveness of management systems and practices in tenas
of ensuring environmental compliance and the safety and health of workers and
the general public, as well as their consistency with DOE goals, objectives,
policies, procedures, and standards related to ES&H; and (2) to identify the
root cause for the deficiencies found by the Tiger Team across all
organizations and discipl ines reviewed.

5.0

5.2

MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT

SCOPE

The scope of the assessment , from an ES&H perspective, included the following :
(I) management cOl1lllitment and leadership; (2) organizational structure and
management configuration for clear lines of oversight and accountability;
(3) planning and budgeting; (4) human resource management, including training
and staffing; (S) management systems, including performance monitoring and
assessment, and self-assessment; (6) conduct of operations; and (7) public and
institutional interactions.
Interviews were held with managers, supervisors, and s~aff personnel
representing a wide variety of program interests . Interviewees included
personnel from the DOE Headquarters Office of Fossil Energy (FE) and the
Office of Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves (DOE/NPOSR); DOE/NPOSR-CUW
staff onsite at Casper, Wyoming; and employees of JBEC, the operating
contractor.
The Managem~nt Subteam examined a number of key management areas, including
DOE pol icies and directive systems, self-assessment systems, internal and
external cOl1lllunications, and individual perfonaance appraisal systems .
Documents reviewed included DOE Orders; Secretary of Energy Not ices (SENs) ;
NPOSR-CUW Managp::;ent Directives ; prograM budget and planning guidance ; the DOE
contract with JBEC (Contract No . DE-ACOI-B6FE60896); policies; admin istrative
procedures; implellll!ntation plans ; program/project management plans; management
agreements ; standard operating procedures; FE, DOE/NPOSR, DOE/NPOSR-CUW, and
JBEC self-assessment activities ; audit and appraisal reports; incident
reports; job descriptions; and mission and function statements .
5.3

APPROACH

The Management Subteam conducted it. assessment in accordance with the ~
Team Gyidance Manual, (February 1990) . The Management Subteam also used the
draft, Environment. Safety. and Health Management performance Obiectiyes and
Criteria for Tiger Team Assessments, (August IS, 1991) in conducting th i s
assessllll!nt . These perfonaance objectives and criteria were one element used
to evaluate findings gathered i n the course of the review.

J-fD1

The Management Subteam interacted extensively with the Environmental Subteam
and the Safety and Health Subteam to ensure the causal factors identified by
all three subteams were considered in the identification and evaluation of
root causes.
The Management Subteam assessment was conducted between June 22 and July 20,
1992. A list of the documents reviewed by the Management Subteam is provided
in Appendix E-2. The biographical sketches of the subteam members are
presented in Appendix A-4.
The Management Subteall initially developed an understanding of the
organizational roles, responsibilities, and authorities of FE, DOE/NPOSR,
DOE/NPOSR-CUW, and JBEC through review of a series of program documents prior
to the subteillll'sarrlval onsite. These documents included information on the
FE, DOE/NPOSR, DOE/NPOSR-CUW, and JBEC organization, mission, and
self-assesslllent activities. After the subteam arrival, briefings were
conducted concerning the FE, DOE/NPOSR , DOE/NPOSR-CUW, and JBEC organizational
structure, lIission, and self-assessment activities. A presentation was also
provided on achievements for each of the management and organization
perfonaance object i ves, and appropri ate poi nts of contact, with whom subteam
llellbers could lleet to IIOre specifically discuss performance objectives, were
identified. The subteam then conducted interviews and developed an
understanding of perceptions of FE, DOE/NPOSR, DOE/NPOSR-CUW, and JBEC
personnel concerning ESlH activities at NPR-3, NOSR-I, and NOSR-3; ES1H
policies and goals; and the adequacy of supporting documentation. These
interviews were supplelllented by a detailed review of supporting documentation
describing such topics as the organization, roles, responsibilities, poliCies,
plans, budgets, procedures, and performance criteria for the organizational
elf!llents performing ESlH functions and operational programs at NPR-3, NOSR-I,
alld NOSR-3.
To further support the subteam's assessment while onsite, daily debriefings
and consultations were held with the Environmental Subteam and the Safety and
Health Subteall. The objective of these interactions was to uncover potential
lIanagement and organizational problems that might be common to the findings of
all of the subteams. The Management Subteam identified individuals to serve
as points of contact with the Environmental Subteam and the Safety and Health
Subteall. These points of contact attended the daily debriefings of the other
subtealls.
The Managelllent Subteam provided DOE/NPOSR-CUW with 55 prel iminary observations
and JBEC with 59 preliminary observations on July I, 1992, to validate for
factual accunc,V. Subsequently, the Management Subteall prepared 24 findings
and 1 spechl issue based on the validated preliminary observations and
additional interviews and doculllent reviews. The ,resulting findings were
reviewed for factual accuracy by DOE/NPOSR, DOE/NPOSR-CUW, and JBEC.
The root cause inalysis conducted by the Management Subteam has been
integrated with the causal factors identified by the other two subteams. The
results of the integrated root cause analysis ire discussed in Sectio!l 2.4.
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5.4

IWIAGEMENT ASSESSMENT SllltARY

The stewardship for the management and operations of the Naval Petroleum
Reserve has been assigned to several different Federal agencies, since the
reserve was established by the U.S. Congress in 1912. This culminated in the
reserve being placed under the direction of DOE in 1977, as a result of the
DOE Organization Act of 1977 . The mission of the reserve, established by
legislative mandate, is to produce and market oil and natural gas. Such a
mission is not totally consistent with DOE's more conventional mission of high
technology, research, and development . Consequently, it was never fully
anticipated that many of the standards and requirements set forth in DOE
Orders and directives would also be applied to what is the equivalent of a
commercial oil field operation. However, with only a few exceptions, the
prillciples embedded in the DOE poliCies and procedures related to the
protactlon of the environment and the health and safety of Individual workers
and the public should be applied with equal force to the operations at
NPOSR-CUW.
Because of the long history of the reserve related to the production and sale
of oil and natural gas, the management styles and philosophies appear to be
more closely modeled after those of the commercial oil and gas Industry,
rather than those associated with a government-funded and managed operation.
The overall operation tends to be highly Informal with a notable absence of
documented poliCies and procedures, which is apparently characteristic of the
field operations of the 011 and gas Industry . Verbal agreements are reached
and deci sions are made which are rarely ever fully documented. Although thi s
style and method of operation may have served the field organization well in
oil exploration and production operations, it is not well suited for the
development and Implementation of a complex ES1H program which requires a IIIOre
structured and disciplined approach.
DOE/NPOSR-CUW and its operating contractor have taken some positive first
steps to reshape the organization, as well as the management styles and
philosophies which have prevailed for many years, to bring them into
conformance with DOE requirements and standards. However, they are only in
the formative stages and many of the DOE policy and procedural requirements,
as well as the rigor, formal ity, and structure required to apply those
requirements are still relatively foreign to many elements of the field
organizations. The Management Subteam believes there Is an emerging
recognition that the ES1H requirements prescribed by DOE are Indeed applicable
to their oil and gas field operations and Is optimistic that this recognition
will continue to grow and develop, resulting in positive actions to fully
comply with, or exceed, DOE requirements . The majority of the staff members
have exhibited a will and a desire to fulfill their responsibilities and
obligations, even though an ES1H culture has not yet permeated all elements of
the organization . The majority of the organizational components have not yet
developed a real sense of ownership for the ES1H component of their
responsibil itles and appear to be waiting for detailed step-by-step guidance .
Although the Secretary's program and objectives to achieve a level of
excellence In ES1H have now been a matter of record for more than 3 years , FE,
DOE/NPOSR, and DOE/NPOSR-CUW have only recently initiated actions to fully
comply with the spirit and intent of the program. As a result, many of the
management systems, formal pol icies and procedures, and well-defined
responsibilities, which would normally be expected to be in place In a lIIature
5-3
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organization, are only now in the formative stages ~f . dev~lopment . Some of
the necessary remedial actions to correct these defICIenCIes have been
initiated, but have not yet achieved the momentum necessary to carry them
through to a successful conclusion . It is expected that the findings of the
Tiger Team and the resultant corrective actions required by all levels of the
organization will serve as a catalyst to provide that momentum.
The legislative mandate to maint ain production and prof i tability in the oil
field operations presents a financial barrier which could be a limiting factor
in the development and implementation of a comprehensive ES&H program.
Although this constraint has long been recognized, there has been no visible
effort to develop strategic and operational plans to explore alternative
solutions. Moreover, DOE/NPOSR-CUW and the operating contractor have not yet
considered intermediate or compensatory actions which could be taken to
improve their ES&H posture until longer term, or permanent solutions can be
developed and implemented.
It is the opinion of the Management Subteam that the overall ES&H program
within DOE/NPOSR-CUW and the operating contractor is marginal at best. Due to
the economic constraints, the late start by all organizational elements to
develop a viable program, and the absence of effective management systems and
controls, it will be some time before they achieve full compliance with DOE
ES&H requirements and even longer to reach the level of excellence expected by
t~e Secretary of Energy.
The Management Subteam recognizes that a new operating contractor has been
selected and will assume responsibil ity for management and operation of the
reserve in September 1992 . Th is change wi 11 place a spec ia1 burden and
respons i bil i ty on DOE/NPOSR-CUW and the new contractor to ensure that all of
the significant efforts to date, including the self-assessment findings, are
not lost in the transition . Carefully developed plans must be completed and
issued which articulate a precise course for the future operation and the
application of the full range of ES&H requirements.

5.5
FINDING MF-I

MANAGEMENT FINDINGS
IIOE/NPOSR Strategic and Operational Planning

The elements of the IIOE/NPOSR planning process are not coordinated In a .anner
that facilitates understanding of, and promotes consistency within, the
strategic and operational plans.
Discussion
StrategiC planning for DOE programs is stipulated by the DOE Office of Policy,
Planning and Analysis (PE-60) in its "Guidelines for Strategic Planning"
(DOE/PE-0094, July 1991) . The requirement for operational planning (for
safety) is included in DOE 5480.19, "Conduct of Operations" (July 9, 1990),
Chapter I, Section C.6. Carefully articulated, unambiguous strategic and
operational plans are essential to successful operation of all DOE sites. In
the judgment of the Management Subteam, the following observations relate to a
deficiency in the overall planning process for DOE/NPOSR:
FE, DOE/NPOSR, and DOE/NPOSR-CUW all prepare and publish a number
of planning documents. For example, FE issues a Safety & Health
Five-Year Plan for all its sites, DOE/NPOSR issues a strategic
plan, and DOE/NPOSR-CUW (in collaboration with its contractor)
prepares a long-Range (lO-year) Plan, which is updated annually.
However, there is no clearly evident coordination of these
planning activities. This absence of coordination results in
redundancy between the planning documents and creates difficulties
in interpreting and monitoring plans for continued operations at
NPOSR-CUW.
Discussions with FE Headquarters personnel Indicated that
DOE/NPOSR management is aware of this problem . A memorandum
("NPOSR Working Groups," Tony Dalllller tc Captain Meeks, May IS,
1992) establishes a Planning Process Working Group to "evaluate
the current planning process and recolllllend a new process taking
Into consideration the Strategic Planning process and the new DOE
requirements." The Planning Process Working Group chairperson Is
responsible for establishing schedules and milestones and
accomplishing the goals In the group. As currently constituted,
the Planning Process Working Group has no members from the field .
The lack of planning coordination has contributed to the absence
of a comprehensive evaluation of the risks and vulnerabilities
associated with achievement of progralllllatic objectives versus
achievement of environment, safety, and health (ES&H) objectives.
Specifically, no case studies have been hypothesized and analyzed
for consequences of different allocations of ES&H and operating
funds.

S-4

)./oS

s-s
yO(p

FINDING MF-2
Cross References
Concern OA.1-3
Self-Asseswent
This finding was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR Internal Appraisal
(June 1992) .
Iknag_nt Appraisal
This finding was partlally identified in the DOE Office of Self-Assessment
lIIanagement appraisal of DOE/NPOSR (July 1992).

DOE/NPOSR-CUV Strategic and Operational
Planning

The DOE/NPOSR-CUV planning and budget process does not include a proactive
envirollllental, ' safety, and health (ESIII) cOllPonent that cOllPlies with
guidelines specified by the Secretary of Energy.
Discussion
The Secretary of Energy has'4r.andated strategic planning and Simultaneously
placed a high priority on the formal integration of ES&H into the program
planning and budgeting process. Guidance 'for this integration was provided in
July 1991 by the DOE Office of PoliCY, Planning and Analysis (PE-60) in its
"Guidelines for Strategic Planning" (DOE/PE-0099, July 1991). An additional
requirement for the site development planning is cited in DOE 4320 . 1B, "Site
Development Planning" (January 7, 1991) . Planning, in general, is the key to
successful operation of any site; incorporation of ES&H program elements into
the site plans ensures that the site will be operated with proper
consideration given to protection of workers, the public, and the environment.
The Management Subteam judged planning by DOE/NPOSR-CUW to have the following
deficiencies:
DOE/NPOSR-CUW does not have a single, comprehensive strategic or
operational plan that addresses all elements of their ES&H program
and integrates those elements with operational activities.
Individual elements of a strategic plan are included in those
documents that have been prepared (e.g., the NPOSR-CUW long-Range
Plans); however, these efforts have not produced the planning
guidance needed to meet DOE requirements.
The NPOSR-CUW long-Range (lO-year) Pl ans that 'have been issued
thus far (1) do not address the safety and health cOl1lponents of
the ES&H program, and (2) treat the environmental component in a
largely superficial manner. In fact, these planning documents
are, for the most part, limited to operational and production
elements plus strategies associated with marketing and
profitability . ES&H requirements and objectives are not presented
in a manner such that prioritization and proper integration with
operational strategies can occur.
i'

A strategic plan issued for all of NPOSR on May 5, 1992 ("FY 1994
Strategic Plan, Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves") follows
the guidance on format cited in DOE/PE-0099, but does not
specifically address the program at the Naval Petroleum Reserves
Number 3 (NPR-3) and omits any reference to the ES&H programs at
othe .. NPOSR sites . This pl·an was prepared at FE Headquarters
exclusively by DOE/NPOSR personnel, but was rev·tewed by the
Director, DOE/NPOSR-CUW. A neW effort is underway to revise the
strategic plan by involving more field personnel in its "
formulation. A strategic planning workshop for this successor
plan was held in Boulder, Colorado in April 1992; ES&H was a topic
of discussion at this workshop. A second group effort is
scheduled for late July 1992 . At this time, however, there is no
way of determining whether (and if so, to what degree) ES&H
5-7
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program considerations for the NPOSR-CUW sites will be addressed
in the new strategic plan.
The budget guidance provided by FE to DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not been
specific toward enhancing the ESlH program. Basically, DOE/NPOSR
has provided DOE/NPOSR-CUW with the total annual budget
allocation, and no specific guidance with respect to the emphasis
to be placed on the ESIH programs. Furthermore, no effective
systell is in place for reso 1vi ng di spari ties between budget
guidance and site needs to meet increasing ES&H program demands.
In accordance with headquarters instructions, DOE/NPOSR-CUW
recently issued "U . S. DOE Safety & Health 1994 Five-Year Plan for
NPOSR-CUW" (May 1, 1992), which addresses the proposed enhancement
of safety and health measures at the site·for FY 1994-199B. The
plan does not fulfill the need far a comprehensive plan for the
site that (1) integrates ES&H with operational activities and (2)
provides a mechanism for evaluating trade-off decisions between
ES&H and operations.
DOE/NPOSR-CUW has completed initial corrective action plans In
response to the findings included In their self-assessment report
(April 1992). Although these plans contain a significant number
of Individual commitments associated with an integrated ES&H
system, these commitments have not been consolidated Into a
comprehensive coordinated plan that Integrates all the proposed
ES&H actions with operational commitments to ensure that the total
program can be accomplished.
DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not issued the "Site Development Plan" and the
"Technical Site Information" document mandated by DOE 4320.1B. A
draft of the "Site Development Plan" Is being reviewed by
DOE/NPOSR personnel. A draft "Technical Site Information"
document Is scheduled to be issued by the end of FY 1992.
Cross References
Concern OA.I-3
Self-Assess..nt
This finding was fully identified In the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April
1992) .
Manage.ent Appraisal
This finding was fully identified in the DOE Office of Self-Assessment
management appraisal of NPOSR-CUW (June 1992) and was fully Identified in the
DOE/NPOSR OffiCI of Planning and Technical Assurance managellMlnt appraisal of
NPOSR-CUW (May 1992).

FINDING MF-3

DOE/NPOSR and DOE/NPOSR-CIN Resource Manage.ent

DOE/NPOSR-CIN and DOE/NPOSR have not .ade the necessary co.litlent to
envirolUllllnt, safety, and health (ESlH) excellence called for in DOE
initiatives, while sillU1taneously cOlllPlying with the Naval Petrole_ Reserves
Production Act of 1976. DOE/NPOSR has not provided guidance to DOE/NPOSR-CIN
regarding alternatives which !light enhance the probability of attai_nt of
programmatic and ESlH objectives.
Discussion
The Secretary of Energy's 10-Polnt Initiative dramatically changed the
philosophy and manner in which the entire DOE complex operates. The
achievement of ESIH objectives was Identified as having an increased level of
significance, and the attainment of programmatic objectives could not be
viewed in isolation; i.e., they were Inextricably linked to accolllJlllshment of
ES&H objectives. This fundamental change has r equired that the entire DOE
complex reevaluate the way it conducts its mission and has established the
need to identify, consider, and implement innovative solutions for obtaining
the maximum level of achievement of programmatic and ES&H objectives.
DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not been Innovative In considering and developing such
solutions, and DOE/NPOSR has not been proactive In providing guidance to
DOE/NPOSR-CUW regarding realization of programmatic and ESlH objectives.
The Management Subteam recognizes that NPOSR-CUW must address an additional
consideration in the successful execution of its mission, which Is a
derivative of the Naval Petroleum Reser.ves Production Act of 1976, Public law
(P.L.) 94-258, as amended. This Act directs the Secretary of the Navy to
produce Naval Petroleum Reserve Number 3 (NPR-3) at the "maxlmull efficient
rate." This clause has been Interpreted by the Office' of Management and
Budget and others to require "economic viability" for the operations of NPR-3;
i.e., gross revenues froll the reserves must exceed gross out1eys. (See "Audit
of Effectiveness of Rtv.nu. Enhanc.ment and Cost Reduction Programs at NPR-3,"
Office of In~pector General, March 3, 1987.) The Mlnagement Subteam does not
believe there has been a full examination of management alternatiVes available
to DOE/NPOSR-CUW to maximize achievement of programmatic and ESlH objltctives,
while slmu.ltlneous1y responding to the letter of the Nlva1 p.troltull Reserve
Production Act. For eXlmp1.:
Th. Interpr.tatlon of P.l . 94-258, which leads to the
profitability r.qulrement, seriously limits the allowable Increase
In budget that can b. appli ed to .nhanclng ESIH progrllIIs. With
this constraint, IncreaslS In the ESlH budget must come .Ither
from corresponding decreas.s In the operations budget (which
conc.lvab1y could decrease the production .cash flow and thereby
compound the problem) or from alternative sources of funds for
ES1H Items. The DOE/NPOSR-CUW response to the Management
Subteam's list of preliminary observations Indicates that these
alternatlv. funding sources are being considered.
DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not been proactive In requesting, nor has
DOE/NPOSR bltn proactive In .supp1ying add1-tiona1 resources
(internal to DOE or contractors) to assist NPOSR-CUW in developing
and improving its ES&H program. Although FE and DOE/NPOSR have
provided significant attention and assistance to NPOSR-CUW in 1992
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after notification of the impending Tiger Team Assessment, little
assistance was sought or offered prior to 1992, except when driven
by specific events or requirements. Institutionalization of the
self-assessment program has increased the formality of operations.
Moreover, the development of management systems, as identified in
tt,e self-assessment at NPOSR-CUII and in the Tiger Team Assessment,
should enhance the communication of resource needs and
availability.
Similarly, the guidance that DOE/NPOSR provides to DOE/NPOSR-CUII
has not historically included any policy direction as to what
level of commitment DOE/NPOSR-CUII should exercise in achieving
programmatic and ES&H objectives, while remaining consistent with
the operational interpretation of P. l. 94-258.
The position of Envirollmenta1 Specialist was created in 1989;
however, since that time DOE/NPOSR-CUII has not increased or
reallocated ES&H responsibil ittes and has not reassigned any
existing full-time equivalents (FTEs) to ES&H-related positions.
The March 1991 reorganization at FE that separated NPOSR from the
Strategic Petroleum Reserve left eight open pOSitions in NPOSR.
Seven of these positions have now been filled, six since September
19, 1991. Although significant additional plannin", budgeting,
reporting, and other prograJll-related responsibil itles were
transferred to NPOSR along with these eight FTEs, NPOSR chose to
fill seven of the eight positions with technical and clerical
personnel. The 1 ES&H position, filled in March 1992, is the only
1 of 18 FTEs in NPOSR with full ES&H responsibil i~ies, and the
only non-management-1eve1 POSitlOA with specific ES&H
responsibilities. This unique opportunity to allocate a large
number of vacant positions came during a time when FE had been
made aware of significant ES&H programmatic deficiencies in FE
programs through Tiger Team Assessments of the Morgantown and
Pittsburgh Energy Technology Centers, and when the Department's
ES&H initiatives and programs were getting significant and
Increasing emphasis. Nl'aSR and FE management failed to use this
opportunity to reallocate their FTEs consistent with the increased
DOE emphasis on the achievement of ES&H objectives.

obtaining the services of ES&H experts, at no cost increment to
DOE/NPOSR-CUII, frOID other sites by temporary "detailing" to
NPOSR-CUII. In addition, there is no interim plan describing how
DOE/NPOSR-CUII proposes to address the need for increased ES&H
emphaSiS, while the deCision on additional FTE slots is pending.
Cross References
Finding QA/CF-6
Self-AssesSllent
This finding was partially identified In the DOE/NPOSR-CUII self-assessment
(April 1992).
Management Appraisal
This finding was partially identified in the DOE Office of Self-Assessment
management appraisal of DOE/NPOSR (July 1992), was partially identified in the
DOE Office of Self-Assessment management appraisal of NPOSR.CUII (June 1992),
and was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR Office of Planning and Technical
Assurance management appraisal of NPOSR-CUII (May 1992) .
DOE/NPOSR Internal Appraisal
This finding was not identified in the DOE/NPOSR internal appraisal (June
1992) .

DOE/NPOSR-CUII has requested two new FTEs for FY 1993, which It
proposes to fill with ES&H experts; The fact that historically
there have not been annual increases in overall site budgets and
DOE staffing levels, combined with the fact that initial
discussions' between DOE/NPOSR-CUII and FE personnel have indicated
that the · prospects for DOE/NPOSR-CUII's being awarded these
additional personnel are not· favorable. In spite of this fact,
there I s no i ndication that DOE/NPOSR-CUII has developed an
altern~ti.\Ie pl an as to how It would cover increased ES&H demands
If the extra personnel slots are not awarded. Alternatives might
Include reassignment of operaUons personnel"'to ES&H positions or
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FIIIlING MF-4

J8EC Environ.ent, Safety, and Health (ESlH)
Progra hlp1_nhtion Plan

Cross Refer.ences
Concerns OA . l-l and 0A.6-2

JBEC has not developed an i~l_ntation plan which both integrates and
priorittzes operational and ESlH activtties.

Se1f-AssesSlll!nt

Dtscusston

This finding was fully identified in the JBEC self-assessment (April 1992).

DOE 5480.18, "Envtronllent, Safety, and Health Program for Department of Energy
Operations" (SeptMber 23, 1986), Section 8.d. (4) requires that DOE site
contractors execute programs and policies in a manner that comp1 ies with
mandatory requtrellents relating to ESlH. DOE 5480.18, Section 8.d. (6)
stipulates preparation of an implementation plan, which is defined as "a
conc ise descri pt i on of the approach, resources, and time peri od planned for
illP1ementing Orders that require such plans on a site-wide basis," with the
additional requirellent that the plan include a description of the execution of
ESlH responstbil tttes. In the judgment of the Management Subteam , the J8EC
illP1ellentation plans have the following deficiencies :

Kanag_nt Appraisal
This finding was fully identified in the DOE Office of Self-Assessment
management appraiSil1 of NPOSR-CUW (June 1992) and was fully identified in the
DOE/NPOSR Office of Planning and Technical Assurance management appraisal of
NPOSR-CUW (May 1992) .

The Annual Operating Plan (AOP), prepared by JBEC but approved and
issued by DOE/NPOSR-CUW, cites programmatic activities (e.g.,
goals and objectives) for the upcoming fiscal year with ESlH
activities included . However, the AOP does not cite definitive
guidance on priorities in the event of budgetary constraints or
prograJlllat i c changes.
Although JBEC's planning and budgeting process identifies ESlH
internal aanagelllent and oversight functions, the process does not
identify those ESlH activities which are conducted as part of
managelllent and operating functions. Thus, the reported ESlH
expenditure understates the actual effort .
JBEC has not performed a detailed staffing-needs analysis to
justify the addition of ESlH personnel to meet increased
regulatory requirements. The Safety and Health Five-Year Plan
cites a requirement for additional personnel, but the more
detat1ed analysts, including requirements for incremental
environlllental staff, is needed to prepare a meaningful ESlH
program implementation plan.
Comprehens i ve eva 1uat i on has not been performed of the risks and
vulnerabilities associated with achievement of programmatic
objectives versus achievement of ESlH objectives. Specifically,
no case studies have been hypothesized and analyzed for
con sequence s of different al locations of ESlH and operating funds.
JBEC has completed ini ti al corrective action plans in response to
the findings included in its self· assessment (April 1992). These
plans contain a significant number of individual connitments
associated with the design and implementation of an integrated
ESlH system. However, JBEC has not consolidated these commitments
into a cOllPrehensive ilnp1elllentation plan that integrates all of
the proposed ESlH actions with operational commitments to enSUt'e
that all of the program objettives can be achieved.
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FIIIlING 1IF-5

JBEC Corporate Support

JBEC Houston, the corporate office, does not have a fonaal or a consistently
applied infor.al oversight progra. to assure cOipliance with the provisions of
its contract with DOE/NPOSR, Contract No. DE-ACOI-86FE60896. Si.ilarly, they
do not have a for.al systl!ll or _thod to provide enviro_nt, safety, and
heillth (ESIII) planning or policy guidance to JBEC (Casper).

Cross References
Findings MF-12; Section 4.5.1.1
Self-AssesSllent
This finding was partially identified in the JBEC self-asjlessment
(April 1992).

Discussion

Kanag_nt Appraisal

JBEC Houston recently identified SOllIe broad corporate· planning objectives
which include ES&H-related elellll!nts. However, it has not yet completed a
strategic planning process or systelll to provide corporate planning guidance or
assistance to JBEC. Consequently, JBEC does not have a subordinate strategic
plan that integrates corporate objectives and strategies and contractual
requir_nts with specific DOE planning requirelllents to serve as an integrated
sitewide plan to achieve the ESIH goals and objectives set forth by the
Secretary of Energy.

This finding was not identified in the DOE Office of Self-Assess.ent
managellll!nt appraisal of NPOSR-CUII (June 1992). The June 1992 report addressed
SOllIe corporate activites, but none of the. were related to the findings in
MF-5. This finding was not identified in the DOE/NPDSR Office of Planning and
Technical Assurance laanagellent appraisal of NPOSR-CUII {May 1992) . .

JBEC Houston has de.onstrated an active interest in the operational activities
of JBEC and has initiated a nUllber of independent reviews and assessllll!nts of
ESIII activities which have produced several lleaningful findings and
reca.endations . However, the illlPlelllentation or disposition of those findings
and reca.endat ions was largely left to the discretion of the management staff
at JBEC. The corporate office does not have a formal corrective action system
to identify and track findings or deficiencies to closure. Without a
corporate .andate for corrective action and the assignillent of specific
responsibil ities, many of the findings have neither been implelllented nor
tracked to closure.
JBEC Houston does not have a fonaal or structured internal oversight program
to ensure that it has fully cOllPlied with all of the requirements and
deliverables set forth in its contract with DOE/NPOSR. Therefore, many of the
reviews or assesslllents which have been provided were in response to speCific
problems or deficiencies identified by DOE.
JBEC Houston does not have formal corporate-wide poliCies and procedures
related to ES&H t o be applied to field operational units.
JBEC Houston conducts a formal evaluation of the performance of the JBEC
General Manager annually. According to the senior executive who performs this
evaluation, ES&H is an implicit factor in the evaluation. However, no
specific, measurabl e goals or objectives have been established as yet.
The Tiger Teall was verbally advised that JBEC Houston Is responsible for
overseeing execution of the actions which will be required as a result of the
June 1992 JBEC Self-Assessillent Implementation Plan (SAIP) and the JBEC
self-assessment (April 1992). JBEC corporate-level resources will be used
annually to conduct independent evaluations of the JBEC Self-Assessillent
ProgrUi. However, JBEC Houston has not yet reviewed the SAIP and is providing
only periodic checks of progress on illlPlementation of the specified actions .
OVersight is perforlled infol'1lally through review of reports prepared by JBEC
1oca 1 staff and routed to the corporate offi ce.
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FlIIDIIIi MF-6

DOE/NPOSR-CUV Roles, Responsibilities, and
Authorities

DDE/IfOSR-CUM has not idequately defined, fonaally docu.ented, or cOllUnicated
envi~t, safety, UId hulth (ESIIt) roles, responsibilities, authorities,
UId interfaces necessary to ensure that they are c~nly understood and
applied by all organizational el..ents, including contractors and
subcontractors.
Discussion
The definition of roles, responsibilities, and authorities and the subsequent
delegations of authority are important first steps in the development and
illpll!lll!ntation of a coeprehensive ES&H progru. [S&H roles, responsibil ities,
and authorities should be developed in a hierarchical order, beginning with an
organizational charter of NPOSR-CUI/ and roles and responsibil ities of the
Director on through each organizational element and ending with the individual
ellployees is appropriate. These designations and delegations should be
refiected in unit charters , applicable policies and procedures, individual
position descriptions, etc . Such a process should also establish appropriate
i nterfaces and linkages between top management, the ESlH organization, and
those responsible for line operations, including the contractor organization .
It, is equally illPortant that- these detenninations be further incorporated into
appropriate operating policies and procedures which establish the internal
process for ensuring that ES&H considerations and requirements are
consistently considered and applied to all elements of the existing operation,
is well as proposed iIIOdifications or new initiatives. Well-defined roles,
responsibil ities, and authorities further establish a documented line of
accountability frOll the Director, DOE/NPOSR-CUI/ through each operational unit,
including contractors. Organizations or individual employees should not be
held accountable unless their responsibil ities have been fully defined and
they have been del egated ' adequate authority to carry out those
responsibil ities .
Organ i zational roles, responsibilities, and authorities have recently been
partially defined and Included in unit charters. However, they are generic in
nature and do not Include the' full range of responsibilities and authorities
necessary to fonauhte and implement a comprehensive Integrated ESlH program
for DOE and contractor operations and activities, such is ES&H planning,
inspections and oversight, poliCies and procedures, training requirements,
resource management, and any support systems which may be required for
tracking of commitments and corrective actions. (See Findings HF - ll and
HF-lS.J

infonaal, undocumented, and are not conSistently or uniformly applied. For
example, both the Engineering Division and the Environmental Special ist have
an Infonlil responsibility to provide findings and observations which were
developed during ,the course of their routine field inspections to the
Director, Contract Surveillance and Administration Division. However, there
is no fOnlil mechanism for the assignment or acceptance of responsibility and
accountability for corrective actions or a fOnlil method of tracking remedial
actions to closure. including verification of the coepleted action.
Responsibil ity and authority for the review of engineering designs for new
projects, the modification of existing facilities, and the review of work
authorizations to ensure that all appropriate ES&H criteria and requirements
have been considered and Incorporated has not been established and documented.
limited Infonaal ESlH reviews are performed by the engineering organization
without any Involvement by the ES&H staff. (See Finding HF-IS.)
DOE/NPOSR-CUI/ has not developed fonaal operating poliCies and procedures which
Include assigned roles and responsibil itles for all elements of the ES&H
program and further define the Internal process for the' application of those
responsibil ities, such as the review and approval of work authorizations,
engineering changes, and proposed corrective or remedial actions. (See
Finding HF-IS.)
In sURl11ary, DOE/NPOSR-CUI/ has taken some initial actions to define ES&H roles,
responsibil itles, and authorities, such as developing unit charters and
modifying many of their individual employee position descriptions . However,
it has not yet ·clearly defined the full range of specific responsibilities
required to formulate, implement, and direct a comprehensive ESlH program.
Cross References
Findings HF-ll and HF-lS; Concerns OA.l-S and OS.I-2
Self-Assessment
This finding was partially identified In the DOE/NPOSR-CUI/ self-assessment
(April ),992).
Hanagetlent Appra Isa1
This finding was partially Identified in the DOE Office of Self-Assessment
management appraisal of NPOSR·CUW (June 1992) and was partially identified in
the DOE/NPOSR Office of Planning and Technical Assurance management appraisal
of NPOSR-CUW (Hay 1992).

Primary responsibil ity for the safety and health program has been assigned to
the Contract Surveilhnce and Administration Division. This organization does
not have the requisite resources, training, or technical expertise to fulfill
the total spectrum of its responsibilities which includes policy fonaulatlon,
Interpretation , and Site-specific application of DOE Orders and directives,
progru direction, over~ight, and cOlllpllance functions. The DOE/NPOSR-CUI/
Five-Year Safety and Health Plan states that only 10 percent of a full-time
equivalent position is being dedicated to safety and health functions. As a
result of these limitations, the division is almost totally dependent on other
organizations for i nternal technical support as well as oversight of field
operations and activities . However. these support arrangements are largely
5-17

FillllNG 11'-7

DOE/NPOSR-CUW Stop and Start Work Authority

DOE/KPOSR-CUW has not developed and issued clear and definitive criteria or
guidance setting forth responsibilities and authorities for tellPDrary
sh~s or sto,.ark and restart actions.
Discussion

FlIIlING 11'-8

JBEC Organizational Roles, Responsibilities, and
Authori t1 es

Organizational roles, responsibilities, and authorities lIhich address all
applicable el8lents of a ca.prehensive environlent, safety, and health (ESIH)
progra. have not been fully defined by JBEe and included in fOnlll policies
and procedures.

DOE/NPOSR·CUW has not issued formal policies or procedural guidance which
adequately establishes responsibilities and authorities for environllent,
safety, and health (ESlH)·related temporary shutdowns or stopwork actions and
the circUllstances under which they are to be applied to ensure a cOlll11On
understanding and unifol'1l application by personnel, including contractors, in
all organizational cDIIPonents of NPOSR·CUII. Based on interviews with
personnel at different levels within DOE/NPOSR·CUII and the contractor
organizations, the application of temporary shutdown or stopwork authority is
not unifomly understood. Similarly, the criteria and authority, as well as
the review process, for restarting an operation once it has been stopped for
ESlH deficiencies have not been specifically established in poliCies and
procedures.

The organizational roles and responsibilities of the Safety and Health Section
were partially identified in Policy and Procedure 1.3·02, ·Organizational
Safety Responsibility" (June 9, 1992). However, authorities of the Manager,
Safety and Health Section, as well as other organizational cDIIPonents such as
1 ine organizations which empower the. to carry out their assigned
responsibilities have not been specifically identified. The procedure states
that the line of safety and health authority from the manager to each employee
is reflected in the organizational chart. However, that chart appears to
reflect the chain of cOllll1and as opposed to specific authorities.

In the absence of specific procedures, there is no formal requirement for
supervisors or employees to document and report all incidents involving the
exercise of shutdown or stopwork authority. All such information is an
ilAportant resource in conducting risk assessments, cOllll1unicating lessons
learned to other departments, and compiling data for trend analysis.

The current policy and procedure states that the Manager, Safety and Health
Section, advises and assists management and supervisors, coordinates all
safety activities, and notifies management of problems and concerns .
Responsibilities for the formulation of site· specific poliCies and procedures
as well as compliance enforcement, independent oversight, and the conduct of
annual or triennial appraisals are not specific. Unit charters, which might
further clarify those ESlH responsibilities, have not yet been completed.

Discussion

Cross References
A Management Planning COllll1ittee has been appOinted to ensure maintenance of
safety measures to protect the health and safety of JBEC employees which will,
among other things, review current and proposed projects for adequacy of
safety controls. T./Iis connittee is chaired by the General Manager and
includes t he managers of all operational and staff organizations .

lIone
Self-AssesSEnt
This finding was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR·CUII self·assessment
(April 1992).
Manage.ent Appraisal
This finding was partially identified in the DOE Office of Self·Assessment
management appraisal of NPOSR·CUW (June 1992) and was partially identified in
the DOE/NPOSR Office of Planning and Technical Assurance management appraisal
of NPOSR·CUII (May 1992) .

A Safety Review COllll1ittee has also been appointed which, in part, will also
review current and proposed projects for adequacy of safety controls. This
cOllll1ittee is chaired by the Manager, Safety and Health Section, and the
membership is identical to the Management Planning COllll1ittee with the
exception of the Planning, Evaluation, and Control Coordinator who serves only
on the Management Planning COllll1ittee . The General Manager is also a member,
and provisions have been made for DOE/NPOSR·CUW to be represented.
The charters of those two cOllll1ittees suggest that they have been structured to
satisfy the DOE requirement for independent review and oversight. However,
several of the key members have other direct or indirect responsibilities for
the management of the majority of the operating facilities and for meeting the
production and profitability goals established by DOE. Therefore, it is
unlikely that these cOllll1ittees could satisfy the requirements set forth in DOE
5482.1B, "Environment, Safety, and Health Appraisal Program," for independent
reviews or oversight to ensure an acceptable level of checks and balances
between production operations and ES&H. Moreover, safety cOllll1ittees generally
serve in an advisory capacity to the General Manager who either approves or
disapproves the findings and recollll1endations of the cOllll1ittee . . Since the
General Manager chairs one cOllll1ittee and is a IIHlmber of the other, there is no
higher level of review or mechanism to resolve disputes or appeals.
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JBEC Policy and Procedure 1.5-01, "JBEC Environmental Policy, " which sets
forth roles and responsibilities for the formulation and execution of
environmental programs , is outdated and has not been amended to reflect the
new organizational structure. This procedure identifies some, but not all, of
the responsibilities for both the Environmental Manager and the operational
and staff organizations . Although regulatory compl i ance and independent
oversight functions, as required by DOE pol icies, are imp1 icit in some of the
functional responsibilities which are now assigned to the Environmental
Manager, they are not specifically identified .
Independent oversight of the total ES&H program, as required by DOE pol icies,
are often difficult to achieve in a small organization with limited resources.
The current organizational structure and the assignment of responsibil ities
within JBEC neither emphasizes the importance of independence nor assures that
adequate provisions have been made for the conduct of formal appraisals. The
Safety and Health and the Environmental Sections staff members are responsible
for formulating internal policies and procedures; providing site-specific
interpretations regarding compliance with DOE, Federal, and state regulatory
requirements; providing technical support and guidance to the line
organizations; and serving as the compliance arm for the organization. In
many cases , the same individual could potentially be involved in all of these
functions which diminishes the effectiveness of internal checks and balances .
ES&H-re1ated responsibilities, authorities, and requirements have not
consistently been incorporated into other operational or management policies
and procedures, including several that have been issued within the past few
months. For example, Policy and Procedure 3.3-02, "Management of Construction
Projects," provides reasonably good coverage of ES&H requirements and
specifi es the responsibilities of each participant. (Authorities of each of
the part i cipants are impliCit but not specifically stated.) However, Policy
and Procedure 1.1-14, "Project Management," (May 12, 1992), does not di scuss
the ES&H responsibilities and requirements for project management .

FINDING MF- 9

JBEC Individual Roles, ResponsibH iUes, and
AuthoriUes

Individual roles, responsibl1ities, and authoritias related to environMnt,
safaty, and health (ESIII) functions have not been clearly established and
c~nicated to all JBEC .-p10yees.
Discussion
An effective and enduring cultural change which places the proper emphasis on
ES&H will occur only when each employee fully understands, and accepts
ownership of, ES&H responsibili t ies for their own functional areas and those
of the total operation. Generic statements of responsibility and
accountabil ity have "not been effective in bringing about desired cultural
changes in the work place. In general, individual employees are willing to
accept those responsibilities once llanagement's expectations have been clearly
expressed and consistently and fairly applied.
Individual position descriptions have not yet been completed or modified to
fully reflect the specific responsibil ities and authorities of individual
employees for ES&H functions.
JBEC recently designed a new form for the conduct of employee performance
evaluations which includes ES&H factors. However, these factors only reflect
a generic description of expectations which is uniformly applicable to all
employees regardless of their position or responsibil ities. For the most
part, these generic factors deal with attitudinal characteristics as opposed
to job-specific and measurable goals and objectives. There is a provision for
supervisors to include a narrative evaluation of each rating element .
However, these evaluations are provided "after the fact," thus, they cannot be
used as a means of establishing specific management expectations in advance .
The JBEC Employee Performance Appraisal System does not require or encourage
employees to prepare annual development plans for themselves .

Finally, training respons i bilities at JBEC are currently divided between the
Safety and Health Section and the Personnel Section . Since an overall
training program plan has not been developed, the specific responsibilities,
authorities, and interfaces between these two vrganizations, as well as
requirements from other elements of the JBEC organization have not been
defined.

Se1 f-Auessll8nt

Cross Referencas

This ftnding was fully idlntified in the JBEC self-assessment (April 1992) .

Findings MF - II and MF-15; Concerns FR . I-I, FR.2 - I, FR.4 - I, and FR.5-1
Se1f-AssesSllllnt
Th is finding was partially identified in the JBEC self-assessment (April
1992) .
Managa.ent Appraisal
This f i nding was partiall y identified in the DOE Office of Self-Assessment
management appraisal of NPOSR-CUW (Junl 1992) and was partially identified in
the DOE/NPOSR Office of Planning and Technical Assurance management appraisal
of NPOSR-CUW (May 1992).
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Cross References
Concern OA.6-1

Manlg_nt Appraisal
This finding was parthlly identified in the DOE Office of Self-Assessment
management appraisal of NPOSR-CUW (June 1992) and was partially identified in
the DOE/NPOSR OffiCI of Planning and Ttchnica1 Assurance management appraisal
of NPOSR-CUW (Hay 1992).

FINDING MF-IO

JBEC Stop and Restart lIork Authorl ty

Roles responsibilities, authorities, and criteria for a temporary shutdown or
sto"';'rk and subsequent restart 'have not been clearly defined to ensure a
c_n understanding and unlfonl application by all organizational e1_nts of
JBEC.
Discussion
The concept of stopwork responsibilities and authorities within JBEC seems ,~o
be reasonably well undl!i"stood at the higher levels of the organization.
Although some Interim instructions have been issued, the authorities and the
circumstances under which they are to be applied have not been clearly set
forth in a formal site-specific policy or procedural statement which can be
distributed to all levels of the organization. There appears to be a
,prevailing notion within lower tier organizations that a temporary shutdown or
stopwork authority is only to be applied to operations which pose an immediate
threat to the lives of employees or If it involves imminent danger to the
operating facility . However, supervi sors and employees ' should a1 so be
empowered to initiate a temporary shutdown or to stop work in situations which
have the potential to produce unacceptable environmental consequences.
The criteria and the authority for restart i ng an operation once it has been
stopped have not been clearly defined and included in exisqng JBEC Policies
and Procedures. There is no req~irement for the corrective actions to be
reviewed ' by a member of the environment, safety, and health staff or higher
ieve1s of management prior to restart. The fact that restart authority is
limited to DOE under certain circumstances as set forth in DOE Orders does not
appear to be well understood.
There is currently no formal requirement for JBEC supervisors or employees to
document and report all incidents involving temporary shutdown or stopwork
authority . All such information is an important resource in conducting , ris~
assessments , commun i cating iessons learned to other departments , and compiling
data for trend analysis .
Cross References
None
Self-Assessment
This findi ng was part i ally i dentified in the JBEC self-assessment (April .• .
1992) .
Management Appra I sal
This fi nd i ng was par t 1a11y identified in the DOE Office of Se1f·Assessment
management appra i sal of NPOSR·CUW (June 1992) and was partially identified in
the DOE/NPOSR Offi ce of Planning and Technical Assurance management appraisal
of NPOSR· CUW (May 1992) .

FINDING MF-ll

OOE{NPOSR-CUV Training Progra.

OOE{NPOSR-CUV has not l~l_nted a for.a1, effective, and
envlron.ent, safety, and health (ESlH) training progra..

c~rehenslve

Discussion
Training of all personnel in the subject fundamentals and on practices to be
followed is a vital component of effective ESlH program Implementation.
Training provides assurance that (I) personnel are knowledgable and kept up to
date on ESlH Issues and, thus , are better able to perform their duties In
accordance with ESlH regulations, (2) a safer work environment Is created, and
(3) greater protection for the environment is provided. In order to establish
a unlfol'1ll understanding of purpose and structure, responsibilities and
authorities should be defined and documented which Identify responsibility for
detel'1ll1 n I ng the magn i tude and scope of the tra I n I ng program to be established.
This program should include, but not be limited to, an identification of the
training which has been provided to existing employees, a determination as to
what additional training should be provided to fill any voids that were
detected, and the method of delivery (1.e., Internal formal training course,
on - the-job training , external training, etc.). Training should be planned and
tailored to the specific needs of the Individual employees and should Include
an appropriate progression of training courses from the most baSic
introductory level, If appropriate, through inc:reaslngly more complex courses.
This should be continued until the training manager and/or the Immediate
supervisor Is satisfied that the Individual is fully prepared to carry out the
full range of his/her responsibilities. Refresher training and a process to
Identify needed or revised ESlH issues must also be established.
Specific program elements that are needed for a comprehensive and fully
effective training program include the following : (1) a job- specific needs
evaluation, (2) a syllabus for each position stipulating what training courses
should be completed, (3) a training records system that alerts the Individual
when completion of training or retraining Is delinquent, and (4) a mechanism
to evaluate the effectiveness of training.
The essential e1t.nents of an effective ESlH training program are not In place
at DOE/NPOSR-CUII, as evidenced by the following:
The DOE/NPOSR-CUII training program essentially consists of the
Administration Office Manager's being responsible for maintaining
training records. However, responsibility for developing and
maintaining an explicitly defined training program for local DOE
personnel has not been assigned. As a result , there is no
established framework for a definitive training program with
articulated training policy, goals, and expectations . Also,
previously prepared training procedures (e . g., SOP 04-34-10,
"Training Program NPOSR-CUW, " May 19, 1987) are not in use.
Discussions with DOE/NPOSR-CUII managers with responsibility for
ESlH program activities indicated that no job-specific training
needs evaluation to identify ES&H training requirements for staff
members has been made. As a result, no implementation plan for
fulf i l li ng identified training needs has been developed, and the
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ES&H training provided to staff has been very 1 imlted .
Finding MF-14 . )

(See

Interviews with staff members who have assigned responsibilities
in the ESlH program revealed training deficiencies in that area
for the individual staff members . This includes the
organizational element responsible for the Contract Surveillance
and Adllinistration Division, which has primary responsibility for
the safety and health prograll. It is not evident that this
organization has the requisite resources, training, or technical
expertise to fulfill the total spectrum of its responsibil ities .
Sillilarly, the Environmental Protection Specialist and the
engineering staff who provide support to the DOE/NPOSR-CUW ESlH
functions have not been trained in the full range of activities
for which they are responsible . (See Finding MF-6.)
A total of 222 training courses (including conferences) have been
provided to DOE/NPOSR-CUW employees during the past 6 years. Of
these training courses, only 22 (or 12 percent) were clearly ESlH
core courses, while another 55 (or 24 percent) were ESlH-related
courses (e.g., Quality Assurance) .
Finally, the Management Subteam also identified that DOE/NPOSR-CUW does not
monitor to ensure that JBEC and its subcontractors are meeting ESlH training
requirements, as required by DOE 5482 . 1B · Environment, Safety, and Health
Appraisal Program. · (See Concern TC . 1-4 . )
Cross References
Findings MF-6, MF - 14, A/CF - l, A/CF-2, A/CF-5, A/BMPF-l, SW/CF-l, SW/CF-2 ,
SW/CF-4, SW/CF -6, SW/CF-7, GW/CF-l, WM/CF-l, TCM/CF-l, TCM/CF-3, QA/CF-5,
QA/CF-IO, QA/CF-ll, IWS/CF-l, IWS/CF -3, IWS-CF-4, NEPA/CF-l, NEPA/CF-2,
NEPA/CF-3 , and NEPA/CF-4 ; Concerns OA . 1-6, EP.3 - 2, and TC.1-4
Self-Assessment
Th i s finding was fully ident i fied in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April
1992) .
Managellent Appra isa1
Thi s fi nd i ng was fully i dentified in the DOE Office of Self-Assessment
management appra i sal of NPOSR-CUW (June 1992) and was fully identified in the
DOE/ NPOSR Offi ce of Planning and Technical Assurance management appraisal of
NPOSR-CUW (May 1992) .

FINDING MF -12

JBEe Hu.an Resources Managelent

The JBEC recruiting and career ~nagelent progr..s at NPOSR-eUW do not ensure
continuity of staff qualified to effect cOIIplete illplelentation of
envirOllllent, safety, and health (ESUI) progrill require.ents.
Discussion
DOE 5480.19 ·Conduct of Operations· (July 9, 1990), Chapter 1 cites the
importance of the compatibility of operational and ES&H goals. Moreover, the
guidelines for ·Operations Organization and Administration· in this Order
(Chapter I, Section C.2) stipulate the need for proactive human resources
management to achieve these goals. The observations cited below pertain to
deficiencies in JBEC human resources management practices that impede the
achievement of these goals.
JBEC has no formal ized career path pl anning program that provides
staff with opportunities for ESlH vocational development and
growth. The small size of the JBEC (Casper) operation complicates
the establishment of this type of human resources management
program, but the maximum practical effort is needed to ensure that
qualified employees have the opportunity to develop ESlH expertise
and to use this enhanced capability to advance their careers .
JBEC has no formalized program to identify individuals for
succession to higher level management positions. Discussions with
JBEC management did indicate, however, that an initiative is being
formulated to develop future executive managers through a system
of identifying personnel with high potential and then providing
them with the training and experience to enhance their career
opportun i ties.
JBEC has not used all of its corporate resources in conducting its
ESlH recruiting activities, although JBEC has on several occasions
contacted JBEC Houston, the corporate office, for support in
filling certain environmental positions on a temporary baSis.
This process is not, however, currently formalized in Pol icy and
Procedure 1.6-06 , ·Recruiting Additional or Replacement
Personll1!l . •
Cross References
Concerns OA . 6-2 and TC.IO - l
Self-Assessment
Thi s f i nding was fully i dentified i n the JBEC self- assessment (April 1992) .
Managelent Appraisal
This find i ng was fully i dentified In the DOE Offiee of Self-Assessment
management apprai s al of NPOSR-CUW (June 1992) and was fully i dentified In t he
DOE/NPOSR Office of Phnn l ng and Technical Assurance management appra l nl of
NPOSR-CUW (May 1992) .

FIlIlING !IF - 13

JBEC Environ.ent, Safety, and Health (ESlH)
Training Progra.

JaEC has not i.,lelented a for.al, effective, and cu.prehensive ESlH training
progra..
Discussion
DOE policy calls for adequate training in all activities for which it is
required. DOE 5480 . 19 ·Conduct of Operations· (July 9, 1990), for example ,
e.,hasizes both llinagnent training (Chapter I, Section C. 5) and on-shift
training (Chapter V). In the ESlH area, training of all personnel on the
subj ect fundaJlentals and on practices to be followed is a vital component of
progra. i.,le.entation. The Management Subteam observed a number of
deficiencies in the JBEC ES&H training program, the most salient of which are
given below.
The JBEC Training Specialist has had the respons 'i bility of
developing and implementing a comprehensive training program, with
special emphasis on ESlH, since January 1992. In · an appraisal
interview, the Training Specialist stated his intention to prepare
an integrated plan for implementing the proposed enhanced training
program. Thus far, however, this plan has not been issued, and no
firm schedule for its preparation has been established.
According to the Training Specialist, activi t ies to date have been
reactive , responding to immediate needs, rather than proactive in
developing a comprehensive training program .

Currently, JBEC does not perfo,.. quality assurance appraisals of
the ESlH training functions. The new Quality Assurance Plan calls
for this activity once the JBEC Quality Management Section is
IIObillzed to fulfill this responsibility. Through a new
for.allzed process as part of Its self-assessment progra., JBEC
will be. able to evaluate the effectiveness of ES&H training
activities; however, this evaluation is not scheduled to be
Initiated until mld-FY 1993 .
JBEC ESlH staff take environmental samples without adequate
training in sampling techniques or methodology. For.al training
in s,t andard llethods for environmental sampl ing is not being
conducted. (See Finding MF-18.)
Staff training on self-assessment procedures and on the
Self-Assessment Implementation Plans (SAIPs) has not been
conducted by JBEC. JBEC has addressed the need for
self-assessment training in their Self-Assessment Program Plan,
but no schedules or milestones for conducting this training have
been developed . The personnel Involved in preparing the
self-assessment reports and the SAIPs are knowledgeable of the
process; however, this information has not been adequately
communicated to all staff members. As a result, the
Self-Assessment Program is not formally institutionalized within
each organizational unit, and participation in the self-assessment
process by all levels of responsibility has been deficient.
Cross References

Currently, JBEC training activities are decentr.alized and
fragmented, in that both the Safety and Health Section and the
Personnel Section coordinate ES&H-related training (Le., the
Personnel Section for offsite training and the Safety and Health
Section for onsite training). Each group maintains separate
training records , although the Training SpeCialist in the Safety
and Health Section does input to the Personnel Section training
records system.

Find ings MF-18, A/~F-I, A/CF-2, A/CF·5, A/BMPF-I, SW/CF-I, SW/CF-2, SW/CF-4,
SW/CF·6, SW/CF -7, GW/CF-3, WM/CF-I, TCM/CF-I, TCM/CF-3, QA/CF-5, QA/CF - IO,
QA/CF-II, IWS/CF·I, IWS/CF-3 , IWS/CF -4, NEPA/CF-I, NEPA/CF-2, NEPA/CF-3,
NEPA/CF-4; Concerns OA.8-I, OP.2-I, OP . 6-I , HA . 4-I, TC . I-I, TC . I - 2, TC.I-3,
TC.4-I, TC . IO-I, EP.3-I, and PT.2-1

Not all JBEC employees at Naval Petroleum Reserve Number 3 (NPR-3)
recei ve Occupat i ona 1 Safety and Heal th Admi ni strat i on (OSHA)
training appropriate to their needs, as specified in 29 CFR IglO
and 29 CFR 1926 . (See Concern TC.4-1.)

Managelent Appraisal

Safety meetings are used to provide occupational safety training ;
however, training record sheets, which are designed to provide' a
recor d of attendance by the individual training topic, are not
well documented . (See Section 4. 5. 5.)

Self-Asses SIlent
This finding was fully Identified In the JBEC self-assessment (April 1992) .

Th i s finding was fully identified in the DOE Office of Self-Assessment
management appraisal of NPOSR-CUW (June 1992) and was fully Identified In the
DOE/NPOSR Office of Planning and Technical Assurance management appraisal of
NPOSR-CUW (May 1992).

JBEC does not currently provide supervisor or llinagement
development training (as required by DOE 5480.19, Chapter I,
Section C.5). This type of training had been provided to new
supervisors before 1985, and again In 1990.
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FJIIlING 11'-14

FE ind DOE/NPOSR Environ.ent, Safety, and Health
(ESIII) Oversight

FE ind DOE/NPOSR oversight of ESIII prograas and activities at NPOSR-CUW lacks
sufficient definition ind for.ality to ensure ti ..ly and proper i~l ...ntation
of DOE directives, other ESIII regulations, and DOE initiatives directed at
achieving ESIII excellence.
Discussion
The Secretary of Energy has clearly assigned the responsibil ity for ensuring
that progrilll objectives are achieved in full compliance with applicable ESlH
regulations and DOE policies and for achieving excellence in ESlH matters to
line progrilll llanagement. Thi~ responsibility is carried out through various
policies, systetlS, and activities at each management level frOil the Program
Secretarial Officers down to subcontractor management . The development,
cOlllllunication and application of these policies, systems, and activities
collectively constitutes oversight of ESlH. Oversight elements for this
assessment include the following:
guidance and direction;
reviews, appraisals, and evaluations; and
management i nformation systems.
Significant improvements in the amount and quality of oversight of field ESlH
programs and activities by FE and NPOSR have been made in 1992 . The DOE
Office of Self·Assessment (FE-6) has now been staffed, has issued formal
Self·Assessment Program Plans, and has performed management appraisals of ESlH
programs in DOE/NPOSR and NPOSR-CUW. FE-6 also initiated a meeting of FE and
f i eld ESlH counterparts, scheduled for later this summer, which is designed to
enhance communication and the understanding of ESlH issues. DOE/NPOSR hired
an Environmental Specialist in the Office of Planning and Technical Assurance
i n March 1992 . This Environmental Specialist has conducted an internal
appraisal of DOE/NPOSR and a Management Appraisal and validation and
verification appraisal of corrective actions taken at NPOSR-CUW. These
appraisals have been conducted in accordance with detailed, written plans and
resulted in formally documented reports. However, the general lack of
fonnality in management approach and a failure to fully integrate ESlH into
all FE Headquarters units adversely affects the achievement of excellence in
ESlH wi thin DOE/NPOSR and at NPOSR-CUW. Specific deficiencies include the
following :
Roles, responsibilities, and authorities are not clearly defined
and communicated . Interviews with DOE personnel indicated that a
philosophy of individual responsibility for ESIH has been
i nformally communicated froll! the Assistant Secretary for Fossil
Energy and the Director, DOE/NPOSR. This is reflected somewhat in
the importance attached to Total Quality Management down through
the organization. However, FE-6 and the DOE/NP.OSR Office of
Plann i ng and Technical Assurance (FE -64) Environmental Specialist
are tasked with , essentially, all speCific responsibilities for
ESlH at FE and NPOSR . ESlH roles, responsibilities, and
authorit i es for other organizational eleRints are not yet clearly
I-II
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defined and co.unicated. The mission and function state..nts and
position descriptions for FE-6 and FE-64 describe ESlH roles,
responsibilities, and authorities. However, the roles,
responsibilities, and authorities for developlM!nt and llaintenance
of ESlH ele.ants, such as a Quality Assurance Program or training
within these offices, are not delineated. In addition, the roles,
responsibilities, and authorities of these two organizations and
the interfaces between various FE, DOE/NPOSR, and DOE/NPOSR-CUW
organizations regarding ESlH matters have not been fOrllally or
clearly cOllllUnicated to all personnel. The role of the NPOSR
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Compliance Officer is
detailed in the FE-64 Mission and Function Statement, but the
position descriptions of neither the FE-64 Office Director nor the
Environmental . Protection Special ist indicates a role as NEPA
Compliance Officer. The person acting as the FE NEPA COlipliance
Officer is located in the FE-6 office, although the FE-6 Mission
and Function Statement does not indicate this to be so.
Neither FE nor DOE/NPOSR have a fonnal, centralized training plan
or program, nor have they deSignated individuals or organizations
responsible for a training program. Responsibil ities for ESlH
training are not formally defined. Oversight of field
organization ESlH training programs is limited to the appraisals
done by FE-6 or the Environmental Specialist. ESlH training for
FE and DOE/NPOSR personnel is minimal; of 48 courses attended by
DOE/NPOSR personnel in 1991 and 1992, only 1 was clearly ESlH
related.
Neither FE nor DOE/NPOSR have a formal directives system to ensure
adequate review of DOE Orders and Secretary of Energy Notices,
communication of expectations to subordinate organizations (FE to
DOE/NPOSR or DOE/NPOSR to DOE/NPOSR-CUW), or tracking and followup
to assure that appropriate and required actions have been taken.
DOE directives are generally forwarded to subordinate
organizations without guidance or direction as to expectations or
the need for formal responses regarding implementation or specific
directive requirements . An example of a consequence of this lack
of fonna1ity is that specific guidance on the DOE self-assessment
initiative was not provided to DOE/NPOSR-CUW until December 1991,
long after the need for self-assessment programs and activities
were established by the Secretary. Another example is that no
specific guidance or expectations for implementation (i.e.,
submittal of an appl icabil ity matrix, or response regarding
status) was given to DOE/NPOSR or the site regarding Conduct of
Operations, a program directed by Secretarial guidance in December
1989 and by DOE 5480.19, ·Conduct of Operations Requirel1Mlnts for
DOE Facilities· (issued in Ju·jy 1990). DOE/NPOSR did issue
memoranda to the site alert i ng it to the need for deve 1opi ng a
self-assessment program on July 25, 1991, and the need for
developing a formal conduct of operations plan on October I, 1991.
However, neither of these documents provided specific guidance or
required any response from the site.
Neither FE nor DOE/NPOSR have a formal, functioning corrective
action progralA in place to track to closure ESlH deficiencies

Identified by the DOE staff or external oversight organizations.
Although not clearly delineated In the Office of Fossil Energy
Self-Assessment Program Plan, the Intent, as stated by FE-6 and
DOE/NPOSR personnel, Is to have one Integrated, comprehensive
tricking systllll accessible to all levels of the FE organization,
Including the contractors.
Neither FE nor DOE/NPOSR have procedures or cOlll1litment tracking
systlllls to provide the foraa1ity and consistency needed to assure
that their progralls and activities related to ESlH are conducted
In accordance wi th DOE Orders and that proper ES~H oversight of
subordinate organizations' operations are exercised.
Cross References
Inadequacies In the oversight of ESlH programs and activities at NPOSR-CUII are
factors In many of the Tiger Teall Assessment concerns and findings. Of
particular note are Concerns 0A.1-2 and OA.2-2 .
Self-AssesSlll!nt

FINDING MF-JS

DOE/NPOSR-CUII Envl ro_nt, Safety, and Health
(ESIH) OVersight of JBEC

The oversight progrill and activities of DOE/NPOSR-CUII are not adequately
defined, developed, staffed, I~le.ented, or docUiented to provide assurance
that JBEC progrillS and activities are In cOllPlfance with ESIH regulations and
DOE directives and that DOE ESIH Initiatives are being properly addressed.
Discussion
The Secretary of Energy has clearly assigned the responsibility for ensu r ing
that program objectives are achieved In full compliance with applicable ESlH
regulations and DOE poliCies and for achieving excellence In ESlH matters to
line program management. This responsibility Is carried out through various
policies, systems, and activities at each management level from the Prograll
Secretaria 1 Offl cers down to subcontrictor management. The development,
cOlll1lunlcatlon, and application of these pol icles, systems, and activities
collectively constitutes oversight of ESlH. Oversight elements for this
assessment include the following:
guidance and direction;

This finding was partially Identified In t he DOE/NPOSR Internal Appraisal
(June 1992). However, there has been no self-assessment of FE.

reviews, appraisals, and evaluations; and

Manage.ent Appraisal

management Information systems.

This finding was partially Identified In the DOE Office of Self-Assessment
management appraisal of DOE/NPOSR (July 1992).

DOE/NPOSR-CUII Is the first line DOE organizational element performing
oversight at NPOSR-CUII, with the most access and Intimate knowledge of
contractor performance. Formal oversight of JOEC activities by DOE/NPOSR-CUII
regarding ESlH performance has primarily been through the Cost Plus Award Fee
evaluation process and contractor ESlH program assessments performed by
external organizations. Environmental oversight was the responsibility of the
award fee functional monitor (a collateral duty) until September 1991 when the
responslbll ity was passed to an individual reassigned to a new position
entitled "Environmental Specialist." Safety and health oversight
respons I bility has been del egated to the 01 rector, Contract Survei 11 ance and
Administration with field surveillance Input from the engineering staff and
the Environmental Special i st. Quality assurance responslbll ity I s assigned as
a collateral duty to a member of the engineering staff. Most of the essential
elements of an effective oversight program either do not exist or are
Informally established and Implemented . Deficiencies in the DOE/NPOSR-CUII
oversight program and activities Involve Inadequate organization, staffing,
and training; Informality of processes and lack of documentation; lack of a
directives system; and the lack of management Information systems . Specific
deficiencies In each of these areas are as follows :
The ESlH organizational structure does not provide for Internal
oversight assessment by persons that are Independent of technical
direction or involvement In the activity being assessed . The
organization also has direct conflicts of Interest for the areas
of safety and health and qua 11 ty assurance I n that personnel
responsible for oversight also have program responsibilities
(I.e . , cost , schedule, and production) . Personnel performing ESlH
duties are not ES1H professionals by education or experience, and
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supplemental ESlH training for this staff has been very limited.
(See Finding MF - 11.)
Overs i ght activities have been conducted i n an informal manner.
No written procedures exist to describe the ESlH oversight program
or its implementation. Safety and health field assessments are
unplanned, unstructured, limited i n number (findings are primarily
randOil observations made during technical or production-related
field visits), and no ESlH program-type assessments have been made
by site personnel. Prior to the spring of 1992, ES&H concerns
were not cons i s tent 1y or formally documented,
transllitted/distributed , tracked, reviewed for proper corrective
action , or ver i f i ed as closed. In general, there are no formal
requ i rements established for DOE review and approval of contractor
documents with regard to ESlH . The DOE/NPOSR-CUW staff tasked
with ESlH responsibilities do not review proposed engineering
changes to facilit i es, construction of new facilities, or work
authorizations to ensure that all appropriate ES&H criteria or
considerations have been included .
DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not performed functional or triennial management
appraisals of JBEC as required by DOE 5482 . 1B, "Environment ,
Safety, and Health Appraisal Program." Although certain
functional areas have been appraised by external organizat i ons,
there has been no formal p1ann i ng or schedu 1 i ng of appra i sa 1s to
comply with DOE 5482 . 1B until the May 1992 issuance of the
DOE/NPOSR-CUW Self-Assessment Program Manual . The schedul ing of
appraisal of the contractor provided in this manual, if properly
implemented , should satisfy the requirements of DOE 5482 . 1B.
DOE/NPOSR-CUW does not have a formal or fully function i ng
di rectives system i n place. DOE does not have a written procedure
descri bi ng the processing of DOE directives or communicating
expectations and requ i rements to the contractor, although the need
for such a procedure has been identified, and one is currently
be i ng drafted . The DOE Si te Office recently conducted a review
of DOE di rectives and issued compliance letters to JBEC concerning
the applicabil i ty of Orders and Secretary of Energy Notices
(S ENs) . As of June 15, 1992 , letters had been sent to JBEC for
approximat ely 75 percent of these directives .
While this
communi cat i on was necessary and commendable , the letters varied
greatly i n the level of gu i dance and di d not require specifi c
r esponses or act ions where appropriate .
DOE/ NPOSR-CUW does not have a formal , functioning corrective
action program in place to track to closure ES&H defic i encies
identifi ed by DOE st aff or external oversight organizations .
DOE/NPOSR-CUW doe s not have a commi tment track i ng system for
either incoming or outgo i ng co rrespondence .
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DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not identified ES&H performance indicators and
does not perform any formal trend analysis. DOE/NPOSR-CUW has
drafted DOE/NPOSR-CUW Self-Assessment Program Standard Operating
Procedure (SAP-SOP)-7 describing a trend analysis program for
self-assessment find i ngs.
Cross References
Inadequate oversight of JBEC programs and activities by DOE/NPOSR-CUW was a
factor in many of the Tiger Tllm findings (e.g., MF-ll) and concerns.
Self-AssesSMnt
This finding was fully identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self- assessment (April
1992) .
Management Appraisal
This findi ng was fully identified in the DOE Office of Self-Assessment
management appraisal of NPOSR-CUW (June 1992) and was fully identified in the
DOE/NPOSR Office of Planning and Technical Assurance management appraisal of
NPOSR-CUW (May 1992).

FINDING MF-16

~E/NPOSR-CUV

Contract Administration

OOE/NPOSR-CUV has not enforced the provisions of the Scope of Work
requirellents related to envirol1llllnt. ufety. and health (ES&H) and quality
assurance (QA) in the cont ract between OOE/NPOSR and JBEC Houston.
Discuss ion

JBEC purchase orders and subcontracts even though the required safety article
had not been included in the proposed subcontracts for construction .
Subsequent Contractor Procurement Systems Reviews by OOE failed to detect this
omission .
Cross Referencea
Findings HF-15 and HF-19; Concern OA.1-3

The ES&H requirements set forth in Contract No. DE-ACOI-86FE60896 between
OOE/NPOSR and JBEC are excellent and go well beyond the requirements of the
standard Safety and Health Clause included in most management and operating
contracts. They set forth specific requirements and deliverables. as .well as
schedules which clearly ident ify DOE expectations with respect to the ES&H
program to be established by the contractor. To further emphasize the
importance of these requirement s. they were included in the Scope of Work
statement which afforded them equal status with operational requirements.
Quality requirements were also separately identified in the Scope of Work
statement. Although they are 1ess specific in terms of deliverables and
schedules. they do identify the essential elements. including reporting
requirements of the QA program. which the contractor was expected .to develop
and maintain. Si nce OOE does not currently have a standard contract clause
applicable to envi ronmental requirements. the provisions included in the Scope
of Work provided in excellent means of defining the DOE/NPOSR expectations and
requi rements .
The DOE/NPOSR contract has been assigned to DOE/NPOSR-CUW for administration
and technical direction within specified limits. The Scope of Work. as set
forth in Attachment A. required the contractor to prepare and submit for
approval by the Director, NPOSR-CUW, an Environmental Protection Plan and a
Health and Safety Plan within 90 days after the effective date of the
contract. The approved plans were also to be updated at least annually. The
professional safety and health staff of the contractor is also required to
conduct documented inspections of all activities at least annually and submit
a report to the Director, NPOSR-CUW citing all identified deficiencies and the
corrective actions to be taken. Although the current contract was effective
October I, 1986, the contractor has not completed any of those required
actions . Similarly, DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not taken any action to enforce the
mandatory provisions of the contract even though the 'Compliance Directive'
which is included in the Environmental Protection section, as well as the
Scope of Work for Safety and nealth, specifically identifies the actions to be
taken by the Director, NPOSR-CUW, or his authorized representative, in the
event the contractor fails to comply with these requirements.
If the required actions and de1iverables for ES&H and QA as set forth in the
Scope of Work statement had been completed in a timely manner, it seems likely
that many of the findings and concerns identified by the Tiger Team would have
been resolved or at least minimi zed. Although the Cost Plus Award Fee records
were not examined for the entire term of the contract, it does not appear that
the failure on the part of the contractor to comply with the Scope of Work
requirements specifically set forth in the contract was fully considered by
OOE/NPOSR-CUW in evaluating and rating overall contract performance . (See
Fi ndings HF-15 and HF-19; Concern OA . I-3 . )
In addition to its failure to fully enforce the requirements set forth in the
Scope of Work, OOE/NPOSR-CUW approved the standard terms and conditions for
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Self-Assesslll!nt
This finding was not identified in the OOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment (April
1992) .
Management Appraisal
This finding was not identified in the OOE Office of Self-Assessment
management appraisal of NPOSR-CUW (June 1992) and was not identified in the
OOE/NPOSR Office of Planning and Technical Assurance management appraisal of
DOE/NPOSR-CUII (Hay 1992).

FIIIlING MF-17

Cost Plus Award Fee Process

The Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAr) process, as illlpll!lll!nted at OOE/NPOSR-ClIV, has
not been fully effective' in co.unicating ESlH expectations and goals to all
JBEC IAnagl!lll!nt levels and gathering and evaluating ESlH perforunce data, and
does not act as a fully effective incentive tool to prOllOte ESlH perforunce.
Discussion
JBEC manages and operates NPOSR-ClIV under a prime contract with DOE which uses
a Cost Plus Award Fee mechanism . DOE Notice 4220 .3 "Award Fee Contracts, "
(currently being revised) states that the process "should clearly delineate
and effectively communicate to the contractors appropriate milestones and
performance objectives for the upcoming rating per'lods." In doing so, DOE can
translate ES&H goals and priorities into performance expectations. ES&H
performance against the objectives and criteria in the Award Fee Determination
Plan (AFDP) should be monitored on a continuous basis so that a comprehensive
fee determi nation may be made following the performance period. Further, the
CPAF process is designed to provide an incentive to achieve optimum contract
performance by enabling the contractor to earn an increased fee as a reward
for des i red perfo",ance.
At NPOSR-CUW, ES&H objectives and criteria currently receive 25 percent of the
stated weight in the AFDP. DOE/NPOSR-CUW recently recommended that the
percentage be increased to 30 percent of the available award fee. This
allocation appropriately reflects ES&H as a priori ty at NPOSR-CUW since this
weight is greater than or equal to other performance categories .
Moreover, DOE/NPOSR-CUW has taken steps to enhance ES&H considerations in the
CPAF process at NPOSR·CUW and has made an effort to improve interaction with
JBEC in the CPAF process by inviting it to participdte in monthly Performance
Evaluation Committee (PEC) meetings. However, the CPAF process at NPOSR
remains deficient in some areas.
COlllDunication of Goals. priorities, and Expectations
The ES&H performance objectives and criteria in the AFDP are generally broad
and subjective in nature. A balance between objective and subjective criteria
is lacking . The lack of objective and measurable criteria and milestones ,
where appropriate, hampers the AFDP from effectively communicating to the
contractor what is expected in the way of performance . This deficiency also
makes it difficult for performance monitors and evaluators to collect
information and characterize ES&H performance using the established criteria.
The AFDP lacks adequate and comprehensive ES&H programmatic criteria necessary
for a thorough evaluati on of ES&H performance . For example, the current AFDP
does not contain criteria pertaining to the National Environmental Policy Act
program, environmental training, or compliance requirements related to DOE
environmental orders. The programmatic criteria that do exist lack
specificity, clarity , and schedules/milestones.
DOE/NPOSR·CUW has not fully developed the potential of the CPAF system to
serve as a management tool to communicate the changes and new initiatives
which have been generated in recent years. Although the weighting has been
ilppropriately changed, the actual criteria related to the desired changes
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continue to lack sufficient specificity to serve as a standard to measure
performance and results.
The Office of Environment, Safety and Health (EH) has commented several times
in the past (August 1990, February 1991 , and August 1991) that the criteria
were not adequate . EH has also provided guidance to FE ("Award Fee Safety and
Health Programs Guidance" and "General Comments," February 1991) for improving
their ESlH criteria. While DOE/NPOSR-CUW has recently recommended some
changes to the safety and health criteria, they did not incorporate this
guidance into past AFDPs .
The absence of appropriate ES&H criteria 11mits the abi11ty of DOE/NPOSR·CUW
to effectively communicate clear and concise ES&H goals and objectives to JBEC
through the AFDP.
Additional ES&H priorities and goals are often provided on a verbal basis to
JBEC, which does not provide a documented record for evaluation of
performance. JBEC has recognized this problem, but has failed to request
written documentation of such guidance in a formal manner.
Incentive System
DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not fully used the award fee process as an effective
incentive tool to promote ES&H excellence . Although on occasion a specific
incentive was assigned to a particular ES&H initiative, this practice has not
been consistently applied to promote ES&H performance . DOE/NPOSR-CUW has made
an effort to correct potential deficiencies using the process, but has not
extended that effort to promote new initiatives and ES&H programs. A review
of several monthly PEC reports revealed over 40 items related to the
correction of specific deficiencies while only five were directed to the
development of ES&H programs or initiatives. While the correction of
deficiencies is an important component of the process and should continue to
be, the process should also provide an incentive to pursue new developments.
Additionally, DOE/NPOSR-CUW does not characterize expectations and formally
communicate them to JBEC.
process Mechanisms
The timely comprehensive, and accurate collection and evaluation of ES&H
performanc~ data are crucial to an effective award fee process. At NPOSR-CUW,
there are some deficiencies in the CPAF process that are not conducive to the
achievement of these objectives . Neither NPOSR nor DOE/NPOSR-CUW prov ide
specific guidance or procedures for the collection of ES&H performance
information as inputs into the CPAF process. The lack of such guidance is
especially critical at NPOSR-CUW because of the deficiencies cited earl ier in
regard to the performance objectives and criteria. This problem is compounded
by the fact that some personnel responsible for collecting and evaluating ES&H
performance data in connection with the CPAF process lack the formal training
and experience in ES&H requirements and issues.
Further, there are no structured programmat ic ES&H assessments or evaluations
conducted in connection with the CPAF evaluation . While occasional audits
performed by external groups have been incorporated into the CPAF, the bulk of
performance information that is used in the evaluation is often event driven,
such as incidents that are discovered by DOE/NPOSR-CUW monitors. The lick of

evaluation of individual ES1H programs makes it difficult to perform a
cOlllp1ete evaluation of ES1H activities for the entire rating period. This
situation is compounded by the limited and irregular DOE/NPOSR-CUW ES1H
presence on site which limits their capabil ity to gather performance data in
the ESlH area .
DOE/NPOSR-CUW does not have a formal tracking system for the corrective
actions taken by JBEC to address deficiencies identified in the CPAF process.
While SOlIe informal tracking is done at the Performance Evaluation Committee
level. the absence of formal programs limits the effectiveness of the process
as a performance improvement tool . DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not developed a formal
lessons learned program in relation to deficiencies and achievements
identified in the CPAF process.
Cross References
Findings MF-4 and MF-IS
Self-Assess.ent
This finding was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment
(April 1992) .
Manage.ent Appraisal

FINDING MF - 18

JBEC Enviro~nt, Safety, and Health (ESlH)
Oversight

The oversight progra. and activities of JBEC are not adequately defined,
developed, staffed, i.,le.ented, or docu.ented to provide assurance that JBEC
ESlH progra.s and activities are in cOlpliance with DOE directives and other
regulations or that DOE ESlH initiatives are being properly addressed.
Discussion
The Secretary of Energy has clearly assigned the responsibility for ensuring
that program objectives are achieved in full compliance with applicable ESlH
regulations and DOE policies and for achieving excellence in ESlH lIIatters to
line prograJII management. This responsibility is carried out through various
policies, systems, and activities at each management level frOll the Program
Secretarial Officers down to subcontractor management. The development,
communication, and application of these policies, systems, and activities
collectively constitutes oversight of ESlH. Oversight elements for this
assessment include the following:
guidance and direction;
reviews. appraisals, and evaluations. and
management information systems.

This finding was partially identified in the DOE Office of Self-Assessment
lIIanagement appraisal of DOE/NPOSR (July 1992), was partially identified in the
DOE Office of Self-Assessment lIIanagement appraisal of NPOSR-CUW (June 1992).
and was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR Office of Planning and Technical
Assurance lIanagel1M!nt appraisal of NPOSR-CUW (May 1992).

JBEC. as the management and operating contractor at NPOSR-CUW, has
responsibility for operational activities and, thus, has the best opportunity,
as well as the contractual responsibil ity and obligation, to exercise
comprehensive ES1H oversight of these operations. Formal ES1H oversight
within JBEC at NPOSR-CUW has primarily been the responsibility of designated
ES1H specialists in staff environmental and safety and health organizations
reporting to the General Manager. Documented safety inspections of equipment
have been performed by line management and workers for years. In addition,
the 1 ine management responsibil ity for ES1H is currently being more formally
communicated to the line through new mission statements (issued), new unit
charters (being drafted), revised job descriptions (being drafted), and
employee performance evaluation standards (issued, but inadequate; see Finding
MF-9). Most of the elements of an effective oversight program exist or are
being developed within JBEC. Enhanced ES1H staffing, surveillance, and
personnel involvement in safety and health matters have occurred over the last
2 years. With the approach of the Tiger Team Assessment. several major
program appraisals were conducted by both in-house staff and external
appraisers . Significant attention has been directed at major ES1H program
elements, such as conduct of operations and quality as surance in the last few
months.
However, ES1H oversight by JBEC in some areas has been nonexistent or
insufficient. and in many areas is poorly documented and lacks adequate
follow - through for identified defic i encies. Some key elements of an effective
oversight program have not yet been developed or implemented by JBEC.
Deficiencies in the JBEC/NPOSR-CUW oversight program and activities include
inadequate organization, staffing, and training; informality of processes and
lack of documentation; inadequate procedures ; incomplete implementation of a
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directives system; and the lack of (or inadequate) management information
systems. SpecHic deficiencies in each of these areas are as follows:
For the JBEC Safety and Health and Environmental Sections, there
is a lack of independence in that the personnel performing
independent assessments are also responsible for providing
technical support , guidance, and review. This question of
independence has not been adequately addressed by JBEC. The JBEC
Environmental Section has experienced significant turnover and
staffing shortages. In the spring of 1992, JBEC brought in
temporary personnel to fill the Environmental Manager position and
provide supplemental technical expertise . Environmental oversight
activities have thus been primarily reactive in nature. For
example, the Environmental Section staff do not visit reported
spill sites before cleanup or evaluate the accuracy of spill
reports . They do not evaluate the appropriateness or adequacy of
production-specified actions to prevent recurrence for spills and
1eaks . The Management Subteam revi ewed several completed and
approved 1991 spill and leak reports and noted that the blocks for
specifying actions to prevent recurrence were sometimes blank,
were sometimes not annotated as complete, and were sometimes
incorrectly noted as compiete when, in fact, actions had not been
taken or were not veri fi able.
In general, ES&H training for the ES&H staff or other JBEC
personnel has not been given high priority or funding . JBEC ES&H
personnel responsible for environmental sampling lack training in
site-specific environmental sampling techniques, and there are no
formal site procedures detailing this activity. (See Finding
MF-13. )
Weaknesses exist in the JBEC management system for Polic i es and
Procedures (P&Ps).
JBEC has a formal system for P&Ps, but a
clear hierarchy of documents has not been established. (P&Ps are
combi nat i on Pol icy and Procedure documents, although some P&Ps are
strictly policy statements; the distinction between a P&P and an
Operation Procedure has not been defined; and desk procedures or
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) have not been defined.)
Policy and Procedure 5. 4-01 , · Procedure Preparation and
DistribUtion· (June 8, 1992), allows new or revised procedures to
be accumulated for up to 3 months prior to formal publication. A
new Quality Assurance Manu~ 1 (awa i t i ng DOE approval) establishes a
hierarchy of procedures, but still does not identify policies in
this hierarchy , and it is not yet clear how th1s Manual will be
implemented with regard to site procedures .
JBEC does not have a clear, written policy or procedure for the
use of procedures (e . g., strict adherence, · out and i n use· at the
work locat i on, and change all errors formally before proceeding)
or for making emergency or minor changes. Policy and Procedure
5. 4-04, ·Reviewing, Revising and Deleting Published Procedures·
(June 8, 1992), permits JBEC personnel to mark up a copy of an
i ncorrect P&P for ·temporary use· while a changa is being
processed; supervisory and ES&H staff reviews and approval are not
requ i red .
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JBEC Environmental Section P&Ps are out of date (l.e., they
reference old organizations, personnel, and telephone numbers)
and, in general, inadequately address key elements such as the
frequency and scope of assessment activities, the _ans of
documenting deficiencies, and the processing of identified
deficiencies (e.g., distribution, tracking, designation of
responsible parties, reporting of completion of corrective
actions , verification and closure , and trending/root cause
determination) •
JBEC has not developed fOrlla 1 programs or procedures for the
environmental functional areas of air quality and waste management
which are specified in Policy and Procedure 1.5-01, ·Environmental
Policy . •
JBEC Safety and Health Policies and Procedures, although in better
condition than Environmental P&Ps, also inadequately address key
elements such as the frequency and scope of assessment activities,
the means of documenting deficiencies, and the processing of
identified deficiencies.
ES&H deficiencies are not consi stently documented, distributed,
tracked to closure, assigned for corrective actions, verified as
complete, trended, or evaluated for root cause or generic
conditions. In April 1992, JBEC developed and implemented a
safety and health deficiency tracking system (outlined in Pol icy
and Procedure 1.3-40, ·Safety and Health Department Tracking
Program,· is.ued June 9, 1992) which consolidated and enhanced
existing informal tracking systems . Environmental issues are
tracked by various , mostly informal Environmental Section tracking
systems. Although a sitewide comprehensive corrective action
system is now under development , it is not yet functioning. The
Management Subteam notes that JBEC intends to input the findings
from past internal and external appraisals and inspections into
the new corrective action system and perform verification of
adeqUate corrective action. This aggressive and proactive
approach should provide additional assurance that previously noted
deficiencies have been addressed.
JBEC does not have a fully functioning directives system in place.
A new JBEC procedure detailing the review and proceSSing of DOE
directives was issued on May 29, 1992. A backfit review of DOE
Orders and Secretary of Energy Notices is in progress, but the
appl icilbility of DOE Orders and other regulations to NPOSR-CUW
activities and the level of compliance by JBEC have not been fully
determined . As a result, many JBEC organizat i onal elements are
attempting to develop or enhance the site ES&H program without a
full awareness and understanding of the requirements and guidance
provided in DOE directives.
JBEC does not have a written cOl1l1litment tracking system, although
a formal system is being maintained by the General Manager's
clerical staff . However, recently issued DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC
management policies authorizing formal correspondence directly
between staff members which cOl1l1lunicate DOE expectations and JBEC
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cOlaitllents have not been factored into the existing cOlllllitment
tricking systell. Thus, the potential exists for expectations and
cOlaitllents to bypass the tracking system and thus avoid the
attention of lIanagement.
JBEC has not fully identified ESlH performance indicators and does
not perfor.. any fOl"llal trend analysis of ESlH deficiencies. JBEC
has no written procedures for a perfornance indicator/trend
analysis progru. JBEC has collected standard perfornance
indicator infor..ation as directed by SEN-29-91 for four quarters
and has also identified a nUliber of additional site-specific
perfor..ance indicators. However, these indicators have been
reported directly to OOE without any narrative or analysis and
there is no evidence that they have been utilized as a management
too 1 for change.

Se,f-Assessllent
This finding was partially identified in the OOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC
self-assessments (April 1992).
Managetll!nt Appraisal
This finding was fully identified in the OOE Office of Self-Assessllent
management appraisal of NPOSR-CUW (June 1992) and was fully identified in the
OOE/NPOSR Office of Planning and Technical Assurance lIanagement appraisal of
NPOSR-CUW (May 1992) .

The JBEC oversight of ESlH for subcontractors is lacking in
fonaality and consistency. The extent and responsibilities for
coaaunication between contract admini strators, Contracting Officer
Technical Representatives (COTRs), and the ESlH technical staff
are not clearly delineated in procedures. COTRs do not appear to
be actively involved in assessing subcontractor performance in the
ESlH areas as required by Policy and Procedure 1.5-03,
·Subcontractor Environmental Monitoring· (March 10, 1992), and
Policy and Procedure 1.3-32, ·Subcontractor Safety Monitoring·
(May 27, 1992), and documentation methods do not accommodate these
reviews. Formal notification of ESlH staff that subcontractors
are onsite and need site-specific ESlH training is not formal and
does not routinely occur . Subcontractor Quarterly Performance
Evaluations do not contain any Environmental Section performance
elements. Two 1991 Quarterly Performance Evaluation reports for
one subcontractor indicated satisfactory safety performance when,
in fact , J EC SlH staff and management had identified numerous
safety violations on several occasions and unacceptable safety
attitudes by site supervision . In addition, during the evaluation
period a letter had been written to the subcontractor threatening
sanctions and removal from the site if safety performance was not
improved. Performance Evaluation reports are not distributed to
management or to the ESlH technical staff. JBEC Policy and
Procedure 1.3-32 and Pol icy and Procedure 1.5-03 both require
mon i tori ng of subcontractors by the COTRs and the Envi ronmenta 1
and Safety and Health Sections staff . However, neither provides
any specifics as to frequency, checklists or items to inspect,
documentation and cOlllllunication of find i nqs (good or bad),
specification and review of corrective actions ,
verification/closu re , or tracking and trending.

Cross References
Inadequate JBEC ESlH oversight was a factor i n many of the Tiger Team concerns
and findings (e .g . , MF-9 and MF-13).
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FIlIlING !IF-19

the omission of the required article frOll construction subcontracts is a
violation of the provisions of the prime contract.

JBEC Contract COIIIp li ance

JBEC has not fully co.plied with the .andatory envirollEnt, safety, and health
(ESlH) provisions of their contract with DOElHPOSR.

Cross References
Findings HF-16; Concerns OA.I-l and OA.I-4

Discussion
The Scope of Work in Attachment A of DOE/NPOSR Contract Number
DE·ACOI·86FE60896 identifies a number of specific requirements and
del iverables related to ESlH. Article 1 of the Environmental Protection
section of the Scope of Work states, "The Contractor shall take all measures
necessary to cOlllPly with all applicable federal, state and local environmental
protection statutes, regulations and standards, and all applicable DOE
Orders." It also states that the contractor must ensure that he is completely
knowledgeable of and able to implement all such statutes and regulations.
Based on the number of findings identified by the Tiger Team, it is evident
that JBEC has not fully complied with this provision of the contract .
Article 2 specifies, "The Contractor shall submit for approval in writing an
Environmental Protection Plan to the Director, NPOSR-CUW within ninety (90)
days after the effective date of the contract . " It further states that the
plan shall be updated, reViewed, and approved by DOE when necessary, but no
less than annually. Although the contract became effective Octobel' I, 1986,
JBEC has not completed and submitted the Environmental Protection Plan or any
subsequent updates.
Article 2 of the Safety and Health clause of the Scope of Work states, "The
Contractor shall submit for approval, in writing, a Health and Safety Plan to
the Director, NPOSR-CUW, within ninety (90) days after the effective date of
the contract . " The approved plan was also to be updated no less than once
each year. JBEC has not completed and submitted the Health and Safety Plan or
any subsequent updates.
Article 5 of the Safety and Health Cla~se states, "The Contractor's
professional safety and health personnel shall conduct documented inspections
of all activities at least once each year . " A copy of the report indicating
all deficiencies found and correcti ve action taken or planned was to be
submitted to the Director, DOE/NPOSR-CUW. According to JBEC personnel, these
inspections have not been completed and reported as specified in the contract.
An external JBEC audit completed Hay IS, 1991, stated that JBEC is
all of the reporting requirements set forth in the prime contract.
JBEC management apparently made a unilateral decision to defer any
comply with the contractual requirements pending a DOE decision to
negot i ate a new contract.

not meeting
However,
action to
compete or

The provisions of the contract and related DOE procurement regulations, which
are also applicable to JBEC, require that the flowdown provisions of the
Safety and Health Clause in the prime contract be included in all subcontracts
and major purchase orders issued by JBEC. JBEC has included those 9rovisions
i n the terms and conditions of all major procurement actions with the
exception of those related to subcontracts fOI construction. Even though the
terms and conditions for construction subcontracts were approved by DOE and
subsequently reviewed during a Contractor Procurement Systems Review by DOE,
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Self-Asses SEnt
This finding was not identified in the JBEC self-assessment (April 1992).
Minage.ent Appraisal
This finding was not identified in the DOE Office of Self-Assessllll!nt
management appraisal of NPOSR-CUW (June 1992) and was not identified in the
DOE/NPOSR Office of Planning and Technical Assurance .anagement appraisal of
NPOSR-CUW (Hay 1992).

FIIIlING MF-20

FE, DOE/lIPOSR, and DOE/NPOSR-CUI/ Quality
Assurance (QA) Prograas

September 1985. However, implementing directives described in the
implementation plan were never issued by DOE/NPOSR-CUW, and no DOE QA Program
was established . In addition, the requirement to implement the QA Progralll as
required by DOE 5700.6A, and the scope of work in the contract between DOE and
JBEC, was never enforced by DOE. (See Finding MF-16 . )

FE and DOE/lIPOSR have not developed and illplellented QA prograas iIS required by
DOE 5700.6C. DOE/NPOSR-CUI/ hilS not fully developed illplellenting procedures or
illplellented a QA progrilll iIS required by DOE 5700. 6C .

Cross References

Discussion

Finding MF-16, QA/CF-3, and QA/CF-6; Concern QV.I-2.

An effective QA ProgrUl is a key IIiInagellent systell which helps provide
structure, fOrllill1ty, and consistency to environment, safety , and health
(ESlH) progralls and activities . DOE Order 5700.6C, 'Qual ity Assurance,'
requires DOE Oepartllental elellents to develop and implement QA programs to
goverr. the work of the organization.
FE and DOE/NPOSR have not developed or implemented QA programs as required by
DOE 5700.6C. FE has not assigned responsibil ity for developing a QA program.
In DOE/NPOSR, the responsibility for QA rests with the Office of Planning and
Technical Assurance (FE -64) , as evidenced in their Mission Statellent and
individual position descriptions . However, It is not clear from these
docullents whether a formal QA program is intended to be developed and
lIIai ntained at DOE/NPOSR . Moreover, no formal plans have been established to
develop a QA prograll for DOE/NPOSR . Neither FE nor DOE/NPOSR have formal
procedures that detail the implementation of the QA program elements
delineated in DOE 5700 . 6C .
A fOnlal QA Program Manual was drafted for DOE/NPOSR-CUW, which has been
approved locally ar.~ transmitted to DOE/NPOSR on June 6, 1992 , for review and
approval by the Assistant Secretary fo!'" Fossil Energy (FE-l). Some top-level
implementing QA procedures (QAPs) have been drafted and are incorporated as
part of the QA Program Mdnual, but no Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for
implementing QA requirements have been developed . In addit i on , as a result of
a brief review of the draft manual, the Management Subteam identified
weaknesses in the following areas regarding the draft QAPs:
The QAPs do not clearly require ES&H specialist (including QA)
review of and concurrence to project plans or SOPs when
appropriate .
The need for preparing SOPs is weakly stated in QAP 5.1 as ' They
lUy be written when it seems prudent to prov i de workers written
instructions . .. • (emphasis added).
Section 16 of the QA manual, entitled 'Corrective Action, '
addresses only corr'lctive actions related t o QA audits or
Nonconformance Reports and does not include routine corrective
act ions related to r out i ne survei 11 ances and inspect ions,
appraisals, or findings from outside entities.
The Management Subteam notes that the lack of a formal QA program at NPOSR·CUW
was identified by FE as early as 1983 . A QA PrograrA Implemen tati on Plan was
developed by the management and operating (H&O) contractor, Lawrence-Allison
(llerged into J8EC in 1989), and fo~arded to DOE/NPOSR in 1984. The policies
and procedures for a QA Program (called the QA Plan) were prepared by the
contractor in Harch 1985 and approved for implementation hy DOE/NPOSR-CUW in
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Self-Assess.nt
This finding was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessllent
(April 1992) in that the lack of a sitewide QA progrilll was identified. This
finding, as it relates to FE and DOE/NPOSR, was not identified in the
DOE/NPOSR self-a6sessllent (July 1992).
Managellent Appraisal
This finding was not identified in the DOE Office of Self·ASSessllent
management appraisal of NPOSR (July 1992), was not identified in the DOE
Office of Self-Assessment management appraisal of NPOSR-CUW (June 1992), and
was not identified in the DOE/NPOSR Office of Planning and Technical Assurance
lIIanagement appraisal of NPOSR-CUW (May 1992).
DOE/NPOSR Internal Appraisal
This finding was not identified in the DOE/NPOSR internal appraisal (June
1992) .

F11IlING MF-21

JBEC Quality Assurance (QA) Progr.

JBEC has neither developed i.pl~nting procedures nor imple.ented an approved
QA Progr. as required by DOE 5700.6C.

Self-Assesslll!nt
This finding was partially identified in the JBEC self-assessment (April 1992)
in that the lack of a fully implemented QA program was identified.
Manag~nt

Discussion
An effective QA Program is a key management system which helps prov ide
structure, formality, and consistency to ESlH programs and activities. DOE
Order 5700.6C, "Qual i ty Assurance," requires DOE Departmental elements to
develop and implement quality assurance programs to govern the work of the
organi zat i on.

Appraisal

This finding was not identified in the DOE Office of Self-Assessillent
management appraisal of NPOSR-CUW (June 1992) and was not identified in the
DOE/NPOSR Office of Planning and Technical Assurance management appraisal of
NPOSR-CUW (Hay 1992) .

EXisting JBEC Policies and Procedures and routine informal practices address
lIIany elements of a QA program at NPOSR-CUW in some manner. JBEC recently
drafted a Quality Assurance Manual and forwarded it to DOE/NPOSR·CUW for
review and approval by DOE (forwarded to (FE-60) on June 16, 1992). This QA
Manual contains some Qual ity Assurance Standards (QASs), which are top -level
implementing procedures . However, few lower t ier implementing procedures have
been developed, and the requirements of the draft manual have not yet been
fully implemented. The draft QA Manual addresses the elements of DOE 5700.6C
through the application of the more rigorous American Nuclear Standards
Institute/American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ANSI/ASHE) NQA-l
requirements. It represents a significant amount of effort and with some
exceptions should prov ide a solid foundation for the JBEC QA program at
NPOSR·CUW. However, during a brief review of the draft QA manual, the
Management Subteam identified weaknesses in the following areas :
The QASs do not clearly requ i re the advance review and concurrence
of project plans and department procedures by ESlH specialists
(including QA) when appropriate.
The need for preparing department procedures is weakly stated in
QAS 5.1 as 'They lIIay be written when it seems prudent to provide
workers written instructions ... ·(emphasis added).
Section 5 of the QA manual does not provide for adequate control
of the document review and approval process with regard to
coordination, setting of priorities, timeliness, resolution of
conflicts, and retention of comments.
The QA manual does not address the quality verification of work
activities, only quality verification of reports/analyses and
computer software programs.
Section 16 of the QA manual, entitled "Corrective Action,'
addresses only corrective actions related to QA audits or
Nonconformance Reports and does not include corrective actions
resulting from routine surveillances and inspections, appraisals,
or findings from outside entities .
Cross References
Finding QA/CF·3; Concern QV . I·I
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FIIIlING MF-22

DOE/NPOSR-CUI/ Pel'llits Issued to Private Industry

DOE/NPOSR-CUI/ has not hken steps to ensure that DOE environlllent. safety. and
health (ES&H) shndards and requir_nts are applied to privately owned
facilities operating on DOE-owned lands under the provisions of a use pel'llit.
Discussion
The Director. DOE/NPOSR-CUW. with the approval of the Director. DOE/NPOSR.
issued a revocable. no fee permit to the Amoco Pipe1 ine Company for the
construction and operation of an 8-inch crude oil pipeline and pump station on
government-owned land at the Naval Petroleum Reserve Number 3 (NPR-3).
Although the permit was officially formalized and signed on April 4. 1980. the
effective date was retroactive to February 1. 1978 .
The privately owned pipeline and pumping station provides a means for
DOE/NPOSR-CUI/ to sell crude oil from NPR-3 to private industry. The point of
sale occurs at the lease Automated Custody Transfer (lACT). where the product
is metered before it enters the pipeline of the purchaser . Although the
permit does contain an indemnity clause. the requirement for liability
insurance was waived by DOE on the basis that the permittee is self insured .
Since the permit was issued several years ago. it does not contain or
reference many of the ES&H provisions which would now be required. For
example . the permit does not specify responsibilities for the environmental
cleanup or restoration of any contamination which might result from a ruptured
pipeline or an oil spill emanating from the pumping station or the monitoring
of any potential long-term environmental effects. The Safety and Health
Subteam observed that JBEC has not investigated or analyzed the potential
ri:;ks associated with the pipeline. (See Concerns PT.6-3 and PT.6-4 . )
Article 12 of the permit provides a mechanism for the Director . DOE/NPOSR-CUW
to prescribe add iti onal rules or regulations "from time to time" to be app1 ied
to the privately owned and operated facil ities . However. there is no formal
record of any attempt to ensure that the permittee has been adv i sed of the
enhanced DOE ES&H requirements which apply to all operational ac ti vities at
DOE-owned facil ities.
Cross References
Concerns PT.6 - 3 and PT.6-4
Se1 f -Assesslll!nt
This finding was not identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW se1 f-assessment (April
1992).
Kanagelllent Appraisal
This finding was not identified in the DOE Office of Self-Assessment
management appraisal of NPOSR-CUW (June 1992) and was not identified in the
DOE/NPOSR Office of Planning and Technical Assurance management appraisal of
NPOSR-CUII (May 1992).
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FINDING MF-23

DOE/NPOSR-CUI/ Public and Institutional
Interactions

DOE/NPOSR-CUI/ public and institutional interactions lack adequate fOl'llality to
usure that effective public outreach. lledia relations. and regulatory
interactions are conducted and that shff. at all levels of the organization.
undershnd their responsibil ities and authorities in these areas. FE-5 has
not provided DOE/NPOSR with fOl'llal guidance pertaining to public and
institutional interactions.
Discussion
DOE is dedicated to improving the quality of its relationships and
interactions with external parties who are either interested in. or
potentially affected by. DOE activities or who play an active role in the
oversight of DOE operations. The development of public and community outreach
policies. media relations poliCies. and policies promoting open. positive
relationships with external regulatory bodies are all important components of
a program to accomplish DOE's objectives in this area.
DOE/NPOSR-CUW does not have a formal public outreach and community relations
policy . DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not displayed a proactive approach to disseminating
environmental, safety, and health (ES&H) information to the public on a
regular basis nor has it aggressively solicited ideas and concerns from the
surrounding communities. Moreover, DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not util ized community
relations to promote its operations as a ES&H standard for the industry or as
a valuable asset to the community . While some DOE employees are active in the
community (e.g., making presentations at local schools on the history of the
Teapot Dome), no cohesive, formal policy promoting or structuring such
activities exists.
DOE/NPOSR-CUW also does not have a formal media relations policy in place to
ensure that timely and responsive information is made available to the media .
DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not assigned media responsibil Hies to any member of the
organization so as to establish a focal point for media relations and policy.
DOE/NPOSR- CUW lacks an adequate pol icy concerning relationships with external
regulatory agencies. DOE/NPOSR-CUW has delegated various responsibilities for
interacting with regulatory agencies to JBEC and, in recent years, has
delegated them increased authority to sign specific permits and reports (e.g . ,
pit permits and permits to drill) . The delegation of regulatory
responsibilities to JBEC and the role DOE/NPOSR-CUW will play in these
activities has not been clearly defined or documented in a policy or
procedure. Similarly, the delegation of authority to interact with regulators
within the DOE/NPOSR- CUW organization has not been clearly delineated in a
formal policy or procedure. The lack of policies and procedures is evidenced
by the submittal of the Discharge Monitoring Reports for NPR-3 for the January
- June 1991 and July - December 1991 reporting periods without signatures (see
Finding SW/CF-3). While the relationship between DOE/NPOSR-CUW and the
regulatory agencies has been pos itive, the lack of formality prevents an
institutionalized, consistent approach to regulatory interactions and leaves
NPOSR-CUW vulnerable to potentially significant misunderstandings with the
regulators.

FE has established the Office of Communications (FE-5) which is responsible
for public and institutional interactions. While this office has acted as a
resource for the FE field sites when specific questions concerning public and
institutional interactions arise, FE-5 has not provided OOE/NPOSR-CUW with any
formal guidance concerning the development and implementation of public
outreach, IN!dli relations, or regulatory interaction policies or procedures.
FE-5 is currently drafting a policy and procedure document that is intended to
provide such guidance to the field organizations; however, this document has
not yet been approved or issued. This is at least partly attributable to the
revisions being considered by the Department for DOE 1200 . 1, 'Policies and
Procedures for Departmental News Media Activities,' which governs media
activities. While FE-5 has taken positive steps in the area of public and
institutional interactions, its assistance to the field has generally been
reactive in nature and has lacked formality.
Cross References
Finding SW/CF-3
Sel f-AssesSllent
This finding was partially identified in the DOE\NPOSR-CUW self-assessment
(April 1992).
Management Appra i sal
This finding was partially identified in the DOE Office of Self-Assessment
management appraisal of DOE/NPOSR (July 1992) and was fully identified in the
DOE/NPOSR Office of Planning and Technical Assurance management appraisal of
NPOSR-CUW (May 1992).

FINDING MF-24

JBEC Public and Institutional Interactions

JBEC public and institutional interactions lack adequate fOl"lNlity to assure
that effective public outreach, lledia relations, and regulatory interactions
are conducted and that staff, at all levels of the organization, understand
their responsibil ities and authorities in these areas.
Discussion
DOE is dedicated to improving the quality of its relationships and
interactions with external parties who are either interested in, or
potentially affected by, DOE activities or who play an active role in the
oversight of DOE operations. The development of public and community outreach
policies, media relations policies, and policies promoting open, positive
relationships with external regulatory bodies are all important components of
a program to accomplish DOE's objectives in this area .
JBEC does not have a formal public outreach and community relations policy or
program. JBEC has not displayed a proactive approach to disseminating ESlH
information to the public on a regular basis nor has it aggressively solicited
ideas and concerns from the surrounding communities . Moreover, JBEC has not
used community relations to promote its operations as a valuable asset to the
community. While some JBEC employees are active in the community, no
cohesive, formal policy promoting or structuring such activities exists . JBEC
also does not have a formal media relations policy in place to ensure that
timely and responsive information is made available to the media. While the
contract contains a clear data release clause, JBEC has not de~eloped a formal
policy that has been communicated to all levels of the organization . JBEC
also has not assigned media responsibilities to any member of the organization
so as to establish a focal point for media relations and policy.
JBEC lacks an adequate formal policy concerning relationships with external
regulatory agencies. JBEC, as operator of the NPOSR-CUW facilities has been
delegated various responsibilities for interacting with regulatory agencies,
and in recent years, has been delegated increased authority to sign specific
permits and reports (e.g., pit permits and permits to drill) . While some
guidelines are provided in individual Policy and Procedures documents on
individual responsibilities for interacting with regulators, JBEC ' s delegated
regulatory responsibilities have not been clearly defined or documented in a
sitewide policy or procedure. Additionally, there have been instances where
informal understandings are arrived at with regulators, which are not
confirmed with written documentation . The North Waterflood discharge issue
(see Finding SW/CF -2) i s an example of such a situation. JBEC lacks a formal
po,l icy or procedure that addresses the need for formal, written documentation
of any such understanding. While the rel ationship between JBEC and the
regulatory agencies have been positive , the lack of formality prevents an
institutional i zed , cons istent approach to regulatory interactions and leaves
NPOSR-CUW vulnerable to potentially sign i ficant misunderstandings with the
regul ators .
Cross References
Find i ng SW/CF -2
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SPECIAL ISSUE-NOSR-3

Se1f-AssesSlll!nt
This finding was partially identified in the JBEC self-assessment (April
1992) .

Managa.ent Appraisal
This finding was partially identified in the DOE Office of Self-Assessment
aanagelM!nt appraisal of DOE/NPOSR (July 1992) and was fully identified in the
DOE/NPOSR Office of Planning and Technical Assurance management appraisal of
NPOSR-CUW (May 1992).

DOE responsibilities and requirements for the protection of environlM!nt,
safety, and health (ES&H) have not been specifically set forth in the Standard
Industry Operating Agreements for the development and operation of
cOfllllunitized natural gas wells at the Naval Oil Shale Reserve (NOSR) sites.
Discussion
In recent years, there has been a significant nulllber of cOlllllercia1 natural gas
wells developed along the boundaries of the DOE-owned NOSR sites in Colorado.
To minimize drainage of the natural gas fields underlying the NOSR sites by
private development, DOE developed a Co.unitization Progrilll. Under the
provisions of this program, DOE joined with other .inera1 interest owners to
develop and operate wells near the boundaries of the NOSR sites. The owners
agreed to develop the wells jOintly and to share in the costs and revenues
based on the acreage held by each partner within the unit which was being
poo 1ed for development.
The majority of the communitized well s are operated by privately owned firms
and are located on lands of which DOE does not own the surface rights.
However, in one case a communitized well Is located on DOE land and is
operated by a private firm under the provisions of a modified Standard
Industry Operating Agreement. Although the development and subsequent
operation of a produCing well is generally the responsibility of the member
that owns the greatest percentage of surface land in the designated area, that
is not always the case. In some instances, DOE owns more that 50 percent of
the well, but, for a variety of reasons, the private partner was chosen to
develop and operate the well. In other cases, DOE/NPOSR-CUW has chosen to
serve as the operator. even though the well is located on privately owned
land .
The development and operation of the communitized wells and the
responsibll ities of the parties are set forth un'der a modified Standard
Industry Operating Agreement, similar to those which have been used for many
Y2ars by the 011 and gas industty for wells with joint ownership . Although,
the terms and conditions of those agreements reflect certain DOE contractual
requirements, they do not contain many of the ES!H provisions which are
generally incorporated into DOE contractual agreements .
The Tiger Team does not question the propriety of these contractual agreements
or the importance of participating in communitized oil or gas wells to protect
the f i nancial interests of the U.S. Government. Ho~ever , the Secretary of
Energy has stated that ES!H programs wi ll be developed for all elements of DOE
which go beyond mere compliance with existing laws and regu1~tions. DOE
organizati ons, including all contractors and industrial participants, are
expected to achieve a level of excellence in the development and application
of environmental, as well as safety and health , programs which will serve as a
model for other agencies and private i ndustry. To achieve the Secretary ' s
stated object ives, contractual or operating agreements with private industry,
i n particular, should place a strong emphasis on DOE 's ES!H standards and
requirements . DOE has a special obligation to apply these important
pri nciples to those programs associated with the development, marketing, or
commercial tzatlon of the government -owned natural resources which have been
entrusted to the Department . Great care must be exercised to avoid even the
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potential perception that profitability motives or object i ves have taken
precedence over protection of the envi ronment or publ i c and worker safety .
It is in that context that the Tiger team believes there are some Issues
associated with the CoaIUnitization Program which should be reexami ned by
DOE/NPOSR with the advice and support of the Offi ce of General Counsel . These
Issues are presented below.
DOE/NPOSR-CUII asserts that the cOl1l1lunitl zed well located on DOE
propert y is subject to all of the ES&H rules , regulations, and
requiretlents of DOE. It further states that it is responsible for
exercising oversight of the field activities to ensure that all
such requirements are cons i stently applied. DOE Is ass i sted by
the Bureau of land Management (BlM) under the prov i sions of a
MeIIorandua of Undarshnd i ng (HOU), wherein BlM assists DOE in the
appl i cation and enforcement of National Env i ronmental Pol i cy Act
requ i rements, preservat i on of antiquities , etc . (The
Environmental Subteam noted that many of these requ i red actions
were not cOllpleted unt i l the operational activit ies were well
underway due to weather cc.nditions at the fi eld si te . )

long-term environmental consequences resulting from the
development and operation of communitized wells on privately owned
or leased lands .
The duties, responsibilities, and authorities of DOE/NPOSR to
Impose the full spectrum of DOE ES&H requirements on the
industrial part i cipants for wells located on DOE-owned or
privately owned or leased lands . Determine whether the provisions
of the current operating agreements are adequate to enforce any
such requ i rements which are determined to be applicable .
The issue of how the parties would share in any additional costs
resulting from such requirements, if DOE/HPOSR does have an
obligation to apply the special ES&H requirements of DOE to all
such operations,
If a dec i si on i s reached that DOE/NPOSR has a responsibility to apply all
applicable DOE ES&H requ i rements to the cOlllr.uniti zed wells, an action plan
wi ll be required wh i ch reflects the actions to be taken and the planned
completion dates .

Si nce few, i f any, of the special ES&H requirements of DOE are set
forth In the terms and condi t i ons of the current operat i ng
agreement between DOE/NPOSR and the Industr i al participant, there
Is some quest i on as to t he legal authori ty or respons i ()jl \ty of
DOE t o Impose such requ i rements on the i ndustr i al par ticipant even
t hough t he well Is locat ed on DOE land . Moreover , If those
spec i al DOE-imposed ES&H requ i remen t s should result In Increased
development or operat i ng costs , the Industr i al ~art l clpants may be
unwilling to accept a proport i onate share of the i ncreased costs
since t he requirements were not set forth i n the contrac t ual
operat Ing agreement.
A detenlin ati on should be made as to whether DOE/NPOSR has a dut y
and responsi bil \ty t o apply the full range of mandatory DOE ES&H
requirements t o t he development and operati on of the commun i t i zed
wells located on private ly owned or leased lands and ,
particularly, where DOE se rves as the opera t or or owns more than
50 percent of t he oi l or na tural gas righ ts.
An examination should be perfo rmed of the f i nanc i al l i ab ilities of
the government which might accrue from unexpected potenti al
long -term environmental consequences . Add iti onally, a
determlndtion as to whether the liabilities are adequatel y bounded
and protected by~he terms and cond i t ions of t he mod i f i ed Standard
Industry Operati ng Agreements whic h are being applied and ,
particularly, for those wells located on privatel y owned or leased
lands where the government will be entitled t o l ess t han 50
percent of the revenues .
The DOE/HPOSR action plan or response t o the Tiger Team f indings or concer ns
shoul d address the following issues :
The legal sufficiency of the current operating agreements to bound
or protect the interests and liabilities of DOE In t he event of
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6.0

EVALUATION OF SELF -ASSESSflENT PROGRAMS All! REPORTS FOR THE NAVAL
POROLEU!! AND OIL SHALE RESERVES IN COLORADO. !ITN!. AND MY!»!lNG

6.1

INTRODUCTION

On January 26, 1990, the Secretary of Energy directed all line organizations
to implement a comprehensive self-assessment prograM to identify and
characterize environment, safety, and health (ES&H) concerns relating to their
operations and directed the Tiger Teams to evaluate the effectiveness of the
self-assessment programs of the sites being reviewed. On July 31, 1990, the
Secretary issued guidance on the conduct of self-assessments, stressing the
importance of comprehensive, routine self-assessments within the U. S.
Department of Energy (DOE) and its contractors.
6.2

6.0
EVALUA TION OF SELF-ASSESSMENT PROGRAMS AND
REPORTS FOR THE NAVAL PETROLEUM AND OIL SHALE
RESERVES IN COLORADO, UTAH, AND WYOMING

SCOPE

The Tiger Team evaluated the self-assessment reports and programs of the DOE
Office of Fossil Energy (FE); the DOE Office of Naval Petroleum and 011 Shale
Reserves at Headquarters (DOE/NPOSR); the DOE Naval Petroleum and 011 Shale
Reserves in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming Site Office (DOE/NPOSR-CijW); and John
Brown Engineers and Constructors Inc. (JBEC), th2 operating contractor.
For FE, the Tiger Team evaluation included an assessment of the programs and
program plans of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Naval
Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves (FE-60) and the Office of Self-Assessment
(FE-6). In addition, the Tiger Team evaluated an internal appraisal completed
by DOE/NPOSR, as well as management appraisals of DOE/NPOSR and DOE/NPOSR-CUW
completed by FE-6.
For DOE/NPOSR-CUW, the Tiger Team evaluation included the April 1992
self-assessment report and the May 1992 Self-Assessment Program Manual . As a
part of t he evaluation of the Self-Assessment Program, the Management Subteam
also evaluated the status of self-assessment institutionalization within the
organization . DOE/NPOSR-CUW conducted a self-assessment in June 1991 .
However, the Tiger Team did not receive the document until the day before
publication of the Tiger Team report and, therefore, did not have time to
compare the findings of the June 1991 self-assessment to the Tiger Team
findings and concerns .
For JBEC, the Tiger Team evaluation included the April 1992 self-assessment
report and the June 1992 Self-Assessment Program Manual. As a part of the
evaluation of the JBEC Self-Assessment Program, the Management Subteam also
evaluated the status of self-assessment institutionalization within the
operating contractor's organization.
The JBEC self-assessment report is an effective building block for DOE and the
future contractor. Although it does not go into extensive detail about the
problems that exist, it adequately describes the universe of deficiencies.
6.3

EVALUATION STRATEGY

The Self-Assessment Task Group developed an understanding of the
organizational roles, responsibilities, and authorities of FE, DOE/NPOSR,
DOE/NPOSR-CUW, and JBEC by reviewing a series of program documents before the
onsite assessment. These documents included information on the FE, DOE/NPOSR,
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DOE/NPOSR-CUlI, and JBEC organizations, missions, and self-assessment
activities. When the Self-Assessment Task Group and the Management Subteam
arrived onsite, briefings were conducted concerning the
DOE/NPOSR-CUlI and JBEC organizations, lIIissions, and self-assessment
act1vities. Presentations on the current status of self-assessment activities
at NPOSR-CUlI were also provided . Appropriate points of contact were
identified with whom subteam and task group members could meet to more
specifically discuss performance objectives. The subteam and task group then
conducted Interviews and developed an understanding of perceptions of the
DOE/NPOSR-CUlI and JBEC personnel concerning ES&H and self-assessment
activities at Naval Petroleum Reserve Num~ e r 3 (NPR-3), Naval Oil Shale
Reserve Number 1 (NOSR-l), and Naval Oil ,hale Reserve Number 3 (NOSR -3); ES&H
policies and goals; and the adequacy of s~ ~porting documentation. These
Interviews were supplemented by a detailed review of supporting documentation
descri bing such topics as the organization, roles, responsibilities, policies,
plans, budgets, procedures, and perfonaance criteria for the organizational
elements performing ES&H functions and conducting operational programs at
NPR-3, NOSR-l, and NOSR-3.

lines of Inquiry used by the Management Subteam and Self-Assessment Task Group
to assess the self-assessment reports and programs were pursued with the staff
involved In conducting self- assessment act1vltles at each organizational level
of FE, DOE/NPOSR, DOE/NPOSR-CUW, and JBEC. A system of both a random and
selected interview process was used to assess management and employee
self-assessment Involvement and understanding.
The Management Subteam developed 1 preliminary observation for FE, 55
pre llml nary observat ions for DOE/NPOSR-CUW, and 59 preliminary observat Ions
for JBEC. The subteam performed a peer review of these observations before
releasing them to DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC to val idate for factual accuracy on
July 1, 1992 . Subsequently, the Management Subteam prepared 30 findings based
on the validated preliminary observations and additional Interviews and
document reviews. Six of the 30 findings were specific to self-assessment .
Both the management and self- assessment findings were subjected to a peer
revl ew before bei ng released to DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC for a factual accuracy
review . The resulting 30 findings were reviewed for factual accuracy by FE,
DOE/NPOSR, DOE/NPOSR-CUW, and JBEC .

On July 7, 1992, selected Management Subteam members conducted interviews at
DOE Headquarters with personnel from FE, FE-6, and DOE/NPOSR to discuss
similar self-assessment progralll1latic areas.

6.4

EVALUATION SlIIIARY

6.4.1

Self-Assessment Overview

To further support the Management Subteam's onslte assessment, daily
debrieflngs and consultations were held with the Environmental and the Safety
and Health Subteams. The objective of these Interactions was to identify
potential management and organizational problems that might be cOlll1lon to the
findings of all of the subteams. The Management Subteam identified
Individuals to serve as points of cootact with the Environmental and the
Safety and Health Subteams. These points of contact attended the dally
debrl efl ngs of each of the other subteams .

FE has made significant progress In the self-assessment area . This progress
Includes the development of a self-assessment framework that flows down
through the entire line organization from FE-I to the operating contractor .
While FE has taken an aggressive approach to self-assessment, necessary
program elements have not been developed and Instltutea In a timely fashion.
This has slowed progress in the development and Implementation of a
comprehensive self-assessment program. Field organizations and the operating
contractor have not been provided timely guidance and direction for the
development and conduct of self-assessment activities. Correction of the
deficiencies presented in the Tiger Team findings should strengthen the
eff orts of FE to institut i onalize the total self-assessment program using the
existing framework as the basis for further development. The self- assessment
framework Is representative of an ES&H program that has been Integrated
throughout the line organizations . It can serve as a foundat i on for the
future development of other Important ES&H programs within FE. There has been
progress, but much remains to be done to ensure that an Inst i tutionalized,
comprehensive self-assessment program Is fully developed and implemented
throughout the FE organization.

The self-assessment review was conducted by the Management Subteam along with
a Self-Assessment Task Group, the latter of which was comprised of two
representati ves from the Management Subteam and one representative each from
the Env i ronmental and the Safety and Health Subteams. The Management Subteam
also evaluated other eleme~ts of management performance to gain a broader
perspect i ve of the assimilation and understanding of the self-assessment
proce s s by NPOSR-CUW managers and employees.
The rev i ew was conducted using the following guidance:
Secretary of Ener gy Notice (SEN)-6E -92, "Departmental
Or ganizational and Management Arrangements " (February 21, 1992);
Memorandum : "Guidance on Environmental, Safety, and Health
Self-Assessment," from the Secretary of Energy to Secretarial
Officers, Managers, Operations Offices, Administrators, and Power
Market i ng Administrations (July 31, 1990);
Draft EnV i ronment , Safety, and Health Management Performance
Obj ect i ves and Criteria for Tiger Team Management Assessments
(August 15 , 1991);

FE established FE -6 , which has developed a Self-Assessment Program Plan and i s
in the process of Implementing that plan. FE has conducted management
apprai s als of DOE/NPOSR and DOE/NPOSR-CUW and Its operating contractor, JBEC .
These management appraisals are an Important element of the Self- Assessment
Program, but these are not a substitute for self-assessments as defined in
Secretarial guidance on self-assessment (January 26, 1990 and July 31, 1990) .
Consi stent with their Implementation plan, DOE/NPOSR conducted an annual
Internal appraisal and a management appraisal of DOE/NPOSR -CUW . The Internal
appraisal has been exami ned as part of this self- assessment evaluation. Both
DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC have developed a Self-Assessment Program Plan ,
conducted a self-assessment, and developed a corrective action plan to address
the defi ciencies Ident i fied In the i r self-assessments.

6- 2

6- 3

L/b/

J../0~

6.4 . 2

Sl!!!IHrY of Self-Asses SEnt prograM Findings

TABLE 6-2
COMPARISONS OF OOE/NPOSR, OOE/NPOSR-CUW, AND JBEC
SELF-ASSESSMENT REPORT FINDINGS AND CONCERNS
WITH TIGER TEAM RESULTS

The Tiger Team review of the FE , DOE/NPOSR-CUW, DOE/NPOSR-CUW , and JBEC
self-assessments and programs led t o t he Identification of one finding for FE ,
one finding for DOE/NPOSR , two findings for DOE/NPOSR-CUW, and two findings
for JBEC . The self-assessment finding numbers and statement s are presented In
Table 6-1.

SA- l

SA-2

SA-3
SA-4

'-

SA-5
SA-6

6.4.3

TABLE 6-1
SUMMARY OF SELF-ASSESSMENT FINDINGS
FE Progra. Office Self-AssessEnt Progra.
FE has ne i ther fully developed or Implemented i ts Self-Assessment
Program, nor supplied timely , formal guidance to the field
reQardlnQ self-assessment.
DOE/NPOSR Self-Assessment Progra.
DOE/NPOSR has not fully developed or implemented Its
Self-Assessment Program, nor supplied timely , formal guidance to
the field reQardinQ self-assessment.
DOE/NPOSR-CUW Self-Assessment Progra.
DOE/NPOSR-CUW has not fully developed or Impl emented its
Self-Assessment ProQram.
OOE/NPOSR-CUW Self-Assessment Report
The OOE/NPOSR-CUW April 1992 self-assessment report does not
provide the level of detail needed to establish a clear
understanding of the deficiencies exist i ng In the ES&H programs at
NPOSR-CUW .
JBEC Self-Assessment Progra.
JBEC has not fully developed or Implemented Its Self-Assessment
Program .
JBEC Self-Assessment Report
The JBEC Apr i l 1992 self-assessment report does not provide the
l evel of detail needed to establish a clear understand i ng of the
de fi ciencies ex l stl nQ In the ES&H programs at NPOSR-CUW.
Eyal uation of Self-Assessment Reports

The Tiger Team fi nd ings and concerns were compared with those Identified by
OOE/NPOSR , OOE/NPOSR-CUW , and JBEC In their Internal appraisals and
self-assessment reports, and a de t ermi nat ion was made as to whether each
f i nding and concern was fully, partially , or not Identified . The results of
these comparisons are sunrnarlzed In Table 6-2.
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o (0%)

3 (75%)

1 (25%)

DOE/NPOSR-CUW

36 (37%)

40 (42%)

20 (21%)

JBEC

87 (53%)

52 (32%)

24 (15%)

OOE/NPOSR

6. 5

EVALUATION OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFfiCE OF FOSSIL ENERGY

6.5.1

Eyaluatlon of FE Self-AsseSSment program

fiNDING SA- I

FE Progra. Office Self-Assessment Progra.

FE has neither fully developed or Implemented its Self-Assessment Progra., nor
supplied timely, formal guidance to the field regarding self-assessment.
Discussion
FE has made sign i ficant progress In establishing a comprehens i ve
self-assessment program. FE has taken steps toward fulfilling of the
requ i rements of SEN-6E-92 for an Independent self-assessment organization by
creating the Office of Self-Assessment (FE-6) . FE-6 has developed an Office
of Foss i l Energy Self-Assessment Program Plan (March 1992) , which conta i ns the
basic elements of a self-assessment program as set forth in the July 31 , 1990,
Secretarial guidance. This plan has been approved by the Assistant Secretary
for Fossil Energy.
The Self-Assessment Program Plan has been forwarded to all FE Headquar ter s and
field organi zat ions, and conrnents have been rece i ved from some of these
organ i zations . FE-6 sa id It realizes that the plan will need to be augmented
wi th standard ope rat ing procedures or other formal operat i ng guidel i nes t o
address some of the conrnents . Although a schedule for the completion of th i s
augmentation has not been established, the augmentation will be In i t i ated wi t h
a meeti ng scheduled by FE-6 wi th the i r group counter parts to be held at DOE
Headquarters In August 1992 .

FE-6 has conducted formal management appraisals of DOE/NPOSR, DOE/NPOSR-CUW,
and JBEC organizations as part of its Self-Assessment Program. However, FE
has not fully developed or implemented a comprehensive self-assessment program
as evidenced by the following:
While FE-6 was established with the intent of being an independent
self-assessment organization, the additional duties placed on the
FE-6 staff act to lessen the office's degree of independence in
the self-assessment process. FE has placed respons i bi l.ity for
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) compliance and
occupational safety and health (OSH) assistance in the FE-6
organization. FE-6 provides program guidance and direction in
these areas to the entire FE organization and, is also responsible
for self-assessment activities which include the assessment of
NEPA and OSH performance within FE. Therefore, self-assessment
activities are being conducted, in some cases, by the same
organization and personnel that have direct program assistance
responsibility for the activities being assessed. This is not
consistent with the requirement for an independent self-assessment
organization set forth in SEN-6E-92.
While the Self-Assessment Program Plan cites the need for
conducting root cause analysis, it does not include the
methodology to be utilized or other detailed information on the
approach to be taken to ensure performance of a comprehensive,
uniform, and useful root cause analysis. The root cause analysis
performed as part of the management appraisals of DOE/NPOSR,
DOE/NPOSR-CUW, and JBEC was valid and reliable, but the existing
plan does not adequately address root cause analysis methodology
to ensure that it is conducted in a consistent, effective, and
standardized manner.
Although the Self-Assessment Program Plan indicates the need for a
formal system to communicate lessons learned and outlines the
types of information that will form the basis for such a system,
the lessons learned component of the plan does not specify or
explain the method or system to be used in disseminating ES&H
information to the various FE organizational units. The
distribution of lessons learned is particularly important for the
FE sites as they share many common operat i ona 1 concerns and other
issues such as methods of applying with DOE Orders, requirements,
and good management practices. Management at the various sites
need to share information on common issues such as how to apply a
graded approach to the application of specific program elements
and how resources can best be used and collectively shared in
addressing corrective actions. However, there is no evidence that
a lessons-learned program has been implemented.
The Sel f-Assessment Program Plan addresses the need for a
corrective action process which includes tracking and verification
components. The plan provides a description of data elements
(e .g. , milestones and cost) to be included in tracking systems .
The plan calls for "a computerized system" and a "network system,"
but does not provide a more in-depth explanation of how the
systems are to be developed and implemented . While FE-I has
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committed to the use of an FE-wide corrective action tracking
system in a June I, 1992, memorandum to his Deputy Assistant
Secretaries and Office Directors, a fully developed process which
tracks the status of ES&H deficiencies identified through the
Self-Assessment Program has not been implemented.
The FE Self-Assessment Program Plan addresses the development of
corrective actions, schedules, milestones, and cost estimates.
However, the Program Pl an does not address the methodology of how
these corrective act ions wi 11 be pri ori t i zed to ensure that the
most crucial items are the first to be corrected. FE has not
appl ied the corrective action component of its program by
producing corrective action plans or instituting a formal
procedure for monitoring corrective actions generated by its
various organizational components. Further, the FE
Self-Assessment Program has not yet adequately incorporated
important ES&H information sources, such as performance indicators
and the occurrence reporting system .
While the Self-Assessment Program Plan states that personnel
responsible for conducting appraisals should be properly trained
and training should be scheduled as appropriate, the training
needs and elements are not developed and described in the plan.
While some training has been conducted, a comprehensive training
program has not been fully developed or implemented.
The FE Self-Assessment Program Plan call s for independent
verification and evaluation of the status and quality of (I) its
ES&H performance, (2) the Program-Wide Self-Assessment Program,
and (3) the discharge of ES&H responsibilities, but the plan does
not describe how these requirements will be accomplished. Without
the implementation procedures of each element, the self-assessment
program cannot be considered comprehensive in scope. Similarly,
FE calls for independent appraisals of itself, but does not define
how they wi 11 be accomp 11 shed .
FE has not supplied its field organizations with timely, formal
assistance, and followup regarding development and implementation
of its Self-Assessment Program. The first Departmental directives
regarding self-assessment were issued on January 31, 1990 (FE
transmitted Secretarial guidance on ES&H self-assessment to its
Deputy Assistant Secretaries and line organizations on February I,
1990). At least two of FE's subordinate organizations, DOE/NPOSR
and DOE/NPOSR, were not provided with the July 31, 1990,
Secretarial guidance containing the Tiger Team performance
objectives and criteria for evaluating DOE and contractor
self-assessment programs until July 25, 1991. Ass i stance to
DOE/NPOSR-CUW was not provided until February 1992 . The failure
to transmit timely guidance has had an adverse impact on the
field's conduct of self-assessment activities.
Cross References
Findings MF-14 and MF -20
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6 . 5.2

Evaluation of Self-Assessment Report

At the time of the Tiger Team Assessment of DOE/NPOSR-CUW, FE had not
completed a self-assessment or internal appraisal. The management appraisals
of DOE/NPOSR and DOE/NPOSR-CUW did not include a review of FE.

6.6

EVALUATION OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF NAVAL PETROLEUM
AND OIL SHALE RESERVES

6.6.1

Evaluation of DOE/NPOSR Self-Assessment Proarg

FINDING SA-2

DOE/NPOSR Self-Assesslll!nt Progra.

DOE/NPOSR has neither fully developed or i~le1ented its Self-AssesSient
PrograJII, nor supplled tillely. fOnAl guidance to the field regarding
self-assessllent.
Discussion
DOE/NPOSR has taken positive steps in the establishment of a comprehensive
self-assessment program. DOE/NPOSR has developed a Self-Assessment
Implementation Plan which contains the basic elements of a self-assessment
program as set forth in the July 31, 1990, Secretarial guidance. This plan
has been approved by the Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy (FE-I) and the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves.
DOE/NPOSR has conducted a formal management appraisal of the DOE/NPOSR-CUW and
J8EC organizations and an internal appraisal as part of its Self-Assessment
Program. However, DOE/NPOSR has not fully developed or implemented a
comprehensive self-assessment program based on the following:
DOE/NPOSR's Office of Planning and Technical Assurance (FE-60) has
been given primary responsibility for conducting the DOE/NPOSR
Self-Assessment Program. Among FE-60's mission functions are ES&H
oversight of field operations and ES&H planning activities
associated with the field organizations . FE-60 provides program
guidance and direction in these areas to the NPOSR field
organizations and also is responsible for self-assessment
activities which include the assessment of ES&H activities, (e.g . ,
oversight and planning). Therefore, self-assessment activities
are being conducted by the same organization that has direct
program and assistance responsibility for the activities being
assessed. This is not consistent with the requirement for an
independent self-assessment organization or function as required
by SEN-6E-92 .
While the Self-Assessment Program Plan cites the need for
conducting root cause analysis, it does not identify the
methodology to be utilized or other detailed guidance to ensure
comprehensive, useful root cause analysis is performed in a
consistent and effect i ve manner. The root cause analysis
performed as part of the management appraisal of DOE/NPOSR-CUW and
JBEC, and the internal appraisal of DOE/NPOSR was inadequate
because it was limited to a listing of the most frequently
occurring causal factors.
Although the Self-Assessment Program Plan specifies the need for a
sys t em to cOl1l11unicate lessons learned and assigns responsibility
for these activities , the lessons -learned component of the plan
does not specifically identify or explai n the method or system t o
be used in di sseminat i ng ES&H information to the various NPOSR
organizational un i ts . The dis tr i bution of lessons learned is
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OOE/NPOSR has not supplied its field organizations with timely,
formal guidance regarding self-assessment, although the first
Departmental directives regarding self-assessment were issued as
early as January 26, 1990 . OOE/NPOSR did not transmit any formal
guidance to the field until July 1991. The failure to transmit
timely guidance has had an adverse impact on the field's conduct
of self-assessment activities .

particularly important for FE and the NPOSR sites as they share
many cOl1lllOn issues such as methods to comply with DOE Orders ,
requirements, and good management practices . Management at the
various sites need to share information on cOlllllon issues, such as
how to apply a graded approach to specific program implementation
and how resources can best be used and collectively shared in
addressing corrective action.
The listed sources of information (Le., Occurrence Reporting and
Processing System (ORPS) and other performance indicator
information) which will feed into the lessons-learned program are
narrow in scope and do not include lessons learned from
self-assessment activities. Additionally, the annual distribution
of information is not appropriate since a lessons-learned program
should be a real-time and a continuous process which provides
information to organizations to avoid the repetition of problems
that have already occurred elsewhere. While some information has
been obtained through the ORPS, there is no evidence that the
lessons-learned program has been fully implemented.
The Self-Assessment Program Plan addresses the need for a
corrective action process which includes tracking and verification
components . The plan provides a description of data elements
(e.g., completion date ?nd status) to be tracked in tracking
systems . However, the plan does not ensure that cost estimates
and funding sources will be included in the tracking system.
Additionally, the plan calls for a system, but does not provide an
in-depth explanation of how the system is to be developed and
implemented. FE - 60 has verbally indicated it plans on utilizing
the CATTS system for tracking, but a fully implemented process
which tracks the status of ES&H deficiencies identified through
the self-assessment program is not yet in place.

Cross References
Findings MF-l, MF-3, MF-14, and MF-20
Management Appraisal
This finding was partially identified in the DOE Office of Self-Assessment
management appraisal of DOE/NPOSR (July 1992) .
Internal Appraisal
This finding was partially addressed in the OOE/NPOSR internal appraisal
(June 1992).
6.6.2

Eyaluation of OOE/NPOSR Internal Appraisal

The Management Subteam compared its findings to the findings of the OOE/NPOSR
internal appraisal . This comparison is presented in Table 6-3.
TABLE 6-3
ClIIPARISON OF OOE/NPOSR INTERNAl APPRAISAL
CONCERNS IIITH MANAGEMENT

The DOE/NPOSR Self -Assessment Program Plan addresses the
development of corrective actions, including prioritization to
ensure that the most crucial items are the first to be corrected.
However, the Self-Assessment Program Plan does not describe the
methodo logy for how DOE/NPOSR intends to produce corrective act i on
plans with realistic time schedules, measurable milestones, and
reasonable cost estimates with identified funding sources .
The training component of the Self-Assessment Program Plan
effectively addresses the training issues by outlining sample
training courses according to emphasis area (e.g., analytical
t echniques) and requiring a thorough review of the potential
partic i pants training record . However, the plan does not provide
for a needs analysis element to distinguish which courses are
required or preferred to prepare an individual to effectively
participate in the self-assessment functions . While some training
has been conducted, a comprehens i ve performance-based training
program has not been fully developed and implemented .
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6.7

EVALUATION OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NAVAL PETROLEUM OIL SHALE
RESERVES IN COLORADO, UTAH, AND WYOMING SITE OFFICE

6.7.1

Evaluation of DOE/NPOSR-CUW Self-Assessment Program

FINDING SA-3

DOE/NPOSR-CUW Self-Assessment Program

DOE/NPOSR-CUV has not fully developed or implemented its Self-Assessment
Program.
Discussion
DOE/NPOSR-CUW has developed a framework for the establishment of a
comprehensive Self-Assessment Program. The first step in developing that
framework was the performance of March 1992 self-assessment. Following this,
DOE/NPOSR-CUW prepared and received approval of a Self-Assessment Program
Manual. The manual was revised during May 1992 and approved by the Assistant
Secretary for Fossil Energy on
June 11, 1992. This manual incorporated the lessons learned from the
experience of conducting the initial self-assessment without a plan.
Revisions to the plan were based on comments received from the Office of
Self-Assessment (FE-6). DOE/NPOSR-CUW was also the subject of a management
appraisal conducted from May 11-15, 1992, by FE-6 with a final report dated
June 1992 and a management appraisal conducted during May 1992 by OOE/NPOSR
(FE-60). DOE/NPOSR-CUW plans to implement the corrective actions for the
self-assessment report of March 1992 and the Management Appraisals of FE-6 and
FE-60 along with the Tiger Team corrective actions.
The self-assessment report, Self-Assessment Plan, and Corrective Action Plan
provide the basic framework for the DOE/NPOSR-CUW Self-Assessment Program;
however, the Program is not yet fully developed and implemented. A review of
the May 1992 Self-Assessment Program Manual in comparison with (1) the
Secretarial guidance of July 31, 1990, (2) the ES&H Management Performance
Objectives and Criteria for Tiger Team Management Assessments (August 15,
1991), and (3) the management appraisals of FE-6 and FE-60, indicates that,
although the work done to date represents a good first step, much work remains
to be done to fully develop the Self-Assessment Program. The Tiger Team
identified the following deficiencies in the Self-Assessment Program:
OOE/NPOSR-CUW did not develop and receive approval of its
Self-Assessment Program Manual in a timely manner. This is partly
due to the lack of timely guidance from the Director, NPOSR, the
time expended to prepare the March 1992 self-assessment in
response to the directive of Director, NPOSR, and the focus of the
staff on the scheduled Tiger Team Assessment.
The Self-Assessment Program Plan does not address how the
organizational independence called for in SEN-6E-92 will be
achieved. OOE/NPOSR-CUW's Self-Assessment Program Standard
Ope~ating Procedure (DOE -SAP-SOP)-2 does not provide for such an
independent organization, although it does acknowledge that "third
party, independent, in -depth evaluations/validations are critical
to maintaining objectivity within the process. " It does not
indicate how this third -party support or independence will be
determined or provided. However, the Management Subteam
6-1 2
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functional appraisals. More fundamentally, in DOE -SAP-SOP-3,
there is not a clear basis or criteria establ ished for the
scheduling of annual functional appraisals, which according to the
plan include management and environmental activities. However,
the FE Self-Assessment Program requires that functional and
management appraisals be conducted only on a triennial basis.

recognizes that due to the small size of the DOE/NPOSR: CUW
organization, they do not have th~ re~ourl::es to establls~ a truly
independent self-assessment orgaOlzatlon In accordance wIth
SEN-6E-92 .
Although the plan describes the methodology to be used to review
the internal performance of the operating contractor, it does not
describe the methodology or approach for assessing the performance
of DOE/NPOSR-CUW. Similarly, the plan does not clearly establish
linkage or coordination points between the oversight role of
DOE/NPOSR-CUW and the operational role of the operating
contractor.
DOE-SAP -SOP-2 and DOE-SAP-SOP -4 do not i ndicate how the
independent verification and evaluation of the status and quality
of ES&H performance and the self-assessment process, including the
di scharge of ES&H responsibil ities by DOE/NPOSR-CUW management,
will be ~ccomplished. As previously pointed out, DOE-SAP-SOP-2
does call for third-party participation, but it does not indicate
how this participation will be provided . DOE-SAP-SOP-4 does not
provide implementing details on how independent self-assessment
evaluations will be performed by qualified personnel not directly
responsible for the activity being assessed .
The DOE/NPOSR-CUW Self-Assessment Program Plan does not contain
provisions for the utilization of important ES&H information
sources, such as performance indicators and occurrence reporting .
The Self-Assessment Program does not have standard operating
procedures for utilizing formal systems for conducting root cause
analysis and incorporating lessons learned.
Corrective actions are being tracked in accordance with
DOE-SAP -SOP-6 . Findings and corrective actions for the March 1992
se If -assessment , as well as the fi ndi ngs and subsequent correct i ve
actions for the Tiger Team Assessment, are to be tracked using a
Self-Assessment Database as described in DOE-SAP-SOP -6. This
database was used to prepare DOE/NPOSR-CUW's Corrective Action
Plan (June 1992) which indicates that only two of the seven
corrective actions to be completed in May and June 1992 have been
completed, and none of them contain cost estimates for completion.
The corrective actions identified in the March 1992
Se If-Assessment lack rea list ic and appr opri ate ly phased,
sequenced, and pri orit i zed schedul es wi th measurabl e mil estones.
They al so fai led to include cost estimates with identified funding
sources and are currently behind schedule .
The Self-Assessment Program does not incorporate appraisal
activities required by DOE S482 . 1B, "Environment, Safety, and
Health Appraisal Program ." This DOE Order has not been
implemented in such a way that ongoing oversight activities are
adequately integrated into the DOE/NPOSR-CUW Self-Assessment
Program. According to the FE Self-Assessment Program Plan,
results of M an"~ ement Appra i sa I s and other extern aI assessments
(e.g ., Tiger Team Assessments and Technical Safety Appraisals)
should be used to determine both the scope and frequency of
6-13
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DOE-SAP-SOP-S provides for preparation and conduct of
self-assessment training; however, it lacks specificity on
training schedules and the types of training in various
fundamental self-assessment activities, such as root cause
analysis or lessons learned, that will be provided.
Cross References
Findings MF-2, MF-3, MF-6, MF-11, MF-1S, and MF-20
Self-Assessment
This finding was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment
(April 1992).
Management Appra i sa I
This finding is partially identified in the DOE Office of Self-Assessment
management appraisal of NPOSR-CUW (June 1992) and the DOE/NPOSR Office of
Technical Assurance management appraisal of NPOSR-CUW (May 1992).
6.7.2
FINDING SA-4

Evaluatjon of DQE/NPQSR-CUM Self-Assessment Report
OOE/NPOSR-CUV Self-Assess.ent Report

The OOE/NPOSR-CUV April 1992 self-assessment report does not provide the level
of detail needed to establ ish a clear understanding of the deficiencies
exi st i ng in the ES&H progralls at NPOSR-CUV.
Discussion
DOE/NPOSR -CUW showed initiative by performing an ES&H Self-Assessment in
conjunction with JBEC during 1991. However, no followup or corrective actions
were performed based on the self-assessment. A more extensive DOE/NPOSR-CUW
self-assessment was conducted between February and April 1992, and resulted in
a two-volume report last revised in April 1992. The assessment team was
composed of DOE/NPOSR-CUW professionals (Self-Assessment Conrnittee) who
conducted t he assessment. The self-assessment report was fairly comprehensive
in scope covering DOE facilities and addres si ng major areas in each ES&H
discipl ine . The report included corrective actions, key findings, and root
causes .
The DOE/NPOSR -CUW Self-Assessment Committee based its self-assessment
primarily on the Environment , Safety and Health Management Performance
Object ives and Criteria for Tiger Team Management Assessments (August 15 ,
1991), the . P~r!ormance ~bjectives and Cr i teria for Technical Safety Appraisals
at DOE FacIlitIes and SItes (June 1990), and the Performance Objectives and
Criteria for Conducting DOE Environmental Audits (January 1992) .

activities . The corrective actions written to respond to the
findings also lack technical depth and a comprehensive explanation
of the action to be taken with appropriate interim milestones .
Each of these deficiencies suggests that DOE/NPOSR-CUW lacks a
clear technical understanding of the deficiencies discovered and
the actions needed to correct them.

DOE/NPOSR - CUW al so hired a contractor to prepare site-specific performance
objectives and criteria (POCs) . However , the resulting product was relatively
unchanged from the previously mentioned performance objectives and criter i a .
The committee performed the self- assessment by making a judgmept as to whether
or not the organization met the POCs. The committee made no other attempt to
val i date those determinations by a performance-based actual field review of
current operat i ng pract ices and systems .

The corrective action statements for key findings were general
statements that lacked technical specificity and had no relevance
to the corrective actions which will be requ i red. The Tig~r Team
does not bel i eve that DOE/NPOSR-CUW has a comprehensive
understanding of the technical deficiencies that exist and what
will be needed to correct them since the responsibil ity for
corrective action was placed on JBEC in many instances . The
self - assessment report did not clearly ident i fy the role
DOE/NPOSR- CUW must take in correcting the deficiencies except that
DOE will en s ure compliance through its Self-Assessment Program.

The POCs developed in the documents mentioned above are intended to provide
general guidelines for a particular assessment element rather than provide
specific guidelines for a detailed, site - specific assessment. Their use may
result in capturing many of the most obvious ES&H deficiencies within
funct i ona 1 and management areas . However , the total re 1 i ance on the POCs will
not pr ovide the level of detail needed to establish a clear understanding of
the deficiencies and to init i ate appropriate corrective actions .
Other deficiencies in the self-asses sment i dentified by the Tiger Team include
the following:

Cross References
DOE/ NPOSR- CUW did not perform a review of DOE Orders, Secretary of
Energy Notices (SENs), codes/standards , or other regulations to
establish a baseline of regulatory compl i ance functions , required
systems , and best management practices which were specific to
their oil field pr oduction mission and operation . Since they did
not have a catalog of basel ine requirements , no attempt was made
to spec i f i cally analyze existing procedures , operations, or
systems to determine whether they were consistent with DOE
requi rements and standards .
The Management Subteam recogn i zes that DOE/NPOSR -CUW is a small
office with 1 imited resources . However, the self-assessment
act i vi ties were conducted by employees who "are responsible for
ES&H management , oversight and performance " (April 1992
DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment report). The assessment was
conducted by individuals who were responsible for the programs
Whi c h they were assessing. This is not consistent with the
requ i rement for independence in conducting self-assessment
ac t ivities. Additionally, most of the individuals who conducted
the as ses sment act i vities lacked adequate training and
profe s sional experience in auditing ES&H issues and activ i ties.

Findings MF-2, MF-3, MF - 6, MF - II, MF-IS , and MF-20
Self- Assessment
This finding was partially identified in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self- assessment
(April 1992).
Management Appraisal
This finding was partially identified in the DOE Offic~ of Self - As~essment
management appra i sal (June 1992) and the DOE/NPOSR OffIce of TechnIcal
As s urance management appraisal of NPOSR- CUW (May 1992) .
The results of DOE/NPOSR-CUW ' s findings and concerns as compared t o those
ident i fied by the Tiger Team report are presented in more detail in Table 6- 4
that follows .
The ev aluation of the DOE/NPOSR-CUW Self-As sessment by the Tiger Team is
discu s sed below .
6.7 . 2 . 1

The roo t cause analysis of the results of the assessment was not
conducted on a consistent basis across the three disciplines
assessed . Further , the env i ronmenta 1 and safety and health root
cau se analysis was inadequate . The environmental root causes are
a l isti ng of causal factors and the frequency of their occurrence
with no real analys i s conducted . The safety and health root
causes are s i mply a rewording of the associated key find i ngs.

Envi ronment

The DOE/NPOSR-CUW assessment was a funct i onal appraisal of its role of policy
development, i nte rpretation and i mplementation , and oversight of ES&H. The
DOE/NPOSR - CUW as sessment identified p~ogralfl!latic deficiencies i~ a~l
environmental di sciplines. In comparison WIth the Tiger Team FIndIngs ,
19 were fully identified, 29 were partially identified , and 14 were not
identifi ed. Table 6-3 provides a comparison of the DOE/NPOSR -CUW and Tiger
Team Asses sments .

The findings listed in the self-assessment report are
under-developed and incomplete . They are generally a verbatim
repetition of the associated POC with little or no technical
di scu s s i on of t he issue or explanation of the deficiency. There
i s al so 1 i ttl e evidence that performance-based field
i nvest i gations were conducted in connection with the assessment
6-15
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providing evidence that DOE/NPOSR-CUW had a basic understanding of the problem
and necessary correct i ve act i on.

TABLE 6-4
COMPARISON OF DOE/NPOSR-CUV
SELF-ASSESSMENT REPORT FINDINGS AND CONCERNS
IIITH TIGER TEAM RESULTS

Safety and
Health

14 (70%)

Environmental
Management
TOTAL

Of the concerns identified by the S&H Subteam, 70 percent had been fully
identified in the self-assessment and 10 percent partially identified. This
relatively high (80 percent) identification and partial identification of
concerns in the self-assessment appears more attributable to the criteria
employed, rather than to a basic knowledge of the deficiencies.

2 (10%)

4 (20%)

19 (31%)

29 (47%)

14

3 (23%)

8 (62%)

(15%)

36 (37%)

40 (42%)

20 (21%)

(22%)

The s~lf-assessment was tailored to maximize the identification of program
deficiencies likely to be discovered by the Tiger Team. This approach
generally involved reviewing the POCs and then restating them as a negative
finding against the DOE/ ".'OSR-CUW program. DOE/NPOSR-CUW generally failed to
probe deeper into the issues to identify noncompl iances with regulations and
risks to the environment and human health resulting from these programmatic
deficiencies. There was little evidence that confirmatory interviews Of :te
investigations were conducted. There appears to be a limited appreciat·
'f
the fact that programs, in and of themselves, are not an end requiremE
Rather, they are the disciplined means to achieve environmental compli
and, ultimately, excellence. The "fully" ratings refer to findings th; • are
purely programmatic (e.g., lack of a NEPA program). The "partially" ratings
refer to findings where programmatic issues are identified, but specific
issues are omitted (e .g. , lack of a Spill Prevention Control and
Countermeasure (SPCC) Plan, without identification of the ramifications, such
as inadequate secondary containment around tanks, insufficient response
equipment, and lack of training for responders) . Thus, "partially identified"
is a minimal term, usually meaning less than 50 percent. This also leads to
corrective action statement s that are superficial, non-responsive to the
issues, and lacking in detail.
6.7.2 . 2

Safety and Heal th

Six key findings were derived from the general findings and presented in the
self-assessment along with root causes and corrective actions. The key
findings were largely directed to JBEC and included DOE/NPOSR-CUW only in
general terms; for example, one key finding stated that DOE/NPOSR-CUII lacks
administration systems. The root causes developed were not adequate as they
did not reflect fundamental issues, that if corrected, would address the key
findings. Instead, they appeared to be key findings that still had underlying
unresolved issues. The corrective actions, derived from the key findings,
were general statements that had little relevance to corrective action. In
addition, specific action plans had not been prepared.
Overall, the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment had fully identified 70 percent and
partially identified 10 percent of the S&H Subteam's concerns. The S&H Subteam
does not bel ieve, however, that a fundamental understanding of the
deficiencies exists and what will be needed to correct them as the
responsibility for corrective action was placed on JBEC, in many instances.
It did not clearly identify the role DOE/NPOSR-CUW must take in correcting
these deficiencies except that DOE will ensure compliance through its
Self-Assessment Program. Table 6-3 provides a comparison of the DOE/NPOSR-CUW
and Tiger Team Assessments with regard to safety and health concerns.
6.7.2.3

Management

The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment addressed many important deficiencies and
was a critical self-evaluation . In general, DOE/NPOSR-CUW identified most of
those findings noted by the Management Subteam. There are, however, weakness
in the self-assessment approach, including the fact that (I) the criteria for
conduct ing the assessments was 1imited to the management performance
objectives and criteria, and (2) the root causes identified were only
symptoms or causal factors and do not represent the fundamental origins of the
deficiencies. Therefore, it is possible that a number of deficiencies still
remain unidentified, and if actions are limited to the identified symptoms,
the true root cause will likely continue . In addition, the corrective action
plan lacked specific elements or milestones, and the corrective action
implementation schedule appeared to be overly optimistic.

The DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment varied in scope across the technical areas
rev i ewed by the Safety and Health (S&H) Subteam due to the nature and number
of assessment criteria applied. For each criterion, a finding and corrective
action statement was made. In many cases, these statements were superficial,
lacking any significant discussion or analysis of the findings. There was
little evidence that the nature of the deficiencies identified was well
understood by the ES&H committee performing the self-assessment. In many
instances, repetitious phrases were used stating criteria had not been met,
followed by a corrective action statement that they would be met without
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6.8

EVALUATION OF JOHN BROWN ENGINEERS AND CONSTRUCTORS INC.

6.8 . 1

Eyaluation of JBEC Self-Assessment ProqraJI

FINDING SA-5

JBEC Sel f -AssesslDl!nt Progrilll

JBEC has not fully developed or illlplelllmted its Self-Asses slDI!nt Progrilll.

such prioritization, limited resources cannot be used efficiently .
Tracking and trending of corrective actions and findings from
self-assessment activities are covered in JBEC QAS-SAP - 6 and JBEC
QAS-SAP- 7 ; however , these procedures lack criteria for scheduling
corrective actions which are currently based on time cycles rather
than need. In addition, approved procedures do not specifically
address the method of determining appropriate milestones and cost
estimates for corrective action plans .

Discussion
JBEC ~as developed a framework for establ ishing a comprehensive
Self-Assessment Program. The first step in developing that framework was the
performance of an i nitial April 1992 self- assessment. Following this , JBEC
pr~pared and received approval of their Self-Assessment Program Manual from
the Director , NPOSR-CUW and the Director, NPOSR as of June 3 and 8, 1992,
respect i vely . This plan incorporated the lessons learned from the experience
of conduct i ng the in i t i a1 self- assessment without a plan . JBEC was also
included in the management appraisal of May 11-15 , 1992, conducted by the
Office of Self -Asse s sment (H-6) , and the management appraisal conducted by
OOE/NPOSR (FE - 60) in May 1992 . JBEC plans to implement the corrective actions
for the self-assessment report of April 1992, and the management appraisals of
H - 6 and H-60 along with the Tiger Team corrective actions .
The self- assessment report and plan with corrective action schedule provide
the framework for the JBEC Self-Assessment Program; however, the program is
not fully developed and implemented . A review of the June 1992
Self-Asse s sment Program Manual in compar i son with (1) the Secretarial guidance
of July 31 , 1990 , (2) the ES&H Management Performance Objectives and Criteria
for Tiger Team Management Asse s sments (August 15, 1991), and (3) the
management appraisals by FE-6 and FE-60, indicate that, although the work
completed t o date represents a good first s tep, much work remains to be done
to fully develop the Self-As sessment Program . The Tiger Team identified the
f ollowing defi cienc i es in the Self-Asses sment Program :
JBEC did not develop and receive approval of its Self-Assessment
Program Manual in a timely manner . This is due to the lack of
t i mely gu i dance from DOE/NPOSR- CUW and DOE/NPOSR , the time
expended to prepare the April 1992 self- assessment in response to
the directi ve of the Di rector, NPOSR, and the focus of the staff
on the scheduled Tiger Team As sessment .
No formal performance-based tra i ning pr ograms are indicated for
the management systems that support the self-assessment process
i tsel f (e.g . , trend analYSiS, root cause analYSiS , lessons
learned , prioritization, and corrective action plans). JBEC ' s
Self-Assessment Program Quality Ass urance Standard (QAS-SAP)-5
provides for preparation and conduct of self- assessment training;
however , it lacks specificity on t raining schedules, types of
t ra i ni ng i n various fundamental self-assessment activities , and
use of existing training courses.
Ther e is no methodology in the JBEC Self-Assessment Program Plan
to ensure that limited resources are properly allocated to the
most critical corrective actions or that the most critical
corr ective actions within a category are prioritized . Without

The plan lacks specificity in describing how outside assessments
will be factored into the overall self-assessment activities or
how routine wa1k-thro~ghs and other related appraisals will be
incorporated into the Self-Assessment Program. Si mi larl y , the
plan doe s not clearly establish linkage or coordination points
between the operational activities of JBEC and the oversight role
of OOE/NPOSR-CUW .
JBEC QAS-SAP-1 and JBEC QAS - SAP- 4 lack specificity on the
procedures by which Lead Assessors validate the closeout of
corrective actions and findings. They also lack description of
actions by the Lead Assessor for findings that were previously
identified and closed out, but have since reoccurred. These
procedures indicate that the Lead Assessor signs off on corrective
actions, but it does not indicate where JBEC unit managers enter
into the decision making proce s s for corrective action closeout.
While limited implementation of the Self-Assessment Plan has taken place such
as corr ective action tracking, more work remains to be done before the program
conforms to the Secretary's intent. Actual implementation is constrained by
the following :
The JBEC charter does not provide for an independent
self- assessment office with independent oversight of
self-assessment/ES&H functions . There is no clear plan that
indicates how the JBEC self-as sessment organization described in
JBEC QAS-SAP-2 will maintain its independence when conducting
Self-Asse s sment Program activities .
Since the Self-Asse s sment Pr ogram P1an was completed just prior to
the arrival of the Tiger Team , it has , for the most part, not been
institutional ized and ownership of the various tasks has not been
achieved at all levels of the organization .
The JBEC Self-Assessment Program Plan does not en s ure independent
verification and evaluation of the status and quality of ESlH
performance and the self-assessment process, including the
discharge of ES&H management responsibilities . There is no clear
plan that indicates how th i s i ndependent verification will be
conducted through the use of external resources such as those
available at the JBEC Houston , the corporate office . The plan
also lacks specificity as to how the JBEC self-assessment
activit i es wi ll be coordinated with those of the client,
DOE/NPOSR-CUW , to avoid both organ i zations from proceed i ng in
di fferent d i rect i ons wi t h self- assessment activities, or
corrective action plans .
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The JBEC Self-Assessment Program Plan does not identify a
methodology of how key finding s, cau s al factors, and root causes
will be developed for self-assessment act i vities . The plan does
indicate that the Corrective Action Tracki ng and Trending System
database will be used to track findings and corrective actions for
self-appraisal evaluations. However, the plan also does not call
for the use of a prioritization system such as the Revised Tiger
Team Action Plan Prioritization System as described in the
Secretarial memorandum dated August 1, 1990.
Cross References
Finding s MF - 4, MF - 5, MF-8 , MF - 9, MF - 12, MF - 13, MF - 18 , and MF - 21

At the direct i on of DOE/NPOSR- CUW, JBEC agreed not to attempt to val idate most
determinations by an actual fieid review of current operating practices and
systems , since many of the participants were famil iar with field and
programmatic conditions and were the same personnel who would be interviewed
by an independent, out side aud i t i ng group.
The DOE POCs are intended to provide general guidel ines for a particular
element , but not to provide specific guidelines for a detailed , site-specific
assessment. Their use may result in capturing many ES&H deficiencies within
funct i ona 1 and management areas . However, total re 1 i ance on the POCs wi 11 not
provide the level of detail needed to establish a clear understanding of the
deficiencies and how to effectively correct those deficiencies. In an effort
to develop a comprehensive baseline, a self- assessment mu .>t include an
extensive review of DOE Orders, Notices, Secretary of Energy Notices , r ules ,
and r egulations which relate to existing POCs.

Sel f - Assessment
This finding is parti ally identified in the JBEC self-assessment (April 1992).
Management Appraisal
This finding was partially ident i fied in the DOE Office of Self-Assessment
management appraisal of NPOSR-CUW (June 1992) and was partially identified in
the DOE/NPOSR Office of Planning and Technical Assurance management appraisal
(May 1992).
6.8 . 2
FINDING SA-6

Evaluation of JBEC Self-Assessment Report
JBEC Self-Assessment Report

The JBEC April 1992 self-assessment report does not provide for the level of
detail needed to establish a clear understanding of the deficiencies existing
i ll the ES&H prograJIIS at NPOSR-CUV.
Discussion
The JBEe self- assessment was conducted between February and April 1992,
r esult i ng i n a four - volume report last revised in April 1992. The assessment
teams were composed of JBEC subject matter experts who conducted the
asse s sment . A consulting firm provided some support in several environmental
disciplines. The self-assessment report was fairly ct,mprehensive in scope
coveri ng all DOE facil Hies and addressing all major areas in each ES'H
disc i pl i ne . The report included corrective actions, key finding s , and root
cau ses.
The JBEC Self-Assessment Team based their assessment primarily on the
"Environment, Safety and Health Management Performance Objectives and Criteria
(POCs) for Tiger Team Management Assessments" (August 15, 1991), the
"Per formance Object i ves and Criteria for Technical Safety Appraisals at DOE
Fac i l iti es and Si tes " (June 1990) , and "Performance Objectives and Criteria
f or Conduct ing DOE Environmental Audits. ' JBEC also utilized the services of
a consult i ng firm wh i ch was selected and hired by DOE/NPOSR- CUW to assist in
characterizing the , performance objectives and criteria (POes) to provide a
more s i te-specific criteria. However, the resulting product was literally
unchanged from the DOE POCs. The self- assessment team performed the
asses sment by maki ng a judgment as to whether their organization met the POCs .

Overall , the JBEC self- as sessment report was extensive in scope, crit i cal in
nature, and reflected a management commitment to fully identify problems
associated with their operations. To some extent , JBEC used other DOE site ' s
Technical Safety Appraisal and self-assessment reports , thus using less ons
learned from other facilities' experience . However, JBEC should ensure that
it has a full understanding of its Site-specifiC programmatic defi c i encies ,
root causes, and the complexity of the corrective action s as cor rective action
pl'ans , schedules , and budgets are developed and appl ied .
Other deficiencies in the self- as sessment ident i fied
the following:
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the Tiger Team include

Due to the small staff, JBEC and DOE/NPOSR -CUW agreed in advance
t hat some self-assessment activities would be conducted by
employee s who have direct ES&H management and oversight
responsibil ities. As a result , the subsequent assessment was
conducted in many instances by individual s who were responsible
for the programs they were assessing. Thi s is not cons i stent with
the requirement for independence when conducting self- assessment
activities.
A root cau se was identified for each i ndividual finding . However ,
they were not fully supported by a comprehens , ve root cause
analysis . The root causes li s ted were generally an elaboration on
the causal factors related to the individual finding and not the
result of an in - depth analys i s of those factor s .
The finding s 1 isted i n the Self-Asses sment Repor t are generally
under -developed and incomplete . The findings generally contain
little or no discu s sion of the issue or a detailed explanation of
the deficiency . The corrective actions written to respond to the
findings , in many cases, also l ac k depth and a comprehensive
explanation of the action to be taken wi th appropriate i nterim
milestones. Each of t hese deficiencies suggests that JBEC must
incorporate addit i onal detail and analys i s to their
self- assessment evaluations .

6-22
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LWH . ll.E states that NPR -3 should have a cont i ngency plan ; this is not
required) . JBEC does not appear to have a thorough understanding of
environmental regulatory requirements and issues pertinent to their
facilities .

Cross References
Findings MF-4, MF-8, MF-9, MF-12, MF - 13, and MF - 18
Se I f-AssesSEnt

This finding was partially identified in the JBEC self -assessment
(April 1992).
6.8.2.2

Manage.ent Appraisal
This finding was partially identified in the DOE Office of Self- Assessment
management appraisal of NPOSR-CUW (June 1992) and was partially identified in
the DOE/NPOSR Office of Technical Assurance management appraisal (May 1992) .
A comparison of the Tiger Team findings to the JBEC findings is contained in
Table 6-5.
TABLE 6-5
COMPARISON OF JBEC
SELF -ASSESSMENT REPORT FIIIlINGS AND CONCERNS
WITH TIGER TEAM RESULTS

Safety
& Health

61 (68%)

19 (21")

10 (11")

Env i ronmenta I

22 (36")

25 (42l1;)

13 (22l1;)

4 (30l1;)

8 (62l1;)

87 (53")

52 (32l1;)

Management
TOTAL

(8%)
24 ( 15")

Spec i fic areas addressed are covered in more detail in the sections that
follow.
6 .8.2.1

Envi rolUlent

In comparing the JBEC self- assessment findings with those identified by the
Env ironmental Subteam, the subteam found that 22 were ful)y identified , 25
were partially identified, and 13 were not identified (see Table 6-4). As in
the case of the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self-assessment, the programmatic deficiencies
were generally well identified, but lacked specific details . However, they
were more expl icit than those which were in the DOE/NPOSR-CUW assessment.
While there were more details in the JBEC assessment, there were also
si gnificant erroneous statements (e . g . , finding LWH . 3A stated , "A small
quantity generator permit was obtained from EPA"; however, there is no such
permit). There were also incorrect regulatory statements (e.g. , finding
6- 23
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Safety and Health

The JBEC sel f - assessment appeared comprehensive and critical. The
"Performance Objectives and Criter i a for Technical Safety Appraisals at
Oepartment of Energy Facilities and Sites " (June 1990) served as a guide for
the self-assessment process . Based on the use of criteria from these reference
documents , the scope of the self- assessment was extensive . For each
criterion, a finding was identified along with a statement of corrective
action. Although these statements were generally clear , they were brief and
did not provide sufficient detail to suggest an in-depth understanding of the
deficiency . This may have been due to the limited participation by only a few
JBEC staff members in developing the self-assessment report, and the use of an
outside contractor in developing one of the technical areas (PT) in the Safety
and Health self-assessment report . Such an approach I imited the broader
involvement of the organization and , thus, limited the depth of the JBEC
response .
The self-assessment was candid as evidenced by the number of concerns that had
been fully (68 percent) or partially (21 percent) identified in the
self-assessment. Table 6- 4 provides a comparison of the JBEC ~ nd Tiger Team
As sessments as they relate to safety and health concerns.
Key findings were der i ved from the general findings and were analyzed for
causa I factors and root causes .
The root causes appeared to address
fundamental problems . Corrective actions reflected a gener al management
commitment to correct problems , but lacked specific i ty and , thus, i t was
difficult to assess management ' s underst anding of the actions and resources
that wi ll be required to correct ident i fied deficiencies. The time allocated
for corrective action did not appear realistic. For example, JBEC expects to
i mplement a DOE-approved QA Program by September 30 , 1992 . The corrective
actions proposed did not consider the impact that l i mited resources will have
on implementing new programs and eliminat i ng acknowledged defi ciencies.
Overall , the JBEC self-assessment was extens i ve in scope , critical , and
reflected a management commitment to identifying problems . A greater
understanding of the defic i encies cited will be needed , however , b~ f~re a
rea list i c correct i ve act i on plan can be developed .
6 .8.2.3

Management

Similar to the DOE/NPOSR-CUW self- as sessment, the JBEC self -assessment was a
critical self-evaluation which included most of those deficiencies ident i fied
by the Management Subt eam. Weaknesses in t he JBEe self-assessment centered
around exclusive use of management performance object i ves and criter i a for
conducting the self- assessment, developing root causes , and establishing
correct i ve act ions. In t he fi rst instance , because base regul atory
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requirements were not included as part of the criteria for conducting the
self-assessment, it is possible that a number of deficiencies still remain
unidentified. In the second instance, root causes identified were judged to
be symptoms and not the underlying origins. As a result, if actions are
limited to the identified symptoms, the true root cause will likely continue.
Finally, the corrective action plan lacked specific elements or milestones,
and the corrective action implementation schedule appeared to be overly
optimistic .
6.9

REVIEW OF FE AND NPOSR MANAGEMENT APPRAISALS

Prior to the Tiger Team Assessment management apprai sal s were conducted by
FE-6 of DOE/NPOSR and DOE/NPOSR-CUW, dnd FE-64 of DOE/NPOSR-CUW. Although
these management apprai sal s are not self-assessment reports, they are part of
the self-assessment programs for FE and DOE/NPOSR. Therefore, the Management
Subteam compared its findings to the findings in the management appraisals .
The results of this comparison are presented in Table 6-6.
TABLE 6-6
COMPARISON OF HEADQUARTERS MANAGEMENT APPRAISAL
1F:'::F":===F1NDINGS WITH MANAGEMENT SUBTEAM AND SELF-ASSESSMENT7:R=.EV=IEW~~===I

o (0%)

7 (88%)

1 (12%)

8

7 (2!n.)

11 (46")

6 (25")

24

9 (35")

11 (42%)

6 (23")

26
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Appendix A

ASSESSMENT TEAM PERSONNEL AND
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

Appendix A-1

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF TIGER TEAM ASSESSMENT
TEAM LEADER AND TEAM LEADER STAFF

OSP COORDINATOR
EMILE BOULOS
IJ-----tl

TIGER TEAM LEADER
DAVID SIMONSON
ASSISTANT TO TIGER TEAM LEADER
GARY LIHZ
SECRETARY TO TIGER TEAM LEADER
ANN DAVIS

ADM INISTRATI ON
MARY MEADOWS
I~-~I

OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
MARK KASISCHKE

l>

.....
.....
I
I

ENVIRONMENTAL SUBTEAM LEADER
AL SIKRI
DEPUTY SUBTEAM LEADER
LEE BANICKI
DEPUTY SUBTEAM LEADER
WILLIAM HASSELKUS

MANAGEMENT SUBTEAM LEADER
MARCUS JONES

Figure A-l-l NPOSR-CUW Tiger Team Organization

SAFETY AND HEALTH
SUBTEAM LEADER
LEONARD LOJEK

IWIE:

David P. Simonson

AREA OF RESP:

Tiger Team Leader

ASSOCIATION:

u.S . Department of Energy, Rocky Flats Office

EXPERIENCE:

26 Years

u.s . Department of Energy, Rocky Flats Office
-

Senior Technical Advisor to the Manager.

-

Deputy Manager and Assistant Manager for Environmental Management.
Managed the Rocky Fl ats Waste Management and Envi ronmenta 1
Restoration Programs.

U.S. Department of Energy, Defense Programs, Headquarters
Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary. Deputy to the Deputy
Assistant Secretary responsible for management of the Department's
nuclear material production and defense program generated waste .
-

NAME:

Ann E. Davis

AREA OF RESP:

Administrative Assistant to Tiger Team Leader

ASSOCIATION:

U.S . Department of Energy, Rocky Flats Office

EXPERIENCE:

II Years

U. S. Department of Energy, Rocky Flats Office - Office of Assistant
Manager for Environmental Management . Secretarial and adlllinistrative
support to the Assistant Manager for environmental restoration and
waste management activities at the Rocky Flats Plant.
U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Field Office - Financial
Resources Division , Procurement Division, and Office of the Manager.
Bookkeeping and records auditing for private industry.

EDUCATION :

Work-related and computer software training, and NISC
independent study courses .

Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Materials Production.
Responsible for management of the Department's nuclear materials
production program.

U. S. Department of Energy, Richland Field Office
-

Director, Production Operations Division . Responsible for
lIIanagement of all production of nuclear materials at DOE's Hanford
Site.

-

Project Manager, SIS. Managed the Special Isotope Separation
Project, a billion dollar project to develop and build a facility
to separate plutoniulII isotopes for use in nuclear weapons.

-

Chief, Chellical Processing Branch. Managed the Nuclear Fuel and
PlutoniulII Processing Facilities of the Hanford Nuclear Materials
Product i on Complex.

-

Other management and engineering positions in reactor deSign ,
construction, and testing.

EDUCATION:

B.S., Mechanical Engineering, New Mexico State University
M.S . , Nuclear Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
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NAME:

Mary Meadows

AREA OF RESP:

Tiger Team Administrator

ASSOCIATION:

U.S . Department of Energy, Headquarters

UPERIENCE:

32 Years

U. S. Department of Energy
Supervisory Appraisal Specialist: Responsible for the overall
planning and conduct of Tiger Team Assessments, Technical Safety
Appraisals, Management Appraisals, Nuclear Safety Program
Appraisals, Design Rev i ews, and Comprehensive Appraisals.
Responsible for the overall production for draft reports in the
field and final publication of reports at DOE Headquarters; also
for providing coordination and editorial support on DOE/EH
apprai sals.
-

Staff Assistant. Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview.
Recollll1ended specific changes in administrative procedures for the
purpose of increasing efficiency, eliainating unnecessary details,
and providing needed management control .

-

Staff Assistant, Office of Bio-Medical and Environmental Research .
Obtained and cOllll1unicated information to organizations and
individuals inside/outside the Agency on a wide range of Agency
organ i zat i on, personnel, and procedures .

-

Staff Assistant, Office of the COllll1issioner, USAEC.

-

Administrative Assistant, Office of the Assistant General Manager
for Research and Development , USAEC.

Other Related Experience
-

Administrative and conference planning responsibilities within the
USAEC , ERDA, and DOE.

EDUCATION:

Numerous work- related courses and workshops at various
colleges, training centers, SSDC. and the American
Management Association.

OntERS :

Member, U. S. Delegation to Disarmament Conference, Geneva,
Swi tzer1and
Recipient of Federal Government Awards for superior
performance.
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Appendix A-2

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF ENVIRONMENTAL
SUBTEAM MEMBERS

Atam P. (Al) Sikri

IWIE:
AREA OF RESP:

Environmental Subteam Leader

ASSOCIATION:

U. S. Department of Energy

EXPERIENCE:
•

24 years

U. S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Audit
Team Leader and Environmental Engineer, Office of Environmental
Audit . Provides gUidance, direction, and assistance to a
multi-disciplined group of professionals performing Environmental
Audits and Assessments at DOE facil ities. Participated as the
Enviromaental Subteam Leader for the Ames Laboratory and Stanford
linear Accelerator Center Tiger Tea,n Assessments; Team Leader for
the West Valley Demonstration Project Envi ronmenta 1 Audit; and
Assistant Subteam Leader for the Sandia National Laboratories,
Tiger Team Assessment .
Assessment and Validation Engineer, Office of Program/Project
Management. Provided independent appraisal of projects involving
design/construction, environmental asp~cts plan~ing/scheduling, .
and cost estimating. Also, NEPA Compl1ance Offlcer for the Offlce
of Procurement.
Program Manager/Assistant Director, Office of Fossil Energy.
Responsible for directing and managing synthetic fuel research,
development, and demonstration of technologies. Processes were
developed in full compliance with environmental regulations.
-

•

General Eng i neer, Offi ce of Defense Programs . Worked with uran i um
enrichment technology, project management, and classification
determination capability.

Leroy H. Ban i ck i
Deputy Envi ronmenta1 Subteam Leader

ASSOCIATION:

U. S. Department of Energy

EXPERIENCE:

14 years

•

U. S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Audit, Washington,
DC
-

•

•

Petroleum Engineer, U.S . Corps of Engineers . Work involved
process design, project engineering, and cost studie.
enior Process Design/Development Engineer . Have worked with
DuPont Company, Cities Service Company (now part of Occidental
Petroleum Corporation), Johnson & Johnson, and Hoffmann-LaRoche,
Incorporated

EDUCATION:

Ph.D., Chemical Engineering, University of Pennsylvania
M.S.E., Chemical Engineering, University of Michigan
B.S.E., Metallurgical Engineering, University of Michigan
B.S.E., Chemical Engineering, University .of Michigan
Regi stered Profess i ona1 Engi neer
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Deputy Director, Environmental and Natural Resou:-ces Office, with
responsibil ity for hazardous waste, asbestos abatement, spill
control and countermeasures, and environmental training programs.

Department of the Army, Ft. Carson, Colorado
-

•

Project Officer for Installation Restoration Program activities at
Air Guard bases nationwide.

White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico
-

•

Environmental Protection SpeCialist responsible for providing
guidance, direction, and assistance to a multi-disciplined group
of profeSSionals performing Tiger Team Assessments and
Environmental Audits at DOE facilities.

Headquarters, Air National Guard, Andrews AFB, Maryland

Environmentalist, responsible for hazardous waste, asbestos
abatement, cultural and natural resources progrills.

Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Florida
Biological Scientist, responsible for Environmental
Assessment/Envi ronmenta 1 Impact Statement preparation and
endangered spec i es programs.

Other Experi ence
-

OTHER:

HAIlE:
AREA OF RESP:

•

Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, Prossp.r,
Washington
-

•

Soil Conservat i oni st.

Menominee Indian Nation, Neopit, Wisconsin
-

EDUCATION:

Forest Inventory Specialist .
Graduate Studies, Forest Pathology, Louisiana State
University
M.S . , Biology, UniverSity of Texas at El Paso
B.S . , Wildlife Management, McNeese State University
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MAIlE:

William N. Hasselkus

AREA OF RESP:

Deputy Environlllental Subteam leader

ASSOCIATlOft:

U. S. Department of Energy

EXPERIENCE:

21 years

MAIlE:

Raeann Reid

AREA OF RESP:

Group Coordinator

ASSOCIATION:

Arthur D. little, Inc .

EXPERIDlCE:

20 years

•
•

u.s. Departllll!nt of Energy, Office of Environmental Audit
-

_ Group Coordinator for the Tiger Team Assessments of the Energy
Technology Engineering Center, the Naval Petroleum Reserves in
California, and the Strategic Petroleum Reserves and Deputy
Coordinator for the Idaho National Engineering laboratory Tiger
Team Assessment.

E~virol1lll!ntal Engi~eer responsible for providing guidance ,
dIrection, and assIstance to a multi-disciplined group of
professionals perfol"lling Tiger Team Assessments and Environmental
Audits at DOE facilities.

_ led and participated in audits and risk assessments for several
Arthur D. little clients, primarily in the petrochemical and
petroleum industries including oil refineries, oil terminals, and
production facilities .

Environlll!n~al Engineer supporting environmental compl iance support
to DOE NatIonal laboratory and ancillary facil ities.

-

•

Environlllent, Health and Safety Manager providing ES&H support for
the Prograa Office for construction of the world's largest
particle accelerator. Co-manager of the Environmental Impact
Statellent for the project.

Arthur D. little, Inc.

•

Other Industry Experience
Twenty years experience including environmental operations ;
environmental regulatory affairs; industrial and cOllll1ercial
hazardous waste management, site evaluation, remediation and
offsite disposal; and industrial and commercial laboratory
management.

Booz, Allen and Haailton, Inc . , Consultant s
-

Are~

llanager support i ng Superfund pol icy development for the
Envlrol1lll!ntal Protection Agency, and area manager for
cotapl!ance support for EPA's facilities, primarily
through leadIng envIronmental audit teams.
environlll!nta~

•

U. S. AI"IIY Materiel Coanand
-

•

Chief, Environmental Quality Division, responsible for
envir~nlllental cOllPliance oversight and guidance.
In this
cap~c~ty, developed and implellll!nted the Connand's Environmental
AudIting program. This position also involved operation of the
AI"IIY's Installation Restoration Program.

In the oil industry, worked as a refinery environmental
supervi sor, evaluated the department audi t program for a major
exploration and production company , evaluated environmental risks
associated with abandoned oil production sites for a lessor, led
and participated in environmental audits of refineries and bulk
terminals for four major oil companies .

u.S. AI"llY Environmental Hygiene Agency
-

•

_ While working for a major petrochemical manufacturer, audited toll
manufacturers, bulk terminals, repackaging plants, recyclers, and
commercial disposal facilities.

Sanita~y Engineer serving as project leader for Industrial and
dOIleStlC wastewater investigations conducted by teams of
professionals at Army facilities.

EDUCATION:

B.S., Mathematics, Minor Chemistry, Texas Technological
University

u.S. Army Electronics Command
-

EDUCATI Oft:

Served as the original facil ity environmental coordinator at Fort
Monmouth, N.J.
MBA, Fairleigh Dickinson University
B. S. , Chemical Engineering, New Jersey Institute of
Technology
Executive Excellence Program, Federal Executive Institute
Program for Senior Executives, MIT
A-2 - 4
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lynne Day

NAME:

AREA OF RESP:

Envi ronmenta 1 Subteam Admi ni s trat i ve Support

AREA OF RESP:

In active Waste Sites

ASSOCIATION:

META

ASSOCIATION:

Arthur D. little, Inc.

EXPERIENCE:

15 years

EXPERIENCE:

8 years

NAME:

•

META

Joseph Delaney

•

Arthur D. little, Inc.

Information Processing Specialist. Provides administrative
support for Environmental Audit s, Progress Assessments, and the
Environmental Subteam on DOE Tiger Team Assessments. Participant
in Tiger Team Assessments of the Solar Energy Research Institute ,
los Alamos National laboratory, and Strategic Pe trol eum Reserve s.
Participant in Environmental Audit s of the CompGnent Development
and Integration Facil i ty and Envi ronmenta1 Measurements laboratory
sites . Provided support for the Environment , Safety and Health
Progress Assessments of the Fernald Environmental Management
Project and Hanford Site .
Attended Progress Assessment training
program.
•

Partic i pated in a nu.ber of environllll!ntal audits for ca.llll!rcial
clients. Specialized in the assessillent of c0llp1iance with surface
water, drinking water , spill prevention , and hazardous waste
regulations .
-

INNOVA Communications, Inc .
-

•

Surface water/drinking water specialist for the Tiger Teu
Assessments of the Naval Petro1ewa Reserves in California, the
Pittsburgh Energy Technology Center , the Strategic Petro1eu.
Reserve, and the Fermi laboratory; assisted on the Stanford linear
Accelerator Center Tiger Teu Assessll1ent .

Office Administrator. Provided system and documentation support
for a local and wide area network integration firm . Worked on
office automation systems configuration analysis project providing
technical writing and project management support . Responsible for
development of instruction materials , graphics support, manuals,
and vendor documentation. Prepared proposals, presentations ,
graphics, and technical drawings . Compiled and prepared
statist i cal data for price quotations , cost proposals, analys is,
and report i ng .

Sandler

Environmental Consultant
-

Conducted a variety of studies assessing the impact lif process
wastewater discharges on receiving water quality. These studies
included characterization of waste streams, thermal impact
assessment, and water quality modeling in support of National
Pollutant Discharge E1 imination System permit app1 i cations .
Participated in several samp1 ing programs for the Army Corps of
Engi neers to assess PCB di scharges and dredge materi a1 di sposa 1
si t es .

&Greenb1um

Wor d Process i ng Departmental Manager. Deve loped and coord i nated
act i vi t i es related to the word processing department for law firm
specializing in patent/trademark law . Responsible for direct
superv i sion and staffing of word processing department .
Respon s i b1e for hardware and software procurement and
in st allations . Identified and resolved problems, and repaired and
r eplaced malfunctioning hardware components. Performed data base
management func t i ons .
EDUCATION:

•

Prepared a Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) training lIIanua1 to
address the major provisions of TSCA, including asbestos and
polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) managellll!nt.

-

Prepared and updated Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure
P1 ans and [mergency Response P1 ans to address oi 1 and hazardous
materials spills from several industrial sites.

EDUCATION:

B. S., Civil Engineering, Northeastern University

OTHER:

Registered Professional Engineer

A.A., Computer Science, Strayer College , Arlington, VA

A- 2- 5

497

A- 2- 6

'-198

HAIlE:

Richard D'Ermil io

NAME:

Richard B. Lynch

AREA OF RESP:

Toxic and Chemical Materials

AREA OF RESP:

Technical Editor

ASSOCIATION:

Arthur D. Little , Inc .

ASSOCIATION:

META

EXPERIENCE:

7 years

EXPERIENCE:

5 years

•

-

•

Technical Editor. Provides technical editing and graphics support
to the Environmental Subteam during Tiger Team Assessments. Also,
oversees the preparation of the camera-ready copy of final
assessment reports and audit reports for DOE's Office of Special
Projects and Office of Environmental Audit.

Participated in the Pittsburgh Energy Technology Center, Solar
Energy Research Center, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Oak Ridge
K- 25 Site, and the Fermi Laboratory Tiger Team Assessments as a
waste management specialist for the Environmental Subteams . Also,
participated as a waste management specialist in the Progress
Assessment at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Site .

Responsible for the corporate hazardous and special waste
management program, including identification and characterization
of hazardous wastes, formulating and implementing a waste tracking
program, and manag i ng empty conta i ners .

-

Developed and impl emented faci 1 i ty-speci fi c emergency contingency
planning procedures.

-

Developed corporate underground storage tank (UST) management
program.

-

•

Managed a waste di sposa1 contract for the Federal Government
Defense Reutil ization and Marketing Office (DRMO) involving
identification, characterization, packaging, and removal of
surp 1 us hazardous materi a 1 s located at Federal Government
facilities throughout New England .

Writer/Editor. Provides technical writing and editing support for
DOE's Office of New Production Reactors (NPR), including writing
NPR's Correspondence Manual and a variety of technical articles
fo r publ ication .

Advanced Sciences, Inc .
-

Writer/Editor . Researched, wrote, and edited fact sheets and
information briefs on energy conservation and renewable energy
topics for a DOE-funded energy information service.

-

Response Analyst/Media Liaison . Analyzed and researched inquiries
on energy topics from the general public, U.S. Congress, and trade
associations. Also, wrote information briefs, press releases , and
assisted with media outreach activities.

Chemical Waste Management
-

•

META

A. W. Chesterton Company
-

•

•

Arthur D. Little Inc .

EDUCATION:

B.A . , General Studies, Louisiana State University

S. E. T. Envi ronmenta 1
-

EDUCATION:

Managed a project for CORll1onwealth Edison of Illinois which
i nvo 1ved the removal of soil sand decontami nat i on of sites
contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyl s (PCBs) .
M.S . , Hazardous Materials Management , Tufts University
(in progress)
B.A., in Environmental Science, State University of New York
College at Purchase
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John J. Pulliam III

NAME:
NAME:

Donald Neal

AREA OF RESP:

Waste Management

ASSOCIATION:

Arthur D. little, Inc .

EXPERIENCE:

9 years

•

AREA OF RESP:

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Coordinator

ASSOCIATION:

u. S.

EXPERIENCE:

23 years

•

Arthur D. little, Inc.

U. S. Department of Energy
-

Waste management specialist for Tiger Team Assessments of the Oak
Ridge K-25 Site, Ames laboratory, and the National Institute for
Petro 1eum and Energy Research .
•

Provides technical guidance to commercial cl ients on hazardous
waste recycling and disposal .

General Biologist. Recommended species to be added to the list of
Endangered and Threatened Species over a four state area .

-

Prepared solid and hazardous waste management plans for industry
and municipalities.

-

Evaluated waste management facility compliance with environmental
permits and regulations.
Investigated methods for air pollution monitoring, air emissions
control, and source testing, for independent engineering
evaluations and other interested parties .

•

-

Managed environmental assessments and permitting of i ndustrial
facilities including solid and hazardous waste, power generation,
cogeneration , pulp and paper, and natural gas storage and
transmi ss i on .

Wildlife Biologist . Reviewed and recommended approval of recovery
plans for endangered and threatened species in the Office of
Endangered Species, Washington, D.C. Revised recovery planning
procedures. Managed the nationwide endangered species land
acquisition program.
Fishery Biologist/Fish and Wildlife Biologist. Analyzed water
resource development projects to determine their impact on fish
and wildl ife resources and recommended mitigation for those
impacts. Utilized Habitat Evaluation Procedures and remote
sensing. PartiCipated in river basin planning.

-

ENSR Consulting Engineering
-

Environmental Protection Specialist, Project Activities Division
and Waste Activities Division. Determines the required NEPA
document for OOE projects. Revi ews Envi ronmenta1 Impact
Statements and Envi ronmenta1 Assessments for accuracy and
adequacy. Develops NEPA compliance policies and guidance.

U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service

CSI Resource Systems Inc .
Managed environmental permitting of waste management facilities
including environmental impact assessments; air, water, and solid
waste permits.

•

•

Department of Energy

mUCATlON:

Fishery Biologist . Worked as a hatchery biologist and then
assistant manager at four National Fish Hatcheries in three
states. Propagated warm water fish and trout, includ ing disease
diagnosis and control . Prepared reports, paid bills, kept
records, and performed other administrative functions .
M.S ., Biology , University of Southwestern louisiana
B.S ., General Agriculture, New Mexico State University

GCA Technology Division
Project manager for quality assurance for 1985 National Acid
Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP) emissions inventory.
Designed and implemented Continuous Emissions Monitoring System
for air emission sources.

EDUCATION:

M.S., Biology, University of Massachusetts
B.S., Biology, University of Massachusetts
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NAME:

James J . Rea

NAME:

William G. Rhodes

AREA OF RESP:

Groundwater/Soils, Sediments, and Biota

AREA OF RESP:

Radiation

ASSOCIATION:

Arthur D. little, Inc.

ASSOCIATION:

Arthur D. little, Inc.

EXPERIENCE:

g years

EXPERIENCE:

12 years

•

-

•

•

Arthur D. little, Inc .

Arthur D. little, Inc.
-

Participated in the Tiger Team Assessments of the Oak Ridge K-25
Site, los Alamos National laboratory, and Solar Energy Research
Institute (SERI) as the lead groundwater/soils, sediments, and
biota specialist. Additionally, participated in the Tiger Team
Assessment of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve as a surface
water/drinking water special ist and for the SERI Tiger Team
Assessment as the inactive waste sites special ist.

various DOE facilities, including los Alamos National laboratory,
Sandia National laboratory, Albuquerque, West Yalley
Demonstration Project, and the Hanford Site.
•

General Electric Company, Knolls Atomic Power laboratory
lead Engineer. Responsible for the radiological environmental
monitoring for the laboratory and quality assurance for some
environmental surveillance activities for U. S. Navy facilities.
Supervised a three-site action program to ensure each site
compl ied with Environmental Protection Agency radionucl ide
emission standards.

Briggs Associates, Inc.
-

Environmental Scientist with responsibilities of Project Manager.
Conducted land transfer site assessments; emergency response
spill/site assessments; remedial investigation/remedial design;
regulatory agency interfacing, including compliance management of
RCRA, CERClA, SARA, TSCA, and National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System permitting; underground storage tank
management; surface and subsurface investigation; hydrogeologic
contaminant flow conditions; surveying and field mapping.

-

Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc .
-

•

lead Health Physics Technician to support the U.S. Department of
Energy's UHTRA Projects . Responsible for radiological engineering
assessments; personnel and environmental dosimetry;
decontamination; site and vicinity property excavation control;
and radionuclide laboratory analysis .

Benson, Mot i n and Greer Drilli ng Company
EDUCATION:
-

Drilling Fluid Engineer. Responsibilities included the design and
maintenance of the drilling fluid programs for secondary recovery
oil wells and natural gas injection wells.

EDUCATION:

Graduate Studies, Hydrogeology and Environmental Studies,
University of Montana
B.S., Conservation Science, Fort lewis College

OTHER:

Member of the American Chemical Society and Plenary Membership
in the Health Phy~ics Society
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lead Health Physicist. Responsible for supervising internal,
and environmental dosimetry for the laboratory .

~~ternal,

•

Participated in Tiger Team Assessments, an Environmental Audit, a
li ne Management Envi ronmenta1 Audi t, and a Progress Assessment at

OTHER:

Radiological Engineer. Conducted inspections and audits of
various radiological facil ities, including prototype reactor
sites, radiochemistry laboratories, radioactive waste processing
and storage facil ities, fuel fabrication facil ities, hot cell
laboratories, and x-ray and radiography facilities. Also
responsible for various radiological engineering tasks, such as
approving radiological procedures, decontamination and
decol!l1lissioning, soll characterization studies, and air sampling
app li ed research and development.
M.S., Radiological Sciences and Protection, University of
Massachusetts at lowell
R. T., (ARRT), Registered Radiological Technologist,
Wittenberg University and Mercy Medical Center
B. A., Physics and Biology (Dual Major), Wittenberg
University
Certified Health Physicist, American Board of Health Physics
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Lorene L. Si gal , PhD.

NAME:

AREA OF RESP:

National Environmental Pol icy Act

ASSOCIATION:

Oak Ri dge Nat i ona 1 Laboratory

EXPERIENCE:

12 years

•

NAME:

Sarah J . Simon

AREA OF RESP:

Air

ASSOCIATION:

Arthur D. Little, Inc.

EXPERIENCE:

20 years

•

Arthur D. Little, Inc .

Oak Ridge National Laboratory
-

Participated in the Pittsburgh Energy Technology Ceroter, Oak Ridge
Site , and Ames Laboratory Tiger Team Assessments as air
specialist for the Environmental Subteam .

Participated in 13 Tiger Team Assessments .

K-25

Prepared terrestrial ecology sections of environmental impact
statements for coal-fired , oil-fired, and nuclear power plants ;
u. S. Army disposal of chemical agents and munit i ons; and U.S. Air
Force base closures and reuse .

Performed envi ronmenta 1 ri skll i abi li ty assessments for pul p and
paper, electrical connector, and manufac t uring facil it ies .
Coordinated risk assessment teams.

Technical assistance to the DOE Office of NEPA Oversight .
Development of the draft DOE NEPA Compl iance Guide and the DOE
NEPA Compl iance Audit Protocol .

Presented session on excellence in environmental management
systems .
•

Massachusetts Division of Air Quality Control

Preparation of the DOE Regulatory Compliance Guide for Prevention
of Significant Deterioration under the Clear Air Act.

Directed the air quality assessment programs including monitoring,
model ing, and emission inventories. Planned and developed an air
toxic monitoring program. Procured a mobi le laboratory and data
acquisition system.

- Team Leader for Oak Ridge Nat i onal Laboratory environmental
compliance assessments for the U. S. Air Force under their
Environmental Compl iance and Management Program (ECAMP).
EDUCATION:

Provided air program liaison and developed recommendations for new
programs addressing site cleanup and multi-media permits and
operations; network computer systems; and legislative commissions
on lead and indoor air pollution.

Basic research in the effects of air pollut2nts on vegetation .
Ph .D. , Botany and Microbiology, Arizona State University
M.A., Systematic Biology and Ecology , San Francisco State
University
B. A. , Art , Stanford Un i vers i ty

•

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region I
Eval uated state air programs . Reviewed tec ~ n ic al and regulatory
adequacy of energy facility emission limits; emiSSion inventories;
state implementation plan submittals ; and acid deposition
programs .
-

Reviewed Federal air and water permit applications and grants ;
audi ted state programs ; and perfor med compliance inspect ions.

EDUCATION:

M.S., Environmental Engineering, Northeastern Univers i ty
B.S. , Civil Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
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HAIlE:

Clifford H. SU!llllers

AREA OF RESP:

Surface Water

ASSOCIATION:

Arthur D. little. Inc.

EXPERIENCE:
•

31 years

-

Performed inspections and audits for a variety of clients. both
connercial and government. in areas such as aerospace
manufacturing. power generation. and chemical and petrochemical
manufacturi ng.

-

Supported a commercial cl ient in remedial planning to ensure
compliance with the Clean Water Act and National Pollutant
Discharge Elilllination Syshm (NPDES) regulations. including
development and implementation of sampling programs. preparation
of a water poll ut ion control manual. preparat i on of an app1i cat i on
for an NPDES pel'llit modification. and assistance in negotiations
with state regulators.

EDUCATION:

Joseph Swiniarski
Qua 1 i ty Assurance

ASSOCIATION:

Arthur D. little. Inc.

EXPERIENCE:

30 years

•

Arthur D. little. Inc.

-

HAIlE:

AREA OF RESP:

Resident Environllental Coordinator on Johnson Island for the Army
Chemical Detllilitarization prograDI. Responsible for preparation
and implementation of environmental compliance plans by the
Operations and Maintenance Contractor. Oversight responsibility
for five enviromllental engineers and five plant operations
departmental staff.

Arthur D. little. Inc.
PartiCipated in the Tiger Team Assessments of the Idaho National
Engineering laboratory and Energy Technology Engineering Center as
the quality assurance specialist. Also partiCipated in Tiger Team
preassessments of the laramie Energy Technology Center and Oak
Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant.
-

Evaluated quality assurance capabilities and good laboratory
practices compliance for testing laboratories of a major U.S .
cosmetics company.

-

Consultant and experimental preclinical therapeutic and
toxicologic scientist (1963-present) with broad experience in
laboratory management. radiation biology. and quality assurance
monitoring within Arthur D. little. Inc. life Science Section.
Responsibilities included managing contract work for the U. S.
National Cancer Institute and the U.S. Army.

-

Managed Arthur D. little. Inc. veterinary laboratories
(1984-1989). Responsibilities included assurance of compliance
with U.S. National Institutes of Health guidel ines. U.S.
Department of Agriculture regulations. U.S. Food and Drug
Administration regulations. U.S . Environmental Protection Agency
regulations. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Public Health
regulations. and U.S. National Toxicology Program requirements for
barrier toxicology testing facilities .

Graduate Studies at louisiana State UniverSity and
Northeastern University
A.B .• Chemistry. Florida State University

EDUCATION:
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M.A .• Physiology. Minor. Biology. Boston University
B.S .• Biology. Minor Chemistry. Northeastern University
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Helen C. Walters

NAME:

AREA OF RESP:

Envi ronmenta 1 Subteam Admi ni strat i ve Support

ASSOCIATION:

META

EXPERIENCE:

25 years

•

META
Information Processing Specialist. Provides administrative
support to the Environmental Subteam on DOE Tiger Team Assessments
and overall support to DOE's Office of Special Projects.
Participated in Tiger Team Assessments of the Sandia National
laboratory, Albuquerque, Morgantown Energy Technology Center,
Idaho National Engineering laboratory, Pittsburgh Energy
Technology Center, los Alamos National laboratory, the Naval
Petroleum Reserves in California, the Strategic Petroleum
Reserves, the National Institute for Petroleum and Energy
Research, and the Fermi laboratory. Participated in the
Environmental Audits of the Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action
Project and the Component Development and Integration Facility .
Provides administrative support for final Tiger Team and
environmental audit reports.

•

Cate
-

•

&Associates, Chartered

Administrator. Served as Executive Assistant with administrative
responsibil ities for fil ing estate accounting in excess of
$125,000 to the Commissioner of Accounts; liaison with attorneys
and the courts with regards to these accounts; and handl ed
accounts receivable and payable.
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National Council of Farmer Cooperatives
-

EDUCATION:

Administrator. Responsible for administration of financial and
human resources for a staff of 13 professional and 13 support
staff. Duties in the area of finance included the preparation and
oversight of an annual operating budget of $2.5 million with
reporting responsibil ity to a committee composed of board members .
Duties in the area of human resources included hiring and training
of all support staff, and developing and coordinating employee
benefits packages . Responsible for accommodating 65 employees in
newly con struct ed, 17 , OOO- square-foot office space .
B. S., Bus i ness, Kent St ate Uni vers i ty
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leonard M. lojek

IWIE:

AREA OF RESP:

Safety and Health Subteilll leader

ASSOCIATION:

Office of Perfonlance AssessJDent, Headquarters, Department
of Energy

EXPERIENCE:

33 Years

Appendix A-3

•

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF SAFETY AND HEAL TH
SUBTEAM MEMBERS

•

•

u. S. DepartllM!nt of Energy, Washington, DC
-

Safety and Health SubteUl leader for Tiger Team AssesslMlnts and
Team leader for Technical Safety Appraisals. leader or teilll
member on 16 TSAs.

-

Qual ity Assurance Manager, Assistant Secretary for Environment,
Safety and Health.

-

Quality Assurance ProgriIJII Manager, Assistant Secretary for Fossil
Energy .

-

Program Manager of R&D efforts in Solvent Refined Coal Conversion
Programs (SRC-I and SRC-II), Assistant Secretary for Fossil
Energy.

Chemi cal Systems laboratory, DOD
-

Project Manager and Project Engi neer for di sposa1 of obsolete
toxic chemical munit~ons .

-

Product Engineer for slDOke and pyrotechnic chemicals, and for riot
control chemicals . Process Engineer for plasticized white
phosphorus mun i t ions.

Calgon Corporation
-

Technical Service Engineer for industrial and util ity water
treatment systems.

EDUCATION:

M.S.A., Management Engineering, George Washington University
B.S ., Chemical Engineering, Carnegie -Mellon University

OTHER:

Member , Ameri can Institute of Chemi cal Engi neers
Member, Ameri can Soci ety of Qual i ty Control
Member, American Defense Preparedness Assoc i ation
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lIME:

George P. Ba il ey

IWIE:

Jilml,Y E. Biggs

AREA OF RESP:

Ellergency Preparedness and Fire Protection

AREA OF RESP:

Fire Protection, Industrial Safety, and Ellergency
Preparedness

ASSOCIATION:

Advanced Syste.s Technology, Inc .

ASSOCIATION:

Biggs Associ ates

EXPERIENCE:

31 Years

EXPERIENCE:

34 Years

•

Advanced Systems Technology , Inc .
-

•

•

Senior Emergency Preparedness Licensing Engineer, Marble Hill,
Nuclear Generating Station .
•

Site Emergency Planning coor dinator, Waterford 3, Steam Electric
Station .

•
•

Manager , Protective Services .

AIG Consultants , Inc .

•

-

•

Senior Staff Loss Control Engineer . Conducted fire, liabil ity,
and workers compensation safety survey of petro-chemical plants
and refineries .

U.S. Air Force Retired
-

EDUCATION:

OTHER:

•

Nuclear Energy Services, Inc.
-

•

Senior Emergency Planning Analyst .

Lou is i ana Power & Li ght
-

•

•

Publ ic Service of Indiana
-

•

Preparednes ~ .

Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.
-

•

Manager, Emergency

•

EDUCATION:

A.A., Fire Science Technology, College of San Mateo,
Cal ifornia
Postgraduate work for Fire Science PrograJI
Standard DeSignated Teaching Credential in Vocational Trade
and Technical Teaching in Fire Science (lifetime
Certificate No . VPL 1254 State of California)
Business Adlllinistration and Premedical Studies , City College
of San Franci sco

OTHER:

Member : International Association of Fire Chiefs, National
Fire Protection Association (Industrial Sect ion), Veterans
of Safety, National Safety Council, American Society of
Industrial Security, World Safety Orgailization , and Texas
Safety Association Certified: WSO-CSE, WSO-CSM, W50-CSS

Onsite Controller, Nuclear Emergency Team.
University of Phil ippines
Tunxis Community College
Hartford State Vocational College
NET Course, Sandia Base, New Mexico
Di saster Preparedness Instructor Course
CBR Warfare Instructor Course
AIF - Former Member, Subcommittee on Siting,
Li cens i ng and Emergency Preparedness
AI F - Former Member, Subcommi ttee on Safeguards
Member , Society of Fire Protection Engineers

Tarrant County Water Control and hlprovellent District
- Safety Director (Safety, Fire Protection, and Security).
Biggs Associ ates
- Private consultant in fire protection, industrial safety, accident
investigation. PartiCipated in DOE Technical Safety Appraisals as
Reviewer of Fire Protection, Industrial Safety, and Ellergency
Preparedness.
International ColOllbia Resources Corporation (Mining)
- Fire Protection Division Manager : Responsible for corporate fire
protect i on and rescue.
- Manager of Industrial Safety Division: Responsible for corporate
safety, fire protection, first aid, rescue and industrial hygiene
Exxon Services Venezuela (PetroleuM)
- Corporate Technical Advisor, Fire Protection and Fire Prevention .
- Technical AdVisor, Fire Protection.
Half Moon Bay Fire Protection District (Municipal)
Fire Chief of a California Fire Protection District
Redwood City Fire DepartMent (Municipal)
Fire Inspection and Arson Investigation : Performed safety
construction inspections, investigated fires and made
recoanendations for prevention .
Naval Supply Center Fire Department
Performed building, fire and .hip inspections.
U. S. Naval Air Station - Fire Departllent
- Fireman, Pump Operator and Officer: Structural fire department
ollerations for a U.S. Navy installation in Japan .
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Pamela A. Claps

IWIE:

Robert J. Cordes

AR£A OF RESP:

Worker Safety/OSHA 1B Specialist

AREA OF RESP:

Operations/Site-Facil ity Safety Review

ASSOCIATI ON:

Murphy &. Associ ates

ASSOCIATION:

Robert J. Cordes &. Associ ates

3 years

EXPERIElCE:

34 Years

IWIE:

EXPERIElCE:
•

•

Murphy &. Associ ates
-

Participated in Solar Energy Research Institute and the Naval
Petroleum Reserves in California Tiger Team Assessments and the
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant OSHA Inspection.

-

Assisted in industrial hygiene sampl ing .

-

Ass i sted in conducting safety inspections .

-

Knowledgeable in OSHA standards and researched appropriate OSHA
standards vi 01 at ion.

-

Developed OSHA-modified 1B's .

-

Developed report formats.

-

Performed computer programming, data input, and Beta testing as
part of DOE Technical Safety Appraisals.

EDUCATI ON:

Robert J. Cordes &. Associates
-

•

Principal. Provides petroleum industry safety consultant
services, including expert witness, inspections, investigations ,
and program development.

Marathon Oil Company
-

Safety Supervisor, Safety and Training Coordinator, and
Environmental and Safety Coordinator. Responsible for the safety,
training, and environmental aspects of Marathon's production
operations in the Gulf of Mexico.

-

Senior Risk Engineer. Responsible for inspecting refineries , gas
plants, product terminals, fuel gas plants, pipeline terminals and
production, both offshore and onshore .

-

Safety Representative, Supervisor of Safety and Security .
Responsible for safety during a S100 million plant expansion at
200,000 B/D refinery.

Course work in Engineering Design and Computer Technology,
Colorado State University

Design Engineer . Involved with selection, design , and operation
of refinery equipment.
Proces s Engineer.
process units.
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Daily involvement with operations at refinery

EDUCATION:

B. S., Mechanical Engineering, Washington Univers i ty,
St. loui s, Mi ssouri

OlllER:

Certified Safety Professional
Member, ANSI Z244 lockout/Tagout Standard Conmittee
Member , ANSI Z1l7 Confined Space Entry Standard Committee
Member, Allerican Society of Safety Engineers
Advisory Meillber, American Petroleuill Institute, Safety and
Fire Protection Committee
President, Society of Ohio Safety Engineers (1978- 1979)
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IWIE:

David M. Drury

IWIE:

Gary J. Gottfried

AREA OF RESP:

Worker Safety and Health (OSHA) Compliance

AREA OF RESP:

Occupat i ona 1 Safety

ASSOCIATION:

Private Consultant

ASSOCIATION:

Apex Envi ronmenta1, Inc .

EXPERIENCE:

8 Years

EXPERIENCE:

17 Years

•

•

Private Consultant
-

Participant in Technical Safety Appraisal (TSA) Tiger Team
Assessments.
lead Worker Safety Appraisor for 3 Tiger Team Assessments.

Apex Environmental, Inc.
-

•

Monterey Coal Company (MCC)

(subsidiary of Exxon, USA)

-

Training Specialist: Coordinating and documenting training
requirements and individual ized assessments for training.
- Safety Specialist: Analyzed MCC accident statistics, maintained
MSHA CFR 30 updates, maintained Illinois Right-to-Know law
requirements including MDSDs. Provided oversight and guidance for
accident irwestigations.
- Health and Safety Technician: Maintained all health monitoring
equipment, conducted air quality and noise sampling, fire
protection audits, and self rescuer audits.
- Safety Inspector: loss control system, Computer loss Control
Surveillance System, MSHA inspections and worker safety audits;
and emergency preparedness system. Conducted Accident
Investigations.
•

-

•

Biospherics Incorporated
-

Exxon U.S . A.
-

Field Safety Coordinator, Valdez Oil Spill : Conducted state and
Federal OSHA inspections of all facilities (barges, petroleum
storage areas, vessels, food handling, etc.); worker safety and
equipment audits .

EDUCATION:

B.S., Industrial Technology, Southern 111 inois University
Associates Degree , Mining Technology, Wabash Valley College

OTHER:

Ansu1 Industrial Fire School
National Safety Council Congress & Exposition
Mi ne Emergency Preparedness
loss Control Management Training
loss Control Surveillance System (data processing)
MSHA Instructor Certifications
MSHA Electrical Qualifications
Emergency Medical Technician (EMT-l)
OSHA 24 Hour Hazard Material Certification
OSHA Voluntary Compliance Instructor
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Principal, Industrial Hygi enist: Responsible for conducting
industrial hygiene, public/occupational health and safety and
environmental programs.
Manages and perfonns studies involving asbestos programs, indoor
air quality, environmental audits, industry exposure assessllll!nt
and control, hazard assessment and control, health and safety
program development/implementation, and industrial hygiene
surveys; concentration in the petroleum industry, utilities, and
1aboratory env i ronments.
Project Manager for Mobil Oil Health and Safety Servi ces Contract.
Technical appraiser for DOE Technical Safety Appraisals and Tiger
Team Assessments in discip1 ines of Occupational Safety, Industrial
Hygiene, and Personnel Protection. Partic i pated in 12 appraisals
including NPR, SPR, lANl, INEl, and ANl-E.

-

Vice President, laboratory and Industrial Hygiene Services:
Responsible for operations of the Industrial Hygiene and
laboratory Divisions, including management of financial
perfonnance, bus i ness development, protocol development,
productivity, technical direction and supervision of over 100
Industrial Hygienists, Chemists, and Environmental Scientists.
Managed major industry and government contract efforts; performed
technical programs as an industrial hygienist, and chemist; led
industrial hygiene surveys, laboratory studies, and health and
safety programs; concentration in the petroleum industry,
utilities, laboratories, and manufacturing facilities.
Principal Investigator for API Industrial Hygiene Monitoring
Studies.

EDUCATION:

B.S. , Chemistry, Purdue University

OTHER:

Certified Industrial Hygienist by the American Board of
Industrial Hygiene, 1983
EPA Accredited Asbestos Inspector and Management Planner
President , AlHA, Potomac Section , 1985-1986
Vice President, AIHA, Potomac Section, 1984-1985
Treasurer, AIHA, Potomac Section, 1987-1989
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MAIlE:

lydia G. Guerra

MAIlE:

Janice E. Hill

AREA OF RESP:

Coordi nator, Safety and Health

AREA OF RESP:

Coordinator

ASSOCIATION:

EGtaG Idaho, Inc.

EXPERIENCE:

14 Years

ASSOCIATION:

M. H. Chew and Associates

EXPERIENCE:

14 Years

•

•

M.H. Chew and Associates
-

Administrative Assistant to Tiger Team leader of the Tiger Team
Assessment at the Strategi c Petrol eUIl Reserve Project Management
Office and the los Alamos National laboratory (lANl): Responsible
for assist i ng Tiger Team leader with communications , weekly and
monthly reports , schedules, and admi nistrative support .

-

Report Coordinator for the overall coordination and production of
the draft report at the Princeton Plasma Physics and Ames
laboratori es .

-

Report Coordinator for the Management Subteam Report of the Tiger
Team Assessment at the Idaho National Engineering laboratory
(INEl) .

Senior Administrator: Support and assist DOE-HQ in staffing
Technical Safety Appraisals, Tiger Team Management Subteams, and
similar onsite review teams. Maintain rosters of consultants and
laboratory personnel in all technical disciplines .
_ Report Coordi nator for the Safety and Health Subteam on the Tiger
Team Assessments at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, the Solar
Energy Research Institute, the los Alamos National laboratory, the
Naval Petroleum Reserves in California, the Strategic Petroleum
Reserves, and for the Chemical Safety Oversight Review at the los
Alamos National laboratory .
_ Administrator: Assisted in the planning and handled the logistics
for the onsite review teams for the Technical Safety Appraisals
conducted at the Advanced Test Reactor. Acted as liaison between
EGtaG Idaho management and team members during onsite appraisal.

Report Coordinator for the Safety and Health Subteam Reports of
the Tiger Team Assessments at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant,
lawrence Berkeley laboratory , Pi ttsburgh Energy Technology
Center , Princeton Plasma Physics laboratory , lANl, and Oak Ridge
K-25 site .
•

EGtaG Idaho, Inc.

_ Report Coordinator for the Test Reactor Area Technical Safety
Appra i sa 1s Fac il i ty Act i on Plan. Des I gned and ma i nta i ned a
computerized system for tracking corrective action. Maintained
hard copy fi 1es and produced regular status reports .

Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company, Inc.

_ Senior Administrative SpeCialist: Performed full secretarial
responsibilities in support of the Advanced Test Reactor.

Report Coordi nator for the Safety and Health Subteam Reports of
the Ti ger Team /lssessments at the Savannah River Site, Pinellas
Plant , and Brookhaven National laboratory .

•

Aero Jet Nuclear

-

Report Coordinator for Technical Safety Appraisal Reports at Oak
Ridge National laboratory, Strategic Petroleum Reserve Site, and
Oak Ri dge Y-12 Plant TSA Followup .

_ Branch Secretary: Performed full secretarial responsibilities In
support of the Advanced Test Reactor and the Environmental Test
Reactor.

-

West i nghouse Idaho Nuclear Company, Inc. Coordinator for the
Techn i cal Safety Appraisal of the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant
at INEl .

_ Technical Typ i st: Performed responsibilities in support of the
Test Reactor Area.

Manager , Information Processing Services, responsible for the
management direction and operation of two centralized Infomatlon
Process i ng Centers.
EDUCATION:

B. S., Education; Corporate Training , Idaho State University

OTHER:

Cert i fied Instructional Trainer, Corporate Training
Word Processing Instructor, Eastern Idaho Technical College
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EDUCATION:

Numerous work-related workshops, computer courses, and
general management and administrator skill courses.

OTHER:

Certified Trainer, Crosby Quality Education System
Hellber , American Nuclear Society
Hetllber, Beta Sigma Ph i
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MAIlE:

Robert D. Jones

MAIlE:

Bernard R. Kokenge

MEA OF RESP:

Aviation Safety

AREA OF RESP:

Organization and Administration/Quality Verification

ASSOCIATI l1li:

Office of Risk Analysis and Technology, Headquarters,
Department of Energy

ASSOCIATION:

BRK Associates, Inc.

EXPERIENCE:

27 Years

EXPERIENCE:
•

7 Years

•

U. S. Department of Energy, Germantown, MO

-

Aviation Safety Specialist, Office of Quality and Safety .
•

•

Private Consultant

-

Representative, Interagency COlllllittee on Aviation Policy.

-

Un i ted States Navy
-

li eutenant, USN.

-

Winged Naval Aviator .

•

•

-

Equipment Specialist, TF-30 Technical Services.

-

F-lll Depot Level Maintenance Team.

-

Areas of Expert i se:
Control.

EDUCATI l1li:

Vice President, Kentucky Christian College
-

United States Air Force

Monsanto Research Corporation, Mound Plant
Associate Director Mound; Responsible for all Mound's cOlllponent
development and production activities associated with primary
detonators, timers, actuators, and pyrotechnic devices.
- Nuclear Operations Director: Responsible for all radiological
development and production technology as applied to the isotopes
of hydrogen, analytical chemistry support for Mound, and
production/testing of radioisotopic thermoelectric generators for
the Galileo and Ulysses space missions.
- Nuclear Technology Manager: Responsible for diverse technical
radiological functions including plutonium-238 processing
technology, plutonium waste management development, tritium
process development in support of DOE weapons programs, and
processing/engineering technology for Mound's tritium operations.
Plutonium Processing Manager : Responsible for the Plutonium
Processing Building operation , wherein plutoniulll- 238 fuel forms
were produced and p1utoni um-238 scrap recovered.
- Plutonium Fuels Group Leader: Investigated the behavior and
physical properties of plutonium-238 as a fuel for space
applications.

M.B.A., Management Specialty, Oklahoma City University
B.S. , Engineering Technology, Oklahoma State University
Additional courses: Federal Aviation Administration
Acadell}' , Transportation Safety Institute, Embry Riddle
Aeronautical UniverSity , EG&G

.5~f

Strategic Planning and Program Development .

-

Afterburner, Combust i on Chamber, Fuel
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TSA/Tiger Team Member on 20 DOE Headquarters appraisals.
Member of the Secretary of Energy's Tritium Task Group.
Chairman, Sandia National Laboratory, livermore, Safety Oversight
COlllllittee.
Chairman, Safety and Health Assessment, Battelle Memorial
Institute .

EDUCATION:

Ph.D ., Inorganic Chemistry, Ohio University
B.S ., Chemistry, University of Dayton

OTHER:

Patent on Plutonium-238 isotopiC fuels
DOE Management Team Cha i rman for th ~ Galileo and Ulysses RTG
space mission program
Member, American Chemical Society

A-3-11

5;lJ.-

IWI£:

Donald E. Lentzen

AHA OF IIESP:

Medical Services

ASSOCIATION:

Office of Occupational Medicine, Headquarters, Department of
Energy

EXPERIENCE:

21 Years

• u. S. Departlll!nt of Energy, Gerllantown,
-

III
Health Systetls Specialist: Concerned with the general health and
welfare of DOE contractors and ellPloyees through the auditing of
worksite conditions, elll!rgency preparedness and health care
del ivery systetls.

•

R. J. Lee Group, Raleigh, NC
- Studied IIaterial science probletlS with the appropriate appl ication
of .icroscopy techniques. Assisted in drafting III!thods for
• icroparticle identification of asbestos which was subsequently
published in the Federal Register.

•

Research Triangle Institute, Research Triangle Park, NC
- Prograa Manager/Senior Research Scientist: Provided prograJI
planning and staff coordination for quality control/quality
assurance activities related to industrial processes, pollution
control, environlllental assesslll!nt, and hazardous waste managelllent .

•

•

North Carolina Departlllent of Natural and Econollic Resources, Raleigh,
NC
- Establ i shed and adllli ni stered State's three-branch envi ronlll!nta 1
testing laboratories . Assisted in develolllllent of a 'STORES'
database certification program.

lIME:

Oliver D. T. Lynch, Jr .

AREA OF RESP:

EH Senior Manager

ASSOCIATION:

Office of Perforllance Assesslll!nt, Headquarters, Departlll!nt
of Energy

EXPERIENCE:

26 Years

U. S. Departlll!nt of Energy, Gerllantown, III

•

_ Director, Safety Inspections Division, OSA.
•

U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Coaaission, Rockville, III
_ Radiation Measurelll!nts and Health Effects Section Chief.
Standardization and Decoaaissioning Section Chief.
Safeguards and Non-Power Reactors Section Chief.
- Radiation Protection Section leader.
_ Environlll!ntal Assesslll!nt Section Chief, 1M1 Program Office .
- 1MI Special Inquiry Group (Rogovin).
- Seni or Envi ronmenta 1 Project Manager .

•

I nternat i ona1 Atoai c Energy Agency
_ Technical Working Group Leader, Vienna, Austria.
Instructor, Cairo, Egypt.

•

General Dynamics, Electric Boat Division, Groton, "cT
_ Chief, Radiological Control Health Engineering .

•

University of Texas Medical School, San Antonio, TX
- Post-doctoral Research Scientist: Investigated RIOlecular aspects
of cell division in bacteria by IIIOnitoring membrane protein
production in synchronized cell growth.

U. S. Atomi c Energy Comi ss i on, las Vegas , NV
-

•

Radiological Specialist .

San Diego State University, San Diego, CA
Assistant Radiological Safety Officer.

•

•

U.S. Publ ic Health Service, St. Petersburg, FL
- Evaluated effectiveness and environllM!ntal impact of various
pesticides for the National Connunicable Disease Control Center.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Cleveland, OH
- Set up and operated shipboard and field laboratories at strategic
location for lake Erie testing in the Great lakes Illinois River
Bas i n Project .

EDUCATION:

EDUCATION:

M.S., Nuclear Physics , San Diego State University
B.S., Appl ied Physics, San Diego State University

OTHER:

Member : Health Physics Society, American Forestry
Association, Sigma Pi Sigma
Author, Textbooks and Training Manuals, Small Craft Safety,
Operations , and Nav i gation

Ph.D ., Microbiology, University of Texas
M.S., Public Health, University of North Carolina
B.S ., Biology, Alma College
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Sdl/

Carl W. Mangus

IIAIIE:

Paul M. MosslAn, M.D .

AREA OF RESP:

Maintenance

AREA OF RESP:

Medical Services

ASSOCIATION:

Private Consultant

ASSOCIATION:

Private Consul tant

3B Years

EXPERIENCE:

40 Years

IIAIIE:

EXPERIENCE:
•

•

Private Consultant

-

Consultant to legal and operating firms in areas of gas plant ,
drilling and production safe work practices, confined space entry ,
personnel injuries, crane and wire rope failures, workboat safety ,
operations, and helicopter he1ipad facilities. Performed
technical safety surveys of oil and gas producing/processing
faci 1 it ies .
•

•

Shell Offshore, Inc .
Senior Staff Technical Safety Specialist . Responsible for
performing technical safety review/approval of engineering and
operat i ng procedures .

•

Manager of Offshore Regulatory Affairs . Responsible for
formu 1at i ng government regu 1at i ons/ i ndust ry standards .
-

Superintendent Offshore Product i on and Maintenance; Offshore
Engineering Section leader.

-

Project Developer and Manager of several gas process i ng plants and
associated pipelines .

•

-

Medi cal Di rector, respons i b1e for the overall IAnagelll!nt of the
Medical Services Departlll!nt.

-

Associate Medical Director of Sandia National laboratories.

Arabian Merican 011 COIIPany (ARAMeO) Dhahran, Saudia Arabia

EDUCATION:

B. S., Mechan i cal Engineeri ng , Oklahoma State University

OTHER:

Registered Professional Engineer, louisiana
Member: American Society of Safety Engineers, Society of
Petroleum Eng i neers , Gulf Coast Safety and Training Group,
Ameri can Petroleum Institute
Past partic i pation in: Internat i opa1 Associat i on of
Drill i ng Contractors , Offshore Operators COlllllittee, U. S.
Coast Guard cOlllllittees; Past Chairman, API Offshore Crane
Specifications, API Offshore Crane Operating and Maintenance
Procedures Marquis Who's Who in America, Science and
Eng i neering , and the Safety Profession ; listed in Dictionary
of International Biography
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General Practitioner .

U.S. AI"II\Y
-

Performed duties on workover and drilling rigs, and pipeline
projects.

Occupational Health Phys i cian .

Northern California State
-

•

Consulting with governlll!nt and private agencies offering expertise
in the III!dical services field with respect to organization and
adJiinistration, procedures and docUlll!ntation, and All!dica1
treatlll!nt.

Sandi a National laboratories

-

Independent Contractor
-

Pr i vate Consultant

Captain in Medical Corps .

EDUCATION:

M.D . , George Washington University, Washington, D.C .
M. P. H., and Occupational Health, University of California,
Berkeley

OTHER:

Certified by Allerican Board of Fully Practice
Certified by Allerican Board of Preventive Medicine in
Occupat ional Medicine
Mellber , Merican Medical Association
MeIIiIer , Merican AcadelU' of Fui1y Practice
Member , Alleri can AcadelllY of Occupat i ona 1 Medi ci ne
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IWIE:

James B. Murphy

NAME:

William R. Murphy

AREA OF RESP:

Worker Safety/OSHA IB Specialist

AREA OF RESP:

Worker Safety and Health (OSHA) Compl iance

ASSOCIATION:

Murphy & Associates

ASSOCIATION:

Murphy and Associates

EXPERIEllCE:

3 Years

EXPERI EllCE:

23 Years

•

•

•

Prudential Insurance Company

Murphy & Associates

- Computer data input for dental claims.

- Safety and health audits for major corporations.

Murphy & Associates

- Training of Safety and Health inspectors .

Assisted in industrial hygiene sampling .

Compl iance guidance to Federal, state, and local governments.

Assisted in conducting safety inspections.

Expert witness in the areas of construction , aviation, and worker
safety and health.

- Knowledgeable in OSHA standards and researched appropriate OSHA
standards violations .

Interpretation of OSHA regulations for U.S. Department of labor,
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, and U. S. Department of
Energy .

- Developed OSHA-modifies IB's
-

Deve loped report formats.
- Performed computer programming, data input, and Beta testing as
part of DOE Technical Safety Apprai sals.
EDUCATION:

•

Core courses and computer programmi ng, County Co 11 ege of
Morri s, Randolph, New Jersey

Participated in 25 DOE Technical Safety Appraisals, and one OSH
Probe .

Exxon - Special Assignment
- Corporate Safety Engineer (Special Assignment). Responsible to
President for all matters pertaining to safety, health, and
envi ronment.
- Senior Safety Engineer. Site safety respons i bilities for all
research/l aboratory/pi 1ot plant and construct i on projects.
Safety Engineer (ESSO, Venezuela). Monitored, inspected, and
implemented project safety/health fire protection.

•

lurgi Corporation
Director of Safety for corporate and field operations safety
programs.

EDUCATION:

B.S., Aeronautical Safety, Emory -Riddle Univers i ty

OTHER:

Executive Secretary , National Safety Council
Member, Systems Safety Society
Member, American Society of Safety Engineers
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IWIE:

F. Richard Myal

AREA OF RESP:

Operat lons/Site-Facil ity Safety Review

ASSOCIATION:

CER Corporation

EXPERIENCE:

25 Years

•

Robert L. Paull in

AREA OF RESP:

Packaging and Transportation/Pipeline Safety

ASSOCIATION:

Paullin Consulting Services

EXPERIENCE:

42 Years

CER Corporation, Las Vegas, NV
-

•

IWIE:

•

Technical and project management responsibil ities with DOE
sponsored Western Gas Sands Program research activities.
Currently responsible for planning, engineering, management, and
execution of the Slant Hole Completion Test experimental project.
This project is designed to evaluate horizontal drilling as an
alternative development method for tight, naturally fractured gas
bearing sandstones and coals. Previously managed the Technology
Extrapolation In Tight Western Gas Sands contract, and the last
two years of the Multiwell Experiment contract. Both projects
involved tight gas sands field research in the Piceance Basin In
western Colorado. In addition, have recently completed a gas
reserve and technical evaluation of an on-going gas development
program in Jordan funded by the World Bank. Participated in the
Technical Safety Appraisal (Tiger Team) conducted during March
1992 at the Strategic Petroleum Reserve sites in Louisiana and
Texas, and was responsible for assessing contractor performance of
maintenance at the Louisiana sites.

Principal. Provides management and engineering and expert witness
services on transportation and pipeline safety subjects to clients
(research, position development, testimony, assistance). Clients
include the Tlmken Company, Continental Telephone Company, the
Instltut~ for Professional Education, Applied Ordinance
Technology, Inc . , United Technologies, Marks Research, GLH, Inc . ,
James Hubbard, Esquire, Jackson a. Kelly, USDA Graduate School,
George Washington University, BASF, DuPont, University of Texas at
Brownsvill e .
•

Pi ute Energy Company, Denver, CO

Amoco Production Company, Denver, CD and Calgary, Canada

M. S., Petroleum Engineering, Pennsylvania State University
B.S., Petroleum Engineering, West Virginia University

OTHER:

Registered Professional Engineer:
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Director, Office of Pipeline Safety.

-

Director, Office of Enforcement, Materials Transportation Bureau.

-

01 rector, Offl ce of Research and Development.

•

Dougl as AI rcraft Company

•

Federal Aviation Administration

-

-

Chief Flight Safety Engineer.

Director, Systems Analysis Office.

EDUCATION:

Ph.D, Public Administration, University of Southern
California
M.S., Civil Engineering, University of California at
Berkeley
B.S., Mechanical Engineering, South Dakota School of Mines &
Technology

OTHER:

Registered Professional Engineer, District of Columbia
Commercial Pilot, single and multi-engine airrraft
Member, Professional Societies

Various Engineering assignments involving design, installation,
troubleshooting of waterflood and steamflood operations and oil
and natural gas development projects in Wyoming, Colorado, and
Utah. Assignments in Canada included heavy oil (Cold Lake) and
tar sands (Athabasca) pilot projects, and corporate economics.
EDUCATION:

U.S. Department of Transportation
-

District Manager: responsible for all engineering, drilling,
production activities, supervision of consultants, regulatory
compl iance, gas contract negotiation, and conflict resolution for
company operated oil and gas wells in Colorado and Utah as well as
non-operated wells in Oklahoma, Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, and
West Virginia.
•

Paullin Consulting Services

Nevada, Colorado, Alberta
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Glenn A. Whan

twIE:

Bernard S. Zager, M.D.

AREA OF RESP:

Technical Support/Training and Certification

AREA OF RESP:

Medical Services

ASSOCIATION:

Private Consultant

ASSOCIATION:

Private Consultant

EXPERIENCE:

36 Years

EXPERIENCE:

36 Years

twIE:

•

•

Private Consultant
-

- Participated in numerous DOE Technical Safety Appraisals as a
reviewer of Occupational Medical Programs.

Participated in 27 DOE Technical Safety Appraisals from 1986 to
1992 in one or more of t he following technical areas: nuclear
crit i ca 11 ty safety, techni ca 1 support, auxil i ary systems, facil ity
engineering, site/faci l i ty safety review, packaging and
transportation, experimental activities, training and
certification, and emergency preparedness .

•

•

General E1 ect ri c Company
- Medical Director and Manager Health and Safety Operation, Nuclear
Energy Business Operation .

Involved in Los Alamos Natl ona1 Laboratory High Temperature
Gas-Cooled Reactor Safety Analysis , 1974 to 1975; Nondestructive
assay measur ements for SNM, International Safeguards , 1983 to
1991.
-

Consultant for Occupational Medical Programs.

•

Ford Motor Company
- Chief Physician, Automotive Assembly Division .

Participated in Nuclear Safety Reviews, 1980 to 1992, as Member
Sandia Tritium Research Laboratory Safety Oversight Committee;
Member and Chairman (for one year), DOE Independent Review
Committee for Transuranic Waste; Member, NRC Nuclear Criticality
Safety Appraisal Teams; Member, DOE Readiness Review Teams and SAR
Reviews.

•

Michigan Bell Telephone Company

•

Private practice medicine and surgery

•

U. S. Army

- Staff Physician.

University of New Mexico

Medical Officer, Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (HASH), Korea.

Professor of Chemical and Nuclear Engineering, 1957 to 1985,
including 11 years as Department Chairman and 3 years as Associate
Dean of Engineering; nuc1edr reactor licensing, and operation; Co60 irradiation cell design, licensing, and operation; nuclear
safety and nuclear environmental safety analysis; nuclear
criticality safety education and training.
Served as International Atomic Energy Agency Technical Expert ,
Reactor Experimentation, 1966 to 1967 .
EDUCATION:

Ph . D, Chemical Engineering, Carnegie-Mellon University
M.S. , Chemical Engineering, Montana State University
B.S. , Chemical Engineering, Indiana Institute of Technology

OTHER:

Fellow of American Nuclear Soc iety
Member, American Institute of Chemical Engineers
Professional Engineer, Nuclear Engineering, New Mexico
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EDUCATION:

M.D., Northwestern University
Intern and Resident, Detroit Grace Hospital
B.A . , Wayne State University

OTHER:

Fellow, American College Occupational and Environmental
Medicine
Fellow, American College Preventive Medicine
Certified in Occupational Medicine, American Board
Preventive Medicine

A-3-21
5~d-.

HAIlE:

Marcus E. Jones

AREA OF RESP:

Management Subteam leader

ASSOCIATION:

U.S. Department of Energy, Headquarters, Office of Special
Projects

EXPERIENCE:

9 years

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Special Projects (OSP) Training Program Manager .
led effort to develop pil ot process for ESlH Progress
Assessments (i . e., followup to the Tiger Team Assessments).

Appendix A·4

Coord i nated or assisted in coordination of Tiger Team
Assessments (HAs) for los Alamos National laboratory;
Sandia National laboratories, Albuquerque; Hanford; and
Argonne Illinois Site.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF MANAGEMENT SUBTEAM
MEMBERS

Served as Deputy Management Subteam leader for the HA of
the Oak Ridge K-25 Site.
Served as Ass istant Environmental Subteam leader for the TTA
of the Sandia National laboratories, Albuquerque.
Environmental Strategies Corporation
Acted as Project Manager for a wide range of efforts
inc 1udi ng vari ous remedi a 1 projects, such as an Intel-im
Remedial Measures and Remedial Investigation/Feasibility
Study for a National Priority list site, environmental
management assessments, and development of compliance
management programs for corporations .
Developed environmental management assessments and
compl iance audit questionnaires. Wrote Spill Prevent ion
Control and Countermeasure (SPCC) Plans, Waste Management
Plans , and Contingency Plans for various industrial
facility .
Geo/Resource Consultants , Inc.
Managed sampl ing and drill ing operations at RCRA/Superfund
Sites. Conducted various regulatory inspections and
assessments .

EDUCATION:

M. S. E. , Environmental Engineering, University of
Al abama
B. S. , Biology , Un i versity of Alabama

HAIlE:

Robert M. Compton

AREAS OF RESP:

Management Assessment

ASSOCIATION:

Nuclear Power Consultants, Inc.

EXPERIENCE:

23 years

•

HAIlE:

Ray D. Duncan

AREA OF RESP:

Management Assessment

ASSOCIATION:

Private Consul tant

EXPERIENCE:

41 years

Private Consultant

Private Consultant
Chaired Task Group to examine management systems and project
management controls at the Savannah River Field Office.

Participated in the DOE Tiger Team Assessments (Management
Subteam and special conduct of operations assessments) of
the Savannah River Site, Hanford, Energy Technology
Engineering Center, Morgantown Energy Technology Center,
Naval Petroleum Reserves in Cal ifornia, and Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory. Also, participated in the Progress
Assessments of Fernald, Y-12 Plant, and Hanford.

Conducted analysis of existing business management systems
at the Nevada Field Office.
Chaired Task Force of nationally recognized experts to
examine SAIC's quality assurance progrUl in support of the
High-Level Waste Storage Program at the Nevada Test Site.

Participated in appraisals cf construction programs, Safety
System Functional Inspections (SSFIs), Motor Operated Valve
problems, regulator issues, etc. for nuclear utilities.

Chaired a Task Force to develop and document a detailed
operational plan for hosting U.S.S . R. scientists at the
Nevada Test Site.

Numerous individual and team assessments and problem
resolution assignments at nuclear utilities for the NRC
related to Safety System Quality Inspections (SSQEs),
Construction Appraisal Team (CAT) inspections,
instrumentation, in-service testing of pumps and valves,
compensatory measures, restart readiness reviews, "problem
plant" corrective actions, safety allegations, etc.

•

U. S. Department of Energy, Energy Research and Development
Administration, Atotlic Energy Co..ission
Deputy Manager, Nevada Operations Office, responsible for
di rect i ng high technology research and development programs
wi th annual budget in excess of $650 mi lli on and an
organization of IIOre than 9,000 eIIployees.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Assistant Manager for Operations, Nevada Operations Office,
responsible for directing eight major divisions, including
Contracts, Procurelllent, Financial Management, Auditing,
Electronic Data Processing (EDP), Property Management,
Industrial Relations, Personnel, Communications, and
Safeguards and Sec uri ty.

Senior Engineer and Reactor Inspector in the areas of civil
and mechanical construction, testing and modification,
inspect i on and enforcement.
Mare Island Naval Shipyard (U.S. Department of Defense)
Nuclear Fluid Systems Engineer and Supervisory Nuclear
Engineer for construction, repair, and refueling of Navy
nuclear vessels .
mUCATlON:
OTHER:

B.S . , Civil Engineering, California State University at
Chico
Member,
Member ,
Member,
Member,

American
American
American
American

Nuclear Society
Society for Qual ity Control
Society for Civil Engineers
Consulting Engineers Council

Director of EDP and Administrative Services DiviSion, Nevada
Operations Office, responsible for all scientific and
computer systems and direction of internal administrative
functions.
EDUCATION:

Masters level course work at Graduate School of Public
Administration, University of Washington

OTHER:

Distinguished Career Service Award
Meritorious Executive Award
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HAIlE:

Mark A. Hartman

HAIlE:

Robert F. McCallum

AREA OF RESP:

Management Assessment

AREA OF RESP:

Management Assessment

ASSOCIATION:

U. S. Department of Energy, Headquarters, Office of Special
Projects

ASSOCIATION:

Private Consultant

EXPERIENCE:

14 years

EXPERIENCE:

2 years

•

U.S . Department of Energy, Office of Environment, Safety and Health
(EH)

Private Consultant
Provides environmental, management, and planning consulting
services in energy technology and waste management.
Participant in the Tiger Team Assessments of the Los Alamos
Nat i on31 Laboratory and Ames Laboratory as a member of the
Management Subteam and served as the Report Technical
Manager for the Tiger Team Assessments of the Naval
Petroleum Reserves in Cal ifornia and the National Institute
for Petroleum and Energy Research .

Participant in the DOE Management Intern Development Program
(MIDP) .
Participant in the Tiger Team Assessment of the Strategic
Petroleum Reserves as a member of the Management Subteam.
Coordinator for the Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) review
process for EH . Perform trend analysis of, and maintain
data base for, CPAF inform~tion .
•

Packer Engineering , Inc .
Responsible for coordinating development of technical and
cost proposals to government and industrial clients
addressing a broad range of engineering and scientific
disciplines . Served on the Energy Technology Engineering
Center, Morgantown Energy Technology Center, and Solar
Energy Research Institute Tiger Team Assessments as the
Report Technical Manager . Served on the Management Subteam
of the Pittsburg Energy Technology Cente~ Tiger Team.

Pennsylvania State Treasury Department , Office of Procurement
Conducted research projects on procurement issues and fi re
protection systems.

EDUCATION:

M.P.A. , Public Administration, Syracuse University
B. A. , Political Science and Criminal Justice, Mansfield
University

Battelle Memorial Institute
Responsible for conducting site selection, institutional
support , and regulatory compliance support to DOE as part of
basic technology support associated with DOE ' s geologic
repository and interim waste storage programs.
Coordinated preparation of environmental data reports and
decision methodology document in support of DOE's
Crysta11 ine Repository Program for di sposa1 of high-level
nuclear waste . Participated in numerous public and state
br i efings during program.
Coordinated development of responses to public comments on
multid i sciplinary Environmental Impact Statement for
Management of Commerc i ally Generated Radioactive Wast e .
Assisted in development of s i te selection methodology for
i dent i f i cation of potential host locations for disposal of
low- level radioact ive wast e in Illino is .
mUCATlON:

M. S. , Management , Purdue Universi ty
B. S., Ci vi l Eng i neering, Un i vers i ty of Lowell

OTHER:

Rece i ved Engineer - In -Tr aining Cert i fic at e , Mas sachu setts
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lIME:

leon H. Heyer

NAME:

R. Charles (Chuck) Morgan

AREA OF RESP:

Managellent Assessment

AREA OF RESP:

Self-Assessment Task Group leader

ASSOCIATION:

The lHM Corporat i on

ASSOCIATION:

U.S. Department of Energy, Headquarters, Office of Special
Projects

EXPERIENCE:

39 years

EXPERIENCE:

20 years

•

President, The lHM Corporation

•

Technical expert under contract to Oak Ridge Associated
Universities and EGaG Idaho, Inc.

U.S. Depart ment of Energy, Office of Environment, Safety and Health
(EH), Washington, DC
Physical Scientist/Team leader, responsible for conducting
self- assessment evaluations as part of Tiger Team
Assessments and Progress Assessments .

Served on 40 Techni cal Safety Appra i sa 1s for DOE's Offi ce of
Environment, Safety and Health .
•

Savannah River Plant, L I. DuPont de NetIOurs & COIIIpany, Aiken, S. C.
ProgrUl Manager responsible for safeguards and security,
long-range planning, budget coordination, quality assurance,
environillental control, energy conservation, and away-fromreactor spent fuel storage.

•

Project Manager, responsible for development of a Central
Facil ity Profile Data Base for Tiger Team Assessment, Action
Plan, Progress AssesslMmt, and Self-Assessment information.
•

Battelle Memorial Institute, Washington, DC
Progrilll Manager, responsible for lIIanagellent of large
mission-oriented contract for environllM!ntal assessments with
the Office of Wetland, Oceans, and Watershgds, U.S.
Envi ronmenta 1 Protect i on Agency .

Atomic Energy Division, L I. DuPont de NelllOurs a Company,
ProgrUl Manager, Technical Division with responsibil ities
for the Defense Waste Processing Facility and the lWR Fuel
Reprocessing Design Project.
Savannah River laboratory, LI. DuPont de Nemours a Company, Aiken,
SC
Assistant D' rector.

Office Manager, responsible for management of Washington, DC
office of Battelle Ocean Sciences and environmental contract
services to Federal agencies.

•

Environmental Science and Engineering, Inc., Herndon, VA
Chief Scientist/Deputy Office Manager, responsible for
management of environmental compliance auditing and
environmental assessment program services .

Director, Separations Chemistry and Engineering Section .
Research Manager, Separations Chemi stry Division.
Research Supervisor , Separations Engineering Division with
responsibilities in the areas of chemical separations;
plutonium, uranium, and thorium processing; and tritium
technology.
EDUCATI ON:

Ph . D., Physical Chemistry, University of III inois
M. S. , Chemistry, Georgia Institute of Technology
B.S. , Chemical Engineering, Georgia Institute of
Technology

Department Manager, responsible for risk assessment and risk
management services to Federal, state, and local governments
and industrial clients .
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response, Washington, DC
Section Chief, responsible for performing and manag i ng risk
assessments and envi ronmenta1 comp 1 i ance assessments of
CERClA and RCRA sites.
Environmental Scientist, responsible for technical case
advisement for hazardous waste, toxic substances, and
pesticide enforcement cases .
EDUCATION:

M. S. , Animal and Veterinary Sciences , University of
Maryland
B.S., Microbiology , Colorado State University
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lIME:

Mi 11 i cent L. Stokes

AREA OF RESP:

Technical Editor/Information Management Specialist

ASSOCIATION:

Advanced Sciences, Inc.

EXPERIENCE:

7 years

•

Advanced Sciences, Inc .
Technical Editor/Information Management Specialist .
Provides onsite admi nistrative oversight, technical editing ,
and graphics support to the Environmental and Management
Subteams duri ng Tiger Team Assessments. Assessments include
the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory , Strategic
Petroleum Reserves , Naval Petroleum Reserves in California ,
Los Alamos National Laboratory, Solar Energy Research
Institute (now NREL), Morgantown Energy Technology Center,
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
Hanford, Paducah Gaseous Di ffusion Plant,. and Sandia
National Laboratories , Livermore. Edits the draft
assessment reports, oversees the preparat i on of the fi na I
assessment reports, and provides writing, editing , and
graph ics support to the U.S . Department of Energy's (DOE's)
Office cf Special Projects. Also participated in the
Environmental Audit of the Southwestern Power Administration
for DOE's Offi ce of Environmental Audit.
Writer/Editor . Researched, wrote, and edited fact sheets
and information briefs on energy conservation and renewabl e
energy topics, including window innovations, energy
efficient lighting, and heat pumps, fo r a DOE-funded energy
information service. Al so, managed the service's
information brief system, supervised med i a outreach for the
project, and researched selected inquiries received from
special interest groups .
Response Analyst/Media Liaison. Analyzed and researched
inquiries on energy from t he general publ ic, U.S. Congress,
and trade as sociations . Also, wrote information briefs and
assisted with media outreach .
The Rocky Mount Record (Rocky Mount, North Carol ina)
News Editor/Reporter. Edited news copy, wrote news and
feature articles , and took photographs .

EDUCATION:

B.A., Journalism/Communicative Arts; minor in Public
Relations , Pembroke State University

OTHER:

Member , Society of Technical Communication
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Appendix B

ENVIRONMENTAL SUBTEAM ASSESSMENT PLAN

1.0

2.1

INTRODUCTION

On June 27, 1989, Secretary of Energy, James D. Watkins announced a 10-point
initiative to strengthen environmental protection and waste management
activities in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). One of the initiatives
involves conducting Tiger Team Assessments at DOE's operating facil ities.
The purpose of the environmental portion of the Tiger Team _Assessment at the
Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming
(NPOSR-CUW) is to provide the Secretary with information on the current
environmental regulatory comp1 iance status and associ ated vu1 nerabil ities of
the facil ities, root causes for noncomp1 iance, adequacy of DOE and ;ite
contractor environmental management programs, and response actions to address
the identified problem areas.
The scope of the environmental assessment for NPOSR-CUW is comprehensive,
covering Federal, state, and local regulations, requirements and guidelines,
and best management practices (BMP). The environmental disciplines to be
addressed in this assessment include : air; soils, sediments, and biota;
surface water; groundwater; waste management; toxic and chemical materials;
quality assurance; radiation; and inactive waste sites. The assessment will
also address National Environmental Pol icy Act (NEPA) requirements .
2.0

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT IMPLEMENTATION

The environmental assessment of the Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves in
Colorado, Utah. and Wyoming (NPOSR-CUW) will be conducted by a team managed by
the Envi ronmenta 1 Subteam Leader and two Deputy Subteam Lea.:lers from the DOE
Office of Environmental Audit, a NEPA Coordinator from the DOE Office of NEPA
Oversight, a Group CoordInator and technical specialists from Arthur D.
Little, Inc., and one NEPA special ist from Oak Ridge Natioria1 Laboratory
(ORNL). The names and responsibilities of the team members are listed below:
A1 Sikri
Bi 11 Hassel kus
Lee Banicki
Raeann Reid
Sarah Simon
James Rea

DOE
DOE
DOE
Arthur D. Little
Arthur D. Little
Arthur D. Little

C1 i ff Summers
Don Neal
Rich D' Ermil io
Joe Swiniarski
Bill Rhodes
Joe Delaney
John Pu 11 iam
Lorene Sigal

Arthur
Arthur
Arthur
Arthur
Arthur
Arthur
DOE
ORNL

D.
D.
D.
D.
D.
D.

Little
Little
Little
Litt,e
Little
Little

Subteam Leader
Deputy Subteam Leader
Deputy Subteam Leader
Group Coordinator
Air
Groundwater/Soils, Sediments,
and Biota
Surface Water/Drinking Water
Waste Management
Toxic and Chemical Materials
Qua 1i ty Assurance
Radiation
Inactive Waste Sites
NEPA Coordinator
NEPA

PREASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES

Preassessment activities for the NPOSR-CUW assessment include the issuance of
an introduction and information request memorandum, a preassessment site
visit, and initial review of documentation which was sent to the Environmental
Subteam by NPOSR-CUW as a result of the information request memorandum, and
requests during the preassessment site visit. In addition, prior to
initiation of onsite work, each of the technical specialists may contact
regulators, whose names were provided by NPOSR-CUW personnel, to request the
most current regulations for the environmental disciplines being covered by
the assessment or to clarify regulations.
The preassessment site visit was conducted April 28-30, 1992, and was attended
by the Environmental Subteam Leader, the Deputy Subteam Leaders, and the Group
Coordinator. The purpose of the preassessment visit was to become familiar
with the operation of Naval Petroleum Reserve No.3 (NPR-3), Naval Oil Shale
Reserves Nos. 1, 2, and 3, (NOSR-I , NOSR-2, and NOSR-3) and NPOSR-CUW as a
unit; to review information being supp1 ied to the subteam; -and to coordinate
plans for the upcoming assessment with DOE and John Brown E & C Inc . (JBEC)
personnel. Representatives from state and local governments were invited to
present their concerns with respect to environment, safety. and health. Three
representatives of regulatory agencies attended the preassessment meeting and
partiCipated in discussions with the subteam.
2.2

ONSIlE ACTIVITIES AND REPORTS

The onsite activities for the environmental assessment will take place from
June 15 to July 20, 1992. These activities will include field inspections,
file/record reviews, and interviews with Casper- and Rifle-based NPOSR-CUW
personnel and regulatory personnel. Each of the specialists will evaluate the
status of corrective actions taken in response to the various types of
environmental audits/assessments that have been conducted at NPOSR-CUW
including the 1988 Environmental Survey, the management effectiveness audits,
the self-assessments, audits by environmental consultants, and regulatory
inspections. The overall schedule and detailed agenda for the Environmental
Subteam technical specialists is shown in Appendix C. Any modifications to
the agenda while in the field will be: coordinated with the NPOSR-CUW
environmental site contacts .
The Environmental Subteam has been divided into two teams. _ Table B-1 lists
the members of the two teams. Team A will conduct field work in Wyoming only
and Team B will conduct field work in both Wyoming and Colorado . The
disciplines which will receive the most intense review at NOSR-I and NOSR-3
are groundwater, surface water, and inactive waste sites; however, the other
disciplines will be reviewed on a more limited basis by these specialists
duri ng thei r fi e1d work in Colorado. Because there has been no development of
the resources at NOSR-2, there will be no field work in Utah during the
assessment. The inactive waste sites specialist will review aerial photos of
NOSR-2, however, for the purpose of identifying evidence of dumping.
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Table 8-1

Teu A
Lee Banicki
Raeann Reid
Sarah Si mon
Don Neal
Rich 0' Ermil io
Joe Swiniarski
Bi 11 Rhodes
Lorene Si ga 1

DOE
Arthur
Arthur
Arthur
Arthur
Arthur
Arthur
ORNL

D.
D.
D.
D.
D.
D.

Little
Little
Litt1 e
Little
Little
Little

Deputy Subteam Leader
Group Coordinator
Air
Waste Management
Toxic and Chemical Mater i als
Qual i ty Assurance
Radi at ion
NEPA

Teu 8
Al Sikri
Bill Hasse1kus
John Pulliam
James Rea

DOE
DOE
DOE
Arthur D. Little

Cl i ff Summers
Joe Delaney

Arthur D. Little
Arthur C. Little

Subteam Leader
Deputy Subteam Leader
NEPA Coordinator
Groundwater/Soil.; , Sediments,
and Biota
Surface Water/Drinking Water
Inactive Waste Sites

A daily debriefing for the benefit of the Environmental Subteam Leader will be
held each afternoon . At a specific time, determined by the Environmental
Subteam , the technical specialists will relate a summary of their activities
of the day and any concerns which may develop into findings. DOE and JBEC
personnel and regulators may attend these debriefings and will be encouraged
to provide the subteam members with additional information and clarification
as needed.
Written draft findings for each discipline wi ll be provided to DOE/NPOSR-CUW
personnel, DOE Headquarters personnel, and JBEC personnel prior to the factual
accuracy review (FAR) for a particular discipline. These should be reviewed
prior to the FAR , and there will be an opportunity during the FAR to comment
on the technical and factual accuracy of the draft findings .
A closeout briefing will be conducted at the conclusion of the onsite
assessment activities. A draft report containing findings "from the entire
Tiger Team assessment will be provided to the DOE/NPOSR-CUW and JBEC personnel
for their review and comment.
3.0

AIR

The air port i on of the assessment wi 11 evaluate the current ope rat i ng
practices and air qual ity programs at NPOSR-CUW to determine environmental
compliance status. The documents and standards used will include regulations
promulgated under the Federal Clean Air Act, those promulgated under the laws
administered by the Wyoming Department of Environmental Qual ity and the
Colorado Department of Health, and agency guidance and reconnended procedures.
The assessment will also review site conformance with DOE Orders, the Tiger
Team Guidance Manual, general guidance and Secretary of Energy Notices as well
as best management practices and site contractor policies and procedures .
The assessment wi 11 focus on air qual i ty permi tt i ng needs and programs,
emission characterization programs and inventories, operation of emission
sources and control measures, asbestos management, and monitoring programs.
3. 1

ISSUE IDENTIFICATION

The activities at NPOSR·CUW have the potential to create ai.r pollution and are
regulated by various Federal and state programs. Because there has been no
development of the resources at NOSR-2, this site will not be within the scope
of the ai r assessment . There will be a review i n Casper of NOSR-i and NOSR -3
documents related to ai r quality compliance and decontamination and demol i tion
activit i es , includ i ng asbestos abatement, and there will be a l i mited
assessment of air issues by one of the technical specialists on Team B dur i ng
his field work at NOSR- i and NOSR-3. The primary focus of the air assessment
will be the activiti es at NPR-3 in Wyoming.
The approach to determining sign i ficant air quality issues at NPR -3 will be to
in spect s i te f ac i l iti es and ai r emission sources and observe operat i onal and
management activit i es that support ai r quality goals; to review the
app1 icabil ity of regulations and other standards ; to evaluate t he adequacy of
emi ssion source and monitor ing documentation, records, and plans ; to i nterview
DI'E , JBEC, and agency personnel ; and to rev i ew other documents and files
pertain i ng to air i ss ues.
B-3
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Based on NPOSR-CUW records and interviews, the assessment will determine
whether the site has been adequately characterized for air quality purposes .
Site information will be reviewed regarding the site emission sources
(equipment, dust creating activities, organic materials storage, vehicle
management, etc.) and its emission inventory. The review will also include
any records, plans, or studies characterizing and addressing any short term or
continuing risks posed by unplanned and planned emissions, and the program and
plan for management of releases of hydrogen sulfide.
The documents related to state air permits and the Federal Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) program will be reviewed. The assessment will
review NPOSR-CUW procedures for assuring that appropriate permits are appl ied
for and in place . Source operating procedures and activities will be examined
for compl iance with operating conditions of the permits and requirements of
the state air regulations . Site programs will be evaluated with regard to the
DOE air effluent monitoring requirements and the source testing requirements
of state permits and regulations.
Ambient air qual ity and meteorological monitoring systems and reports will be
investigated to determine whether they meet DOE and regulatory requirements
and if they conform to good practice for acquiring, interpreting, and using
air qual ity and weather i nformation .
The assessment will also evaluate the site's conformance with asbestos
emission control and notification requirements .

3.2

RECORDS REQUIRED

Documents and files that will be reviewed include, but are not limited to:
Annual Environmental Reports for DOE;

•
•

Contractor Environmental Control Questionnaire and checkl ists;
Air Quality and Meteorological Monitoring reports and plan s;
Monitoring equipment and calibration records;
NPOSR-CUW QA Program Manuals and records;
Emi ss i on inventory reports for the Wyomi ng DEQ;
Steam generator operating procedures;
Well and tank battery operating and maintenance records;
Gas and gasol ine storage tank descriptions and records;
Gas and gaso line handl i ng equi pment descri pt ions and records;
Air permit applications for the Low Temperature Separation Gas
PI ant and Steam Generators;

•

Asbestos handling procedures and notifications; and
Gas release control studies , including emergencies.

4.0

SURFACE WATERIDRJNKIN& IIATER

The surface water/drinking water portion of the assessment will evaluate
compl iance with Federal , state, and local water pollution control requirements
established to comply with the Federal Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water
Act. Included in the review will be the rules and regulations of the Colorado
Department of Health, the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, the
Wyomi ng Department of Envi ronmenta I Qua I ity, and the Wyomi ng Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission. In addition, the assessment will evaluate compliance
with ODE Orders and Secretary of Energy Notices (SEN), and water pollution
control operations with respect to accepted industry best management
practices.
The scope of the surface water/drinking water assessment will include document
reviews, interviews with ODE and JBEC personnel, inspection of facilities in
both Colorado and Wyoming, including tank farms and tank batteries,
observation of wastewater and groundwater sampling, and inspection of the
potential direction for site storm water runoff. The Spill Prevention Control
and Countermeasure (SPCC) plan implementation, including secondary
containment , implementing procedures, and personnel training will be reviewed.
As part of the surface water/drinking water portion of the assessment,
interviews will be coordinated with other Environmental Subteam special1sts,
particularly the toxic and chemical materials and groundwater specialists to
ensure that all potential issues are addressed.
'

4.1

ISSUE IDENTIFICATION

NPOSR - CUW purchases its drinking water for NPR-3 in bulk. from Midwest,
Wyoming, treats the water by processing it through a reverse osmosis unit and
~dds chlorine for pur~fication . The treatment and distribution system wih be
1nspected, documentat10n reviewed, and the potential need to certify the
treatment operator wi 11 be assessed.
Ther~ are IS N~DES permits for NPR- 3 . The permits , permit applications, the
requ1red ~amp~lng and analysis , and requisite data reporting will be reviewed
to determ1ne 1f they are in compliance with regulatory requirements .

A number of potential issues, noted during document review and discussions
with site personnel, which will be addressed dur i ng the assessment include:
Management of produced water, including monitoring, recordkeeping,
and reporting requirements;
The apparent concern regarding the potential impact of the
poss i bIe NOSR-3 shale pil e collapse on water qua Ii ty in the
adjacent West Sharrard Creek;
An assessment of the need to apply for an NPDES stormwater permit
for the shale pile runoff at NOSR-3;

Other regulatory agency correspondence , notices and documents;
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•

All sampl ing and analysis performed, and suppor.ting documentation
generated, to ensure NPDES compliance;
An assessment of the need to characterize storm water runoff at
NPR-3;
An assessment of the need to prepare and implement a program to
install, monitor, and maintain backflow prevention devices where
required;
Preparation of an Environmental Monitoring Plan that meets the
requirements of DOE 5400.1;
Preparation of a Water Monitoring Program that meets the
requirements of DOE 5400.1; and

•

4.2

SPCC Plan implementation.

RECORDS REQUIRED

Files will be reviewed as part of the assessment, including documents not yet
reviewed or received . Specific documents and files to be examined as part of
the review process include, but are not limited to, the following:
Recent analytical data on wastewater releases;

•

Notices of violations related to wastewater releases;
Operators' logbooks and treatment plant records;
Standard operating procedures for wastewater collection, holding,
and treatment;

•

Samp 1 i ng protocols and logbooks;
Wastewater lab tracking repurts;
Treatment plant and monitoring equipment maintenance records;
Detailed drawings of the potable water storage and distribution
system;
Records of drinking water quality;
Internal memos or correspondence related to surface water or
drinking water issues;
Surface water envi ronmenta 1 survei 11 ance programs;
U.S . Department of Energy Award Fee Board final fee determination
packages; and
Other records as determi ned ons i te .
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GROUNDWATER/SOILS. SEDIMENTS. AND BIOTA

The purpose of the groundwater/SOils, sediments, and biota portion of the
environmental assessment for the NPOSR-CUW Tiger Team is to evaluate the
prograRll1atic and technical status of groundwater protection and monitoring as
they are related to regulations, DOE Orders, and industry and best management
practices (BMPs). This effort will be coordinated with the radiation, waste
management, inactive waste sites, and surface water specialists. Standards
used may include DOE Orders, Colorado Department of Health and Wyoming
Department of Environmental Quality regulations, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, Liabil ity and Recovery Act (CERClA) and
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Guidance documents may
include publications developed as part of the CERCLA and RCRA programs by the
U. S. EPA, and documents published by professional groundwater organizations
such as the National Water Well Association and the Association of Groundwater
Scientists and Engineers.
The biota portion of the assessment will focus on the impact of NPOSR-CUW
activities on flora and fauna in the area. A review of documents will include
natura 1 resource damage reports and Federal and state endangered speci es
lists. A review of sampling and monitoring activities will be conducted
duri ng the ons i te port i on of the assessment.

5.1

ISSUE IDENTIFICATION

Prel iminary review of information supplied by NPOSR-CUW has identified several
issues concerning groundwater protection and monitoring programs . These
issues include program management and implementation, technical execution of
data collection activities, and data management and interpretation. These
issues will be investigated through review of reports, written records, and
documents, direct observations of field operations, and interviews with key
technical and management personnel. Regulatory agencies will also be
contacted if needed.
Groundwater protection plans, environmental monitoring program plans, and
recent copies of environmental monitoring reports will be reviewed to
determine if they are in compliance with DOE requirements. The reports will
also be reviewed for technical accuracy and data validity. Preliminary review
indicates that there may not be a comprehensive hydrogeological
characterization of the NPOSR-CUW Sites. The presence of the known or
suspected areas of contamination, such as the Anvil Points and Rul ison Plants
and shale piles , the herbicide drum disposal area, the solid waste disposal
area, the chemical dock area, identified oil seeps, and at least six inactive
mud pits (reserve pits), may indicate the need for additional groundwater
monitoring locations.
The status of current investigations and plans for future corrective actions
will be evaluated . In addition to document review, the groundwater special ist
will observe field conditions, monitoring well locations and construction,
well purging and sampling techniques and field QA/QC procedures . Discussions
will be held with site personnel who have responsibilities for groundwater
protection , remedial action, and monitoring well sampling .
The present soil s , sediments, and biota monitoring programs at NPOSR-CUW
appear to be minimal . The impact of historical and/or current liquid
B-8
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discharges , surface water runoff from inactive waste sitas , holding ponds and
reserve pits will be examined in detail . Monitoring plans will be reviewed to
determ i ne if they are in compliance wi th regulations . Sample parameters ,
locations and collection techniques will be rev i ewed . Documents will be
reviewed to determine the nature and extent of contamination at known or
suspected source areas .

A Health and Safety Plan , including special precautions required
when constructi ng or sampling groundwater monitoring wells;
Data and maps which contain information on subsurface geology ,
hydrology, and potential or known areas of contamination;
Field operations plans and work plans for conducting past or
present groundwater investigations and;

Key issues relative to groundwater, soils, sediments, and biota monitoring
programs were identified from preliminary review of information provided by
DOE. Specific issues to be investigated further include , but are not limited
to :
The interact i on and implementati on of state and Federal
groundwater and soil monitoring requirements and the relationship
with offsite areas;

•

The following documents will be needed to evaluate the status of the soils,
sediments, and bi ota programs:
Env i ronmental mon i toring reports;

The appropriateness and technical execution of the groundwater,
soil s, sediments , and biota samp1 ing program;

Field operati ons plans (with supporting SOPs), for conduct i ng
soils/sediment investigations ;

•
•
•

Sample QA/QC and chain-of-custody ;

Environmental monitoring plans;

•

The appropriateness and enforcement of laboratory analytical
procedures;

•

Characterization of the groundwater regime;

Closure of monitoring wells, and well constr uction;

Remedial action plans and reports;

Description of tra i ning of personnel that conduct groundwater ,
soils, sediments, and biota samp1 ing and sample analysis ;

Site specific reports of surface or subsurface soils;
Natural resource damage reports ;

•
•
•

Characteri zation of the surface and subsurface soil regime;
The level of data val i dat i on and personnel qualificat i ons employed
in t he data val idation ; and
Data management .
These issues will be i nvestigated through review of reports, written records ,
and documents, di rect observat i on of field operations, and interviews with key
technic al and man agement personnel.

5. 2

Analytical sampling data .

RECORDS REQUIRED

The followin g document s wi ll be needed t o evaluat e the status of the
groundwater programs :
Groundwater Protection Management Program Plan, Environmental
Monit ori ng Plans (past and present) and Annual Site Env i ronmental
Reports, all of whic h are requ i red under DOE 5400 . 1;

6.0

Surveys of flora and fauna ;
Analysis of heavy metals and radionuc1ides in the biota; and
Site specific reports of surface or subsurface soil s .

WASTE MANAGEMENT

The pur pose of the waste management portion of the environmental assessment is
to examine compliance of the NPOSR -CUW wi t h state and Federal laws and
regulat i ons , DOE Order s , and Secretary of Energy Not i ces pertai ni ng to the
generat i on and management of hazardou s and nonhazardous waste s. Included in
t he env ironmen t al assessment will be evaluations of was t e accumulati on ,
character izat ion , label i ng, tr ansportation , sto rage , recycl i ng , and di sposal
prac tices.
Th is porti on of t he assessment wi ll be coordinated wi th the i nact ive was t e
sites, sur fa ce wat er, and groundwater/s oil s, sed iments, and bi ot a spec ial is t s
t o i dent i fy any wast e man agemen t practices that may pose a th reat t o t he
envi r onment . Thi s wi 11 al so be coordi nat ed wi th the qual i ty as suranc e, toxi c
and chem i cal mater ial s, and air speci al ists fo r issues related t o trai ning ,
waste sampling and an alys i s, PC8 and pest ic ide waste man agement, and as bestos
di sposa 1.

NPOSR-CUW Site spec i f i c reports of groundwater i nvestigations,
monit oring programs or remed i al act i ons ;
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6.1

Bad Oil Recycling Facility;

ISSUE IDENTIFICATION

NPOSR-CUW consists of four distinct sites: two in Colorado and one each in
Wya.ing and Utah . The Naval Oil Shale Reserve No.2 (NOSR-2), located in
Utah, is not actively exploited, and therefore will not be included in the
scope of the waste management assessment. The two sites in Colorado, NOSR-I
and NOSR-3, host DOE work related to environmental restoration, and drilling
and operating offset wells . These sites will not be inspected by the waste
management specialist during the environmental assessment. Rather, another
member of the environmental subteam will inspect these sites. Most operations
of the NPOSR-CUW occur at Naval Petroleum Reserve No.3 (NPR-3) in Wyoming.
This site is engaged in oil and gas production using a variety of primary,
secondary, and tertiary techniques .
NPR-3 generates wastes associated with the production of oil and gas . This
waste is exempt from the Federal hazardous waste regulations . Such materials
include drilling mud, cuttings and well cement, prodlJced waters, and sediments
and sludges from produced water pits. Most of the oil and ·gas production
wastes are regulated under the Federal nonhazardous waste regulations and by
state regulations. Both NPR-3 and NOSR- I and ~IOSR-3 are currently operating
as a Conditionally Exempt Small Quantity Generator of hazardous waste « lOa
Kg/month). At NPR-3, this waste is collected from generators and stored at
the Hazardous Waste Storage Pad . Hazardous wastes generated at the sites
include spent solvents, ignitable wastes , and characteristic wastes .
Nonhazardous waste generated at NPOSR-CUW includes oil and gas production
wastes, petroleum contaminated soils, waste oils, construction debris, scrap
metal , septage, and general refuse. Most of the oil and gas production wastes
at NPR-3 are either injected underground (production waters) , land arp1ied
(evaporation pond sludge and sediment), buried in place in retaining pits
(drilling mud, cuttings and well cement), or buried in an onsite landfill .
Naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) is generated at NPOSR-CUW,
some of which eventually becomes waste. It appears that no mixed waste is
stored or generated at NPOSR-CUW.
Management and control of wastes will be assessed through interviews with site
personnel , ins pections of waste generation points and waste management
facilities, site records, and other relevant documents . The primary purpose
of this evaluation will be to assess compliance with laws and regulations.
However, i n the case of unregulated waste management procedures and practices,
the concept of Best Management Practice (BMP) will be applied to prevent or
minimize releases of materi al s to the environment and to suggest more
efficient operational proced ~ res.
Based on an initial review of the NPOSR-CUW documents, there are several waste
management facilities and programs that warrant evaluation including, bu t not
1 imited to:
Hazardous Was te Storage Pad ;
So li d Waste Di sposal Facility (landfill);
Road application operations ;
B-II
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Retaining pits;
Oil and gas waste management;
Underground storage tank management;
Waste generator training and procedures;
Waste characterization and tracking;
Satellite accumulation areas;
Waste minimization; and
Hazardous and radioactive waste management planning.
Underground injection wells used to dispose of production waters will be
assessed by the groundwater special i st.
The Hazardous Waste Storage Pad is used to store hazardous waste prior to
ultimate transport offsite for treatment and disposal. The envirom.enta1
assessment will inspect the design, operation, maintenance and management of
this facility. Compliance with Federal and state regulations will be
evaluated. The road application operation and the onsite landfill will be
inspected and records will be reviewed to ascertain regu1 atory comp1 i ance.
Operation of the Bad Oil Recycling Facility will ba evaluated as will
management of retaining pits associated with well construction and production
processing.
Waste generation points will be investigated and in place management systems
wi ll be assessed. Persons responsible for waste generation and operation of
satell ite accumulation areas for hazardous waste will be interviewed to
ascertain basic waste generator knowledge. Trai'ling programs and records will
also be examined to verify comprehensive participation by employees.
The overall system for managing waste at NPOSR-CUW will be evaluated,
including waste characterization and tracking, waste minimization plan, and
waste management program plan . In particular, management of oil and gas
production waste, other nonhazardous waste , and hazardous waste will be
examined . Each of these programs will be assessed for completenpss and
consistency with Federal and state laws and DOE Orders. Waste minimization
progra.jl plans were developed for NPR-3, NOSR-I, and NOSR-3 . The
implementation of these plans will be assessed .
The status of onsite records will be evaluated to determine whether
appropriate documents are maintained as required by the regulations . These
records include, but are not limited to: manifests, waste analysis records,
operat ing logs, and inspection records . In addition, the s.tatus of any
NPOSR -CUW procedures as they relate to environmental waste management will be
evaluated . As part of waste management, and in conjunction with toxic and
chemical materials specialist , the status of the site ' s underground storage
tanks will be evaluated for compliance with regulations . Activities related
to RCRA corrective actions will be exa.mined in conjunction with the inactive
B-12

55tf.

waste site specialist. Both the toxic and chemical materials and inactive
waste sites specialists will be consulted on the issue of the "pig" pits
located on the site . The waste management specialist will also coordinate
with the radiation specialist to assess radioactive waste management at
NPOSR-CUW.

6.2

RECORDS REQUIRED

In addition to documents reviewed prior to the initiation of onsite
activities, we will be reviewing the following:

•
•
•
•
•
7.0

Training records and curriculum;
Last three years of manifests including landfill restriction
notification forms;
Permits and agency correspondence;
Inspection reports and waste tracking reports; and
Waste characterization.

TOXIC AND CHEMICAL MATERIALS

The toxic and chemical materials (TCM) portion of the assessment will address
the management and control of hazardous materials used at NPOSR-CUW, such as
bu1 k or laboratory quantity chemical s, compressed gases, polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs), asbestos containing materials, pesticides, and other toxic
an~ chemical materials, with emphasis on their handling and storage. The
information obtained will be used to assess whether the management and control
of these materials at NPOSR-CUW are in compliance with Federal, state, and
local regulations, and with DOE Orders . In addition the best management
practice (BMP) concept will be applied to address th; prevention and
minimization of environmental releases of toxic substances for situations not
s~ecifically covered by regulations or DOE Orders. Primary emphasis will be
glven to the substances regulated by the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA)
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), and the Federal Insecticide'
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).
'
The toxic and . chemical materials assessment will be coordinated with the waste
inactive waste sites, and quality assurance
technlca1 spec~allsts f?r.lssues ~ega~ding PCB and pesticide waste management,
asbestos hand11ng, pestlclde app11catlon, storage of chemicals in aboveground
stora~e tanks , releases of chemicals, personnel training and subcontractor
overslght.
manag~ment, al~, ~urface w~ter,

7.1

ISSUE IDENTIFICATION

specialists on Team B during the field work at NOSR-l and NOSR-3 . The primary
focus of the TCM assessment will be the activities at NPR-3 in Wyoming .
Many toxic and chemical materials are currently stored and used at the
NPOSR-CUW facilities . Most of these are treatment chemicals for water,
wastewater, or downhole; chemicals for maintenance; or laboratory chemicals .
Locations used in the past or currently for storage of toxic or chemical
materials will be inspected. Areas of emphasis include the management of
oils, paints, solvents, acids, bases, acutely hazardous materials, and
compressed gases, as well as the spill prevention control and countermeasures
developed at each site for management of these chemicals . The use of
aboveground storage tanks (AST) for bulk chemical storage will be evaluated to
determine if inspections, maintenance, and secondary containment is adequate .
The management of oil -filled electrical equipment and hydraulic equipment
which contains or has contained PCB and/or PCB-contaminated fluids will be
reviewed during the assessment . PCB fluid and equipment disposal practices
will be reviewed from past inventories to determine the methods of disposal
and the locations of disposal sites . Procedures for PCB analysis, removal,
and handling will be reviewed . Inspection and reporting requirements for PCB
equipment and any past spills will be evaluated to identify potential problem
areas.
Asbestos management, the past records or proposed plans to remove, store, and
dispose of the material from contaminated buildings, soil, water, and
equipment will be evaluated during this portion of the assessment . Based on
preassessment review, it appears that asbestos at NPOSR-CUW can be found on
buildings, pipelines, and in the form of transite siding . Evaluation of
procedures, recordkeeping, storage, monitoring and inventories for asbestos
will be conducted at NPOSR-CUW to ascertain the extent of asbestos management
programs. Use of certified subcontractors for asbestos removal will also be
evaluated. Asbestos management related to compliance with the national
emission standard for asbestos will be evaluated by the Environmental Subteam
air specialist .
Pesticide usage on the site will be reviewed to determine the risks of
environmental contamination . Pesticides are applied at NPOSR-CUW primarily by
subcontractors; however, NPOSR-CUW personnel apply some unrestricted
herbicides. The assessment will focus on application records, storage,
disposal practices, and environment al monitoring and subcontractor oversight .
Sampling and analysis of toxic and chemical materials, primarily PCBs and
asbestos, conducted by subcontract laboratories will be reviewed to determine
if these activities conform to regulatory and DOE Order specifications. The
QA programs governing sampling and analysis of toxic or chemical materials
will be evaluated, including any relevant internal QA audits performed by
NPOSR -CUW .

Management and control of the toxic and hazardous sUbstances will be
determine~ through interviews with site personnel, inspections of facilities,
and a reVl ew of documen~s . . Beca~se there has been no devp1opment of the
resources at NOSR-2, thlS slte wl11 not be within the scope of the TCM
assessment . There will be a review in Casper of NOSR-l and NOSR-3 documents
re1ated.to chemic~l .management, PCB management, and pesticide application , and
there wl11 be a 11mlted assessment of TCM issues by one of the technical
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Spill control and emergency preparedness plans for each site and
NPOSR-CUW-wide;

A number of potential i ssues, noted during document review and discussions
with site personnel , which will receive emphasis during the assessment
include:

Inventories and inspection records for ASTs;

Management of containers of flammable liquids in storage cabinets ;

•

Management of oil-filled electrical equipment and hydraulic
equipment and documentation;

Other records as determined onsite.

Training of personnel to manage toxic and chemical materials;

8.0

Lack of procedures to manage toxic ,nd chemical materials; and

The Quality Assurance (QA) phase of the environmental assessment of NPOSR-CUW
will consist of an evaluation of the QA procedures for general environmental
programs and an evaluation of the sampling and analysis procedures performed
by NPOSR-CUW onsite or offsite contractors conducting analyses on
environmental samples, to ensure that they provide scientifically valid and
defens i bI e data.

Long-term storage of chemicals for potential future use .
7.2

Audits or inspections pertaining to the toxic and chemical
materials programs; and

RECORDS REQUIRED

Files will be reviewed as part of the environmental assessment, including
documents not yet reviewed or received (e.g. , p~tent~a~ly classif~e~
documents individual files, documents not yet ldentlfled) . Speclflc
documents' and files to be reviewed as part of the assessment include, but will
not be limited to, the following :
Toxic substances label ing and tracking system;
Procedures for handling, control, and management of toxic
substances, including excess chemicals and eqUipment or scrap;
Wast e Minimization Plan and/or Pollution Prevention Awareness
PI an ;
PCB annual inventory documents;
Inventory of current PCB-contaminated electrical equipment, or
documentation of their removal;
Records of inspections of PCB transformers ;
PCB handling, storage, and disposal procedures ;
Correspondence wi th fi re department on PCB equipment;
Training, handling , storage , disposal records, and environme~tal
monitoring related to pesticide and herbicide use for both slte
personnel and subcontracted personnel;
SOPs for pesticide/herbicide management;
Pesticide/herbicide reports to regulatory agencies;
Special procedures involving handling, storage, use and disposal
of asbestos;
Inventories/monitoring records for asbestos- containing materials ;
B-15
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QUALITY ASSURANCE

The assessment will evaluate environmental protection programs in six areas:
environmental surveillance, effluent monitoring, waste management, chemical
and radiological analyses, decontamination and decommissioning, and inactive
waste sites. Each of these areas require analyses of various sample media.
Because there has been no development of the resources at NOSR-2, this site
will not be within the scope of the quality assurance assessment. There will
be a review in Casper of NOSR-I and NOSR-3 documents, and there will be an
evaluation of environmental sampling t echniques by one of the technical
special ists on Team B during his field work at NOSR-I and NOSR-3. The primary
focus of the qual ity assurance assessment will be the programs at NPR-3 in
Wyoming.
8.1

ISSUE IDElfTIFICATlON

The QA procedures for NPOSR-CUW environmental programs will be reviewed for
the effectiveness of implementation and compliance with DOE requirements. The
review will include an assessment of the QA organization and structure
developed by NPOSR-CUW contractors and DOE site offices to meet the
requirements of Federal and state regulations, DOE Orders, QA standards, and
EPA guidance manuals. QA activities will be specifically evaluated in
accordance with DOE 5400.1, "General Environmental Protection Program," DOE
5700 . 6C, "Quality Assurance," and other DOE Orders in the 5400 series, as well
as accepted industry practices and standards of performance. In addition,
assessment of NPOSR-CUW QA practices will be coordinated with other
environment subteam specialists to ensure that all potential quality assurance
problems, related to environmental programs, are identified. Primary contacts
are expected to be the QA representatives, NPOSR-CUW personnel involved in
environmental monitoring activities, and NPOSR-CUW personnel responsible for
the various environmental programs.
Aspects of QA programs related to environmental management by NPOSR-CUW
contractors that will be reviewed include operator training, equipment
calibration and maintenance, precision and accuracy evaluation, blank, split,
and spike sample analyses, sample handling and chain-of-custody procedures,
data reduction and validation, reports and documentation. Technical
operations in the field will be observed to verify sample acquisition and
B-16
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Results of QA sample analysis of external performance evaluation
samples from EPA or DOE Environmental Measurements Laboratory;

transfer practices . Standard operating procedures for sampling and analysis
will be reviewed to ensure proper implementation and conformance with accepted
practices. Internal quality assurance auditing practices will be examined .
Furthermore, the results of interlaboratory test program participation by DOE
contractor laboratories, as administered by the Environmental Protection
Agency , will be evaluated. Qua 1ity assurance programs and procedures of
offsite laboratories subcontracted by NPOSR-CUW organizations will be included
in the assessment. The following issues will be specifically reviewed:
•

Results of i nternal precision and accuracy studies of
environmental analyses;
Training record s for sampling technicians and laboratory personnel
at NPOSR -CUW and site contractors;
Laboratory notebooks, data reporting forms , and sampling logbooks;

Analytical lab certifications for sample analyses at analytical
1 aboratori es;

Instrument maintenance , repair, and calibration records for
laboratory and field equipment;

QA oversight of offsite analytical laboratories;

•
•

Contractual agreements with offsite laboratories;

Computer program validation and verification; and

Environmental monitoring programs at NPR -3, NOSR-I, and NOSR-3;

Other records as determined onsite .

QA Plans and QA Project Plans activities administered by
NPOSR-CUW;
Environmental sample integrity at DOE contractor laboratories;

•

Standard operating procedures for sampl ing and analysis at the
NPOSR-CUW si tes;
Groundwater, surface water, ambient
at NPOSR-CUW sites.

8.2

~ir

and emissions monitoring

The radiation portion of the assessment will include reviewing all activities ,
facilities and areas that involve or potentially involve the use of radiation
or radioactive material (RAM). This will include current and past operations.
Radiation protection programs at NPOSR-CUW will be assessed to determine
compliance with the documents listed in the Tiger Team Manual, DOE Orders, and
Federal and state regulations. These programs will also be reviewed against
commonly accepted best industry practices and standards for performance .

QA manuals and implementing procedures for the environmental
monitoring and surveillance programs;
Annual QA summary reports for NPOSR-CUW and site contractors;

9.1

Envi ronmental sampl ing and analysi s procedures manual S;

The general approach used in conducting the assessment will consist of
interviews with NPOSR-CUW contractors, subcontractors, and DOE personnel.
Additionally, inspections of selected NPOSR-CUW facilities and locations;
observat i ons of various operational processes; and reviews of documents,
procedures , and records associated with the radiation protection program will
be performed. The program will be evaluated by defining its scope, deSign ,
quality, and effectiveness of implementation with respect to protecting the
public and the environment. Facility design, safety analyses, engineered
safety features, and monitoring and control devices will be evaluated as they
pertain to the potential release of RAM to the environment.

Part of the environmental assessment of NPOSR-CUW will consist of a review of
documents and files. This will include documents not previously reviewed or
received, such as classified documents, individual files, and documents which
have not been identified at this time . Some specific documents and files that
will be reviewed in this phase of the assessment include, but are not limited
to, the following :
QA plans for NPOSR-CUW, DOE site offices and each site contractor;

•

RADIATION

The radiation portion of the assessment will consist of, but will not be
limited to, evaluating environmental radiation protection programs in the
following areas : naturally occurl-ing radioactive materials (NORM); source
control ; source transfer/disposal; source leak checks ; environmental surveys;
decontamination and decommiss i oning; radiological analysis; and waste
management . Radiation issues may overlap other areas to be evaluated during
the assessment, thus, the radiation specialist will coordinate his reviews
with the other team specialists to ensure all radiological issues are reviewed
in sufficient detail . 8ecause there has been no development of the resources
at NOSR-2 , this site will not be within the scope of the radiation assessment.
There will be a review in Casper of NOSR-I and NOSR -3 documents, and there
will be a limited as sessment of radiation issues by one of the technical
specialists on Team 8 during his field work at NOSR-I and NOSR-3. The primary
focus of the radiation assessment will be the activities at NPR-3 in Wyoming.

RECORDS REQUIRED

•

9.0

Procurement documents or contractual agreements for offsite
analytical and radiological laboratory services;
QA audits of environmental sampling and analysis at NPOSR-CUW and
at site contractor facilities;
QA aud its of offsite analytical and radiological laboratories
under contract to NPOSR-CUW directed facilities;
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ISSUE IDENTIFICATION
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It is realized that the NPOSR-CUW sites do not now , nor have they in the past ,
processed RAM, and that the uses of radioactive material s may be limited to
use of sealed sources and/or materials that have been contaminated with NORM
during various operational proces ses. Thus , there may be no requirement for a
routine radiological environmental surveillance program on or offsite .
Nevertheless , the activity levels of NORM present at the sites are not
insignificant , and environmental implications associated with NORM
contamination may exist in the areas of contamination control, release of
equipment, radiological monitoring, and radioactive waste management . Such
scenarios in the oil and gas industry are an emerging environmental and
regulatory problem nationally, and are also covered for DOE facilitie s in
various sections of the DOE Orders such as in Chapter IV of DOE 5400.5.
Therefore, monitoring equipment and associated maintenance and cal ibration
requirements at NPOSR-CUW will be reviewed , along with records of radiological
surveys for equipment shipments, materials disposition , and sampling result s
of waste streams for the presence of NORM.
Procedures for decontamination of equipment and areas contaminated with RAM
will be evaluated . Historical records for equipment having undergone
decontami nat i on and release for unrestri cted use will be revi ewed . Of
particular interest will be any surveys, sampling, and analysis records of
areas that may have been inadvertently contaminated with RAM . Specific areas
of interest will be equipment storage locations, laboratories, and various
production areas . Further, disposition records for any sealed sources will be
evaluated. Also, due to the high variability of the magnitude of NORM radon
gas present in wells , analysis of effluents or residuals for concentration of
RAM will be reviewed .
9.2

RECORDS REQUIRED

Specific documents and files to be reviewed as part of the assessment include,
but will not be limited to, the following:

Reports on any required decontaminations;

•
•
•
10.0

Survey report; of RAM packages;
Radi at i on survey reports;
Radioactivity data for any sampled media including wastewater,
sludges, and resins;
Environmental monitoring plan;
Unplanned RAM release reports;

•

Site emergency plan; and
Site Radiation Protection Plan .
INACTIVE WASTE SITES

The inactive waste sites portion of the assessment will focus on the historic
handling, storage, and disposal of hazardous substances, including compliance
with CERClA and SARA requirements, RCRA corrective action activities and
inactive waste site identification and cleanup activities . Particul~r
attention will be paid to compliance with Federal, state, and local laws and
regulations and compliance with DOE Orders and guidelines .
The assessment of inactive waste sites will be conducted in coordination with
the groundwater, surface water, toxic and chemical materials, air, and waste
management technical specialists. Compliance with SARA Title III will be
evaluated by the air specialist.
10.1

ISSUE IDENTIFICATION

There are f~w records of past chemical and waste management practices at the
NPOSR-CUW sItes . However, there is some evidence of chemical contamination
associated with past operational and storage practices at NPOSR-CUW. Some
general areas which will be examined will include storage locations with known
or s~spected soil contamination; areas which have received either fuel or
chemIcal spills; areas where underground storage tanks have been removed;
warehouses, laydown yards, .and maintenance areas; subcontractor storage areas;
and former and current solId waste landfills. Some specific areas of concern
at NPR-3 include:

Source leak test reports;
Source transfer or disposal records;

Reports on any generated radioactive waste;

Mud disposal pits, especially those where chromium was added to
the mud;

•
•
•
•

Tank rings which have received waste materials;
Buried herbicide drums;
Draws . whic~ received solid and/or liquid wastes, especially those
to whIch lInes were pigged, and

Underground pipel ines, both abandoned and activ.e, which have the
potential to leak.

Some specific areas of concern at NOSR-l and NOSR-3 include:

Radioanalytical QA programs and procedures ;

Draws which received solid and/or liqu i d wastes;

Description of radiation monitoring equipment, practices,
procedures (e .g., calibration, maintenance, source checks, etc.);

The Anvil Points and Rulison shale piles; and

Decontamination information, plans and data;
B-19

I=\L.,I

•

The former Anvil Po i nts and Rulison plants .
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Analyt ical data for remedial activities ;

No areas of concern have been identified at NOSR-2; however , since there is
public access to the property, aerial photos will be reviewed to identify
potential dump sites . Forty per cent of the NOSR-2 land surface is located
within the Uintah-Ouray Indian Reservation. Aerial photos of this property
will not be reviewed unless upon evaluation it is determined that there are
potential significant risks for DOE associated with any mismanagement of this
surface property.

Spill reports and releases notifications, including Unusual
Occurrence Reports and Minor Release Reports ;
Consent orders;
Community Relations Plans ;

The adequacy of the methodology for identifying and characterizing inactive
waste sites will be evaluated. Th i s will include a review of the
characterization and prioritization of the identified sites . Additionally,
the scheduling and planning of remedial activities will be assessed, including
workp1an development, field data collection, and the status of remedial
actions. It is our understanding that at NPR-3 a CERCLA Phase I assessment
was conducted, and there was an investigation of an area suspected to have
been a burial site for pesticide drums. A preliminary assessment was
conducted of the Anvil Points plant area at NOSR-3 . There has been no
investigation of NOSR-I in Colorado nor NOSR-2 in Utah, and NPOSR-CUW
personnel have expressed concern regarding the adequacy of the investigative
work for NPR-3.
A review of NPOSR-CUW's co","unity relations program will be included in the
inactive wastes portion of the assessment. A verification of NPOSR-CUW's
administrative records file will be performed .
The assessment will also cover release reporting procedures , including the
identification of substances with reportable quantities, procedures for
evaluating releases subject to notification requirements, and recordkeeping
and training activities. It is the Team's understanding that NPOSR -CUW is not
subject to SARA Title III, EPA Form R reporting requirements. The
justification for this determination will be reviewed and will be coordinated
by the air specialist.
The general approach to this SARA assessment will include an inspection of
NPOSR -CUW facilities to identify sources of hazardous materials ; review of
sit~-~ide . inventory of hazardous materials, emergency response plans,
notIfIcatIon procedures, evacuation plans, training programs for site
personnel , and procedures for release mitigation; interviews with the chemical
coordinator, safety personnel, and regulatory agencies.
10.2

RECORDS REQUIRED

The assessment of inactive waste sites will require a review of many records
and files, including some not yet received from NPOSR-CUW:
CERCLA § 103 notifications and updates;
Site specific plans for environmental restoration;

Records regarding ongoing site identification;
Historical aerial photographs and site plans ;
UST information and tank removal reports;
Draft Phase I installation as sessment;
Remedial design and construction plans; and
Orders and decision documents regarding remedial action s.
11.0

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT

The objectives of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) assessment are
(I) to evaluate the NEPA management structure and review processes of the site
office and headquarters ; (2) to identify problems that may lead to
inappropriate procedures or inadequate NEPA documentation ; and (3) to ensure
cons i stency wi th the NEPA Counc il on Envi ronmenta 1 Quality Regu1 at ions, and
with the DOE NEPA regulations, Orders, and memoranda . The overall goal of the
NEPA assessment is to foster improved and environmentally sound
decision -making for those DOE actions having the potential for significant
impacts on the environment.
The NEPA portion of the assessment will be conducted in coordination with
other Environmental Subteam technical special ists but primarily the biota ,
waste management, inactive waste site, and surface water specialists .
11.1

ISSUE IDENTIFICATION

NEPA protocol, developed by the Office of NEPA Oversight (EH-2S) and ORNL,
Includes worksheets that focus the team's line of inquiry to ensure a
comprehensive, consistent approach to the assessment. The content of the
worksheets is divided into sp.ven main areas as follows:
~

Overview of NEPA issues;
Management structure (overal l organization , training, use of
contractors, recordkeeping, etc . );

Property transfer records, including that property transferred to
the Publ ic Service Company of Colorado;

NEPA compliance planning ;

Records regarding the status of inactive waste sites;

Determinat i on of level of NEPA review required;

NEPA/CERCLA, NEPA/RCRA integration;

Environmental incident reports;
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Procedural aspects of NEPA documents; and

Lists of ongoing and proposed RCRA closures and corrective
actions.

Technical content of NEPA documents.

All NEPA-inte~rated documents prepared in support of remedial
action .

The general approach to the assessment will include interviews with DOE
Headquarters, DOE/NPOSR-CUW , and JBEC s ta ff respons i b1e for the NEPA
procedures and review process; NPOSR-CUW project and program managers; the
legal and public relations staff and the classification manager ; and others ,
as the need arises . The use of categorical exclusions (CX);
memoranda -to -file, and action description memoranda (ADM) will be evaluated
for consistency with DOE guidelines.
RECORDS REQUIRED

11.2

As part of the NEPA assessment, files will be reviewed, including document s
not previously received or reviewed (e .g., potentially classified document s ,
individual files, and/or documents not previously identified) . Specific
documents and files to be reviewed as part of the assessment include, but will
not be limited to, the following:
Records that locate, identify, and describe both onsite and
offsite occurrences of the following resources that may be
affected by site activities : endangered and threatened species
and their critical habitats; bald and golden eagles and migratory
birds and their nests; wild horses and burros ; waterways,
including waters and navigable waters of the United States,
floodplains, wetlands, and wild and scenic rivers; national
recreat ion trail S; wilderness and wilderness study areas; sacred
Native American sites; prime/unique farmland; prehistoric and
historic ruins and monuments; archaeological and historic sites;
and other Federal 1ands (e . g. , Nat i ona 1 Forests) .

State or local "NEPA-type" statutes and regulations.

•
•

Description of any litigation related to NEPA .
Memoranda to files related to ongoing actions .
Documents used to make, support, or record NEPA determinations
(e .g., Environmental Evaluations, Environmental Checkl ists, CXs,
or ADMs) prepared since January 1990.
All NPOSR-CUW environmental assessments (EA) and environmental
impact statements (EIS) that are still used for assessment of all
ongoing or proposed actions.
Documents and studies that are cited in support of major aspects
of site EAs and [ISs (e.g., biological assessments for endangered
species or engineering details of projects).
Monitoring and mitigation reports available for EAs and EISs.
Printout from a data base which tracks NEPA documents (if such a
data base eXists).

Documentation of consultation with agencies responsible for the
administration of the resources listed above (e.g., Section 7
consultation with the Department of the Interior on endangered
species) .
Policies and procedures for implementing related regulations
(e.g., TSCA, RCRA, CERCLA, Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, Safe
Drinking Water Act, and Noise Control Act) .
•

Any NPOSR-CUW-specific or Field Office NEPA guidance or policies .
Cap i tal budget files and other appropriate records or proposed
actions or initiated changes in operation.
Records of ongoing and proposed actions or initiated changes in
operation (e.g., major systems acquisitions; major projects; work
being done under contract to others; DOE-sponsored research;
activity data sheets; conceptual design reports; and lists of
general plant projects, line items, maintenance projects, and work
orders) .
Lists of ongoing and proposed CERCLA response actions.
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ENVIRONMENTAL SUBTEAM DAIL Y AGENDAS

OVERALL SCHEDULE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUBTEAM ACTIVITIES
A: Casper
B: Rifle

A: Casper
B: Rifle

A: Casper
B: Rifle

A: Caeper
B: Rifle

Team A: travel to
Casper

Orientation

J . Pulliam travel to

1630 Daily Debrief
Conference R:lom B

B: Travel t o Cae per

Team B: travel to Rifle

Interviews. tou",

Traval

Caeper
1630 Daily Debrief
Conference Room B

Team: Caeper

1300 NEPA findings to
eite for 6/22 FAR

1630 Daily Debrief
Conference Room B

1630 Daily Debrief
Conference Room B

1630 Daily Debrief
Conference Room B

::

.

."}::

Teem: develop
performance objectives
and finding statements

,,;::::.,

..;:::;!:

Team Off

Caeper

Caeper

Cetlper

Cae per

C8!lper

Cae per

1400 NEPA FAR

1630 Daily Debrief
Conference Room B

1 300 RAD and partial
QAFAR

TCM findings to eite for
6/26 FAR

1400 TCM FAR in DOE
Conference Room

A: travel home
B: continue etlaessment

1900 RAD and partial
QA findings to eite for
6/24 FAR

1630 Daily Debrief
Conference Room A

1630 Deily Debrief
Conference Room A

1630 Deily Debrief
Conference Room A

Review findings

1630 Daily Debrief
Conference Room B

A: oHeita. findings
development

A: offsite. findings
development

A: oHeita. findings
development

B: Cae per. continue
etlseaement

B: Caeper. cor.tinue
8!lsessment

B: travel home

Assesement continues
IWS findings t o site for
6/29 FAR

nI

.Team oH

Team: offsite. findings
development

Holiday

Holiday

0900 IWS FAR
1600 Daily Debrief
Conference Room A

":::::;'
Teem: travel to Caeper

Caeper

Caeper

Caeper

C8!lper

Caeper

1830 WM findings to
site for 70 FAR

1100 WM FAR

0930 QA FAR

0930 SW/ DW FAR

1400 GW/SSB FAR

1300 QA findings to eite
for 718 FAR

1400 AIR FAR

0900 GW/SSB findings
to aite fur 7 / 10 FAR

2030 AIR and partial
IWS (1) findings to eite
for 7/8 FAR

1230 SW/DW findings to
sita for 7 /9 FAR

Finalize Report

OVERALL SCHEDULE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUBTE.~M ACTIVITIES (Continued)

C_per
Te.", Off

Drett report finelized

Key finclinge to
",.,egement eubte.",
Admint.tr.tive wrep-up
Appendic.. to printer
Drett report finelized

Te.", Off

NPOSR-CUW Clo..out

Trevel Home

n
I

N

Teem A
lee B."icki
Rich D'Ermilio
Don Neel
Ree."n Reid
Bill Rhod..

lorene Sigel
Sarah Simon
Joe Swini. .ki

T..mB
AI Sikri
Bill H ..eelkue
Joe Del."ey
John Pulli.",
J _ R ••
Cliff SuIYlfTl4llW

FAR: F.ctual Accuraoy Review

Adminietrlltive wrep-up

DETAILED SCHEDULE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUBTEAM ACTIVITIES
s.rllh Simon

.",

Sefety orientation.
environmental briefing

/4Jr

Interview:
073()"OS30 J. McKlnn.
r.: operatiCHUI
IMpection:
0900-1000 One or two
Ite.", generetore
Intervie.... :
T. Doll
L. Mclaughlin

Inlpecltione :
W.... Tenk batteri.. T..t
..t ..,it..
D. Hoyer
Interviewe:
1030·1130 E. Reieh
re: production emillionl
1130·1430 B. Bendoriok
re : monitoring. permitl.
inventori ..

Interviewe:
0730 ·OS30 A. Tyler
re: SARA III
OS30·0930 D. Stagg
re: SARA III
0930·1030 D. Richerd.
re: SARA

Intervilwe:
1200-1300 T. Doll
1400-1500 M. Taylor
rl: faoiliti ... projectl.
H.S

n
I

Inlpection:
Fireflood Building with
J. MoKenna
InterviewI:
0900 Den Lu_
re: oomplienoe ectiviti ..
1030 B. Bendorick
re: air management

Interviewrmlpection:
1 03()"11 00 A. Hagen
re: g_ operationl
pm Windehield tour NPR-3

Dev..op performance
Interview:
073()"OS30 J . VenderVoort objectiv .. end findinge
re: V~hicle meintenence•
Itetemente
fueling

Interviewe:
1200 D. Crnioh
re: _b..tOl
1300 J . Rochelle
re: projeote
1400 J . Brodrecht
re: H.S project
150()"1800 G. Groonw
re: air progr.",
management

Interview:
130()"1400 P. Morgen
re: SARA III. air
management progr.",

Dev"op performanoe
objectiv.. end find inge
Itetemente

Fallowup interview:
OSo()"0900 P. Morgen
re: air management
progr.,.

Develop findinge

Trev" home

W

s.rllh Simon
/4Jr

.",

Intervilwe:
073()"0900 D. Mil_
re: air progr.,. overw;ght
1000 Lt. B. Willi.,.
re: air progr.,. overwight

Fallowup intervilwe:
OSOO Donna Rioherd.
re: air documente. SARA
311·3
0900 C. Rook
re: puroh_ing
D. Pet_
re: g_ t ..ting

IMpection:
H.S monitoring

FoIJowup intorviewe:
1000 B. BendOl iok
1100 T. Doll

'nlpection:
Batten... tenkl
pm Document review

Interviewe:
C. Gervin
re: puroh_ing

Interview:
1330 M. FOIdick

130()"1400 J . Woten
re: QA of air monitoring
progr.",
1400 B. Buh
re: feoility projeote

570

Document review

Develop findinge

DETAILED SCHEDULE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUBTEAM ACTIVITIES (Continued)

s ....ah Simon

em Develop finding.

Develop findinge

Develop findinge

Develop findinge

Holiday

Holiday

pm Develop finding.

Develop finding.

Develop finding.

Develop findinge

Holiday

Holiday

em Draft finding.

Draft finding.

Finaliza findings

Traval home

Air

S .... ah Simon

Air
Travel

nI

pm Draft finding.

Finding. to .ita

1400 FAR

Finaliz. findinge

In.pection.:
DOE cabin ... ea
Septio .ystem
Propane generator
Drinking wat.r .ource
M.t tow.r

Intervi.w/in.pectione:
OBOO P. Morgen
re: Observe groundwater
.empling event•• urfaoe
water .ampling evant.
and .ample prep for
.hipping

Intervi.w.:
OBO()'0900 P. Morgen
ra: .urface wat ... and
drinking water ooncerns
at NOSRe
0930·1130 M. Johnson
re: SPCC

070()'0900 Orientation

Int.rview
1300·1430 E. Cool.y
re: .ite hi.tory with
resp.ct to .urfac. water
management
1430-1800 P. Morgen
re: NPDES i•• u..

Intervi.w
P. Morgen
re: SPCC Plan following
.ampling

Travel to C.per

In.p.ct for SPCC oonoerne

"""

Cliff Summers

em 0730 meat JBEC Rep
at Ru.ty Cannon
Surface Water/Drinking
Saf.ty Ori.ntation.
Water
Environment briefing
Intervi.w:
J. Virgona
re: hi.torical w.te
managemant practices
pm Field tours :
Anvil Point. Plant Area.
Quoneet War.hou•••
Shel. Pil ••
UST••
Tr.h in draw. Ifrom
abova and below). and
Aabestoe dump .....
Anvil Point. Min.

5'7'

D.valop performance
objectiv. end findinge
OBOO-1200 Windshield tour .tatements
of NPR-3
Continu. document
r.vi.w

D.velop performance
obj.ctiv. and findinge
.tatements

DETAILED SCHEDULE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUBTEAM ACTIViTIES (Continued)

Interviewa:
0830-1030 D. Rich.-da
re: compIianoe reoorda.
reoorda retention
D. $mellwood
re: becldlow prevention
devio.. end leed in
potable wet ...

0730-0900 NPDES
outfell a.-npling with
D. Rich.-da

pm

Interviewa:
1300-1430 D. Doyle
re: SPCC
1430-1530 P. Morg..,
re: Environmentel
menegement et NPOSR

Interview:
1430-1530 D. Mil..
re: DOE ov_ight of
SW/DW ectiviti..

Interview:
1400-1500 M. Taylor
re: drinking weter

Followup on SPCC ooncerne Develop findinge

am Develop finding.

Develop findinge

Develop findinge

Develop findinga

HoIide.,

Followup inapectiona

Followup inapeotiona

am lnepection:
NPDES outfell
Surleee Wet .../ Drinking
Wet ...
Cliff SuI1'llTl4n

Cliff Sunvne,.

Surfeee Weter/Drinking
Wet ...

Followup inapectiona

Interviewa:
0800·0830 J. Rochelle
re: SPeC _lei NPDES
ov_ight by DOE
0830-1030 D. Newqulet
re: drinking weter
1030-1130 G. Groome
re: environmentel
menegernent

("")
I

Trevel horne

pm

U1

Cliff Sunvne,.

am Dreft findinge

Dreft findinge

Dreft findinge

Finelin findinga

Surfeee Weter/Drinking
Weter

pm

0930 FAR

Dreft findinge

D"eft finding.

Finding. to aite

Trevel horne

lnepeotione:
Drinking w .... trHtment
plant end atorege feoility

Develop findinge

Interviewa:
0800-0830 J. VenderVoort
end J. MoKenne
D. $mellwood
re: drinking weter

Holiday

DETAILED SCHEDULE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUBT EAM ACTIVITIES (Continued)

Reid tour with
D. Newquiet

em

Groundweter/Soil.,
Sedimente, end Biote

Sefety Orientation,
Environmental Briefing
Interview:
J . Virgona
re: oil .hele mining,
retorting, DaD

pm

Interview!inapectiona:
l . Rv..
re: Reid tour of
Anv~ Pointe Plant .. e ..
Shale pile,
Mine bench, end
Tr.. h in drew Ifrom
above end belowl

lnapection. :
In.pect "on top"
Semple of core hoi..
DOE cabin .. ee

Reid tour Ruli.on Mine

In.pection:
0800 Obeerve
groundwater .empling
event with P. Morgan end
l . Rv ..

lnapectiona :
Field inapectiona of
NOSR·3 g .. welle with
L. Rv..

Develop perlormance
objectiv.. end findinge
0800·1200 Wind.hield tour .tetement.
NPR-3

Travel to C.. per

Interview.:
D. Doyle
B.And.... on
re: NPR-3 hietorical
activiti..

0700-0800 Orientation

Interviewe:
0800.1200 P. Morgan
re: groundwater .empling
during .empling event
1000.1100 M. Johnaon
re: hi.toricel activiti..
Interviewe:
1300-1400 E. Cooley
re: .ite hietory
1430.1530 D. Newquiet
re: Bur.... of Min .. Bore
Hoi.. et NOSR-1

Develop performance
objectiv.. end findinge
.tet.."."te

lnapectiona :
Reid in. paction NPR-3
1430.1530 l . Fivea
re: NPR-3 hydrogeology

n
I

0\

Jernee Rea

em lnapection:

Site iMpaction with
D. Herrmann

GroundweterlSoile,
Sedimente, end Biote

pm

Interviewe:
Telephone interview.
0700-0730 P. Morgan
re: floor draiM
M. Kin.er, BlM
re: MOU with DOE
B. EJdriken
re: MOU with DOE

Interview:
Interview:
1300-1400 Dave Mil ..
D. Doyle
re: DOE oV8llight of
re: GW/SSB i.. u..
GW/SSB progrlllTW
1800.1900 P. Morgan re:
truck ehop flour drain

Interviewe:
l . Rvea
re: GW permit" DEQ
K. Fredrick
re: permite, CO Stete
Engineer
R. Cooper
re: Permita BlM
l . Coleman
re: endangered .peci..

Interviewe:
Dave Mil..
re: Endangered .peci..
B. 8uh
re: "Dllion control
l. Fivea
re: .urfece ute plan of
operation.

Interviewe:
G. Strong
re : oil wen abandonment
B. Andellon
re: oil wen abandonment

Interview:
1500.1530 P. Morgan
re: monitoring well
permita, endangered
.peci..

Interviewe:
1300.1400 G. Strong
re: GW/SSB ie.uea
1400.1500 P. Morgan
re: GW/SSB ".u_

Interview:
Dave Mil..
re: endangered .peci ..

£/73

Document review
Develop findinge

In.pection:
Reid iMpection NPR-3

Develop findinge

Document review
Develop finding.

DETAILED SCHEDULE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUBTEAM ACTIVITIES (Continued)

J.,-,- Au

..., Interview.:
J. H.rj.
Groundwetw/Soile.
re: groundwetw
epproprilltion permitII
Sedimentll. end Biot.
D. Mil.
ra: obearvlltion w .... et

Dev"op findinge

Dev"op findinge

Followup interview.

Followup interview.

Dev"op findinge

Holiday

Holiday

Flood Projec:tll

pm Interviaw:

Trav" home

D. Doyle
ra: cont.nneted .oiI

n
I

~

J.,-,- Au

..., Dreft findinge

Dreft findinge

Dreft findinge

Dr.ft fmdinge

pm Dr.ft findinge

Draft findinge

Dr eft findinge

Findinge to .ita

FIn_ize findinge

Groundwetw/Soile.
Sedimentll. end Biot.

1400 FAR

1730 FoUcwup meeting

Travel home

DETAILED SCHEDULE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUBTEAM ACTIVITIES (Continued)

DonN'"

8m

s.fety orientMion.

environment.. briefing
W.te Manegement

lnepectiomo :
Well.it...
Teet ..te/lit...
T8nk betteri... end
Retaining pile

IMpection:
Interview:
0730-0830
Hezerdoue w_te . torege
ped
J . VenderVoort
re: UST menegement end
recorde
Interview:
0730-0830 A. Hegen
re: G. operetion.
In.pection.:
UST. end locetion.
where UST. heve been
In.pectione:
removed with
LTS G.. Plent
VenderVoort
Steam generetol'll
Compr•• or .tetion
South Terminal
Pig Pile

IMpection:
Lend farm
Solid w.te lendfill

Develop perform.nce
objectiv. and findinge
.tetement.

Interviewe :
0730-0830 L. Hermon
0900-1000 A. Tyler
1000-1100 J . McKenn.

Interview:
1030-1130 P. LeuH
re : weete generetor
training. record.
pm

Wtndehield tour NPR-3

lnepection:
Wyoming Oil end G..
Comoervetion Commi.. ion
recorda

('")
I

CO

Interviewe:
S_ Dund... WYDEa.
re: w.te management
requiremente. concem.
1500-1530
V. Huntington
re: w ..te manegement
training recorda

In.pection:
Lend (roed) applicetion.

Document review

Develop perform.nc.
objectiv .. end findinge
.tetemente

Develop findinge

Tr.velhorne

Interview:
1200-1300 T. Doll
In.pection:
Weter treetment feciliti ..
Weter diepoeal fecility

Review WYDEQ fil.

Don Neal

8m

Review UST recorda

Weete M8negement

pm Interviewe:

1300-1400 C. Garvin
1430-1530
R. Maler-Trumbull

Interviewe:
0700-08CO J. Rochelle
re: [lOE w ..te
menegement planning
0800-1000 P. Morgen
re: w ..te manegement
1030-1130 G. GroOl,..
Review:
Hazerdoue w ..te recorda re: w ..te management
l8ndfill operating recorda

Inten/iewe:
0730-0830 D. Bredley
0830-0900 D. Richerd.
1000-1030 J . McKenn.
1100-1130 D. Cmich

Interview:
1430-1530 D. Mil..
re: DOE ov .... ight

Followup interviewe

515

Develop findinga

In.pection.:
1030-1200 in.pect lendfill
operetiomo
8-1 -3 Grindout Building

Develop findinga

Develop findinga

DETAILED SCHEDULE OF EN IRONMENTAl SUBTEAM ACTIVITIES (Continued)

DonN'"

Rioh8rd D'Ermi!io

n
I

\D

ern Dr.tt findinge

1100 FAR

pm Findinge to .ite

Followup meeting with
.ite

ern Sefety orientetion,
environment. briefing

Interview.:
0730·0830 AI TyI ...
re: TCM m.negement,
tr.ning, MSDS
dietribution, end chemic.
treoking
09c)()'1000 J. McKenna
re: maintenence eotiviti..
103()'1130 D. Stegg
re: exc_ property
m.negement

Toxic end Chemical
Meter!.

Finelize finding.

Trevel home

Interview.:
0730·0830
R. Ebenpecher
re: rig deconteminetion
prectic..
09c)()' 1000 T. Doll
re: TCM m.negement et
wet ... treeting plent

Inlpection:
Preinjection weter
treetment facility
Two t ..t letellit..

lnepeotion.:
Wet... treeting plant,
Shope,
Gerege, end
Pipe yard

Review trenlformer
enely.ie r..ub

Interview:
Shop Foremen
re: chemical uee
pm Wtndehield tour NPR-3

lnepection :
Werehouee
Outeide drum .torege
Exc... yerd
Interview:
1430·1630 S . r ..cher re:
chemic. purch_ing

In.paction.:
Chemical dock
Dog houee

Interview:
1100 B. Copp
re: PCB management

In.pection.:
Ten.leep. 8-1-10, 8-1-3
Three tenk betteri ..
Steern generetor No. 1
LTS G_ Plent

Develop perfonnence
objeotiv.. end finding.
.tetement.

Followup interview:
B. Coop
re: PCB management,
foreign equipment
Interview:

Interview:
Donne Richard.on
re: training on ule of
ohemicel meterial.

P. Lauff

Review :
PCB recorda

Develop performence
Interview.:
objectiv .. end findinge
1300·1400 C. Foote
re : DOE overeight of TCM
Itetement.
purch .. ing, exc... ing,
management
1430· 1530 P. Morgen
re o TCM management, TCM
procurement

reo TCM training

DETAILED SCHEDULE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUBTEAM ACTIVITIES (Continued)

Rich.d O'Ermilio
Toxio end Chemic.
Materi.

.n Interview:
O.MiI..
re: DOE TCM oV4lf'llight

Followup inepeotione

Draft findinge

Develop findinge

Interview:
P. Morgen
re: peetioide menegement

Develop findinge

Or.ft fmdinge

Followup interviewe:
B. Copp
re: PCB
O. Rioherdeon
re: peeticide etorege,
diepoe. menegement
J . McK."".
re: peetioide toppIication
pm R.review TCM
menegement procedur..

Fondinge t') .ite

Trevel home

1400 FAR

rln•• findinge

lnepeotione:
lnepeot pol. mounted
tr_formere with
S . Craine
Followup inepaction of
the g .. plent AST

n
I

0

Joe Swini. .ki

.n Safety orientation end
environment. briefing

Quality Anur ... ce

Obeerv. driI riga,
Interviewe :
evaporation pD. aouth
0730-0830 O. Richerde
r.: environment .~ termin.
end reoorclteeping
0800-1000 A. Tyler
Interviewe:
r.: anvirOl1l"nent I~ing 1030-1130 B. 8endoriok
re: . . a~ ClA (with
Environment. Subt.."
. . apeoialietJ

Obeerv. ehope,
w .....oua. atoreg' . . . .
Review operating
procedur.. end policy
procedur..

Interviewe:
0800-0800 O. Mil..
re: DOE ClA efforta
1030-1130 P. Morgen
re: JBEC a~ing end
enelyaie progr.n

Review operating
procedur..

pm Windahield tour of
NPR-3

Interview:
1300-1400 J. Wotan
rf': JBEC environment.
proteotion ClA progrema

Interviaw:
1400-1500 K. Brown
re: redon. other red
aampling, ...elyaie

5'77

Interview:
1400-1500 G. Groonw
ra: ClA efforta

lnepeotion:
Energy leba
Interview:
1500-11100 O. Newquiat re:
OOEClA

Develop performence
objectiv .. end findinge
Itatamant.

DETAILED SCHEDULE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUBTEAM ACTIVITIES (Continued)

em At EsaH building oneite
Quality AMurenoe

Review eir. wet.,
.urveiHence recorde

pm Exemine OMite r_de

.chiv_

Develop findinge

Obeerve NPDES

Followup intervie_

Develop findinge

Intwview:
D. Cmich

O. Bredy

Obeerve poteble wet.,
e8mpling event end prep

for delivery to leb ott.it

e~

Interview:

Develop findinge

Develop findinge

Trevel horne

Followup intervi.-

Develop findinge

Develop findinge

.chiv_

1400 Exemine Ott.ite
recorde

n

........
I

Joe Swini_ki

pm Develop findinge

Develop findinge

De"elop findinge

Develop findinge

Holiday

em Dreft findinge

Oreft findinge

0930 FAR

Finelize findinge

Trevel horne

pm Draft findinge

F'mdinge to .ite

F'melize findinge

Quelity AMurence

Trevel

Holiday

DETAILED SCHEDULE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUBTEAM ACTIVITIES (Continued)

William Rhod..

Interview.:
0800.0845 D. Milee
re: .ubcontractor work:
Geophysical logging.
Tracer. for logging.
Fluid density
me.. urement. end
Pipeline welding
0900. 1000 S. TIScher
re: .ame topics .. above

Tour of lite .. that may
accumulate NORM

Interview:
1300.1400 G. Groome
re: radiation environment
protection

Interview:
D. Doyle
re : .elf· ... ee.ment

Continue tour.

am Develop findinga

Develop findinga

Finding. to .ite

pm Develop findinga

Develop findings

1300 FAR

am Orientation

lWdiation

Interview:
0800.0900 K. Brown
re: radiation protaction
program
Review radiation record.
fOl' produced waters

pm Windshield tour NPR-3

William Rhod..

Interview:
D. Richlltda
re: produced water
IIImplee

Interview.:
0800·0900 P. Morgen
re: radiation environment
protection
D.Mil..
re: DOE Directive Sy.tem

Develop periOl'menc.
objectivee and finding
.tatlltnent.

Tour .ubcontractor
radiochemistry lab
Develop performance
objectivee and finding
.tatement.

Travel home

Radiation

n
I

.N

Finelize findings

William Rhod..

am Review findings

Review finding.

Review findings

Review finding.

Review findinga

pm Review findinga

Review finding.

Roview findings

Review findings

Review findings

lWdiation

Trevel home

DETAILED SCHEDULE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUBTEAM ACTIVITIES (Continued)

JoeD __ y

.n 0730 meat JBEC Rep
at Ruety Cennon
Safety orientlltion.
environmentel
briefing

-

Review of .hel. pile
prelimin.-y •••• ment
lnepectione :
Wat.tenk . ...
Drum diepoeel .... end
Eveporation pond.
edjecent to .hal. pil.

Inspaction:
0700·0800 Orientation
Develop performance
Intllrvillw:
objectiv.. end findinge
0800 Tour w.lI.it...
0930-1100 P. Morgen re:
other inactivlI w ..te .it.. preliminery ...... mente 0800-1200 Wind.hield tour .tatemenu
with D. N.wquist lind M.
NPR-3
John.on
Intervillw:
1130-1230 M. Johnson
r.: historical .ctiviti..
(with Environmental
Subtlllltn GW .pecielist)

pm Field toun:
Wat. trutment pI.m
Mine b.\ch
auorwat W..ehouee
SheIe pile

lnepection:
IWIi.on Plent

Interviewe:
Trevel to C.p.r
1300-1400 E. Cool.y
re: historical activiti..
D. Newquist
re: prelimin.-y
. . . . .menu •• ite history •
• pill reporting •• ite
development plllnning

Tour of inactivlI w ..te .it..

Dllvelop performance
objectiv .. end findinge
.tatemente

.n lnepectiorw:
Old CreclUng PI.m
Tank Ringe
Cemp No. 1
Well 82-23-X-10

Int.-viewe:
D.Mil..
re: IWS progreme end
.piU reporting
G. Gr()()fN
re: spill reporting di.poeel
practic..

Inspection :
TNck Shop

Document rllvillw

Dreft findinge

n
I

W

Joe Deleney

Bed

oa Facility

pm Int.-view:
1300-1400 D. Doyle
re: drilling mud diepoeel
prectioee.
location
mud
dispoeel
_ _of

Int.-view:
1230-1430 Donne

Intllrview:
D.Lu....
r. : epill reporting

Intllrview.:
D. Newquist
Rich_de
r.: property tran.f ....
B. Buh
re : recorde for
inv..tigativ. end remedial rll: .pill reporting
lICtiviti ... property
tr_fer recorde. end
rel_. reporu
Revi.w ..,elyticel date for
remediel lICtiviti... roed
epplied materi••

Interview:
K. Roberta
r.: property tran.f ....

Develop finding.

Document review

Document review
Ollvelop finding.

Dreft finding.

Finding. to . itll

DETAILED SCHEDULE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUBTEAM ACTIVITIES (Continued)

Joe DeI.,ey

em Fectual Accur80Y Review Travel home

F"",alize findinge

pm

n
I

~

John PuUiem

em 0730 meet JBEC Rep •
I\Jfty Cannon

Continu. tour NOSR-l
end NOSR-3

NEPA
Safety orient8tion.

Travel to C.per

environment briefing

Review .it. dooument:l

Drtlft~.

overvi.w

Interview:
103C).113O D. SokeI.
D. Mil•• (conf.en::e

F"1I'Idinge to environmental
.ubteem lTI8n-clement for
review

cell)

pm lnepectione:

Tour NOSR-l end
NOSR-3

Review ,ite documentll

Site tour

Drtlft findinge. overview

Finding. to

~ite

DETAILED SCHEDULE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUBTEAM ACTIVmES (Continued'

John PuIi.m

NEPA

.m 0930 FAR

Trwel home

Interview:
1200 conf..enoe c.II
with Mik. Kine ... Bl.M

NEPA

Intenn-:

Intenn-:

0800-0900 R. WiIIi8me
re: NEPA
Donne IIcNrde
Milt. Teytor

0800-0900 C. Foot.
re: NEPA
0900-1000 J. Roch...
re: NEPA
1030-1130 D... SokeI.
D.MiIw.J.PuIiem
(conf _ c.IIl

F"tndingI to
Evironmentel Subte.m
~

for review

n

I

Intenn-:

Con

1300-1400 D.... ....,
re: NEPA

1400-1500 J. BouI.naer
re: NEPA

Sit. Tow
Intenn-:

Jerry Mete:....,.
DorothyN~

an-Andenon

Lor.MSigeI

NEPA

.m 0130 FAR

TrllVei home

Dreft findinge. overview

Interview:

1300-1400 D... Newquiet
re: NEPA

Findinge to 8it.

Appendix 0
ENVIRONMENTAL SUBTEAM CONTACTSRNTERVIEWS
(Attached on Microfiche)

Appendix E

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED BY ENVIRONMENTAL
SUBTEAM (Attached on Microfiche)

Appendix G
Appendix F

OSHA NONCOMPLIANCES
(Attached on Mlcroficha)

DEFINITIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUBTEAM CAUSAL
FACTORS AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

DEFINITIONS OF ENYIROIIIEHTAL SUBTEAII CAUSAL FACTORS
AlII CONTRIBUTION FACTORS (Continued)

DEFINITIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUBTEAII CAUSAL FACTORS
AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Policy

Evaluate if ineffective, outdated , or
nonexistent policies contributed to the
finding .

Pol Icy

Evaluate If ineffective, outdated, or
nonexistent policies contributed to the
finding .

Policy IlI'plementatlon

Ascerta I n I f writ ten po li c I es refl ect i ng
Federal, state, and local hws and
regulations, codes, and standards were
appropriately disseminated , Implemented , and
updated.

Change

Risk

Evaluate if the site personnel responsible for
a situation contributing to a finding have
assessed and were aware of the relative degree
of risk involved in the action.

Evaluate if changes in site mission, function,
operation, and established requirements, which
rendered existing policies or procedures
inadequate or inappropriate, were contributing
factors to the finding. Evaluate if the
timeliness and effec t iveness of changes to
site and DOE policy, and the illPlellentlng
procedures , were a contributing factor to the
finding.

Apprai sal s/Audlts/Reviews
Procedures

Identify If written procedures that have been
prepared to effectively implement . ite policy,
DOE Orders, and Federal, state, and local laws
and regulations were a contributing factor to
the finding. Determine if unfamil iarlty with,
or unavailabil ity of those procedures
contributed to the finding.

Detel'lline If Ineffective or Insufficient
appralsals/ audits/reviews or oversight were
contributing factors to the finding . The
factor should or.ly be used as a secondary
contributing factor to the finding.

Design

Evaluate If Inadequate design of a systell was
a contrl but I ng factor to the fl ndl ng.

Hllllan Factors

Ascertain If huaan factors, such as fatigue or
deliberate clrcu.ventlon of a safety systetll,
were contributing factors to the finding.

Barrl ers and Controls

Detenlline If Inadequacies In established
barriers and controls, both administrative and
phYSical, including operational readiness,
rout I ne I nspect I on, and prevent ive
maintenance, and/or a lack of these controls,
contributed to the finding.

Supervis i on

Identify if Ineffective supervisory controls
for implementing policies, procedures ,
standards , laws , etc. , were a contributing
factor to the finding.

Qual ity Assurance/Quality
Cont rol

Identify if Inadequacies in the quality
assurance/cont rol program were causal factors
to the identifi ed finding. This includes
inadequate followup to previously identified
f i nd i ngs .

Personnel

Resour ces

Trai ni ng

Identify if the educational and work
experience backgrounds for personnel holding
responsible positions contributed to the
finding . Detel'1lline If the level of personnel
knowledge about the technic al and safety
aspects of their jobs contributed to the
finding .
Ascerta in I f the number of personnel or
extramural resources available to a job were a
contributing factor to the finding . Evaluate
If Inadequacies in facilities and equipment
were a contributing factor to the finding.
Identify If adequate personnel training on
Implementing site policy, DOE Orders, and
Federal , state , and local laws and regulations
was a contr i buting factor to the finding .

G- I

G-2
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Environment , Safety, and Health Hot line
Reports and Responses
An onsite Tiger Team Assessment hotline (1 -800-824-1702) for collecting
information was established for the NPOSR-CUII assessment and operated between
June 22, 1992, and July 13, 1992. The hotline was established to enable
NPOSR-CUII personnel and the general publ ic to report specific environment ,
safety, and health concerns. Notices of the hotline were made through a staff
memorandum as well as through a local newspaper. Notices also inform NPOSRCUll personnel that information relative to waste, fraud, abuse , misconduct,
and environment and safety issues of a criminal nature could be reported
directly to the OOE Office of the Inspector General at either 1-800-541-1625
or 202 - 586-4073 .

Appendix H

ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY, AND HEALTH HOT LINE
REPORTS AND RESPONSES

This appendix sunnarizes the telephone calls received on the hotline and the
responses or actions taken .

NAVAL PETROLEUM AND OIL SHALE RESERVES
TIGER TEAM ASSESSMENT HOTLINE REPORTS AND RESPONSES
CONTROL '1
DATE:

June 23, 1992

NATURE OF CONCERN:

The caller was concerned wi th pract ices for
hand1 ing employee compensation matters.

RESPONSE:

The caller's concerns were outside the scope of
the Tiger Team assessment. The hot1 ine call was
referred to the Director, DOE NPOSR-CUW, for
response.

CONTROL '3
DATE:

June 30, 1992

NATURE OF CONCERN:

Same caller as number one. The caller
reiterated the concern addressed in Control II,
and expressed an additional concern relevant to
the assessment . The caller stated that JBEC
supervisors are underqualified and not selected
based on education and experi'ence.

RESPONSE :

TM s concern was forwarded to the Management
SubteaJI for response. While the Tiger Team did
not eXailine the educational and experience
qualifications of supervisors at JBEC, the Tiger
TealA's review of the JBEC training prograll
indicates that there is a lack of formal
supervisory training, and there is not a formal
career development progru ori ented towards
identifying and grooming line lAanager
candidates. Although there are instances of
ellp10yees being prOIAOted into the management
ranks, the situations are not (Ollll1On.

CONTROL 12
DATE:

June 24, 1992

NATURE OF CONCERN:

The call er expressed a concern that oil sales
and production records did not correspond,
resulting in missing or unaccounted for oil that
may have been disposed of at 'NPR-3 during the
period of 1981-1987 . The caller was also
concerned that there had been illproper di sposa 1
of oil at NPR-3 .

RESPONSE :

The caller's first concern was outside the scope
of the Tiger Teall assessment. The concern had
previously been reported to and investigated by
the Inspector General. The second concern was
referred to the Envi rOnlenta1 Subteu for
response.
The Waste ManagelM!nt Specialist conducted an
investigation of crude oil disposal practices at
NPR-3. There were no indications that oil was
being disposed of illproper1y. Prior to 1988,
there were instances of tank bottOlls and other
oil productipn wastes being deposited within the
old tank rings at NPR-3 . However, this practice
has been discontinued and there is no evidence
that large-scale dUllping has occurred of the
type indicated by the concern. It does not
appear that the concern is related to
environllenta1 probleMs at NPR-3.

These observations were identified as part of
the Management SubteUl findings in Chapter 5.0
of tM s report.
CONTROL 14
DATE :

July 10, 1992

NATURE OF CONCERN:

Caller was a former contractor ellP1oyee who had
concerns regarding unfair treatment on elllj)loyee
compenB tion issues .

RESPONSE :

The caller was contacted by the Assistant to the
Tiger feu Leader, and informed of avenues of
appeal for those concerns .

CONTROL 15
DATE :

July 13, 1992

NATURE OF CONCERN:

The caller raised several issues including
improper waste disposal practices onsite;
elAp10yee .isuse of government property;
inappropriate adMinistration of the award fee
process; and qualifications and experience of
DOE personnel respons i b1e for overs i ght of ESlH.

RESPONSE:

The Environmental SubteaJI and Management Subteu
were requested to respond to the calL The call
was also forwarded to the Inspector General ' s
office for investigation of Issues outside of

the scope of the Tiger Team assessment,
including the allegation of employee misuse of
government property .
In response to the caller's concern regarding
waste disposal practices, the Environmental
Subteam conducted i nterv i ews, inspect ions,
manifest reviews, and reviewed the Environmental
Survey Prel iminary Report (2/89) . The
Environmental Subteam was not able to confirm or
disprove the caller's allegations. This concern
was also transmitted to the Inspector General
for further invest i gat i on .
The Management Subteil! evaluated and addressed
the adilinistration of the cost-plus-award-fee
process . The evaluation is detailed in the
Tiger TeUl Assessllent Report, Management Subteam
Finding MF-17.
The Tiger Teil! has addressed 'the general
technical issue of the qualifications and
experi ence of the DOE personnel respons i b1e for
ESlH in Managellent SubteUl Findings MF -6 and MF-

15.

Appendix I

WORKING LEVEL EMPLOYEE PERCEPTIONS OF NPR-3
HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAM

APPENDIX I
Working Level ElIJIloyee Perceptions
of NPR-3 Health and Safety Program
Introduction
The etiployees at NPR-3 in general and the working level employees (i . e . ,
hourly etiployees actually perfoT'lling the operations, maintenance, well
servicing, etc.) specifically are not represented by a union or an employee
organization. Hence, no single cOllllittee or organization speaks for the
working level etiployees to assure that they are satisfied wi th the health and
safety progrUl illPlelle:1tation as it pertains to their own individual tasks.
To ascertai n the worki ng level etiployee perception of the implementation of
the health and safety progrUl at NPR-3 as it applies to their own task, this
special review was initiated.

References
The following JBEC pol icies and procedures were reviewed prior to the
interviews and interactions to assist in understanding the health and safety
program and safety culture at NPR-3:
1.3-02
1.3-04
1.3-08
1.3- 10
1.3-18
1.3-40
Di scussion
A.

The consensus of the working level employees that this reviewer
interviewed or interacted with stated that NPR-3 is a safe place to
work. At no time did any employee state that NPR-3 was an unsafe place
to work . As a point of fact, several employees stated that NPR-3 is
safer than most similar oil field operations that they were aware of;
and that, furthermore, they had never worked in a sillilar operation that
was more safe.

B.

The consensus of the working level employees that this reviewer
interviewed or interacted wi th, however, stated that health and safety
noncompl iance and/or safety concerns do exist at NPR-3. These employees
stated that they were aware the JBEC, as part of the general health and
safety program, has pr(lceduralized components which allow for the
identification of noncompliance items and/or safety concerns by
supervisors, their designee or individual working level employees.
However, these employees stated that the rationale or IIII!thodo' ogy to
determi ne the acceptabi li ty (select i on) of these noncomp Ii ance itetllS
and/or safety concerns for correction; the order (tilling) and lIanner
(method) these noncompl iance and/or safety concerns are corrected; and
the routine status feedback on these noncompliance and/or safety
concerns to the individual working level employee is "lacking and should
be improved .

Purpose
The purpose of this review was:
1.

To deteT'lline if the working level ellPloyees perceived that the NPR-3
site is a safe place to work.

2.

To deteT'lline if the working level etiployees had possession of and used
an established IIK!chanisll at NPR-3 to express ",heir health and safety
concerns.

3.

To deteT'lline i f the working level employees' safety concerns at NPR- 3
were acted upon to their satisfaction.

Methodology
Between the period of June 22, 1992, to July 2, 1992, I spent tillK! with the
working level etiployees at the NPR-3 facility interviewing personnel ;
observing work ; and INking -.yself available in the lunch rooms and break areas
to anyone who wanted to discuss safety-related concerns . The Tiger Team
Leader, lIyse I f, and III!IIbers of the SlH SubteUl aI so IIII!t wi th lletllbers of the
etipl oyee safety cOlllli ttee, without contractor lIanagement or ODE site personnel
present.
ElIPl oyee anonYllity was lIai ntained by not doculIII!nting the names of employees
th at were i nterviewed or that interacted with us during our investigation .
Worki ng level employees frOll the production, maintenance, workover rig, field
support , gas plant, and water fac i l ity organizations were i nterviewed. These
organizati ons represent approxilaately 98 percent of the working level
eltp 1oyees .
From these i ntervi ews, interactions, and observations , conclusions on employee
percepti ons were bu i lt and verified between the organ i zation's elements .

I-I

Organizational Safety Responsibilities , Rev. 3, 92/06/11
Accident, Incident, and Near Miss Reporting , Rev . 2, 92/06/08
Safety Meet i ngs, Rev. 3, 92/03/30
Safety Awards, Rev . 4, 92/03/30
Safety Inspections: General Requirements, Rev. 2, 92/06/08
Safety and Health Department Tracking Program, 92/06/11

These employees also stated that they were not aware of any formalized
provisions for appeal within JBEC if an individual employee disagrees
with the selection, t i llling, and manner of correction of noncompliance
items and/or safety concerns .
C.

The consensus of the working level employees that this reviewer
inter viewed or i nteracted with stated that they could refuse to do a
task if they surmised that task was unsafe . Several elllPloyees related
instances in which they had refused and the problefll was then fixed.

D.

The consensus of the working level employees that this reviewer
i nterviewed or interacted with stated that the re'cently created Field
Safety Representative COnlllittee should be formalized by JBEC policy and
procedure . Furthermore , thi s ca.i ttee should lIK!et on a IIOnthly basis
to solicit working level employee safety concerns. In add i tion to the
cOnlllittee's formalization and monthly meetings, the ellPloyees stated
that a more refined syst em of tracki ng be i ni t iated that would provide
1- 2

the initiating working level employee with feedback Qn the selection,
timing, and manner of correction of their individual noncompliance
and/or safety concerns.
E.

Lastly, a smaller number of working level employees stated that some
ambiguity exists regarding their understanding of the safety award
program--particularly the quarterly safety awards.
Gary Lietz
July 15, 1992
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